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
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JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN

EMPIRE TO COMMONWEALTH

THIRTY YEARS OF
BRITISH IMPERIAL HISTORY

BY
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TO
IVY L. LEE

PREFACE

In the following pages an attempt will be made to appraise those forces within the Empire during the last thirty years which make for closer union and cohesion in comparison with those which make for disintegration and decay. Constitutional history, therefore, is stressed; but it is not the purpose of the author to deal with it exclusively, nor to dwell upon the refinements of constitutional minutiae. Excellent volumes have appeared in recent years analysing in full detail the constitutional machinery of the Empire. It is unnecessary to add to their number. It is not so much the mechanism of government as the man behind the government that this book is concerned with. Its principal interest lies in the human equation. This living organism which we call an Empire, or a Commonwealth—what are the racial prejudices, economic interests, social dynamics, which in recent times have influenced the direction in which it moves?

Many matters of genuine interest are omitted. The experiments in state socialism undertaken by New Zealand and Australia have not been touched upon; nor, on the other hand, has space been given to all of the protectorates, Crown colonies and mandates, or even to half of them. Two thirds of this book is devoted to the Dominions, if Ireland be considered one of their number. As the Empire is gradually transformed into a Commonwealth, the history of these self-governing Dominions automatically takes on added interest. Also, within their spacious boundaries may be found a goodly share of the world's unused acreage still suitable for cultivation. Since the future of the Dominions still lies ahead of them, a knowledge of the way in which they evolved from self-governing colonies and Dominions into nationhood becomes increasingly important.

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W. P. H.

Princeton, N. J.

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EMPIRE TO COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER I

THE CLOSE OF THE VICTORIAN ERA

One may think of the British Empire as a league of independent nations closely bound to one another by ties of tradition, language, law and culture. One may chant the praises of the Empire as a boon and blessing to backward folk in Asia and Africa, supplanting crime and anarchy and death with order, decency and justice. One may wholeheartedly condemn it as synonymous with unsavory scandal, economic exploitation, battleship and expeditionary force used freely by unscrupulous bankers, predatory wealth.

The Empire means all these things to the historian and more. To him the proclamations of the fire wardens in Canadian forests in the name of King George are reminiscent of Roman coins found in Libyan deserts. He cannot read of the King-Emperor in India without a thought backward to Pizarro in Peru. Dingy steamers at Aden flying the Union Jack recall Roman galleys loaded with the tin of Cornwall. The panoply and tragedy of the world's imperialisms are one, and now the star of Britain is ascendant.

It has risen steadily throughout the nineteenth century, and with but two exceptions authenticated history has no record of any empire comparable in strength, magnitude and population. Rome, it is true, drew to herself a greater glory. Spain of the sixteenth century perhaps did likewise; or, if you will, cast a deeper shadow. But neither Spain nor Rome controlled the destinies of so numerous and heterogeneous a people as that which owes obedience to the British Crown.





spectacle staged in those June days was in part a personal tribute to Victoria, esteemed and beloved throughout the Empire, in part a fête in honor of the triumphant progress of the Greater Britain.

One wonders what she thought of it, the impressive little lady, as she sat in her royal coach of gold and crimson drawn by her eight cream colored horses and surrounded by her bodyguard of Indian soldiery. For months past the daily press had proclaimed the glories of the coming day, had told of visiting royalty arriving from the capitals of Europe, of famous regiments that were to march, and of their history, and of their uniforms, of the triumphant journeying of the Queen from Scotland to London in her own special train with its locomotive painted pale blue and gold, of her descent from it assisted by a tall Indian on one side, her Highland gillie on the other, of banquets that were to be held, of seats on the line of march selling for four guineas, of honor lists, new peerages created, processions, functions political, functions social.

And now the royal advance from Buckingham palace up Constitution Hill, through Piccadilly, Trafalgar Square, the Strand and Fleet Street to Saint Paul's, the thanksgiving service there, and the return thence across London Bridge, the poorer quarters of her city, Southwark, Westminster Bridge and home.

A parade out of the ordinary, this, military yet the reverse. It was led by a thousand men from beyond the seven seas in uniform: but it would be an act of courtesy to call them soldiers. Dyak police from North Borneo, Maoris from New Zealand, Hausas from West Africa, twenty-six mounted riflemen from the Cape Colony, forty-two armed men from Hong Kong (some of them European, some Sikh, some Chinese), black fighters in the employ of the Royal Niger Company, mounted Zaptiehs from Cyprus, a contingent of Rhodesian horse, men of Australia clad in brown, and two hundred Canadians in the variant uniforms of

thirty military organizations. These composed it—a motley advance guard, in certain ways comparable to the variegated Carthaginian host Hannibal led over Alpine passes into Italy. But with Hannibal went no colonial premiers in sober black; this the foremost difference.

The royal navy followed with but skeleton detachments, for the navy, Britain's special pride, had as was fitting its own chosen day of rejoicing. Then came the army, scarlet uniforms, Highland kilts, the King's own Hussars, Inniskilling Dragoons, generals; guests of honor, and royal children and grandchildren, mounted or in carriages according to age and sex, for Victoria's family was numerous and widely married throughout Europe. Few women and fewer queens could rejoice in nine children, forty grandchildren and thirty great-grandchildren as did England's Queen and India's Empress.

Victoria next, amid the plaudits of the thousands gathered to pay her reverence. And as she drove, throughout all the world were celebrations held to do her honor, in distant tropics, in Asiatic cities, amid Canadian forests, in Paris, New York and Constantinople, wherever Britons dwelt, there made they Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, the sixtieth anniversary of her reign, a day of rejoicing. Only in Ireland, strange land of flamboyant protest, half theatrical and subsidized, half genuine enough, was there no gladness.¹

In Victoria the British people saw mirrored, from the peeress to the keeper of the London lodging house, those qualities of mind and heart which they held most desirable in their womankind, simplicity, conservatism, virtue. One need not dwell long on the character of this quiet yet essentially strong-willed woman whose long life had been passed

¹ Said Mr. Redmond, the Irish spokesman in the House of Commons: "While other parts of the Empire were proud, prosperous and free, Ireland stood at their door in poverty and subjection, sullen and disaffected." *Parliamentary Debates, IV Series, L, 450.*

in dignified devotion to duties not unimportant or easy to perform. The majority leader in the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour, well epitomized at this time the reasons which led loyal Britons to idolize Victoria. "It is," he said, "because the Queen is preëminent in station as she is in virtue. It is because she has so well understood the difficult and delicate task which falls to the constitutional monarch to perform. . . . It is because through a long and laborious life she has been animated with the single view of public duty. It is because in her public life she has been an example to every sovereign and in her private life an example to every citizen."¹ And this expressed without exaggeration or hyperbole the attitude of the average Briton toward his Queen.

In regard to the Empire his ideas were far more cloudy. He knew it to be of tremendous size and growth; he was roughly familiar with the fact of colonial self-government, and of certain great stretches of thinly populated and distant regions ruled in her Majesty's name; coaling stations, dotted in red in his geography, were a memory of his childhood; to tales of the splendor, righteousness, iniquity, wealth and poverty of his Indian possessions he had long been accustomed; and of late years he had read of the newly opened reaches of Empire within the heart of the dark continent. But as to how this Empire came about, the processes of its growth, the method of its government, the trend and drift of social forces within its very fabric, the dynamic economics which underlay its being, of these he knew but little and thought less.

The Crown colonies for the most part antedated the accession of the Queen. In every ocean and in nearly every sea they might be found, sometimes clustered closely, as in the Caribbean, sometimes like lonely sentinels in seas but seldom traversed, as St. Helena and the Falklands in the

¹ *Ibid.*, 442.

South Atlantic; or near the transit routes of commerce as Gibraltar, Malta, Ceylon, and to some extent Mauritius and Fiji. Mere stepping stones were these of Empire for their ocean mother, in acreage insignificant, but in historic and strategic value, ranking high.

But the greater Britain, foreshadowed by the victory of Waterloo, had become a fact within Victorian years. The Canadian settlements that hugged the eastern and the western seaboard of North America, the banks of the St. Lawrence and Ontario's peninsula were now united, fast linked by a great railway, forever a memorial to the political wisdom of its builders as it was to their financial sagacity. The fringed settlements on and near the Australian continent, so insignificant in 1837, had been transformed into six colonies, for decades self-governing and soon to form a great Commonwealth. New Zealand, fairest island in the antipodes, had progressed far beyond a frontier outpost and had become, so many assumed, an economic-political laboratory of genuine importance.

In India, the British *raj* had dug deep its footing, and spreading out toward Afghan hills had westward reached through Balouchistan to Persia, and to the northwest toward Kabul beyond which the Russian bear lay growling; while to the east, past Irawadi swamps, British Burma already impinged upon Siam. The Federated Malay States, monument to the far-sighted Raffles, meanwhile gave Britain choice and unexploited realms near-by the isles of spice, while Hong Kong, further to the east, was fast overtaking all British ports except London in the volume of its commerce.

The delta of the Nile lay under England's power, while to the farthest south the colonies of Natal and the Cape no longer were simply of importance for transient shipping but reaching inland already had proved capable of supporting a not inconsiderable population. From numerous *points d'appui* along equatorial shores, from Zanzibar and the east

on one side, from Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast on the other, the British flag passed inland, and in its wake the missionary and the trader. Great enterprises, meanwhile, had been initiated by the South African Company and other corporations, and greater still had been the dreams and chosen hopes of empire builders who thought in terms of political hegemony beyond the seas that even Rome knew not.

And this imperial structure came into being largely by indirection, and at times apart from, if not contrary to, the theories and convictions held by British statesmen. Definite plan or program for the Empire there was none, at least in England. As far as the current economic theories of the day influenced politics there was no need for any. The Manchester school of political economy captivated by its syllogisms the minds of British statesmen and postulated life everywhere in terms of trade statistics, competition, supply and demand, free trade and laissez-faire. And when Manchester thought of the Empire at all, it did so with some distaste and looked forward to a time when Canada, Australia and other sections of the Empire would follow the American precedent of 1776.

This sweeping generalization must be qualified. It does not apply, for instance, to India. That keystone of the Empire was accepted, for better or for worse, as permanently within the British orbit. The Indian Mutiny had drawn tighter England's hold on her imperial prize; the abolition of the East India Company had further strengthened it; and the coronation of Victoria as Empress had sealed the bond. Even the Liberals acknowledged this, tacitly at least; and for the most part they were ready to sustain imperial interests in Asia and in Africa, to press the point of vantage in diplomatic arenas, to meddle and to muddle with Balkan imbroglios, Russian preponderance in Asia, and the other *materia* of the European chancelleries. And although Gladstone cared too little for British

prestige abroad (so many thought), to his own party, his negligence was more than counterbalanced by the militancy of Palmerston.

Nor does it altogether apply to the self-governing colonies. The recommendations of the Durham report, that constitutional landmark in the history of Canadian self-government, had not been put in operation early in Victoria's reign without severe criticism; nor had they solved the problem of Canadian autonomy. The exciting conflicts of Canadian politics during the next twenty-five years found slight echo, it is true, among the people of England; but it must not be forgotten that the constitution of the Dominion, although to all intent and purpose a colonial product, was finally drawn up in London.

The colonial theories of John Gibbon Wakefield, and the tremendous interest which they excited in the mid-nineteenth century, also must not be overlooked. So plausible and logical did his plans seem for the stratification of social classes in the new colonies on the old English model that men and money both came forward for the new experiment. The fiasco of the South Australian venture in land-owning, which he fathered, in reality was an additional victory for *laissez-faire*. But for the time being it looked as though certain tenets held in Manchester had been undermined.

Few men, moreover, are completely mastered by theoretical concepts. Richard Cobden apparently was, and Gladstone to a less degree. Lord John Russell, on the other hand, during the long years of his premiership was first of all an Englishman and secondly an economist. Therefore he consistently maintained that the colonies were an asset to the Mother country. Lord Grey, his Colonial Secretary, was cautious in surrendering the rights of the Crown to colonial legislatures. As late as 1859 the Colonial Office objected to tariff legislation passed in Canada; and the regulations which forbade tariff discrimination in Australia were only modified in 1873 and not repealed until 1895.

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The British government also, in the charter granted to New Zealand in 1853, reserved all rights of governmental control over the indigenous Maoris, and retained them for twelve years. It is true that Grey recognized graciously the desirability of yielding to the colonial demand for what was, in effect, responsible government.¹ None the less self-government came slowly; and while Grey did order the colonial governors to abstain from party spirit and to model their conduct in respect to politics on the example set by the King of England, it was only by a gradual process that this practice became universal.²

For the most part, however, and particularly after the middle of the century, laissez-faire prevailed in colonial administration as well as in the domain of economic policy, and fortunate did this prove for the Empire. Thrown on their own resources, permitted to work out their own future, disregarded by the high officialdom of the United Kingdom, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Nova Scotia and Cape Colony made excellent progress, fashioning out by the old Anglo-Saxon method of trial and experiment their own constitutional precedents. And this was true of the other self-governing colonies. When Victoria ascended the throne there was not one; by 1897 there were eleven, and in each instance its charter bore the signature of the Queen.

Canada, in the year of her accession, was just emerging from the rebellion of 1837, a veritable civil war which Hume maintained would terminate "in independence and freedom from the baneful domination of the Mother country." Then followed shortly the union of Upper and Lower Canada, and finally the constitution of 1867, making Canada the first of the Dominions, unless Newfoundland be known as such, that island receiving its charter in 1855. Australia,

¹ Livingston, W. R., *The Evolution of Responsible Government in Nova Scotia*, Chapter VII. Madison, Wisconsin, 1927.

² For the relation of governors to colonial legislatures see Bowen, Sir George, *Thirty Years of Colonial Government*, *passim*; and Theal, G. M., *History of South Africa from 1873 to 1884*, I, 97 *et seq.*

meanwhile, at the beginning of Victoria's reign had a population of less than a hundred and fifty thousand, and transportation of criminals still continued there until 1840. Within two decades after, five of the six Australian colonies obtained charters which in every case conferred autonomy, and to their number was added, in 1890, West Australia. Progress in South Africa was slower. The constitutional development of the Cape Colony was hampered greatly by friction between Boer and Briton and by sanguinary conflict with the Kaffirs. Not until 1872 was self-government granted to the Cape. As for Natal, in the Queen's youth, but a handful of settlers was to be found there, centered for the most part at the port of Durban, and Natal proved to be the last of the self-governing colonies to grow to man's estate, obtaining its constitution in 1893.

What these colonies had desired they had won. The Government at Westminster may not have possessed much wisdom; it may at times even have been in the control of doctrinaires, narrow-minded little-Englanders without foresight and without vision: but in the light of subsequent events it may be doubted whether a more paternalistic policy, however enlightened and scientific, would have borne richer fruitage. The result was not the one expected; the colonies became free; but in their freedom they had strengthened and not weakened their love of Britain and their pride in British citizenship. The continued annexation of Indian provinces during the first half of the Victorian era and the shifting policies of British viceroys and of British cabinets toward India is another story, as is also the seizure of Hong Kong, the occupation of Egypt and the subsequent appropriation of the great African protectorates: but certainly, as far as the self-governing colonies are concerned the Victorian epoch well deserves the encomiums heaped upon it.

To differentiate with fairness between the colonial policy of the two leading parties in Great Britain is difficult. In

so far as the Empire as a whole is concerned the Conservatives proved the more popular. Quick as they were to defend the rights of British citizens, both rights of persons and rights of property, against the slightest evidence of discrimination, their strong-armed action met with general approbation. True, the justice of demanding and securing the pecuniary damages claimed was not always scrupulously weighed, and the punitive measures taken were frequently harsh; but the average Briton in Africa or Asia did not trouble himself about such matters. He did expect, always and everywhere, to be protected, and he knew full well that he might expect prompt action from the Conservatives. That party also spent more money for the navy; and to the Englishman at Ceylon or in the Barbados, the navy was not only a visible sign of empire but a source of much legitimate profit, for vessels must be coaled, stores must be bought, and visiting officers spend without stint.

With the self-governing colonies, and particularly Canada, the story is somewhat different. They owed much to British liberalism. Even though the philosophy of laissez-faire might be selfish and over-individualistic, it had benefited Canada. The citizens of the Dominion owed nothing to the Conservatives. The Tory party had been imperialistic, certainly, but its imperialism had been primarily Asiatic. Disraeli throughout his career gave practically no attention to the self-governing colonies. Keen patriot though he was it must not be forgotten that in 1852 he said: "These wretched colonies will all be independent too in a few years, and are a millstone around our neck." And although the Earl of Beaconsfield might be quoted against himself in this respect,¹ the only active steps taken during his ministry to create a policy for those colonies occupied by people of British descent consisted in the unfortunate maneuvers

¹ *Vide* his speech at the Crystal Palace in 1872, made much of by Mr. Froude. See Froude, J. A., *The Earl of Beaconsfield*, 240. (Everyman's Edition.)

of Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Froude in South Africa. Only in Cape Colony and Natal, where a very intense form of British nationalism had been engendered, owing to constant friction with the Boers, was there much active sympathy with the British Tories.

The growth of an imperial consciousness throughout the Empire is a remarkably new thing. Some traces of it dated from Chatham's time, and Disraeli in the quickness of his imagination caught the vision: but Disraeli was more fond of visions than of realities. And while he gave an impetus to empire-thinking, crowned Victoria Empress, and embarked on imperialistic venturings, the morality of which at times was dubious, he did nothing to formulate new bonds, to urge new unities of thought and feeling, and what is more important, to try out new expedients by which the greater Britain might become more closely knit. The in-rooting of the idea of a common purpose, a common destiny and, if need be, a common sacrifice which must ultimately find embodiment in common machinery to give force to its expression, dates as far as England is concerned, from the closing years of the nineteenth century.

Certain historians have proclaimed 1887 as the year of its inception. The Queen's Golden Jubilee at that time did witness, it is true, the first of a long series of imperial conferences: but a colonial conference it was called then, and Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, who presided, was not the man to initiate new ideas or even to welcome them. The days of jubilee, moreover, were devoted primarily to the Queen. In her honor the fête was staged—the colonial conference was in the nature of an aftermath. In the royal procession which wound its way to Westminster Abbey were delegates from all the British world: but they had not thought of any imperial reorganization in connection with their London visit. The British overseas had not concerned themselves with empire-politics. Racially, even spiritually, they regarded themselves as British; politically, their in-

terests had been focused almost exclusively on their own particularism. Westminster still regarded the Empire, with the exception of India, as a pleasant but on the whole subordinate factor in the general scheme of things; and the British colonials were far from displeased with their existing status, providing them as it did with all the privileges of British citizenship and few of the financial burdens.

During the next decade the international horizon became somewhat darkened and the splendid isolation of Britain seemed to many less desirable. The economic imperialism of the latter nineteenth century was now in full swing; the partitioning of Africa had continued at an accelerated pace; Japan had defeated China; the Far East was becoming assertive. Imperialism in 1887 had few adherents; by 1897 its cause had gained greatly in numbers and in influence. With French complications coming to a head in Africa, and Russia still threatening India, Great Britain now took note of Germany, a new rival in trade, a possible rival in years to come upon the high seas. Perhaps it might be well to have a thorough overhauling of imperial machinery and a stock-taking of imperial interests for a time of possible emergency.

Therefore a quickened interest in the Empire was shown in the days of the Diamond Jubilee, and particularly in that portion of it where Britons had set up well-nigh independent states. The arrival of the colonial premiers was made much of and many were the banquets held in their honor. Even that august organ, the *Times*, laid emphasis on the colonial participation in the parade, stressing particularly the fact that Sir Wilfrid Laurier, a Frenchman and a Roman Catholic, headed the Canadian contingent. Here, indeed, was proof of constitutional freedom!

All of which was as it should be: but proof that Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his fellow premiers desired closer union, or that the United Kingdom was fully aware of the imperial significance of the Dominions, and of the Dominions

that were yet to be, is another matter. British society certainly was not nor were the older men in governmental employ.¹ Laurier, himself, was unquestionably content to let well enough alone. That facile orator skillfully avoided at numerous banquets any statements which might seem to imply the desirability of the Empire becoming a more cohesive state. Canada was the only colonial federation that had as yet been achieved, and the Canadian premier for that reason, if for no other, came to London with enhanced prestige. Striking in personality, suave and brilliant in address, Laurier was greeted everywhere as the foremost spokesman of overseas Britain.

And the Canadian acquitted himself well. His speeches were models of tact; they contained handsome compliments for the Queen; they lauded the political wisdom and generosity of the Mother country; they spoke enthusiastically of closer trade relation, in a general way, and capitalized to the utmost the preferential tariff recently accorded Britain by her oldest Dominion; they even referred feelingly to the loyalty of the French-Canadians to the British Crown. But they also never failed to express in one way or another the idea so neatly put by Rudyard Kipling in the two lines familiar to all Canadians:

"Daughter, am I in my Mother's house,
But Mistress in my own."

Thus, at the National Liberal Club, Sir Wilfrid asserted stoutly that "he did not believe in the Parliament of man, but in the Parliament of Great Britain"—as it had been and still was constituted. And at a state banquet given to the premiers in London, presided over by Lord Salisbury,

¹ Sir Donald Smith tells an amusing story in this connection. Harmsworth, the editor, distressed at the lack of attention paid the visiting premiers by Mayfair, planned in their honor a great reception to which many notables in the social world were invited. The Colonial Office, annoyed at this evidence of pushing imperialism, determined to nip it in the bud by arranging for a reception of the premiers elsewhere. Willson, B., *Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal*, II, 264.

he maintained that "while it has been asserted that Canada might become a nation, Canada was a nation already."¹

Now while British statesmen were very careful not to offend colonial sensibilities, many of them thought that the time was ripe for planting the seeds of closer union. Some approached this problem in one way, some in another. The Duke of Devonshire, as chairman of the banquet given to the colonial premiers at Liverpool by the British Empire League, was careful to explain in his introductory remarks that the league was organized to obtain closer commercial relations and improved communications throughout the Empire, and that it harbored no political ambitions since it felt that premature efforts of that kind might prove disastrous. But even his eulogy of free trade within the Empire met with a cold reception, and from an Australian quarter. The Duke was followed by Premier Turner of Victoria who did not hesitate to speak his mind freely. "I do not desire to follow his Grace," he said, "in regard to the remarks which have just been made in respect to free trade with Great Britain. I represent perhaps the most protected colony in the whole group."² And while the Premier of Queensland, in quite general terms, commended imperial federation, Sir Wilfrid Laurier that same evening gave a veiled and delicate intimation that Canada's tariff policy was her own concern.

The possibility of the colonies sharing in the upkeep of the royal navy was another familiar idea among British statesmen, and partly for that reason especial courtesies were doubtless given to the colonial premiers as they witnessed the mammoth naval review held in honor of the Queen. Since the colonial conference of 1887 some slight contribution in money for the support of the navy had been made by all the self-governing colonies except Canada, and it was hoped in naval circles that a more generous as well as a more systematic plan might be devised whereby the naval expenses of the Empire, incurred to no inconsiderable de-

¹ *Times*, June 19th, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, June 14th, 1897.

gree for the protection of the colonies, might be shared more equitably by all Britons no matter where their home might be.

Lord Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, broached this subject at a banquet given to the premiers at the Colonial Institute. He stated that he had been asked to have printed a leaflet containing statistics of naval expenses for distribution among them as they went to the naval review, but that he had objected on the ground that it would look too undignified and would seem too much like "contributions thankfully received." Yet, he did think that something should be done.

The premiers knew, however, that they were present in London more as delegates from, than as representatives of, their respective governments, and they were full wary of authorizing unnecessary appropriations for altruistic purposes. They were courteous and attentive, but only one of them could or would play a leading rôle at this juncture. Sir Gordon Sprigg, of the Cape Colony, carried away with enthusiasm, did promise an ironclad of the first class, and by so doing became a hero in government circles. The other premiers did nothing except to hint at the possibility of a more extensive naval subsidy; as for poor Canada, the most powerful of all the transmarine divisions of the Empire, it must have been humiliating to have sat as her representative at a state banquet and to have heard lauded the pecuniary sacrifices of her lesser sisters. The best that Sir Donald Smith, who responded to the toast of Canada in the absence of Sir Wilfrid, could say on one of these occasions, was to allude to the service of fast Atlantic liners which the immigration office of the Dominion was endeavoring to inaugurate, and to state that in case of war these ships might be available.

But more ambitious projects than either a system of inter-imperial free trade or joint support of the British navy were projected at this time by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain

of Birmingham. "Joe" Chamberlain had already been a power in British politics some twenty years. His was not a gracious personality, nor one in general noted for either compromise or sweet reasonableness. All his life he had been accustomed to hard work and hard thinking. A self-made manufacturer, tall, gaunt and angular, by appearance and mannerism the choicest butt of the political caricaturist, his stormy career had already resulted in his making many bitter enemies as well as many devoted friends. In Birmingham, his native city, he was trusted, perhaps beloved, and never in the trying days that were to come did Birmingham go back on her allegiance. Although Chamberlain had no humor, and although he lavished such open affection as he could bring himself publicly to display on orchids rather than on men, Birmingham believed in the patriotism of her first citizen and sensed his sterling worth, despite unsavory political scandals that were whispered but, be it noted, never proved.

His career had been a constantly widening one. A consistent radical until within late years, his first concern in public life had been municipal reform. That interest broadened until it took in the entire United Kingdom, particularly in so far as politics were related to problems of labor. What focused his attention on imperial rather than on domestic affairs, no one knew. Very likely his intense opposition to Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill, which had led him to help wreck the Liberal party, opened his eyes to the lack of unity within the Empire. At any rate, in 1895, to the surprise of his friends, he had chosen the post of Colonial Secretary in the cabinet of Lord Salisbury in preference to other cabinet positions usually ranked higher. And now he was evidently intent on putting through fundamental changes in the very constitution of the Empire.

Political experience had proved to him that caution as well as fearlessness is necessary in the world of politics. The colonial conference over which he was to preside had

been postponed until after the social functions of the Jubilee had been consummated. In the interval, therefore, before it met, he sought to create an atmosphere favorable for his reforms by public speeches, particularly those at banquets given in honor of the colonial guests. Thus, at a public dinner for the premiers in his own city he told them frankly that, "if our self-governing colonies desire now or at any other time to take their share in the glories and the responsibilities of Empire they will find that we are ready to meet them more than half way. . . . We think of the future of the race as well as the future of our own people." And at the Cordwainers' banquet in London at a later date he maintained that "the links which bind us are slender and might easily be snapped in a moment of passion and irritation." These links should be stronger, and he believed that he spoke for the premiers in thus asserting. He did not want to rush work which must necessarily be slow and delicate. Australia and South Africa were yet to be federated. What he did want to do was to get rid of all obstacles to greater union. It was for the colonies alone "to decide when, in their opinion, the time had come to take up their part in the noble heritage which we have preserved for them as well as for ourselves." The Motherland would welcome them to her glories, privileges and also burdens.

Open and suggestive statements, these; but there is no evidence that the colonial premiers appreciated the significance of what he said, unless Laurier, to whom the glories of the Empire were precisely those laissez-faire principles of political autonomy of which Chamberlain was beginning to grow suspicious. And the official conference with the premiers which followed shortly after seemed also to show negative results. Chamberlain was persuasive and perhaps far-sighted in his ideas, as coming events were to prove, but the time had not come for the kind of thing he had in mind.

In his opening address he plunged *in medias res*. He ex-

pressed himself as delighted with the federation of the Dominion of Canada and the pending federation of the Australian colonies which, he assured the delegates, was a matter entirely for Australia to settle for herself. He hoped that these two successful examples would demonstrate the desirability of a more extensive federation on a still larger model, a federation of the Empire. Of course it must be understood that it was simply a suggestion on his part, a personal hope rather than a political program; but he did look forward to the day when there might be a true council of the Empire to which the colonies would send representatives and plenipotentiaries, "not mere delegates who were unable to speak in their name without further reference to their respective governments, but persons who by their character, by their close touch with colonials, would be able, upon all subjects submitted to them to give really effective and valuable advice."

Chamberlain also had other suggestions. He spoke of the judicial committee of the Privy Council with greatest respect as "The Judicial Court of Appeal of the Empire" which in authority and reputation had no equal on earth except the Supreme Court of the United States. He wanted the colonies to be more directly represented in its membership and stated that the Government, with that end in view, had appointed colonial judges as privy councillors. But these judges came to England only at brief intervals and naturally could not sit on cases in appeal to the Privy Council over which they had passed an original decision. What was the will of the colonies in this matter, he queried?

Coming to the question of defense Chamberlain made the rather broad statement that during Queen Victoria's reign all wars waged by Britain had been carried on in behalf of colonial interests—a remark, which if challenged, he might have had difficulty in proving. Something had been done for the navy but the military situation, he considered, was very unsatisfactory. "If war breaks out, war will be sud-

den, and there will be no time to prepare then." Chamberlain urged the colonies to make ready for war and to adopt some scheme of uniformity in equipment and organization. And the Colonial Secretary then pointed out that, in his opinion, it would be an excellent plan if colonial troops could for a season be brigaded with British regulars while regiments of the latter would take their place with the colonial forces.

The German *Zollverein* seemed to Chamberlain also a living proof of how the German Empire had been made one, and he asked the opinion of the premiers present as to what they thought of the desirability of a similar movement in the interests of their own Empire. The questions of the Pacific cable, imperial penny post, the common regulation of load lines in ships, and a common commercial code, were then touched on, and finally Chamberlain brought up tactfully the problem of alien immigration which was causing her Majesty's Government great annoyance.

The self-governing colonies had all taken steps to prevent the immigration of Asiatics within their borders. And "we quite sympathize," said Chamberlain, "with the determination of the white inhabitants of these colonies who are in close proximity to the millions and the hundreds of millions of Asiatics that there should not be an influx of people alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx, moreover, would seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labor population . . . but we ask you also to bear in mind the traditions of the Empire which make no distinctions in favor of or against race or color." To sanction laws which did so would be painful to her Majesty. On the other hand, should laws be made to exclude individuals on the ground that they were dirty, or immoral, or simply paupers, no harm would be done. And he spoke approvingly of Natal's action in this respect.

Now as far as the proposals of Chamberlain were concerned he knew, and the premiers knew, that legally the

conference could make no change in the *status quo*, and that the entire hope of these suggestions proving successful lay in publicity, and the resultant effect which might be obtained in the various electorates throughout the Empire. Therefore, from his point of view, it was unfortunate that the premiers were either unprepared or unwilling to pass strong resolutions, or even mild ones, in favor of Chamberlain's policies.

As for the project of a British *Zollverein* they simply agreed to take common counsel on it at home, neither favoring nor frowning on its feasibility. The exchange of military units they said might be a good thing, and on their return home they would see what changes might make it possible, a proposal which might or might not mean anything. On the matter of immigration we are told that there was a full exchange of views, but they were not published. And in regard to the navy an effort was made to persuade the Australian delegates that money spent on the navy by Australia should be given with a free hand without the condition that it should be expended in Australian waters; the first Lord of the Admiralty maintaining that a distinction should be drawn between what was politically satisfactory and what was strategically desirable.

But the real crux of the conference came on the question of political relationship. Here was the thing on which Chamberlain had set his heart. Here was proof, one way or another, about how the colonies felt toward the need of closer union; here an accounting might be given for the glowing phrases of after dinner toasts. It was even so, and by the very words of the resolution passed at this time with the approval of all but two of the premiers the tremendous difficulty of reorganizing the British Empire was apparent.

"The Prime Ministers here assembled," it read, "are of the opinion that the present political relations between the United Kingdom and the self-governing colonies are gen-

erally satisfactory under the existing condition of things.”¹ Premiers Seddon of New Zealand and Braddon of Tasmania dissented. They believed with Chamberlain that the time had come for the colonies to carry greater responsibilities as well as heavier burdens. But to Laurier went the victory. And the other premiers also had little stomach for returning home with tales of increased taxation. They felt that of the glory of the Empire they already had their full share; they wanted no more of it if further expenditure was involved. The premiers were unanimous, however, in passing this resolution: “Those assembled are of the opinion that the time has arrived for all restrictions which prevent investment of trust funds in colonial stock to be removed.” Favors they were prepared to ask, few to give.

But what took place within the council chamber of the Colonial Office was of trifling moment, even to the British world. Let well enough alone had ever been an accepted maxim in British politics, and the herculean task of changing or even modifying the vast organic structure over which he presided must now have been apparent to Chamberlain. Although Colonial Secretary, his control over the more important colonies was slight, and but a fraction of the Empire was placed, even nominally, under his jurisdiction.

India, so soon to waken from her slumbers, had her own official spokesman in her Majesty’s cabinet. The future status of that great dependency, within the Empire or without, autonomous or otherwise, must be correlated somehow, to the future of the Empire as a whole. Ireland, a political volcano never quiescent, might legally be a constituent part of the United Kingdom; but the Irish problem truly was imperial in scope, no mere domestic issue without meaning and significance across the water. The dependent Empire, too, the sprawling protectorates under the control of the Foreign Office, and Egypt; surely these lands must be considered; it was a pity that the premiers from overseas

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1897, LIX, 645 (C. 8596).

showed keener interest in laws safeguarding financial investments than in their own political relationships. Was it a matter of mere closet-philosophy whether the Empire should grow or shrink; whether the future had in store greater unity or less; whether a federal form should be evolved, following American and German precedents, or a Hellenic system of entente and understanding come about, based on common culture, need and interest?

Why speculate now on those more generous implications of colonial coördination connoted by the phrase, British Commonwealth of Nations? None did. Were not the apparent glories of the Empire everywhere in evidence? The little weaknesses that sapped and undermined its strength lay hidden. Statistically, it never was in sounder case. Exports and imports, tonnage, battleships, bank deposits, flag raisings, loyal speeches, on these the chronicler could expatiate with fervor. But had he noticed the foreign intelligence trickling in from South Africa during these days of celebration, he might have seen a tiny cloud which speedily was to develop into a hurricane. Little notices, these, none of any particular moment, news items of monopolistic prices charged for coal and dynamite used in the mines of the Rand, a quarrel between President Kruger and his courts over the treatment of a certain American, named Brown; and what was even a little more ominous, word of a treaty of alliance between the South African Republic and the Orange Free State. Perhaps it was as well for Britain that at this hour of imperial rejoicing there were those who spoke for the Motherland in a different key. And not the least of these was Rudyard Kipling, who published for the first time on July 17th, 1897, these lines:

"If drunk with Sight of Power we loose
Wild Tongues that have not Thee in Awe,
Such Boastings as the Gentiles use,
Or lesser Breeds without the Law,
Lord God of Hosts be with us yet,
Lest we forget, lest we forget."

CHAPTER II

WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

By 1899 the pageantry of Empire had been forgotten, and Chamberlain's plans beclouded by the situation in South Africa. Once more in London streets the soldiers march; the Boer war had begun.

This contest, apparently a mere skirmish, caught Britain unaware, destroyed the prestige of the British army and sullied alike the reputation of generals and of statesmen. The South African Republic and the Orange Free State, miniature nations with a total fighting strength of from thirty-five to fifty thousand, defeated and then held at bay the armies of Britain for two and a half years. The Empire was dumbfounded; discovered Europe uniformly hostile, and awoke at the same time to all the social unpreparedness and physical degeneration inwrought in the massed population of the United Kingdom by an easy-going century of muddleheadedness and quick-found wealth. The Empire was not only unprepared for war; it was unprepared for anything.

Certainly, there were extenuating circumstances. The seat of war was distant, some eleven thousand miles, and in a hilly, open country of spacious distances, with water scarce and roads negligible; and the foe well armed. But these facts brought no comfort to the hitherto complacent Briton. He saw his soldiers routed by crude farmers; he saw his own industrial population underfed and consequently underbuilt, unable to comply with even the moderate standard of physique demanded by his own army surgeons; his pride was shaken; his purse grew light; and what was more annoying, his conscience was uneasy.

And as he fought throughout the sordid struggle, so utterly without grandeur, knowing that even in victory there was no glory, but one consolation remained to him, the greater Britain overseas. The call of blood to blood in time of agony and distress was heard and answered. The Canadian fisherman, the New Zealand sheep-rancher, the Australian miner had neither knowledge nor interest in South Africa. But where their brothers fought, there fought they, and doubtless the better, being ignorant of the source of quarrel.

Since the annexation of the Cape of Good Hope, in 1815, a prize of the Napoleonic wars, the relations of the incoming British colonists to the original Dutch settlers had been marked by constant friction. The two races for the most part remained separate in blood, in language and religion, suspicious, hostile. In the thirties of the nineteenth century some ten thousand contentious Boers, embittered by, what seemed to them, British partiality for the negro,¹ inspanned their oxen and migrated, or trekked, northeastward toward the Indian Ocean to what is now Natal. Here they again came in contact with British settlers who had reached Natal by sea. Once more recommencing their wanderings the Boers turned north and west, crossed the Orange River and there founded the Orange Free State. A further trek of this restless folk passed shortly after still further to the north beyond the Vaal River, and resulted in the formation of four more tiny republics which, somewhat later, were coalesced into that of the South African Republic (the Transvaal), the independence of which was officially recognized by Britain in 1852. It was these two republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, that engaged Great Britain in war.

The more immediate facts in regard to the South African situation in 1899, were these: President Kruger, at the head of the Transvaal government, had refused, after prolonged negotiations, to concede in any full measure rights claimed

¹ There are other reasons advanced, see Cloete, H., *The History of the Great Boer Trek*, 4.

by the British government on behalf of European immigrants, for the most part British citizens engaged in developing the gold deposits of the Rand district that centered about the city of Johannesburg. The British Commissioner was then ordered by the Colonial Secretary on September 22nd to break off further negotiations with the Boers and to state that her Majesty's Government would make counter proposals. The Transvaal authorities waited until the end of the month and then requested that by October 2nd they might be informed *what decision, if any, her Majesty's Government had reached*. The reply stated, *it will be some days before her Majesty's despatch is ready*. Whereupon, after delaying until October 9th, the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State, bound together in recent alliance, delivered a joint ultimatum to the British government demanding that the troops which it had recently concentrated on the borders of the Free State be withdrawn in forty-eight hours.¹ With this the British would not comply, and two days later the war began.

Now the ground upon which the British claimed the right of intervention in the affairs of the Transvaal was not imaginary. That little republic had, in 1877, with the tacit approval of certain leading citizens,² been made a British colony. The treasury at the time was empty; the native tribes threatened to break out on the war path; and political administration was disorganized completely. British aid was sought; British aid was given. By 1880, however, the Boers, no longer fearing the negroes who had been defeated by British assistance, grew indignant at the presence of the British tax gatherer. Mr. Gladstone was then in the midst of his famous Midlothian campaign, and denounced with all the majestic fervor which came so readily to him the iniquitous treatment which they had received; the inference seeming clear that if made premier their independence would be restored.

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1899, LXIV (C-9530).

² President Burghers favored annexation. On the other hand, Paul Kruger, soon to succeed him, and the entire executive council were opposed. See Theal, G. M., *History of South Africa*, 1873-1874, I, 271-273.

Gladstone was returned to office. But the missionaries, influential with his nonconformist supporters, opposed the Boers. They thought the welfare of the negro would be jeopardized once British rule ceased; ¹ and Gladstone, instead of independence, suggested South African autonomy. This, the Boers did not want, and Downing Street took no action at all. The Boers protested and in 1881 rose in arms and badly routed a British column at Majuba Hill. The ministry now gave way. Gladstone agreed to the withdrawal of the British troops; the Boers rejoiced, and the British garrisons which had staved off surrender in remote hamlets found their sacrifice of no avail.

Unfortunately, as on many other occasions in Gladstone's conduct of foreign affairs, the measures adopted by the British government were somewhat obscure. A status for the Transvaal was created intermediate between that of self-government and independence. To the Boers was given complete authority over their internal affairs, but they were forbidden to make treaties with foreign powers. And in definite terms, to the Crown was reserved suzerainty over the Transvaal.

This agreement, the Convention of Pretoria, was subsequently modified. The Boers objected to the suzerainty clause; the western boundaries of the state were in dispute; and for these and other reasons they asked for a treaty with Great Britain. This was refused on the ground that treaties were made only between independent sovereign states. The Boer delegates to England, however, came back with a second agreement, the Convention of London, signed in 1884. They had asked for a repudiation of the term, *suzerainty*: what they obtained was a new agreement weakening certain clauses in the old pact and not mentioning in any way *suzerainty*. That disputed word was part of the preamble of the old agreement; the new had no preamble. Fifteen years afterwards it was maintained by the Boers that the

¹ Mackenzie, W. D., *John Mackenzie, passim*.

latter, by omission, abrogated the suzerainty clause of the former. The British held that it did not since, from their point of view, the Convention of London modified only and did not supplant the Convention of Pretoria. A pretty lawyer's quarrel, this, with good logic on both sides.

Technically and legally the dispute between Briton and Boer finds its origin here; and possibly the psychological reason for their mutual disdain lay also in this chain of events. The British concessions were not only ambiguous; they came after defeat rather than victory. From the standpoint of detached ethics, amid the pleasant fields of which, in foreign affairs, he was ever apt to wander, Mr. Gladstone's compromise may have been justified: but as a remedy for racial animosities it was a failure. From Majuba Hill until the end of the century the attitude of the average Boer was one of contempt for both British word and British sword.

If the motivation for fighting lay in the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century, the tangible substance of the quarrel may be traced to the discovery of gold, a decade later, in the Transvaal. The deposits of that precious metal were extensive and were quickly exploited by international bankers and capitalists, by Werner, Beit and other German-Jewish leaders in the world of finance, as well as by wealthy Britons, among whom the outstanding figure was Mr. Cecil Rhodes. Into the Transvaal, and particularly the district about Johannesburg, there now poured a horde of miners, for the most part English and Welsh. Johannesburg became overnight a populous city and the Boers soon discovered that a new problem was thrust into their rural economy.

The reaction to it was natural. Was not the country theirs and all the wealth contained therein? Since neither technique in mining nor knowledge of marketing was known to them the foreigner should be left to operate the mines—but at a price. Heavy taxation, they well calculated, would

serve not only their own enrichment but would also check and limit this flood of hated English which might overflow their country. The mines, of course, could not be worked without dynamite, and in consequence that article was made a government monopoly yielding several hundred per cent. Coal in abundance there was in South Africa, serviceable mines were but thirty miles distant from the gold fields, and coal could easily be taxed in transit by fabulous charges for freight, while mining machinery could also pay a pretty penny at the customs house.

Thus thought the Boer farmers, and as their wealth increased there came with it arrogance and pride which, together with their old contempt for the British, bred of long historic causes, smoldering and kept warm by tales repeated year after year on the lonely farm, led directly to friction with the foreigner and so to war.

Johannesburg grew ever larger; but the Boers remained to govern. Mining centers are not noted for sanitation and municipal efficiency and besides, the Boers could see no reason why the Uitlander should receive comforts unknown to the veldt. Nevertheless, the veldt is not the city, and since three-quarters of the income of the Transvaal came from the mines it was easily the part of justice to expend some fair share of their new-found wealth in improved water works and in sewage facilities for the convenience and health of the foreigner.

The problem of the schools was of like character. The Uitlanders, paying enormously for the privilege of working the mines, considered that the Government should provide a good education for their children: but the Boers thought otherwise; they had no intention whatever of devoting huge sums to modern lighting plants, extensive school facilities and other materia of civilization to the strangers encamped within their gates.¹

¹The Boers did provide public schools. Out of £150,000 voted for educational purposes in 1897, some £30,000 was spent in the Johannesburg

The political administration of Johannesburg was also exclusively in the hands of the Boer officials. Many of them were corrupt, few if any gracious and conciliatory. Boer policemen kept order, Boer teachers taught, Boer courts administered justice—a galling situation for the British miner.

The British had a case; the policy of the Boers was shortsighted, unjust. But it must be remembered that the Boers were a rural folk who had never been accustomed to the amenities of city life, and that what they withheld from the British they did not appropriate to themselves. Furthermore, a strong and growing minority among the better informed Boers, among whom was Louis Botha, would readily have granted concessions had they, rather than President Kruger and his elder statesmen, held a majority in the Volksraad or National Assembly.

It would have been well, therefore, for the Uitlanders to have been patient and to have sought reform exclusively from the Boer government rather than to have organized for the purpose of exerting pressure from without. That policy was not maintained. Their reform association looked to London rather than to Pretoria, partly on its own initiative, partly owing to the skillful manipulation of wealthy mine owners who were only too willing, in this case, to make the grievances of the working man their own. And thus it came about that both foreign labor and foreign capital united in demanding assistance from the British authorities, intervention, armed if need be. And their spokesman was Cecil Rhodes, Premier of the Cape Colony.

An extraordinary person, this Rhodes. A representative of the better type of fortunate entrepreneur in a new land, his career had been marked with dazzling success. The second son of a poor clergyman, in feeble health and unable to continue at his books, he sought physical well-being and

district. English, however, was taught only in the primary grades and the teachers were required to be citizens of the Republic.

a fortune in South Africa. He found both, and so exceedingly prosperous did he become, owing to the diamond mines of Kimberley, that by the end of his twenty-first year he had already made a fortune.

But Rhodes had a vivid imagination and a desire that knew no curb to do more in the world than gather wealth. He returned to England, matriculated at Oxford, and for a number of years divided his time between the old country and South Africa. At the age of twenty-two the drift of his mind might already be seen by an early will in which he wrote freely of his ambitions and hopes for the British race. He believed that in time it would rule the world, South Africa, all of it, should become British, and he, Rhodes, already rich and with potential wealth of extreme proportions already in view, intended to devote his entire fortune toward that end.

Meanwhile, overconfident of the power of money, he must continue to multiply his fortune. Successful business enterprises and the formation by Rhodes of de Beers, the great diamond firm of Kimberley, speedily brought it to new heights. Rhodes then turned to politics in order to pursue more definitely the first step in his chosen dream, the confederation of South Africa. To the north, for the time being, the Transvaal blocked his way: but still further to the north, beyond the settlements of the furthest Boers, lay grassy plains and elevated highlands that stretched beyond the Zambesi River all the way to the great lakes. Here was still more land for the white man. Let Britain hasten to occupy it before other nations. And what is more, it might be reached from the south without passing through the territory of the Boers. To the west of the Transvaal lay Bechuanaland, a no man's country with a scant negro population, that opened up a way of Empire which Rhodes hoped might extend from the Cape to Cairo, from the southern tip to the utmost northern rim of Africa.

Owing to his instigation, then, Britain threw a protec-

torate over Bechuanaland, and for the exploitation of the more northern territory, shortly to be called Rhodesia, he organized, in 1887, a chartered company. This corporation, aided by his wealth, within two years extended the sphere of British influence to the heart of central Africa. And though further advance was halted by the fact that German East Africa touched on Lake Tanganyika to the east while the western banks were a part of the Congo Free State, Rhodes did give aid and assistance in securing for England the territory of Uganda, reaching northward from Lakes Victoria and Albert Nyanza to the open plains of what was soon to become the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

In the interim, came the discovery of gold in the Transvaal and the immediate attention of British capitalists was directed thither. Rhodes, to whom all matters of South African interest were of concern, now threw his efforts into developing the newly opened gold mines. His lucky star had not yet waned: he was soon, in popular repute, the richest man in the world, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the foremost personality in South Africa. Britons were said to be oppressed in the Transvaal: he would come to their rescue.

The reform movement was accelerated. The Uitlanders founded a national constitutional union at Johannesburg and asked the Boer government to grant them political equality, the recognition of the English language on an equal basis with the Dutch, and various other social reforms—a not unreasonable program with the possible exception of political equality; for innocent as the grant of suffrage might appear, it must be held in mind that the Boer population was small, and the fast increasing flood of newcomers would soon result in the outvoting of the Boers in their own country, a situation which they could not view with equanimity.

But President Kruger was obdurate in regard to almost everything. He regarded Rhodes and his friends with suspicion and sought no more connection with the British to

the south than was inevitable. The outlet for the Transvaal he believed should be by the Netherlands Railway from Pretoria to Delagoa Bay in Portuguese East Africa and not by way of the Cape. These Uitlanders were troublesome, and he had no intention of having them become citizens of his republic, and so gradually swamping in numbers the Boers who held title to the soil. For Kruger was a *vortreker* of the original migration of 1835 from the hated English. He was a *dopper*, a member of the narrowest and most bigoted sect of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, so reactionary that even his own stubborn and backward people in 1893 had nearly ousted him from the presidency. And Kruger hardened his heart and replied to the petitions of the Uitlanders:—"This is my country, these are my laws. Those who do not like to obey my laws may leave my country."

Then Rhodes became impatient. All his life he had found the power of money omnipotent; was he to be thwarted now by a handful of farmers? The Transvaal stood in the way of his broader accomplishment—South Africa won for the Empire. British citizens, furthermore, were browbeaten by the Boers. Here was sufficient cause, he considered, for personal intervention. His method was simple. In Rhodesia and Bechuanaland were many men, particularly those who had been in the service of his own South African Company, upon whom he might rely. They could be armed and rifles could also be smuggled into Johannesburg. A small outside force rushing across the border, joined by the Johannesburg volunteers, might speedily overcome such sluggish resistance as would be offered by the sleepy-eyed Boers. Redress could thus instantly be had, and further concessions wrung from the dismayed farmers; perhaps even the gold districts might be taken from them!

The chosen agent of this magnate extraordinary was a certain Dr. Jameson, a British surgeon, a man of wide popularity and at that time administrator of Rhodesia. Jameson

gathered a force of some five hundred men in Bechuanaland on the borders of the Transvaal which, with the connivance of Rhodes, received arms from the Cape. In the interim, to those within the secret at Johannesburg went piano cases and oil drums filled with rifles. Some of the conspirators, however, desired to fight under the British flag and others did not; and delay followed delay. Rumors of the coming uprising were widespread, even reaching England. Jameson grew impatient, Rhodes counseled postponement until all was in readiness. He knew he risked everything on the raid and that his name, hitherto respected by the Cape Boers, would be anathema in any case. But Jameson would not wait. He thought his undertaking easy and on December thirtieth, 1895, he dashed across the border. The result was failure, ignominious and complete. Johannesburg remained quiescent; Jameson was cut off from retreat, surrounded, captured.

The Jameson raid, complete fiasco that it was, fitted in admirably with Kruger's plans; it proved the British as wicked and as treacherous as he had ever held them to be. Rhodes' rash scheme upset all hope of peace and concord. The forces of reaction in the Transvaal were uniformly elated; had not the Briton shown his true colors?

Jameson was not punished by the Boers. Both he and his fellow conspirators were ransomed through the agency of Rhodes' gold, and to Britain was left the question of their guilt and punishment. Unfortunately "Dr. Jim" was treated by the more clamorous and less responsible sections of British opinion as a hero rather than as a criminal. Tried in London, he was sentenced to serve fifteen months in jail, a sentence not over-severe, and what is more, not even partially served.

The British cabinet, meanwhile, disavowed immediately this coup and a committee of Parliament the following year, after an honest if somewhat half-hearted investigation,

severely censured Rhodes.¹ They accused him of "subsidizing, organizing and stimulating an armed insurrection against the Transvaal government." But their act made no impression on the Boers. The fact remained that Cecil Rhodes, her Majesty's Prime Minister for the Cape Colony, had plotted to seize their country by force of arms. And Rhodes had been in communication with the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. Caesar's friends should be above suspicion. They cared nothing for Dr. Jameson, a lovable but erratic character whose subsequent career was to do much to atone for this colossal blunder. The real culprit was Rhodes who, with his capitalistic friends, cared not so much about the wrongs of the Uitlander as for the annexation of their country and the gold fields contained therein.

And they noted carefully that Rhodes suffered no pains and penalties except public censure, the loss of his place in the Privy Council, and the premiership which he resigned of his own accord. They thought he should have been imprisoned. They did not realize that he might have been, had not the British public been infuriated by a telegram from the Kaiser to Kruger congratulating him on the defeat of the raid.

Friction between Boer and Briton was seriously augmented by these events. The Transvaal government, amply provided with funds, hastened the importation of rifles, field artillery, even ambulances. The Uitlanders turned toward England. A monstrous petition was sent by them to the Queen enumerating their grievances. Kruger, it was stated, had shown himself more obdurate than ever, and by the passage of several new laws relative to the press and to immigration had made it clear to them that their only hope of redress lay through the British authorities.

¹The committee was unanimous in its findings except Labouchere. But it made no determined effort to force Rhodes to produce certain documents which, it was claimed, linked the name of Rhodes in this affair with that of Chamberlain.

London now brought pressure to bear on the Transvaal through regular diplomatic channels and sent Lord Milner as High Commissioner to carry forward negotiations. He succeeded somewhat in ameliorating the lot of the Uitlander; an increased proportion of the school funds was now to be devoted to the education of their children; a certain modicum of self-government was given to the city of Johannesburg; a certain relaxation of the franchise laws was now made. Kruger proved difficult. What that bitter old gentleman granted with one hand he was inclined to withdraw with the other. He was so unyielding that he came in conflict with his own officials, and had the British sent a man of different type from Milner they might have overturned his position with his own supporters. But the enhanced prestige which was Kruger's as a result of the raid, plus the personality of Milner, enabled him to keep the upper hand.


Lord Milner had been long in the service of Britain, and in the administration of Egyptian finance had won a brilliant reputation. He had been a Liberal in politics and his appointment to the South African post had been generally hailed as evidence of the Government seeking a fair solution of the Uitlander's difficulties. But Milner proved sharp in manner and curt in speech, likewise adamant in demanding for British citizens in the Transvaal absolute equality with the Boer. Compromise he would not, and unfortunately for the good of the Empire he early became convinced that intervention was essential, an opinion which he did not conceal.

One heard much in Parliamentary circles at the end of the nineteenth century of what was said to be the new diplomacy of Chamberlain and his school, a diplomacy which prided itself on straightforward and open demands but which, according to its critics, was the reverse of diplomatic. Chamberlain was quite as blunt as Milner. He believed that trouble would not cease to brew until the Uitlander

participated in the Government of the Transvaal. He pressed, therefore, for easier franchise laws, subordinated other demands to this, and demanded a franchise based on five years' residence. Early in 1899 the Boers conceded one of seven years, instead of their former ten year requirement, but so complicated the compromise by various provisions as to admit to the franchise of the republic but few new voters. Later in the year Kruger was more conciliatory and even agreed to the five year term, but at a price. The British were to relinquish formally all claims to suzerainty over the republic and were to pledge themselves not to interfere with its internal affairs. In case of future disagreement Kruger proposed a court of arbitration presided over by a disinterested foreigner. Chamberlain, in reply, frankly stated that the British government must be paramount in South Africa and that he would not agree to anything implying independence, a statement not apt to further amity and friendship.

By summer negotiations had drifted to a deadlock, and while the gold gleaned from the Uitlanders went to purchase rifles for the Boers, reinforcements poured in to her Majesty's forces augmenting their number in South Africa from a few to twenty-five thousand.

Kruger believed that Chamberlain intended to draw a ring of steel about the two republics and then to work his will upon them. Whether this was so or not he had good reason for his fear. The "new diplomacy" had published a blue book containing Milner's telegram to Chamberlain stating that the case for intervention was overwhelming. Chamberlain himself at Highbury had spoken for publication of "sands that fast were running out of the hour glass." The British had rejected the Boers' last effort at compromise, but would give no hint of counter proposals. Meanwhile, from India, from Malta, from Britain, the British troopships came. In England, it was the *long vacation*. Chamberlain seemed all powerful. Salisbury, Prime Min-



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ister, was in France; but even he was known to favor a strong South African policy, and many weeks must elapse before Parliament met. There was no appeal, apparently, except to the God of Battles. The two republics, therefore, accepted Britain's challenge, or, if you will, took the initiative and challenged Britain.¹

As the war opened, the Boers, under the aged General Joubert, marched into Natal. At Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith they besieged British garrisons and even threatened the major forces of the enemy which at the beginning of the war they outnumbered. Had the Boers followed the better part of wisdom and pushed the attack they might even have driven the foe all the way to the sea, and in such case probably would have been joined in force by the Cape Dutch,² thus rendering inestimably greater the difficulties of Britain.

But the republicans needed a defensive war to bring out their better qualities. Theirs was no trained army. All burghers, providing their own rifles, bullets, horses and food, could be summoned on *commando* by order of the Government; but with discipline and tactics they had slight acquaintance. Joubert, their general, thought only to drive back the British from the frontier; this once accomplished, he and his army rested. The Boers displayed no initiative in following up initial success. Indeed, had it not been for the ability of General Botha and the blundering of General Buller, Great Britain might have been an early victor.

Botha, for a Boer of influence, was exceedingly young.

¹The Boer ultimatum put the case thus in regard to the concentration of British troops. "Having regard to occurrences in the history of this republic which it is unnecessary here to call to mind, the Government felt obliged to regard the military force as a threat against the independence of the South African Republic." (Williams and Hicks, *Official Documents of the South African War*, 59.) A statement not without significance in view of the events of 1895-6.

²Cape Colony was evenly divided between Boer and British sympathizers, and a slight majority of the Cape Parliament was pro-Boer as may be seen by the petitions on both sides showered on Lord Milner before the opening of hostilities. *Sessional Papers*, 1899, LXIV (C. 9514).

Born of mixed Dutch and Huguenot parentage in Natal in 1864, he was technically a British subject. But the Bothas had long been independent folk. His grandfather had emigrated to Natal to escape from the British at the Cape and his father, involved in financial troubles, thought little of recommencing life in still wilder regions, and had moved, while the boy, Louis, was still a youngster, with all his thirteen children to the Orange Free State.

The son inherited his spirit of adventure, took to the field as a young man against the Blacks and was active in the formation of that curious abortive state, the New Republic.¹ Upon its annexation to the Transvaal he entered actively the service of the latter country, became a commissioner to the tribesmen of Swaziland, settled down as a prosperous farmer, and shortly before the Jameson raid was elected to the Volksraad as one of those in opposition to the official Krugerite party, in which rôle he continued to the end, being one of the seven members who voted against the ultimatum to the British.

At the end of November Joubert was forced by physical incapacity to give over his command, and the young Botha was placed in temporary command, but as a precautionary measure not trusted with full military powers. He was opposed by Sir Redvers Buller, newly arrived in South Africa to command the British army.

Sir Redvers, seemingly, was unfitted for his post. He was a brave man, devoted to his troops, and had already seen service before in South Africa. The reasons for his failure had best be left to the military historians. Suffice it to write that a furious controversy was waged by the press in regard to his career, and no general in recent decades in the British

¹ The New Republic was formed out of some three million acres ceded by the King of Zululand to a few Boers who had assisted him in crushing a revolt of his own people. Botha was one of the land commissioners in this tiny state. Spender, H., *General Botha*, 45 *et seq.*

army has been subject to more bitter or more malign criticism.¹

Buller reached South Africa the last day of October. By the middle of December he advanced in force to relieve the besieged British garrison at Ladysmith and to crush the main Boer army. Botha awaited him, his force concealed in trenches of unusual depth and complexity. Buller, supported by great naval guns, attempted the capture of the Boer position beyond the Tugela River. Botha's troops fired prematurely, thus destroying his well laid plan to trap the entire British army between his trenches and the river. But Buller's army was surprised and badly beaten. This was the battle of Colenso.

The stubborn Boers refused to follow up their victory and Botha, whose authority was limited, could not compel them. Again Buller advanced to the relief of Ladysmith and once more was he defeated by the energetic Botha at Spion Kop. And thus by January, the fourth month of the war, nothing but disaster had yet attended British arms.

The smashing defeat at Colenso aroused the British government and also the British people. The question of the justice of the British cause and plans for the reorganization of the Transvaal after the war was over now engaged public attention less than articles on the *Military Weakness of Britain* and *Lessons from South Africa*. The War Office took alarm. A hundred thousand troops were now in South Africa or on their way thither. It was held an insufficient force and more were sought. And in the meanwhile, even before Buller's second defeat, two new generals were rushed to the rescue, Lords Roberts and Kitchener.

Roberts, already an old man of sixty-eight, had rendered notable service to his country. Slight of build and unusually

¹ The leading charge against Sir Redvers to the popular mind was the belief that he advised the surrender of Ladysmith after his failure to relieve the British garrison there. He returned home in the autumn of 1900 and was disciplined by the authorities, not for action in the field but for replying to popular criticism at a public banquet.

short in stature, in bravery and ability he was preëminent. Long ago, in the great Indian Mutiny he had won the Victoria Cross and since that time he had seen constant service in Abyssinia, Burma and India. In the Afghan wars of 1878-1880 he had again distinguished himself by forced marches of incredible swiftness, whereby he had surprised and routed the Afghan tribesmen at Kandahar. In 1893 he had retired, thinking that his active career was over: but his son had been killed at Colenso and the old man willingly heard the Empire's call to lead her armies. He landed at Cape Town in January, 1900.

There he was joined by General Herbert Horatio Kitchener as chief of staff. The Sirdar of the Anglo-Egyptian army in the Sudan, the victor of Omdurman, the organizer of victory in the upper valley of the Nile, was an admirable choice for the South African post. A silent man of majestic presence and physique, Kitchener drew to himself the respect of all, although the love of few. Supposedly a woman-hater and a scorner of all things that meant not war, Kitchener concealed behind his mask of sternness a kind and generous spirit. But the world knew him as a disciplinarian and as the man who from small beginnings and against terrific odds had patiently established railway connections in upper Egypt, and had made the weak-kneed fellaheen a worthy match for the fire-eating followers of the mad Mahdi.

Under these two veteran commanders the morale of the British troops quickly improved. Within a few weeks General French was sent with a mobile column to relieve the hard pressed British garrison at Kimberley. That alert cavalry officer overtook the besieger, General Cronje of the Free State, on retreat and trapped the Boer forces in the valley of the Modder River. Cronje would neither flee at the cost of losing his baggage train nor would he surrender. From the 18th to the 27th of February his *laager* was turned into a shambles. "It seemed," wrote one British onlooker,

"as though no living man could ever come out of that *laager*. Shell after shell, the live long day dropped into the very centre, yet no surrender, no white flag flown." ¹ Cronje stood out, hoping for succor. Botha in attempting it nearly was captured, after which Cronje surrendered with four thousand men.

The garrisons of Mafeking and Ladysmith were relieved also and Roberts prepared for the main British advance. In six months he changed the entire complexion of the war. With a superb preponderance of troops he forced his way into Bloemfontein, the capital of the Free State, as early as March 13th, and thence drove straight at Pretoria, occupying by mid-summer the capital of the Transvaal.

It was not easy-going. While Botha harried the advance of the British with his Transvaalers, at flank and rear they suffered several stinging reverses from another foe, General Christian De Wet and his Free State army. De Wet was to become the military hero of the republican forces. In intellectual processes simple beyond belief, this man in all that concerned life on the open veldt was wise. He developed a sense and feeling for the strategy of war that was uncanny: his was the fox's rôle, to slip away, to avoid all snares, to lie hidden behind the rugged hills or kopjes which studded the upland plain, to pounce on detachments of the enemy, to tear up railways, to capture ammunition trains; and persistently and untiringly, until the war ended, to annoy, threaten and disrupt the plans of the British.

But as De Wet won victories, Roberts pressed steadily forward, and like a wise general stopped not at Pretoria but pursued De Wet. The latter continued his retreat to the Portuguese border, buried his remaining artillery and with the major part of his army escaped to the wilder terrain of the northern Transvaal.

Apparently the war was over. Kruger and the Government had fled; both capitals were in British hands, likewise

¹ Boyle, C., *Nineteenth Century*, 47:913 (June, 1900).

Johannesburg, the larger towns and all the railways. The mining companies prepared to recommence operations and Lord Roberts returned to England leaving Kitchener to complete such mopping-up operations as were necessary. In Bloemfontein the British troops were said to have been welcomed with flowers. Only a minority of the Free Staters had been inclined to fight anyway, the British thought, and as for the Transvaal, had not the backbone of its resistance been destroyed?

The Boers, however, would not have it so. For nearly two years more they kept on fighting. South Africa is a huge region which the Boer knew and the Briton did not. A guerrilla war was well suited to the psychology of these farmers. It reduced military discipline to a minimum, permitted fairly frequent if dangerous visits to their home folk, and, by the very elasticity of the mechanism involved, toughened the fiber of resistance. After all, in many ways, it was not unlike the trek to which they and their forefathers had been accustomed; the long days of constant journeying in the wilderness were but renewed, the absence of all physical comfort, the dearth of food and water, the patient struggling oxen, the land half trackless and the enemy to watch. For the wild beast and the ferocious Kaffir substitute the British regular and the ill-drilled volunteer, and the parallel is not a forced one. And so the Boers fought on, month after month, a losing war. Days at a time without food, except for the mealies of the Kaffir, apart from their families, alarmed at the growing restlessness and insolence of the Blacks and with uneasy thoughts of what might be happening at the lonely farm, they still kept in the field. And all the while their ranks were thinning fast by death and capture, until victory became defeat if Boer lives were lost in the winning of it.

The determining causes of this resistance were various. To some extent it may be ascribed to the racial psychology of the Boer stock and the deep religious conviction that the

Almighty would stand by them; to some extent it was based on the expectation of aid from Europe and the hope that a political overturn in Great Britain might, as in the days of Gladstone, restore their independence.

The twentieth century had come but the Dutch farmers, religiously, lived in the seventeenth. Cromwell's troopers placed no greater reliance on God as an ally than did these men. The speeches, letters and telegrams of Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the Transvaal since 1883 and thrice reëlected to that honor, might readily have been those of a persecuted Cameronian. He and his people knew the Old Testament and believed that even as the children of Israel had been guided to Canaan, so had their forefathers escaped from the Egyptians and despoilers (British) to occupy the Transvaal. As for Kruger, he wrestled constantly with the Volksraad in prayer, quoted scripture, chapter and verse to startled diplomats, and in so doing reflected what was customary among his people.

And as the British drew near his capital and as Jehovah withdrew his presence from him, the aged President from his railway carriage on the Netherlands Railway sent telegram after telegram to his commanders telling them to "remember 1st Peter, verses 7 and 8: 'cast all your cares upon him; for he cares for you' and verse 8 says, 'but be sober, be vigilant against the Devil whom resist steadfast in the faith, for he walketh about like a raging lion seeking whom he may devour.'"¹ And so through a long category of scriptural references mingling the American Revolution, Daniel in the lion's den and tales of the beast with the duplicities of Salisbury. The tired soldiers would have been amazed had not this iron ration been served to them since childhood, strong meat, but stiffening to the backbone to know that the Lord will smite the enemy and deliver his children.

¹ Kruger, J. S. P., *Memoirs*, 406 *et seq.* Kruger's quotation is not exact. The chapter in question is the fifth.

To Europe the Boer leaders cast an anxious eye. The Continent was bitterly hostile to Britain. Public opinion in Europe had not been cognizant of the difficulties which beset the Uitlanders; it knew nothing of the jealousies and suspicions of the back veldt: it envisaged simply the mighty Empire crushing the two republics, with the Jameson raid in the background. And the Boers still held the Empire somewhat in check. Was intervention, then, not possible? In order to secure it Paulus Kruger went to Europe. The Government of the Netherlands sent a warship to convey him. He landed at Marseilles, proceeded via Paris to the Hague and everywhere was heartily cheered. But that was not indicative of intervention; with the British in command of the seas such an act would have been dangerous. The French, to be sure, after Fashoda had no love for Britain; the German people would have gladly seen that country humiliated; the Czar of Russia actually made overtures to France and Germany in favor of a joint note to Britain on the Boers' behalf: but war was never seriously imminent.

The Boers did not know this; they attached too much significance to the vaporings of European journalism, and they continued to look for outside aid not merely from Europe but also from the Cape Colony. From the latter, many recruits joined their standard, and there would have been more had it not been for the proclamation putting the Cape under martial law. Nevertheless, such assistance as they did receive from this source was more than counter-balanced by accessions to the British forces from Cape loyalists.

The Boers hoped that if they held out long enough the political tide might run in their favor even in England. This was too much to expect. Majuba Hill was a small affray on the outskirts of the Empire; Colenso was a bloody defeat within the boundaries of an old British colony. The ire of the British was now aroused; they were not a super-people to judge dispassionately, like justice blindfolded, the

merits of their own cause. Indeed, it is astonishing that Britons acknowledged as freely as they did that there were elements of righteousness in the arguments of their foes. Public opinion did not keep an even keel; it could not. Lies were freely circulated and believed about the Boers, about Kruger, about the Uitlander. Pro-Boer and even semi-pro-Boer meetings were mobbed: but opposition in Great Britain to the Government did continue throughout the entire war, an excellent proof of the extraordinary political tolerance which characterizes the British people.

Public opinion in the United Kingdom, as reflected in the debates of the House of Commons, was divided. The Irish members, as was customary, bitterly attacked the honesty and integrity of the Cabinet, and compared British tyranny in South Africa with British tyranny in Ireland. The Unionist ranks stood shoulder to shoulder in favor of the Government. The Liberal party, the official Opposition, was split. A minority, following the lead of Lord Rosebery, Sir Henry Fowler and others, shortly became known as Liberal Imperialists. Their attitude was one of approval of the main purposes of the war coupled with here and there strong opposition to certain phases of the Government's policy. But the majority of the Liberals, represented by men of the caliber of Campbell-Bannerman, Harcourt, Morley and Bryce, took the point of view that while in war time the government should not be denied credits, and that the army in the field should be supported, nevertheless, the war was wrong in principle and should speedily be concluded by offering generous terms to the enemy, which, if they did not grant full independence,¹ still promised full self-government within the Empire.

And this position the Liberal party consistently upheld. It was not widely popular in the nation. In war time, it is not easy to assert, "my country right or wrong, and in this

¹ Not a few members of the Opposition demanded that Boer independence be acknowledged, and John Burns was returned from Battersea having made that his election issue.

case she is wrong." But such, though unexpressed in exact terms, was the stand of official Liberalism. Its leaders, from the beginning took this point of view and hesitated not at all to criticize the Government and to attack Chamberlain for what they argued was immoral jingoism.

Chamberlain hit back with vigor¹ and refused in any respect to be apologetic or even conciliatory: but his refusal to explain the nature of Great Britain's counter-proposals during the last fatal month before the war began; his obscure statements as to why they were not sent to the Boer authorities during those last few weeks when the British troops were arriving in an ever increasing stream; and his admission in 1896 that "we had expressly repudiated any right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Transvaal" counted heavily against him. And John Morley even went so far as to assert to his constituents in January 1900: "there has been a plot and there has been a conspiracy, but it was the plot and the conspiracy of a band of gold hunters—a sordid plot against the peace of South Africa at the expense of the fame and strength of the British Empire."

Now that John Morley could say this in war time on the public platform in Great Britain speaks well for his country, and that in the teeth of such remarks he could be reëlected to the House of Commons is still further proof that Britain was uneasy in conscience about the righteousness of the war. And the general election of that year, when the Government appealed to the electorate for a proof of national support, is still further evidence thereof. It was distinctly a *khaki election*,—sprung suddenly on the country in the midst of a great war, at a time when the daily casualty lists were long; and as far as the number of seats in the House of Commons was concerned the Unionist majority was overwhelming. But the number of seats won by the Liberals was greater than that held in 1895 and less than one-third

¹ *Vide* a long speech in the House of Commons, attended with many interruptions. *Parliamentary Debates*, IV series, LXXVII, 254 *et seq.*

of these were occupied by Liberal Imperialists who supported intervention. Furthermore, in the total polling it must not be forgotten that the Unionists had very little the better of it, there being 2,360,852 Unionist votes to 2,055,951 Liberal.

The next session of Parliament reflected the bitterness of the electoral campaign. A not inconsiderable proportion of its time was consumed by honorable members in personal abuse. Lloyd George, who narrowly avoided personal injury during the war at the hands of a mob, made a violent attack on the financial holdings of Chamberlain and his friends. The Colonial Secretary answered blow for blow; and as their verbal combats took place nightly at Westminster, in the Free State and the Transvaal there followed agony and death.

The year 1900 witnessed the victory yet the humiliation of the British forces. Their strength had risen rapidly from 100,000, to 200,000 and still later some quarter of a million men were in the field. But the Boers, driven from one locality reappeared in another. De Wet continued to be a thorn in the side of the British toward the south and east, operating largely in the Free State, with a raid now and again in Cape Colony. In the western Transvaal, De la Rey won many minor engagements while in the north Botha proved as elusive as ever.

Kitchener therefore came to a new decision. He would make of the entire country one gigantic net, burn down and destroy the Boer farm houses, ruin crops, herd women and children and all non-combatants in concentration, or as he preferred to call them, refugee camps, build block-houses but a thousand paces apart, lace barb wire and trenches between them, and by a number of swift sharp drives redeem more and more land from the Boers until either captured or exhausted they gave over the fight. This policy he pursued relentlessly for a year and a half. And Kitchener's method proved successful: but very grad-

ually, for as late even as the autumn of 1901 and the spring of 1902 the Boer victories in the field were as brilliant as any they had hitherto won. De la Rey, the chivalrous old general of the western Transvaal, surprised General Kerwich at Moedwell Farm, fought valiantly against Colonel Donop at Kleinfontein, scattered a column under Colonel Anderson, and finally, in February, 1902, annihilated the forces of Lieutenant General Methuen, making that nobleman a prisoner.¹ De Wet in a brilliant action on Christmas day stormed Tweifontein, routing the imperial yeomanry, while at Bakenlaagte Botha fell upon the forces of Colonel Benson and scored once more for the Transvaalers. But in the meanwhile, the steadily increased acreage of land held by the British gave proof that they were winning with relentness certainty.

And as the net closed in, the outcry against the refugee camps reached Britain and the Opposition in the House of Commons raised a storm of protest against the cruelties of Kitchener. These refugee camps, it was held, were barbarous, breeders of disease and death among the innocent, unworthy of a Christian nation. And so loud became popular indignation that even in the midst of war the Government dispatched a committee of women to South Africa to investigate and tell the truth.

The report of this committee was full and informing. The women went through camp after camp and reported in great detail the actual circumstances under which the prisoners lived. They were far from ideal; food in South Africa was scarce, particularly milk; sanitation was almost impossible to enforce and tents filled with women and children do not offer the best of shelter. The committee made many recommendations, afterwards said to have been

¹ General Methuen's forces were strung out in long column. His oxen, slow moving, had been started while it was yet night, his mules, faster in pace, at dawn. As the mules caught up with the oxen at the rising of the sun, the Boers attacked, and in the general confusion forced a surrender.

put into effect, and exonerated the Government from all charges of cruelty, stating that under the circumstances the situation was about as good as might have been expected. The death rate was very high, for the Boers had lived on isolated farms and their habits of life were not such as could readily be adapted to confinement. Furthermore, "the whole country in which fighting had been taking place was poisoned. Horses, mules, oxen are killed during battles, or due to overwork and exhaustion, and their carcasses are left to putrefy, poisoning earth, air and water. Thousands of other animals are affected. Rinderpest, horse sickness and every other kind of disease claim their victims; the sick beasts crawl to the nearest stream and die on its brink and the water supply of the whole country becomes infected, or they die in the open country and the dust clouds for which South Africa is famous scatter disease-laden particles over the length and breadth of the land." ¹

Such is war. The women and the children did not receive brutal treatment; but had Kitchener any moral right to pen them in? He claimed that it was essentially a humane act or else they would have starved. And as for burning the farms, that also was necessary; for the Boers, he stated, intimidated those burghers who refused to fight by themselves, burning farms and destroying crops. The only thing to do was to make a desert of the countryside.

The British, moreover, parried the Boer complaints by accusations of their own. The negro in South Africa, as the war gradually turned in favor of the invader, became more actively a partisan, and assisted the British troops. The Boers had never behaved decently to the Blacks, so the British maintained, and now, if we would believe the British blue book, the Boers did not hesitate to maltreat

¹ Report on the Refugee Camps in South Africa by the Committee of Ladies. *Sessional Papers*, 1902, CXVII, 14.

and slay them.¹ Therefore, as it approached its later stages, the war became more frightful.

Then came peace. The first overture in that direction had been made by Kruger on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum* and had been promptly rejected. In 1901, Lord Kitchener had offered terms to the Boers based on the annexation of the two republics, an act promulgated by the British government soon after the commencement of the war—but with the provision that representative institutions would be established in the conquered territory. This, in turn, the Boers had refused and the situation remained deadlocked until, thanks to an English Quaker, Mr. Francis Fox, and the friendly connivance of the Government of the Netherlands, peace negotiations were, early in 1902, begun again. Kitchener and Botha were both men of sense and generosity. But Kitchener's hands were bound by his civilian superiors, Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner, the latter still High Commissioner for South Africa. And Botha had to deal with a democracy of stubborn country folk, politically headless since the departure of Kruger, except in the Free State where the blind old President Steyn stuck to his post. The Free Staters, indeed, willed to keep on with the fight even though flowers had been thrown at British troops in Bloemfontein. No touch of the modern world had reached that isolated agricultural community. The Free Staters had but six thousand men left under arms while of the soldiers of the Transvaal there remained ten thousand: but the six thousand had rifles, and

¹ After the war began many bitter complaints were made by British philanthropists and clergymen in regard to the relation of Boer to negro. The former were accused of beating the latter with *sjamboks*, or raw hide whips, and of generally abusing them. *Vide, The Spectator*, Aug. 24th, 1901. As far, however, as the diplomatic correspondence between Britain and the Transvaal is concerned, immediately prior to the war, there is no reference to the negro, and the historian cannot but feel that the negro question was dragged in afterwards by conscience stricken Britons to buttress up a weak defense.

bullets might be had from captured ammunition trains; why end the war?

A preliminary meeting of the leaders of the two republics was held in the Free State in April, 1902, and after a long day of debate an agreement seemed hopeless. Neither President Steyn nor his two generals, Hertzog and De Wet, would give in. They preferred, they said, unconditional surrender to peace terms which gave up their independence, for the man who is forced to surrender unconditionally is not bound by any moral pledge to refrain from fighting in the future. It seemed impossible to move them; on the second day, however, Hertzog suggested that the two republics should themselves frame terms and take them to the British. This was acceded to and they were drawn up, the Boers abandoning everything, including the accursed gold mines and the territory around them, provided that some fragment of independence was left. Kitchener and Milner would not consider this suggestion; but the former tactfully intimated that Britain had many different kinds of colonies and that the Boers might look forward to some degree of autonomy within the Empire. Telegrams were exchanged with London, where fortunately Chamberlain was no longer all-powerful. Salisbury and Lansdowne in the Cabinet both favored a negotiated peace, Kitchener, himself, took a moderate tone, and the British government offered once more the same terms which the Boers rejected in 1901, with the provision attached that they must give their answer by a yes or no vote.

The elected representatives of the Boer soldiers, for the most part their officers, now met at Vereeniging to debate peace or war. For two weeks they argued about the possibilities of continued resistance, compared conditions in the districts from which they came, exchanged stories of scarcity of food and fodder, of sick horses, ill-clad soldiers, thinning ranks, and of the ominous behavior of the Blacks, who day by day became more insolent as their late rulers

lost steadily in strength and power. The Free Staters would not yield. "Fight on to the bitter end," they cried: but they of the Transvaal, in harder case and more desperately pressed by Kitchener's men, were for giving over.

Botha was their protagonist, and now he, simply as one man among others, a companion in poverty and distress, made clear to the soldiers of both republics the nature of the crisis which confronted them. Always reasonable, never scolding, the soldier-statesman pointed out the practical difficulties of continuing the war, spoke feelingly of General Smuts' report from the Cape, of the impossibility of a rising there because of lack of horses, how *voetgangers* (infantry) could not oppose the British; and everywhere the Boers were losing horses, and those which still remained were worn out, half starved. "What progress are we making?" he cried. "None. We are slipping backward every day, there is no use in hiding the truth. . . . The fate of our country is in the hands of the men in this tent. It has been bitter, indeed, for me to speak as I have done. But if I have not spoken the truth convince me of my error and I will be the first to own it. But do not condemn me for I have no other object than to tell you what I believe to be the truth."


So spoke Botha, more anxious to persuade than to gain laurels as an orator, and his wise advice was promptly seconded by the young Afrikaner whose name in after days was to become a household word throughout the Empire. Jan Smuts, at the age of thirty, prominent in the councils of President Kruger, was now a general in the republican armies. Analytical and thorough thinker that he was, he well understood the significance of the decision to be made, and with unerring truth he spoke as follows: "We do not only represent our burghers on *commando*, the troops over which we are placed in command; we represent also the thousands who have passed away after making the last sacrifice for their country; the prisoners scat-


tered the world over; the women and children dying by the thousand in the prison camps of the enemy; we represent the blood and tears of the whole African nation. From the prisons, the camps, the graves, the veldt, and from the womb of the future, that nation cries out to us to make a wise decision now, to take no steps which might lead to the downfall or even to the extermination of the race, and thus make all their sacrifices of no avail.”¹

But the bitter-enders would not bow to the inevitable. Bad as the situation stood, still it was no worse than it had been for a long time. “I can hold out a long while,” said De Wet, “and Britain can do no more; how do we know that she will not yield? Let us trust in God and await the future.” And then these men fell back on the language of the seventeenth century, which is at once so thrilling and so perilous. They appealed to the faith of their fathers. “Have you no faith in God?” they said, searching the hearts of their listeners. The answer was given mournfully by an old Boer commandant: “We asked for God’s answer to our prayer, His hand is stretched out against us.”

Thus these men of iron contended with one another many weeks, and all the while, Botha, like a wise Ulysses of his people, counseled patience. But the representatives of the Free State were sore at heart in so far as the war was no quarrel of theirs, and yet they would continue fighting while those of the Transvaal who had begun it were for peace; and not until Botha had spent long hours in the tent of De Wet in personal pleading did the great majority of them agree to the submission. Finally, the victory was his, and on May 31st it was voted to accept the peace terms, fifty-four to six; and, in the concluding words of General De Wet’s *Three Years War*, “This, the last meeting of the two republics, ended with prayer.”

¹ Minutes of the meeting of the Boer representatives at Vereeniging, to be found in the appendix of De Wet, *Three Years War*.





The peace terms agreed to, briefly summarized, were these: the burghers were to lay down their arms and to recognize the sovereignty of the British Crown; they were not to be deprived of their personal liberty or property; military government was to be succeeded at the earliest possible date by civil, and, as soon after as was feasible, representative institutions were to be introduced; the Dutch language was placed on a parity with English in the schools and courts; no special taxes were to be levied to pay for the war, and his Majesty's government granted three million sterling to assist the people back to their farms. Furthermore, the Government offered to loan additional money to the Boers free of interest for the same purpose.¹ Nothing became the British so well in the whole course of the war as their method of ending it.

And why was it ever begun? But one major issue stands out clearly, the British demand that the franchise laws of the Transvaal be changed. Of physical brutality, it must be remembered, inflicted by the Boers upon British citizens, there was none. But one British citizen had been killed prior to the war, and he while drunk in a rough-and-tumble encounter with the police. Lawlessness and anarchy was not made the ground of intervention: the Government of the Transvaal might have been unjust, but it was stable.

Unquestionably the Boers were a backward people; they had no sense of progress; they hampered railroad development and played the despot toward the British miner. Also, it was asserted, they threatened to create an all-Dutch South Africa, and intrigued with the restless Afrikaner within the precincts of the Cape Colony to that end: therefore until the "paramountcy" of the British was secure there could be no peace. Thus argued Britain's defenders, and with some show of reason. Certain Boers, even before the war, had dreamed of a great South African Dutch Republic, including both Natal and the Cape Colony, just

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1902, LXIX (cd. 1096).

as many Uitlanders had hoped, once possessed of the ballot, to vote the Transvaal into the Empire. Either Boer or Briton must be paramount; and it shall not be the Boer! Furthermore, Britain as the advocate of democracy and fair play in the Transvaal sought for the Uitlander only those privileges which free men everywhere look forward to as their birthright. To deprive the foreign-born miner of the elementary right of suffrage was unjust, and Britain, in supporting his claims, acted as the champion of civilization.

But the validity of both of these arguments seemed to many unsubstantial. It is not impossible to establish amicable understandings between different races living in close geographical proximity, as witness the French in Canada. As for the suffrage, the foreign born in the Transvaal already outnumbered the Boers. Was it fair to expect the latter to relinquish voluntarily the control of their own country; would this foreign born, and for the most part transient population remain free from the control of the great mining companies upon whom it depended for its livelihood? To the Boer apologist, there seemed to lie, behind everything else, a streak of tainted gold. Rhodes was presumably too rich a man and too enlightened to want more money. Chamberlain was not greedy of wealth, either for himself or for others; but the Colonial Secretary prided himself on his realism, conceived of life in terms of power, physical not spiritual. Might it not be that, in this instance, he was the unconscious agent of the unscrupulous?

The logic of Milner, from the pro-Boer point of view, seemed faulty. He asserted, virtually, that Great Britain could not defend her own citizens unless they became citizens of another country, a curious paradox, as he acknowledged. And in affirming that they had a right to participate in the Government of the Transvaal he boldly invented something utterly unknown to international law, for what precedent could be quoted in defense of such

an absurd doctrine that an alien has a right, which should be supported by his own Government, to naturalization in another country, irrespective of its laws? Furthermore, as one Liberal writer put it in 1899: "It is not enough to prove that laws are unjust, that officials are corrupt, or that taxation is too high, or that there are racial feuds." These facts cannot serve as a cause for interference in another state. Yet upon arguments such as these did Great Britain rely, and upon the questionable claim to suzerainty considered, a decade before, simply a protection and precaution against Teutonic intrigue in South Africa.

Few of those who love the Empire now condone this war. It lies in the dark shadow, relieved only by the protests manfully raised against it in Britain during its progress and by the generosity of the aftermath. As Kipling wrote, more, one suspects in regard to the Empire's military debacle than in respect to the moral morass into which it plunged:

"Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good."

And it was a good thing for England, perhaps the most healthy experience that country had met with since Napoleon Bonaparte set sail for St. Helena. It may safely be said that the British army in 1914 owed much of its resourcefulness and readiness to adapt itself to new conditions to its dismal failure at Magersfontein and before Colenso. For decades British generals had been fighting savages. From 1899 to 1902 they fought against excellent generals, De Wet, Botha, De la Rey, and the stubbornness of a white rank and file who did not know what quitting meant. But they learned their lesson and did not forget it, and so did the man at home.

More important, however, one would like to think, than the disclosure of military weakness was the awakening of the British people to the memory of the ancient political

virtues of their race; if not fairmindedness, at least tolerance; if not complete justice, at least compromise. To them was now recalled the seeming want of logic in their political adjustments which by their very elasticity and slow movement had done so much to render powerful and permanent their curious constitutional mechanism. Might did not make right; in a certain sense, might had not even won the war; it had not done anything except secure a military decision. This, intuitively and to their credit, the British knew; and the proof that they did so may be seen in the subsequent course of events in South Africa.

CHAPTER III

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The exhaustion of South Africa after the war, in Cape Colony and Natal as well as in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, was profound. A territory larger than Great Britain and Ireland had been laid waste by British arms. The Boer civilians still were huddled in concentration camps, some 110,000. In addition, over 17,000 Boer soldiers in the field were without means of sustenance; over 20,000 prisoners of war were in Ceylon, Bermuda and St. Helena; and more than 250,000 British troops were in the conquered territory waiting repatriation.

Furthermore, broad and spacious as the uplands of South Africa were, the people who inhabited them, even before the war, were a food-importing folk. Their economic well-being depended primarily on the exploitation of mineral wealth. The value of this had been huge. Canada and Australia exported far less in money value per capita than South Africa; but on the other hand no imminent danger of starvation could possibly threaten these food-exporting countries. In South Africa the British were confronted with the necessity of bringing in their major food supplies from overseas, not merely for the largest British army in their military annals but for their late enemies also. And the season was winter in southern latitudes. The grass lay dry and parched; no crops could be grown for months. Cattle, horses, barns, farm houses, all must be provided, and that as soon as possible.

Lord Milner, now Governor of the two new Crown colonies of the Transvaal and Orange River, and High Com-

missioner for all South Africa as well, was placed in charge of this dangerous situation. He had at his disposal the £3,000,000 granted by Parliament for the rehabilitation of the conquered land, British army stores which he might buy, and the assistance of a number of young Oxford men, enlisted in the service of the new colonies and generally known as "Milner's kindergarten."

A free hand was given him and for three years he was to exercise it, accomplishing prodigies in the way of economic reconstruction, although failing, as one might *a priori* expect, in the establishment of political harmony. He began with the restoration of the countryside, "with little but its roofless houses and empty cattle pens to distinguish it from a barren and uninhabited wilderness." All Boers were given food to last for several months, transportation to their old homes, and credit was placed at their disposal for the purchase of live stock, agricultural implements and seed. Widows were presented with a cow and calf, fowls, building materials, seed for ten acres, and "when necessary their land was ploughed for them." Railway lines were repaired and more were built. Sheep were imported from Australia, potatoes from New Zealand, hardware from England, and sold at cost or distributed free. Meanwhile, the receipts given by Boer and British officers during the late hostilities, for damage done and property confiscated, were duly honored.

And this took money, much money. From Parliament an additional grant of £2,000,000 was obtained, and in the money market a loan for £35,000,000 was floated, the British government going surety for this sum in accordance with its promise made in the peace treaty.

Milner, no longer embarrassed financially, next turned his attention to the reorganization of civil government. A constabulary for the maintenance of order, educational facilities and a judiciary were created first. He then branched out further and added a legislative council to his

system, hoping thus to enlist the services of the ex-Boer commanders. Botha and Smuts, however, refused nomination to it. The new council might pass laws; but after all it represented not the people but the will of Milner. Until full self-government came they thought it wiser to hold aloof, leaving in Milner's hands the responsibility.

His lordship was not loath to exercise it, even beyond the boundaries of the two colonies. He combined the railway systems of the Transvaal and the Orange River, and then sought a railway conference at Bloemfontein with Cape Colony and Natal. By this means his hands were stretched out over all South Africa and a temporary solution, at any rate, was found for the vexatious transport and tariff problems which alike troubled all the colonies.

One chronic complaint of the Boer against Britain, in the old days, had been that the Cape Colony by its tariff virtually taxed the citizens of the Transvaal, since the latter obtained none of the revenue from customs but nevertheless paid high prices as a result of the tariff levied on goods coming from overseas. The same situation existed in regard to Natal and the Free State, the former collecting and retaining the entire duty levied on goods consumed by both. The two republics would have been entirely at the mercy of the seaboard colonies had it not been for the railway through Portuguese territory to Delagoa Bay. By raising their freight charges on importations from Natal and the Cape and by lowering them on goods brought from Delagoa Bay the Boer states had been able to combat this discrimination. And this war of railway rates had been not simply between the Boer republics and the British colonies but also between the Cape and Natal, since each possessed competing lines of railways from the sea to the gold fields.

These difficulties Milner ended. At his instigation Cape Colony and Natal agreed to collect the customs on through freight bound for the interior, keeping but a fraction for

their services in collecting. The inland colonies, on the other hand, made corresponding concessions in the matter of freight rates. By these means the economic coöperation of all four colonies was secured.

Thus far Milner's activities had won the approval even of the Boers. Some of them grumbled at the delays made in honoring the receipts given by their late commanders in the field, at the high prices paid by Milner's agents in the European and Dominion markets, and at the large salaries which were received by the youthful members of his kindergarten. But these complaints were inevitable. What troubled them far more was his evident distrust of the Boers in political affairs and his pronounced inclination toward arbitrary rule.

Milner knew that self-government was inevitable. He determined, however, to stave it off as long as possible. "Absolutely everything," he said, "depends on starting the new self-government and confederation with a British-minded majority. We must wait for federation and self-government until that majority is assured."¹ And to obtain it he advocated a land settlement program which would bring in British emigrants. Fortunately or not, depending on the point of view, the results of this policy were meager. Farming in South Africa is on a large scale and British agriculturists were not tempted thither. Only about one thousand came, and of these the majority made their homes south of the Orange River: but that Milner sought their coming, as he openly stated, in order to overcome the Boer majority did not add to his popularity.

Nor was it enhanced by his proposal to station permanently a corps of the royal army in South Africa. Milner might argue speciously enough that the health of the soldiers would be so excellent with South Africa as a training ground that the added cost of transportation back and

¹ Worsfold, W. B., *Reconstruction in the New Colonies*, 10.

forth could well be afforded: no such argument could fool the Boers.

Nor were they pleased with his public approval of a petition signed by Cape loyalists praying for a suspension of the constitution of that colony. The latter, believing that after the war they had not been sufficiently compensated for their faithful adherence to the British cause, petitioned for the abolition of self-government at the Cape. This, Milner would have concurred in, not out of sympathy, perhaps, with the Cape loyalists but because by so doing he thought that the confederation of all South Africa might be the more readily secured, superimposed from above upon Crown colonies, British made, British directed. Happily, in this instance, he was not supported by Chamberlain, the latter repudiating any intention of suspending the Cape's charter.

The intense conviction which Lord Milner had of the inherent righteousness of the British cause in the late war led him on to further blunders. Although nothing whatever was said in the treaty of Vereeniging in regard to indemnities his lordship felt it only just that the Transvaal should pay some share of the cost of the conflict. How this was to be done and how much it should be worried him greatly. His original idea had been that after the new colony was placed on a sound footing financially one-half of the surplus revenue should be assigned for a given number of years as a war contribution. This proving impractical, a second scheme was devised, the borrowing of £35,000,000 from private sources, the loan guaranteed by Britain with the understanding implied that in the future a flat sum of £30,000,000 would be contributed toward Britain's war expenses. This suggestion never met with favor in South Africa nor was it ever acted upon. Its sole effect was to tarnish somewhat the generosity of Great Britain at the peace.

But how could Milner hope for any surplus at all for

many years? There was, of course, but one answer—the gold mines. Here, indeed, must be found the source of supply for the mere payment of interest on sums already borrowed and for the ordinary expenses of the Government.

Yet the gold mines were in none too prosperous a condition. The trouble was due to lack of cheap labor. The rougher work of the mines had never been done by white miners, but by negroes. The latter were ill-content with post-war conditions. Many of them had left during the conflict for their kraals and were not inclined to return. Others were working for higher wages on the new railways, and as wages rose and labor became more scarce a poorer quality of ore was encountered at the mines, and many either closed or were reduced to half-time operation.

Thereupon Milner looked abroad for labor. Without this he believed that there would be no goose to lay the golden egg of tax reduction, British indemnity (never thus spoken of by Chamberlain or by him), or even ordinary administration expenses. Furthermore, the mines could not profitably be run by white labor, and without colored labor of some description the poor white miners would be in sorry plight.

He sought this cheap commodity first in Egypt: but Cromer would not countenance the enlistment of the Egyptian fellaheen for the South African mines; he needed them at home for his irrigation ditches. The Governor of British East Africa was equally discouraging. To build the Uganda railway it had already been necessary to draw heavily on labor from India; and as for the latter country it would be difficult, Milner knew, to impress the British authorities there with the desirability of a further importation of Indians. There had been sufficient friction already in South Africa between the Hindu traders and the Whites.

From German West Africa, Portuguese East Africa and Rhodesia Milner obtained a few recruits. These regions, however, could not be depended on. The enticement of the negro population from one European dependency to an-

other in Africa was not altogether *au fait*. Milner in consequence turned to China.

Here was an endless supply. Milner, having won the approval of the home authorities, made a treaty with the Chinese government on behalf of the Transvaal. The coolies were to come for three years. Should they prefer to return home before that time they were at liberty to do so, provided they paid their own return passage. The colony agreed to guard, protect and preserve them from all injury, to guarantee their pay, the sanitation and comfort of their compounds, and to prevent all intermingling with the white miners of the Rand.

In 1904 the Chinese began their coming. Within a year 35,000 had reached South Africa, and within that year also the gold output increased fifty per cent and the number of white workers in the mines rose also from ten to thirteen thousand. Even the negroes, attracted apparently by the new situation at the mines, trooped back to their old employment, increasing their number from 78,000 to 105,000 within the year. Lord Milner's plan was seemingly successful.

Its inauguration was responsible, however, more possibly than any other single cause, for the political turnover in Great Britain in the following year. Chinese slavery on the Rand, introduced by British officials, proved an effective Liberal war cry. Placards with the Chinese in chains appeared on the British hoardings; gangs of Chinese, or of men dressed as Chinese, paraded English streets tied to one another by their pigtails. Was it for this that we fought the war? cried the Liberals. The country listened, repudiated Lord Milner, Chamberlain and Balfour, and brought to office Campbell-Bannerman and his radical allies, the Laborites.

In vain the Tories maintained that no slavery existed or was intended, and most academically defined slavery as "a state in which man has absolute power over the life

and fortunes and liberty of another." Useless was it for them to prove that every coolie knew for what he enlisted, how much his pay was to be, the length of service, the character of work, the living in compounds. Without avail was their assertion that white labor was benefited by the introduction of the Chinese, since the latter were only engaged in hard manual toil which was repugnant in any case to the Whites.

The arguments against the new system were too strong. Temperately put by Mr. Asquith, "there were risks in two distinct directions, first of all in the process of recruitment, for however carefully that process was conducted how could you discriminate in a rough and ready manner between good and bad characters . . . secondly, in regard to the methods of treatment after they were landed and housed in the compounds." ¹ The Chinese, closely guarded, their women left behind, were apt to break out and cause trouble, or else start rioting within their inclosures. Many of them were flogged or heavily fined. The police at the mines were accustomed to Oriental methods of punishment. This made matters worse.

The Unionists admitted that the Chinese had been illegally flogged, as Lord Selborne, their nominee as the successor of Milner, acknowledged. And although the wilder stories emanating from the mines, such as the accusation that the mine owners extracted the teeth of the Chinese in order that they would not demand a meat diet, were without foundation, it remained true that the Chinese in the Transvaal were in a condition of slavery. "They could not strike for higher wages or erect homes"; they could not even leave their compounds for forty-eight hours without a special kind of ticket. If one escaped he was imprisoned and fined. If anyone aided an escaped Chinese he was similarly punished. The permission to return home was a chimerical benefit. To earn money to do so before the expiration of

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, IV Series, CLII, 670.

the indenture would take one and a half years. As for the argument of the Unionists that the Transvaal wanted this system, it was pointed out that the legislative body which voted for it was an appointed one, and that over half its membership held salaried posts under Milner.

Furthermore, the more radical upholders of the new British ministry, the labor members, quoted with telling effect from the *Financial News* of 1899. That newspaper's report of the annual meeting of the Consolidated Goldfield's Mining Company contained the following statement: "Lord Harris, the chairman, said that upon the working of the mines with a capital of £2,147,000 the profits for the year had been £1,006,000." And shortly after, Mr. Hammond, the engineer, informed the stockholders that "with a good government there should be an abundance of labor and that there would be no difficulty in cutting down wages." Here was the real reason, the Labor members proclaimed, for the introduction of the Chinese. Black labor could be had, they argued, if the pay was high enough. The thirst for greater profits and not the welfare of the Transvaal, had brought the Chinese to South Africa.

But whether profits or patriotism had introduced the yellow man, the greater Britain overseas resented his coming. Mr. Reid, Prime Minister of Australia, announced that "the Chinese stimulant to Empire building is peculiarly offensive to Australian sentiment." Mr. Seddon of New Zealand added that help never would have been given by his country during the late war had this aftermath been dreamed of. And when his Grace, the Archbishop of Canterbury, fulminated against the entry of the Chinese, the futility of winning over British opinion was apparent. Yet by 1906 the number of Chinese in the Transvaal was upwards of 55,000 and to return them to Asia might prove almost as difficult as their transportation to the west.

The success of Lord Milner's administration of the two colonies was seriously marred by this issue and his resig-

nation came while the discussion of it was at fever heat. It is doubtful, however, if the Chinese question, which loomed so large in Britain, played as great a part in his growing unpopularity in the Transvaal as did the projected Lyttleton constitution of 1905, his solution for the government of the Transvaal in the immediate future.

Milner, ever cautious in trusting his late enemies, hit upon a device in this constitution whereby Britain might fulfill her treaty obligations to the conquered countries and yet at the same time insure British control over them. "Institutions leading toward self-government," said the treaty. "Let us create an intermediate stage," said Milner. We shall erect a government which is representative, but one which is not responsible. We shall have a legislature which is popularly elected with genuine control over the purse; but the executive will not be responsible to it. Representative institutions in part, not in whole, that was Milner's theory. Responsible government with an executive under the control of the legislature he thought should come later. The Lyttleton constitution was but a half-way house and so intended.

The first act of the new Liberal cabinet in England in 1906 was to suspend its inauguration until a committee should report on its acceptability in South Africa. Its findings were adverse. To the Boers the Lyttleton scheme was anathema, since it did not confer full self-government. By many of the British in South Africa it was also disliked. The miners, in particular, held it to be the creation of the Progressive Association, an organization of the mine owners, and to fight both that association and the proposed constitution they formed a Labor Party. Other British citizens, equally displeased, organized a Responsible Government Association to work in harmony with Het Volk, the Dutch Party. With the men of British birth divided there could be no doubt as to the wishes of the majority, and in consequence, in 1907, full responsible government

was granted to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the latter colony now resuming its old name.

Certain powers were reserved for the Crown, as for instance, the land settlement of such few British farmers as had emigrated to the colonies since the war, and the forbidding in the future of all Chinese contracts. But in all other respects the new constitution was more democratic than the Lyttleton one, and even that had been granted to the Transvaal only, the former British government distrusting the Boer predominance in the Free State. Meanwhile, in the new instrument, the presence of official members in the legislative council was done away with, and the slight property qualification which militated against the younger sons of Boers who quite generally lived at home was also discarded. All adult white males were given the vote.

The first election immediately followed. Its results were these:

Het Volk	37	seats
Progressives	21	"
Nationalists (Responsible Assn.)	6	"
Labor	3	"

The Boers had won. With a clear majority over all, Het Volk would control the new Parliament. Those of British birth in the Transvaal were evidently dissatisfied with Crown colony government and preferred to ally themselves with their Boer neighbors rather than trust to the autocratic power of an imported governor. And thus it came about that Louis Botha, commander-in-chief of the Boer forces in the late war, became Prime Minister. Shortly after, the Boers in the Free State, similarly trusted by the British Liberals, carried 29 out of 33 constituencies, and were placed in power under the premiership of Mr. Fischer, in whose cabinet Generals Hertzog and De Wet found prominent places.

The next two years, from 1907 to 1909, were full of promise, not only for the Transvaal and the Free State but for all South Africa, since in them the movement for the creation of a united South Africa grew rapidly to fruition. The causes for it were primarily economic. The customs and railway agreements which Lord Milner had so carefully fathered were about to expire, and all thinking men looked forward with dread to a renewed outbreak of factious disputes over tariffs and railway rates. Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner, had drawn up a memorandum at the request of the South Africans showing how unfortunate and expensive such an internecine fight might become. And in addition, there was the omnipresent negro problem which could only be intelligently solved by the united action of all four colonies. Four separate parliaments with their separate ministries, governors and staffs; four different tariffs; four different legal systems; and above all, four different ways of solving the relations between Blacks and Whites: this situation seemed intolerable.

Botha took the initial steps toward remedying it by summoning in 1908 a conference in Pretoria, ostensibly in regard to the existing tariff and railway agreement. The settlement of economic difficulties by treaty, the usual method, he said was unsatisfactory. What they really should have was a closer union of all South Africa. If it was impossible to achieve it the Transvaal might be forced to come to some understanding with the Portuguese for the extension of her trade through Delagoa Bay. To avoid, if possible, any such outcome and to determine permanently their future relations the delegates decided to call a second conference, this time with the avowed purpose of bringing all South Africa into a federation or union.

Since the sessions of this body were in secret we know only of its procedure in general outline. The coöperation between Boer and Briton, however, was excellent, owing largely to the willingness of General Botha on the one hand

and of Dr. Jameson on the other to forget the past. Dr. Jameson was no longer Premier of the Cape, but his influence with those of British birth was extensive; and when he and Botha became friends, half the battle was won.

All the colonies, with the possible exception of Natal, were eager for union. Natal preferred a loose form of federation. She was shut off somewhat from the other colonies by the mountains; her population was smaller, her representation at the constitutional convention in consequence less; and her white population was overwhelmingly British. Therefore her delegates fought hard for a decentralized form of government, and since they could not obtain this they insisted on a special referendum in their own colony before accepting the new constitution.

But the real battleground in the convention centered about the question of the capital and the negro. The case for Cape Town as capital was a very strong one. It was centrally located in the oldest colony, which also was the largest in both area and population. It was nearer Europe than its rivals and situated as well in a scene of natural beauty. Furthermore, it was far away from the tumultuous mining districts; living here was cheaper, likewise the cost of building.

On the other hand, the Transvaal was the only colony on a sound financial footing. The men of the north must bear the burden of supporting the new government: they thought that this entitled them to the capital. Pretoria, it was argued, was both Boer and British; it would better express, therefore, the genius of the South African nation rather than the anglicized Cape Town.

With both sides standing firm there were but two solutions, either a compromise site or the division of the spoils between the two cities. The Australian precedent in regard to a capital was not a happy one. Bloemfontein in the Free State seemed impossible. The upshot was then that to Pretoria went the executive offices of the new govern-

ment and to Cape Town the Parliament buildings and the legislature, a costly compromise and cumbersome, but the only one seemingly possible.

More serious than the problem of the capital was that of the negro. Ever a constant source of friction between Briton and Boer since 1815, the negro question seemed more insoluble than ever. In Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland the Empire already possessed three negro protectorates in South Africa. Were these to be included in the new Union or not; and if so, on what terms? Within the confines of the four colonies lived numerous negroes. They outnumbered the Whites and gave no evidence of a declining birth rate. The rough labor of the mines was done by them, the manual labor of all South Africa, for that matter. What constitutional safeguards, if any, should be introduced for their protection?

Cape Colony at the convention stood out squarely as the champion of the negro. In the Cape were many so-called colored men of partial African descent. These had exercised the franchise for years. They had shown a tendency to vote for British rather than for Boer representatives in the colonial legislature, and the delegates from the Cape would not consent to their debarment from the Union franchise. In fact, they argued, the Cape franchise, with its slight property but non-racial qualification, was desirable for the entire Union. Neither the Transvaal nor the Free State would agree to this suggestion. Their delegates sought a universal manhood suffrage except for the strict exclusion of all of negro blood. And Natal tended to side with them since that little colony was confronted with an enormous negro preponderance within its borders. As far as votes in the convention were concerned the exclusionists could have carried the day. But had they done so Cape Colony would have rejected their labors. Some formula of compromise had to be invented.

Many were proposed. Among them was a civilization

test. Negroes who were monogamous, who spoke a European language, who owned property or who could prove that they were steadily engaged in some gainful occupation; and who also habitually wore clothes and lived in houses; these the Cape would enfranchise. But against this, the colonies to the north were adamant. They would not permit any negro to vote within their bailiwick. Therefore, the Cape gave way and the Union franchise was settled upon as that in use in the respective colonies at the time of Union, thus giving the colored man a vote in Cape Town but not in Johannesburg. And to this partial exclusion of the negro a further clause was added which prohibited the election of anyone to the new Parliament unless a British citizen of European descent. Whether a mulatto was of European descent or not was not defined in the constitution.

The rights of the colored men in Cape Colony were meanwhile safeguarded by a provision that the franchise of the Cape could not be changed except by a two-thirds vote of the members of both houses of the Union legislature in joint session. It was also made mandatory on the Government that four out of eight nominated members of the Senate should be well acquainted "with the reasonable wants of the colored races in South Africa." As for the native protectorates, a schedule was appended to the constitution defining strictly the way in which the negroes there should be governed if in the future the Imperial Parliament transferred these protectorates to the Union.

Among the remaining points of interest in the constitution are these: the creation of an upper house of the legislature with less power than the upper chamber in Australia or even Canada; the division of the country into four provinces for local self-government; the dependence of the judicial system on the will of the legislature; the stipulations in regard to language equality and constitutional amendments.

The South African Senate is in part nominated, in part elected. The electoral provisions are very complicated and

do not warrant extensive explanation since the Senate was clearly intended to be subordinate to the Assembly. In case of disagreement between the two houses a joint session is to be held which will decide the issue by a majority vote of those present, and since the number of Senators is far less than the number of Assemblymen their power is correspondingly decreased. In addition, it is provided that at the end of ten years the elected Senators, four-fifths of the Senate, are to be chosen directly by the members of the House of Assembly and members of the Provincial Councils.

For purposes of local administration there are four provinces with boundaries coterminous with those of the four old colonies. The powers delegated to these provinces are specific as in the case of Canada; but they are neither as extensive nor as permanent as in the British North America Act. Among them are education and agriculture as well as direct taxation for local needs. But every ordinance of the Provincial Council is subject to revision by the Union Parliament, and more than this, over every province is placed an administrator appointed by the Union government to serve as a local governor with real as well as ornamental functions.

The judiciary requires slight comment. A Supreme Court is provided with its seat at Bloemfontein. But in regard to constitutional questions it cannot, in the very nature of the case, have much to do. Only in constitutions which are federal in character like the Australian or the American are complicated constitutional crises apt to arise. Since there is no real division of authority in South Africa between the Union and the provincial governments there remains little to interpret.

The English and the Dutch languages are placed on an equal footing by the constitution. All laws, records, proclamations, as well as school instruction are to be given in both tongues.

And finally, by a simple two-thirds majority of the mem-

bers of the House of Assembly and the Senate in joint session the constitution is made subject to free amendment.

The Parliament in London gave its approval to this constitution. It did not want to do so. Certain of the clauses in regard to the negro were generally disapproved, particularly the one debarring colored men from serving in Parliament. This was against all British precedent; it was considered unfair to the negro; it would be resented in Hong Kong, Calcutta, Singapore, Cairo and elsewhere. But to amend the constitution, the Prime Minister assured the House, was to destroy all hope for many years of South African union.

The fastidious Mr. Balfour, now leader of the Opposition, did not concern himself much about the negro: and the intransigents in the Imperial Parliament who had the temerity to vote against the leaders of the two major parties mustered but a trifle over fifty votes. The act, therefore, received the royal assent in 1909, and the dream of Lord Carnarvon in the seventies and of Cecil Rhodes in the nineties became a reality.

"His Majesty well knows that you have passed through the fire of sorrow and trouble and that misunderstanding and conflict have brought sorrow on the land. But all this is now peacefully buried with the past."¹

With these optimistic words Lord Gladstone, son of the great Prime Minister and first Governor-General of South Africa, opened in 1910 the first Parliament of the new Dominion. They were, perhaps, more sanguine than the facts warranted. The constitution had, to be sure, been hammered out with a minimum of discord and friction; Boer and Briton had worked together in its making with much unanimity: Botha and Jameson were friends. But it took more than the friendship of the leaders to quench old hatreds.

¹ *South African Hansard*, First Session, First Parliament, King's Speech.

Jameson had sought and Botha had hoped for a Government of "all the talents," based on non-racial lines; but such an ideal proved abortive. The Boer general found, on sounding his friends, so much reluctance and unwillingness to coöperate with those of British birth that he informed Jameson it was impossible; the Boers must organize the Afrikaner separately in a party of their own if he was to continue their leader.

In consequence, the South African Party was formed, representing those of Boer descent, and in opposition to it there appeared two others, the Unionist Party, standing for the British interests, and the Labor Party, representing at first almost exclusively the miners of the Rand. And in the election which was immediately held these various parties won seats in the Union Assembly in the following order:

S.A.P. (South African Party)	67
Unionists	37
Labor	4
Independents	11

With such a majority there could be no question but that Botha was entitled to the premiership, and to him and the Dutch-speaking Afrikaner was intrusted the reins of government.

Now the South African Party, although Boer in composition, stood ostensibly for reconciliation and racial peace, and such was Botha's aim. But within its ranks were many who were neither willing to forgive nor to forget, among whom were members of his own Cabinet, particularly General Hertzog.

The latter was the leader of the Free Staters in Parliament, and his followers had been bitter enders at Vereeniging. Their bitterness had been but partly allayed by the grant of self-government to the Orange River Colony. To control South Africa in the Boer interest was their major hope and Botha, so many of them thought, had been a trifle

too willing to stretch out his hands toward the late foe. His influence with the Afrikander must not grow too great.

Within one month after the opening of Parliament this latent feeling came to the fore. The Unionists made a protest against the new educational act of the Free State which compelled all children above the fourth grade to learn both Dutch and English, whereas the other provinces made a second language to that used in the home optional. The result of this law, the Unionists claimed, made not only for inefficiency but for bad blood between Boer and Briton. In some instances, they asserted, even the Boers sent their children to British schools, since instruction in them was superior to those supported by the state. The two languages were, of course, equal by express provision of the constitution; but, as Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, the Unionist chieftain of the Transvaal, explained, "it was never intended to make the use of both compulsory." And as proof thereof he explained that when the constitution was drawn up with the words in it, *The official languages*, as applied to Dutch and English it was agreed to omit the definite article before the word *official*. An officious typist reinserted it and the error was overlooked. But certainly the mandatory use of both tongues in the schools was not dreamed of.

The reply of the Minister of Education was unconvincing. He could only state that education was a provincial function, and that since the provinces had but slight constitutional autonomy granted them it would be undesirable to attempt thus early to weaken it.

General Hertzog, however, had been the author of the Free State education act and he rushed quickly to its defense. With the circumlocution customary to him he attacked bitterly the favoritism shown the English language in the schools in the days prior to union. "He had always held that no greater injury could be done to South Africa than to put the two sections of children in different camps."

We cannot afford separate schools, he said, and in the Free State all pupils are subject to the same treatment.

Botha, meanwhile, calmed the troubled waters by suggesting a commission of investigation, warning Parliament as he did so that educational powers could not constitutionally be taken away from the provincial councils until five years had elapsed, even should Parliament wish it. But already the term *Hertzogism* had been coined to express Boer *intransigence*.

This initial evidence of disharmony was soon followed by three others. The Dutch Reformed Church, the church of the Afrikaner, sought a *de jure* union throughout all South Africa as well as the *de facto* one which already existed. But the bill which legalized this took away membership in the united church from those colored people in the Cape who had possessed it in that ancient colony in the days before union. This, the Unionists opposed. They were told that they were needlessly interfering in that which concerned them not. But the old rôle of defending the negro against the Dutch was too strong to resist. The bill became law; but ill feeling between the white races increased as it did so.

The land policy of the new Government was another cause of trouble. Lord Milner's immigration program had been a failure, but the hopes of the Unionists waxed high at the idea of a large influx of English speaking colonists. This, the Boers opposed; they wanted the vacant land for their own *bywoners*, or landless burghers; they did not want more British in their midst. Botha was now between two fires. He stood for reconciliation and therefore advocated land for both emigrant and *bywoners*. But Hertzog accused him of inconsistent statements in regard to his land policy, and of stating to his own people that "until 10,000 people in South Africa are given land he would take no steps toward immigration," while asserting before the Eighty Club in London that "Government was prepared to spend large sums

of money to bring into this country thousands of people to settle on the thousands of acres of land lying idle.”¹

Finally, the presence of General Botha in London in 1911 at the imperial conference was regarded with suspicion in certain Boer circles. This was the third London trip that their general had made; and he seemed to enjoy himself there. For the first trip at the conclusion of the war there was, indeed, justification—the obtaining of British aid for post-war reconstruction. His second journey in 1907 to the colonial conference in that year might be overlooked, although some criticism existed of his presentation of the Premier diamond to Queen Alexandra. What was a gracious acknowledgment of the restoration of self-government to the Transvaal in Botha’s eyes appeared in different aspect to many thrifty Boers. But to go there a third time so shortly after, and to accept an honorary generalship in the British army—this seemed to many on the back veldt unpardonable.

And now that their general had returned there was talk of a contribution to the British navy! What had the Transvaal and the Free State, inland regions both, to do with the British navy? British imperial troops still were quartered in the Transvaal. Let them first be withdrawn and South Africa be more thoroughly trusted. The Boers waited with impatience an elucidation of General Botha’s defense policy.

His immediate plans were cautious, providing not at all for the navy but for the creation of a land defense force somewhat on the model of that existing already in Australia. The Boers were not at all opposed to this; but toward a navy they were thoroughly antagonistic, and many of them thought that Botha’s ideas in this respect were not altogether orthodox. There had already been talk of a *Kleine Vlootje*, mosquito fleet. This they did not want, even if it was manned by true Afrikanders and the commands given in Dutch. But worst of all, Botha had hinted that some

¹ *South African Hansard*, Third Session, 2020.

day something should be done for the naval defense of the Dominion.

The Unionists were at one in insisting on it. They pointed out that the trifling contribution given before union by Natal and the Cape Colony, and continued afterwards as part of the constitutional assumption of all financial obligations of the four colonies, was a bagatelle, even on a per capita basis of the white population alone; they spoke with feeling of the British naval base in South Africa, supported by the British treasury at an annual expense of over £1,000,000; they grew alarmed at the danger to the sea-borne trade of South Africa should the British control of the seas be endangered. But all this was of no avail. The Boer majority let the British carry on a one sided debate. It made no difference to them whether the British Unionists proposed to devote one per cent of the annual revenue (£164,000) to the fleet or whether they suggested an insurance scheme based on trade percentages: the majority had no intention of paying either.

Then, on December 14th, 1912, General Botha suddenly resigned his premiership. This act, a surprise to all who were not behind the scenes, marked the beginning of an open fight within the ranks of the South African Party, a contest which was to grow unceasingly more bitter until it culminated in the open revolt of the Hertzog following.

The facts surrounding Botha's resignation were simple. General Hertzog, in a speech at De Wildt, went out of his way to make certain slurring remarks about British imperial interests. "South Africa," he said, "should be governed by the pure Afrikander. . . . All the clamoring for a great fleet contribution emanated from a few thousand, or few hundred thousand people who had axes to grind. . . . The main object was to keep the Dutch and English people separate." These sentiments made Botha angry. He was endeavoring at that time to win the seat in Parliament left vacant by the resignation of Dr. Jameson; and this outburst

of Hertzog's resulted in his losing it by a large majority. Why should his Orange Free State colleague needlessly dig up old enmities; the Cabinet should speak as one voice. He reproached Hertzog, and requested him to refrain from attacking the British. The latter angrily answered that he only stated that South Africa should come first: did Botha deny that it should? The Premier said that of course South Africa should come first but that there was no need to announce it from the house-tops.

Meanwhile Colonel Leuchars, a Cabinet member representing Natal, took up the Empire's quarrel by announcing that General Hertzog was ready "to use the Empire until he had finished with it and then throw it aside like a sucked orange." Leuchars resigned. Hertzog, despite the request of the Prime Minister, refused to do likewise. In consequence, Botha handed in his own resignation to the Governor-General, Lord Gladstone. The latter asked him to form another Cabinet which he did, excluding Hertzog.

The issue which Botha in his wisdom had ignored was thus brought to the surface. The Boers, living in their up-country homesteads, were unacquainted with the amenities of politics; and particularly true was this of those in the Free State. That isolated province had recovered but slowly from the ravages of war. There were within its borders no rich mines; agriculture was depressed and the people poor; and Hertzog was their own general. The Free State had been ignored by Botha, so they thought, the Boer cause no longer was dear to his heart. Rumor ran high, and on the opening of the new Parliament in January 1913 none knew what might be the fate of the Cabinet.

In two weeks time came a congress of the entire South African Party. To heal the breach became impossible, as all South Africa realized. De Wet demanded Botha's resignation and the appointment of the blind old President of the Free State as party leader. Since this would ruin all hopes of a *rapprochement* with the English-speaking Afrikaner,

Botha refused. There were for him but two possible courses: "to continue to work with General Hertzog and to see the two white races in South Africa divided into two hostile camps, or to remain true to the principles of coöperation upon which the party of the Government had been formed." Botha proposed a commission to settle the inter-party feud: Hertzog would have none of it. He accused Botha of weakness, lack of principle, of being a "careless sower, scattering ill will broadcast among the people in the name of reconciliation." A vote between the two contestants followed. The Transvaal Afrikaner, it was known, would follow Botha, those from the Free State, Hertzog. The balance of power would rest with those of Boer blood from the Cape Colony. They elected to follow Botha, the vote resulting in his favor, 131 to 90. Hertzog and his followers withdrew; but as the sessions still continued many of them drifted back, and then, falling once again under the magnetic influence of Botha, they reattached themselves to his leadership. Singleness of purpose, however, combined with untiring zeal or hate, and the sheer force of circumstance, was destined to give the small minority which stood by the Free State general the power and opportunity of wrecking South African harmony.

But for the time being General Hertzog was helpless. He could do nothing in Parliament. Botha was preferred even by the Unionists. From the Labor Party Hertzog extracted some comfort. They also hated Botha, but for different reasons, and when in April 1913 the Labor Party moved a vote of censure against the Premier, Hertzog supported it. Botha had been false, he asserted, to the principles of the South African Party, he had caused attacks to be made by the press on himself and had driven him from the party. He stood for the imperialism of Downing Street which the Cape opposed as well as the Transvaal; and when the Prime Minister indignantly denied this, Hertzog reasserted his

charge and claimed that it must be true since he, Botha, attacked him for saying that South Africa must come first.

Botha answered that he could see no necessity for a personal quarrel. "General Hertzog seems to think that he is the only Afrikaner. He (Botha) had summoned a congress for the purpose of making his own blanket a little bigger. They should all try to sleep under one blanket and it was not right to break up the Party." The motion to censure the Government was lost, 42 to 68. But Hertzog publicly denounced Botha as a *papbroeck* (an invertebrate) and retired to the back veldt, there to fulminate against him.

Aside from the threatened split of his own people, three other problems of the first magnitude confronted Botha during the period of his premiership before the war. The first concerned the negro, the second, Hindu immigration; the third, labor troubles on the Rand and elsewhere.

The negro problem, potentially the most serious of them all, offered for the time being the least difficulty. Within the borders of the Union one and a quarter million Whites were outnumbered by the negroes almost four to one. The statistics from the census of 1911 are illuminating. They run as follows:

The Cape	{ European	583,377
	{ Colored	1,982,588
Natal	{ European	98,114
	{ Colored	1,095,921
Transvaal	{ European	420,562
	{ Colored	1,265,650
Free State	{ European	175,589
	{ Colored	352,985

From this it may be seen that the proportion of negroes to Whites in the Union averaged from two to one in the Free State to ten to one in Natal, a serious problem made worse by the presence of 150,000 Asiatics, for the most part from India.

Fortunately for the peace of South Africa a large majority of the negroes were already segregated from the Whites.

The problem, as all Afrikanders, both Boer and British, conceived it, was to keep them so. Botha's Boer countrymen were unanimous in this regard, at least. But if the negro was to be excluded from owning land in white territory, the reverse process should hold good. They must also, so it was held, become accustomed to the individual ownership of land, and be protected in it from fraud, usury and theft.

In consequence the Government adopted in regard to certain tribal lands a policy frankly paternalistic. Under the law as passed the procedure is that the Government first surveys the land, dividing it approximately into nine-acre lots. These are then given to the natives on a quit rent basis. The allotments cannot be mortgaged, nor may they be sold or even disposed of by will without special consent of the Government. Furthermore they may be taken away from their owners for certain specific crimes and for failure to occupy. Upon the death of the owner the land passes to his first-born male child although the European magistrate may, on show of cause, disinherit the heir for another child. These allotments are small; but it must be remembered that the actual cultivation of the land by the negro is seldom of importance. His chief means of livelihood is his live stock and a generous acreage is reserved by the Government for pasturage under communal ownership.

The land laws also regulated the form of government which must prevail over all such land surveyed. The ordinary method of procedure called for the creation of a number of districts over each of which was placed a white magistrate assisted by a district council of six natives. Of the latter, two are appointed by the Government and four are elected by the land owning natives. But this council has no executive power. It is simply an advisory body and the magistrate may override its acts, or even dismiss its members if so inclined. A regular revenue, however, is assigned to it, derived from a hut tax of 10 shillings a year levied

on all adult males, the money thus raised to be spent for agricultural improvement, education, roads, etc.

This experiment in dealing with the problem of color was not new; except in certain particulars it had been foreshadowed by the Cape Colony law of 1894. Nor, on the other hand, was it generally applicable all over the Union. In all four provinces numerous natives continued to live under the old tribal system, and everywhere throughout South Africa the greater part of the manual labor was still borne by the Blacks. But it did mark the beginning of the end of the old tribal system and the inauguration of a definite policy of segregation. It was officially taken for granted by the Union Government that individual ownership of property was a good thing for the negro, an assumption not altogether axiomatic. In regard to the physical separation of the races there was less to criticize.

More serious for the time being than the solution of the negro problem, because more pressing, was the question of South Africa's relation to India. For the most part the Indian immigrants in the Union had settled in Natal where they worked as coolies on the sugar plantations. But many of them had drifted to the Transvaal, and in the old days had carried on a moiety of the small trading in the mining districts. Not a few, also, owned bazaars and small shops in the Cape. Only in the Orange Free State was there no Indian intrusion—their presence in that Dutch-speaking province had been forbidden.

The necessity for some general statute dealing with the Indians was apparent. Upon federation each colony had its own distinct method, varying from the Free State's policy of exclusion to the Cape's adoption of the Australian law providing for the writing of some European language at dictation. In Natal, where the Indians outnumbered the Whites, an effort had been made to keep out the wives of the immigrants, in order that the return to India might be accelerated. Also, in that province each Indian was sub-

ject to a special head tax. In the Transvaal a special license to carry on trade had been demanded and enforced, and with the winning of self-government in that colony came total exclusion of the Indian. General Botha was troubled. From India to Britain came protests against the treatment of his Majesty's Indian subjects in South Africa; from the Colonial Office came protests to Pretoria. Were British citizens of whatever color not free to travel anywhere in British territory unmolested and unannoyed by onerous discriminations? For a time it seemed as though the difficulty might be surmounted by a gentleman's agreement which would calm Indian pride yet at the same time prevent racial broils in South Africa. Mr. Gokhale, the well-trusted and beloved Indian Nationalist, was commissioned to make one by the Viceroy of India.

He did so, and the South African Immigration Act, passed in consequence, did not mention Indians by name. But it effected the end sought for. Among its clauses was one which gave the Government the right to exclude any persons whom they considered "on economic grounds, or on account of standards or habits of life to be unsuited to the requirements of the Union or any Province thereof."

The treatment of Indians within the borders of the Union yet remained to be considered. Mr. Gokhale believed that he had settled these difficulties also by informal agreement. But in this he was in error, and the Indians in South Africa under Gandhi's leadership continued to press for the abolition of the head tax in Natal, which was still delayed, for the right of free movement into the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and for the official sanction of certain marriages, legal in India, where polygamy was permitted, but under the ban in South Africa. They did not seek the franchise nor even the right to own land.

The sugar planters in Natal, however, objected to the removal of the head tax and the Indians, aroused by their lawyer, Gandhi, went on strike. Heading a thousand of the

strikers, Gandhi advanced on the Transvaal. He was turned back without loss of life, but in Natal a number of Indians were killed. Gandhi was placed in prison and the Government, nonplussed, appointed a commission of inquiry. Gandhi was released that he might testify before it; but this he refused to do since its membership was entirely white. Meanwhile, the Nationalists in India made much capital over the imprisonment of their compatriots in South Africa. Appeals were made to the Crown for imperial intervention. And as this was done, Mr. Gandhi, motivated by the peculiar chivalry which at times characterizes him, refused to make further trouble. The Government, he stated, already had sufficient embarrassment in the industrial crisis which confronted it. He would not add to it.

The Indian agitator in Natal had reference to the labor agitation on the Rand. This, in the year 1913, culminated in a great strike among the miners which, spreading elsewhere, by the beginning of 1914 assumed such proportions that martial law was declared in South Africa. Botha was confronted by serious trouble on the Rand. Mining conditions in South Africa had changed greatly from the early days of democratic individualism which marked the coming of Cecil Rhodes to the Witwatersrand. The mines now were at deep levels, and since expensive machinery was essential to their development they were controlled by large capitalists who lived for the most part in Europe. Of the men actually engaged in mining some 23,000 were white, some 170,000 black. The former were constantly changing their place of work, floating from one mine to another and working, according to custom, on a contract system which offered big chances of winning, or of losing.

Their physical health was exceedingly poor; over a third were tainted with silicosis, a form of tuberculosis in which the lungs gradually fill up with particles of stone. Their average earnings were not high and discontent was rife among them. In the old days they could vent part of

their rage upon the Boers; but now, by 1913, many landless Boers were enrolled among their number, ready listeners like themselves to the advocates of violence and syndicalism.

In the summer of 1913 a strike began at a small mine over the question of a Saturday holiday. The miners there downed tools and advanced on other mines urging that the strike become general. In accordance with the prevalent Roman Dutch law unauthorized public meetings were illegal: the striking miners, accustomed to English usage, continued to hold them, and to compel also all other miners to quit work. Lord Gladstone sent imperial troops to Johannesburg, and in the riots which ensued some twenty were killed, some twenty-five wounded. Botha repaired in person to the scene of action, and by promising a fair investigation persuaded the miners to return to their labor.

But his triumph was brief; this strike proved but the curtain-raiser for the real drama. As the result of the consolidation of the South African railways on the advent of the Union, a number of employees were discharged. One of them, a Mr. Poutsma, with a revolutionary record in his own Holland, organized a general strike of the railway men in which the miners joined. This threatened starvation to Johannesburg, for food supplies in the immediate neighborhood of that city were scanty. Within Johannesburg a committee of public safety was organized by the strikers on lines distinctly revolutionary. The strikers made no effort to conceal their political designs. Education in orthodox socialism they held too slow; the overwhelming preponderance of Dutch-speaking farm owners could not be converted by either the written or the spoken word. But the workers by a general strike could control both mines and railways.

Thus they argued, as Botha, at the head of a hastily gathered commando hit straight at Johannesburg. The ringleaders of the strike were ensconced in the town hall, the red flag flying above them. The Premier surrounded the building, captured the occupants, conveyed ten of them

secretly to a seaport and put them on the *Umgeni*, a vessel then bound for the old country. This highhanded procedure brought down a storm of protest in both England and South Africa. Whatever Botha was, it was quite evident that the term *papbroeck* did not apply to him. In England, Mr. Macdonald and the *Morning Post* were for once in agreement, and equally indignant; the former at the outrageous violation of the legal rights of a workingman; the latter at the affront shown to British citizens. In South Africa the Labor Party cried out shrilly in Parliament, while Hertzog and his small following watched their chance to trip Botha.

Only the Prime Minister was calm. It was rather absurd to try these men for high treason and as General Smuts, the Minister of Defense, explained in Parliament in regard to Poutsma, "There is no crime on the statute book for which he could be prosecuted."¹ The danger was imminent, the action necessary. Thus Botha thought, and since his act was unquestionably illegal he introduced into Parliament a bill of indemnity for the Government, to which a clause was attached forbidding the reëntry of the ten deported men.

The passage of this bill was violently contested throughout the first half of 1914. Contradictory versions of the happenings on the Rand were freely advanced: were the strikers as lawless as the Government asserted; did they really preach anarchy and practice violence toward the non-union men; was there no other method of maintaining civil government than by violating civil rights held dear by Englishmen in times past?

The Boers staunchly upheld Botha and his policy and in this they were supported by the Unionists. Sir Thomas Smart, their leader, quoted with approval from Oliver Cromwell to the following effect: "If nothing should ever be done but what is according to law, the throat of the nation might

¹ *South African Hansard*, Fourth Session, 1st Parliament, 1914, 1056.

be cut while we send for some one to make us a law.”¹ And this seemed to be the general opinion. Furthermore, the deportations were a *fait accompli*; they could not well be undone. During the Boer War the British had not hesitated to deport Boer sympathizers. The Boer majority was not altogether displeased thus to turn the tables on their former enemies; and the more indignant England became, the more willing were they to condone this illegality on the part of their general.

That was not true of all South Africans, and particularly of that ever independent leader of opinion at the Cape, Mr. Merriman. He was much disturbed over Botha's policy and parried successfully Smart's quotation from Cromwell with one from the younger Pitt. Said the latter, in regard to the Wilkes' trial in the eighteenth century: "The acquiescence of respectable people in injustice where its victim is a reprobate or a nuisance has made easy the first inroads on the liberty of a whole nation."² This, Merriman considered a finer precedent. Base as the deported men might be, Botha committed a wrong in depriving them of their legal rights.

The prestige of General Botha, however, was, if anything, strengthened. The Labor Party won a seat or two in Parliament and carried a number of local elections; but labor opposition proved futile and the strike was lost. Close-mouthed yet friendly, cautious yet generous, easy-going yet firm-willed, the Prime Minister after four years of dissension and turmoil continued to retain the confidence of his people.

¹ *Ibid.*, 491.

² *Ibid.*, 883.

CHAPTER IV

AUSTRALIA BECOMES A COMMONWEALTH

Meanwhile, across the seas in far Australia was born a nation. The birth to many seemed belated. The confederation of Canada had already been a fact these thirty years. Yet for half a century the colonies in *Australia felix* had freely reveled in constitutional liberties, had set new precedents in democratic government, had enfranchised women, had endowed the aged poor with pensions, and had boldly utilized the taxing powers of the state for social ends. Why was it that the twentieth century came before they copied conservative Ontario and yet more conservative Quebec?

For many decades the federation of the island continent had been occasionally suggested; but not until 1890 was real headway made in that direction. The political trend in Australia had long been centrifugal. The Government of New South Wales in the beginning functioned over all the widely scattered settlements on the Australian coast; and they of Sydney had been too autocratic, so thought many a disgruntled colonist. Political agitation, therefore, had been in favor of decentralization. From the Mother colony the island of Tasmania had seceded, likewise South Australia to the southeast, Victoria to the south, Queensland to the north, each alike equipped with legislature, charter, royal governor, the complete paraphernalia of colonial self-determinism. From railway gauge to postage stamp each colony stood apart, rejoicing, if not thriving, in its own particularism. To reverse the whole process of Australian history was no simple matter. In wealth and population New South Wales in 1890 still towered far above her sister states. To offset the danger of her renewed domi-

nation and to make Australia one, strong pressure was essential.

It came from three directions, the economic situation within Australia, the expansion of the United States and Europe within Pacific waters, and the growing fear of Asiatic immigration.

Before the days of railways it made little difference whether New South Wales continued under free trade and Victoria became protectionist, or the reverse. But as the hinterland of these colonies was occupied, and as business developed on an intercolonial basis, the absurdity of six variant tariffs became apparent. Some fiscal unity seemed inevitable.

Secondly must be noted the consternation caused in Australia by the apparent designs of France, Russia and even Germany in the Pacific. French colonial ambitions, long dormant, had reawakened, and the Third Republic was now making claims to the New Hebrides. As for Russia, almost every well informed student of foreign affairs in the latter nineteenth century prophesied a coming duel between that country and the United Kingdom. During the Crimean War a Russian descent from Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka had been feared. Since 1860 the Russians had been snugly ensconced in Vladivostok. And soon the prospect of a fortified Port Arthur was to bring the Cossack danger nearer. Furthermore, in 1884, northeastern New Guinea, at their very door, was declared a German protectorate, and in the following year the German flag was hoisted in Samoa. The Germans had come to stay, and there was every evidence of a determination on their part to expand in the Pacific as the purchase, after the Spanish-American War, of the Marianne, Pelew and Caroline Islands indicated.

The men of Australia, long since alarmed, had asked for information in regard to British plans for their military and naval protection. This had pleased England. Hitherto, mindful of 1776, that country had been chary of even sug-

gesting that the colonies should share in the expenses incurred by the Motherland in their defense. But when the colonies, of their own accord, began to ask for assistance the opportunity came for the Colonial Office to reply in kind and to inquire as to the readiness of the colonies to make a contribution for this purpose. A situation was thus created which made the scattered folk in Australia give serious attention for the first time in their happy history to their future security. They were not as isolated as they had thought. Directly to the north lay the island of New Guinea, hitherto uninhabited by Whites; suppose, for instance, an unfriendly power there! The suggestion made them uneasy. Queensland, the nearest colony to New Guinea, had hoped in 1883 to solve this particular difficulty by annexing the island without consent of Parliament. But Britain had disavowed her action. New Zealand had had a similar experience. Problems such as these were too comprehensive for little colonies to settle; only by union could they expect to solve them.

And finally, the immense difficulties which confronted the colonies in the matter of Asiatic immigration drove them more rapidly toward federation. Even more serious in Australia than in California was this issue, for Australia faced not only alien immigration from Japan and China, but also a torrential flood (*in posse*) from India where flew the British flag. How could South Australia, for instance, unless aided by her sister colonies, cope with this situation? Indian interests were powerful at Westminster, and Mr. Chamberlain had frankly warned the Australian premiers in 1897 that there were traditions of Empire to keep in mind. The Indians were her Majesty's subjects; could they be kept out of any portion of her realm? They must be, Australia maintained, if the continent was to stay a white man's country, and to guarantee this, concerted action was imperative.

In view of these circumstances, Sir Henry Parkes of

New South Wales took the initiative in 1890 and summoned a convention in which there were representatives of all the colonies, New Zealand included. This assembly was succeeded the following year by another, which drew up the rough draft of a constitution strikingly like that finally adopted in 1900. To further its acceptance various leagues and associations were formed, the representatives of which petitioned the colonial legislatures to appoint *de jure* delegates to formulate officially a constitution which might be submitted to the electorate. This request was acceded to by all the colonies except New Zealand and Queensland, and in March, 1897, a convention met in Adelaide to determine a form of government for the new nation.

The men who were intrusted with this labor, like those who met in Philadelphia a hundred and ten years earlier, had wide experience in practical politics. Long years of self-government in Australia had well fitted her public men for this duty, and unlike the fathers of the American constitution, they had as models for their study the federal systems already evolved in Switzerland, the United States and Canada. This was a great advantage; but it was counterbalanced on the other hand by a great difficulty which did not confront the constitution makers of America. The Australian delegates had to provide *de novo* a federal form of government which would prove satisfactory for a society already organized on a complicated economic basis. The problem in America had been more simple. Between 1787 and 1897 there intervened, in the United States, the Industrial Revolution and all that it implied. A general statement of constitutional powers might be sufficient for the eighteenth century; to meet conditions in America at the end of the nineteenth a long array of judicial decisions had been added. The framework of the Australian constitution of necessity could not be simple. It had to be specific in detail and yet sufficiently elastic for future growth. How was it to be constructed?

In regard to certain clauses in their constitution the men of the Antipodes came to a ready agreement. Among them were: representative institutions; an administration subordinate to, not independent of, the legislature; a single responsible executive in the person of the premier who should himself be a member of the legislature, and whose cabinet should be likewise. In this they followed British and Canadian precedent.

But here their unanimity ceased, and as they hammered out their constitution it was apparent that, familiar as they were with the constitutions of Canada and Great Britain, they preferred one in many respects modeled on the American, a fact that was reluctantly recognized by the British government when the finished instrument was sent to London for approval.

But the reason for this was not the one given by Mr. Chamberlain. It was not, as he said, because the Canadian constitution was drawn up in England while that of Australia was formulated south of the equator. The real reason was that the American situation in 1787 was in one important respect analogous to the Australian in 1897. In Australia as in the United States a compromise had to be made between the larger and the smaller states or else federation was impossible.

In Canada, the constitution of 1867 might not have taken a federal form at all had it not been that otherwise Quebec would have vetoed it. The problem of the Canadian statesmen was to make as strong a central government as possible, and at the same time win the support of Quebec and also that of the "fierce democracy" of the maritime provinces, ever suspicious of centralized government. There were no prairie provinces as yet in the Dominion, and the Canadian Fathers were fearful lest a weak Canada succumb to the American magnet. In Australia there was not as much instant dread of a powerful neighbor. On the other hand the smaller states were even more jealous of their own

autonomy. Therefore, the peculiar problem which confronted the constitution makers in Australia was to buttress up the small states against the large ones in order that the approval of the former might be secured. In consequence, in the constitution of the new Commonwealth all the powers of the central government, like the American and unlike the Canadian system, are enumerated, the states retaining all powers not taken from them by the constitution. So also, that the less important states in the Australian Commonwealth might be the better protected from their more populous neighbors, a strong second chamber was deemed essential, and a senate was provided, six senators being allotted to each state regardless of population, with the guarantee that for all time the states should retain an equal representation in that body.

As might have been expected, strong objection was taken to this provision by New South Wales, and much was said by her representatives about its unfairness: but they made no keen fight to prevent its adoption. It was generally realized that otherwise the consent of the small states could not be obtained, and it was finally adopted by the convention by a vote of forty-one to five.

But what should be the powers given to this senate? All British practice had been that the control of money bills should rest in the lower house of the legislature. The United States constitution had made acknowledgment of this by the clause which stated that money bills should originate in the House of Representatives. The Australians were unanimous in agreeing to this principle; but should the upper house have anything at all to say about money bills? Should it have the right even to amend them? If it did so a victory was won for the small states; if it did not, but could simply reject or approve, the two larger states, Victoria and New South Wales, with their overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives, would have an important advantage.

The first round in this contest went to the smaller states. As far as actual delegates in the convention were concerned they had the majority, for each state had ten, making thirty votes for Tasmania, West and South Australia combined, against twenty for Victoria and New South Wales; Queensland at this time still held aloof and sent no delegates to the convention. Therefore, in order to force this matter to a speedy issue, the smaller states demanded that it be immediately considered before action be taken on any other disputed point. And this was acceded to with a heavy heart by the delegates from the larger colonies, who felt that the convention would here come to an end.

Mr. Reid, the Prime Minister of New South Wales, then moved a resolution to deny the right of the Senate to amend money bills. Promptly there was a deadlock. The delegates of the three smaller states had the votes to defeat it; the delegates of the two larger ones affirmed flatly that unless it was passed, New South Wales and Victoria would reject federation. The amendment was apparently lost until Mr. Barton came to the rescue. He, next to Sir Henry Parkes, had been the foremost advocate of confederation, and as he was ill at the time of the debate the convention had postponed its vote. The result of this delay was that private as well as public pleading with the delegates won over a sufficient number to secure the amendment's passage. It was carried, twenty-five to twenty-three, a victory for the larger states.

The Queen's Jubilee now intervening, the convention was adjourned in order that the premiers might go to London. In September of the same year it reconvened in Sydney.

The principal debate in Sydney again was on a question which involved the rights of the small as opposed to the large states. It was held on the specific issue as to how a deadlock between the upper and the lower houses of the legislature might be avoided. The controversy over this matter had begun at Adelaide and exception was there

taken to the fact that the draft of the constitution made no provision for settling deadlocks between the two houses. Certainly the experience of the United States should have suggested to the delegates the necessity of providing for this difficulty: but to do so was not easy, and Mr. Barton argued that the more important deadlocks which arose between two co-equal legislative bodies were caused by disputes over money bills, and as such bills could not be amended by the Senate the principal cause of deadlocks was done away with. This, however, did not satisfy the delegates. Troublesome disputes might arise over other matters and some method, they considered, should be found for their constitutional solution. In consequence, a number of amendments to the draft were presented. But all of them brought up the issue of the small versus the large states. If there was to be a joint sitting with equal votes the larger states would win; on the other hand if the lower house was dissolved and an election held, this would give the Senate too much power, and the small states controlled the Senate.

At Sydney the question of deadlocks was vigorously debated for six days, for a compromise of some sort was held essential. One proposal made conjointly by the premiers of South Australia and New South Wales was to formulate a list of subjects which affected state interests and to apply to them a dual referendum, both state and commonwealth. In all other cases a commonwealth referendum was to decide the issue. This was rejected as too complicated, and a great number of other solutions were proposed, amendment and counter-amendment which soon tangled up the delegates in a mass of verbiage.¹ Finally the question was left for a third session of the convention to settle.

This met in Melbourne in January, 1898, and was the most important of the three, for during its sessions a final agreement was made on all disputed points. The matter


¹ Quick and Garran, *The Annotated Constitution of Australia*, 192.

of deadlocks was again threshed out. Many members objected to any mention of the word referendum in the constitution, considering that such a device took away from the prestige of representative government. At last the difficulty was solved as follows: in the case of a deadlock and the second passage of a disputed bill by the lower house of the legislature, after three months from the first passage the Government was authorized to call a new election of both houses. If disagreement again arose a joint sitting was to be called and the bill became law if supported by a three-fifths majority of those present.

Many other complicated problems were also solved by this session, among them one relating to the control of navigable rivers by the federal government. In accordance with precedents set in the United States, the control of navigation was left to the federal authorities. But the situation in Australia was peculiar. The principal river system was that of the Murray-Darling, which emptied into the ocean through South Australia but which had its head waters for the most part in New South Wales. If the latter state should use these head waters extensively for irrigation purposes it was felt by South Australia that river commerce would be injured since the stream would become shallow, and an attempt was made therefore by that state to safeguard her own interests specifically in the constitution. It was generally conceded that navigation came under federal control, and irrigation under that of the state. But in Australia "irrigation and conservation works in the states, if uncontrolled by the Commonwealth, might destroy the navigability of the rivers; whilst navigation regulations of the Commonwealth, and more especially works for maintaining and improving the navigability of the rivers, might seriously interfere with irrigation and conservation."¹

Out of this situation, therefore, a neat quarrel was created. South Australia held out for the use of the word

¹ *Ibid.*, 195.



navigability as expressive of the Commonwealth's powers; but New South Wales objected to this for the Australian rivers, generally shallow during a large part of the year, might readily prove unnavigable if irrigation works were constructed. The convention decided against South Australia and stood fast by the expression, *control of navigation*, instead of using the term which she favored. But now, New South Wales, alarmed at any possible federal interference, insisted on a definite reservation in favor of state control of irrigation. This precipitated a further fight which ended in the adoption of the following clause:

"The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the right of a state or the residents therein to the reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation."¹

Another protracted battle occurred on the railway questions. While it was determined to leave the control of the existing railways to the states, some action had to be taken in regard to freight rates. In the commercial rivalry of New South Wales and Victoria railways as well as custom houses had been used as weapons. A flourishing section of New South Wales lay nearer Melbourne, the capital of Victoria, than Sydney, the capital of New South Wales. To prevent the trade of this region being drawn off to the capital of her rival, New South Wales built railways to the border and granted special long distance rates for the Sydney haul. Victoria countered, however, by preferential rates to commodities coming over the border from New South Wales, and the fight was on. Victoria now held that it would be unfair to forbid her preferential interstate rate by the federal constitution while at the same time not interfering with the long distance rates of New South Wales, even though the latter were in force exclusively within her own boundary lines. Victoria asserted that the natural outlet of southern

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1900, LV (cd. 124).

New South Wales was Melbourne, not Sydney, and South Australia supported Victoria in her objection to making preferential rates unconstitutional, hoping that she might capture some of this trade herself. On the other hand, New South Wales contended that scientific railway management necessitated relatively lower rates for long distance hauls. Furthermore, her special rates to the outlying districts were, she stated, granted to encourage the development of new farms by incoming immigrants.

A protracted debate brought no decision. Finally, as a compromise, the whole question of rates was referred to the arbitrament of the law courts. Preferential or discriminating rates were forbidden if "undue or unreasonable or unjust to any state." But regard must be paid by the courts in making their decision to "financial responsibilities incurred by any state in connection with the construction and maintenance of its railways."

Finally, another quarrel should not be omitted in an attempt to make clear the difficulties which beset the delegates. The fiscal clauses in the Australian constitution are most peculiar; they had to be. In 1897 every colony had its own tariff system. New South Wales derived its revenue from the land and was on a free trade basis. That colony was protected, as far as revenue was concerned, no matter what the constitution said about the tariff. On the other hand the revenues of West Australia came almost entirely from a high protective tariff, and tariffs must necessarily be under federal control. The other colonies occupied positions mid-way between New South Wales and West Australia. But all of them depended somewhat on their tariffs to finance their state budgets.

The result of this situation was that New South Wales would suffer increased taxation if any federal tariff was inaugurated and the other colonies were alarmed lest their revenues be taken away from them. Customs dues and internal revenue taxes, however, would bring a large surplus

to the federal government, for the expense of its maintenance, so it was thought, would be slight. What should be done with this surplus; should it be divided among the states; and if so, what should be the basis of distribution? The problem was solved most ingeniously by the following rather intricate method of bookkeeping:

- “1. The Commonwealth shall credit to each state the revenues collected therein by the Commonwealth.
2. The Commonwealth shall debit to each state:—
 - (a) the expenditure therein of the Commonwealth incurred solely for the maintenance or continuance, at the time of transfer, of any department transferred from the State to the Commonwealth.
 - (b) The proportion of the state, according to the number of its people, in the other expenditures of the Commonwealth.
3. The Commonwealth shall pay to each state month by month the balance (if any) in favor of the state.”

By this means New South Wales was partially placated and the other states for the time being guaranteed a certain income. But this did not tell all the story. New South Wales still clamored for further privileges, and that wealthy state secured them by this added clause which provided that for at least five years after a general tariff went into effect:

“The duties or customs chargeable on goods imported into a state and afterwards passing into another state for consumption, and the duties or excise paid on goods produced or manufactured in a state and afterwards passing into another state for consumption shall be taken to have been collected not in the former but in the latter state.”

New South Wales profited from this clause as follows: that state was the consumer of wines from West Australia and wines were a likely subject of excise duty. The Mother colony objected to paying this excise only to have the greater part of it remitted to the state where the wine was produced. The first part of the above clause was intended simply to balance the situation on paper. What was im-

ported from abroad would enter each state anyway through its port of entry. No railway connected West Australia with the east and it was only in rare instances that goods were imported through Sydney from other colonies.

West Australia was now permitted to retain a special tariff for five years against the other colonies in order to have time to make new fiscal arrangements. But that tariff was not to exceed the federal tariff and was to be cut down one-fifth every year until it ceased to exist. So ended the fiscal battle. The details of the settlement have been regarded in certain quarters as complicated.

Concerning the other provisions of the constitution there were few points of friction. The location of the federal capital caused trouble; but that was shunted to one side by leaving it to the future Parliament to decide where it should be located. Marriage and divorce were placed under the control of the central authorities. A few minor flaws in the constitution of the United States, closely studied by the Australian statesmen, were remedied in the new instrument of government. And finally, a High Court for Australia was established with comprehensive powers in regard to interpreting the constitutionality of future legislation.

The constitution, however, had yet to be accepted, and against it a tumultuous fight was waged in New South Wales. That colony still had reasons for regarding the new constitution with disfavor. Its enforcement would inevitably prove, for some years at least it was maintained, a pecuniary hardship. Owing to a tariff which they did not want one and one-third million people would find prices higher. In the Senate the representation of New South Wales would be the same as little Tasmania. Furthermore, the mother colony took immense pride in her marvelous seaport, Sydney; but Sydney was not chosen as the capital. This, to some minds, seemed an affront. The leading protagonist of federation, Mr. Barton, came from New South Wales, and Mr. Reid, the Premier, had advocated federation warmly.

Nevertheless, the trail of Mr. Reid in federation matters had been circuitous. Although claiming to be an ardent federationist he had been responsible for the clause in the enabling act of 1897 which provided that a minimum of 80,000 votes must be cast in favor of the proposed constitution. Throughout the convention debates his attitude had been far from conciliatory; and now that the work of the convention was to be passed on by a plebiscite of his own colony he so damned the plan with lukewarm praise as to give aid and comfort to the opposition.

The enemies of the constitution were powerful. They drew their strength from both rich and poor. The former objected to the financial clauses which they thought would increase taxation; the latter were sulky because the new constitution, for ordinary purposes of legislation, made no use of that popular fetish among Australian labor politicians, the referendum. Yet the friends of the measure were many and the election was close. For federation there was a majority; but since the total vote cast in favor was under the required minimum the constitution was defeated and the cause of Australian nationalism suffered a distinct check. Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania voted *pro*, and by substantial majorities. Queensland, however, not having sent delegates to the convention, was in the position of an onlooker, and the Government of West Australia had not even submitted the constitution to the electorate. With over half the area and decidedly more than half the population refusing or deferring assent there could be no Commonwealth.

Still, the friends of union did not despair. A majority of the citizens of New South Wales were on their side; could that one state be won over it was felt that the other two recalcitrant colonies would gravitate toward union. Therefore, the federationists renewed their labors.

New South Wales now proposed a number of amendments to the constitution and these were debated by the conference

of premiers. Some were granted, others refused, still others compromised; and the result was that the important colony at last was appeased. Changes were made in the financial clauses as New South Wales requested. It was also agreed that the future seat of government should be in that colony within a hundred miles of Sydney. Finally, instead of a deadlock between the two houses of the legislature being decided by a three-fifths vote of those present at a joint session, it was to be settled by an absolute majority of the membership. New South Wales, having won these concessions, proceeded to ratify.

In the meantime, Queensland secured a special amendment in her own interests which enabled her to divide her huge geographical area into districts for senatorial elections. Thereupon that colony ratified. Only West Australia now held aloof, and the constitution approved by five out of six colonies was sent to London for Parliamentary sanction.

Chamberlain, as Secretary for the Colonies, called a new conference there, not only of the five accepting colonies but also of West Australia and New Zealand.¹ The situation in West Australia was peculiar. Isolated from her sister colonies by enormous distances, traversed by no railway, the traveling time between the capital, Perth, and Sydney was as great as that between New York and Liverpool. The colony was thinly settled, dependent entirely upon the tariff for revenue, and as a condition antecedent to federation it demanded freedom to collect its own tariff for five years without submitting to the sliding scale provided for in the constitution.

The other states would not agree to the change and in the interim the gold mining districts in the eastern section of West Australia clamored for separation. They claimed that they were under-represented in the colonial legislature, that the revenue system bore altogether too heavily upon them

¹ Papers relating to the confederation of Australia, *Sessional Papers*, 1900, CV.

in the interests of the agricultural producers near the seaboard, that they were sufficiently numerous to form a separate colony. Chamberlain did not commit himself to their cause; but he did use their petition as a lever against the Government of West Australia. At his suggestion the obdurate authorities at Perth at last consented to a referendum on the constitution. This vote, also, was in favor of ratification.

New Zealand's case was on another footing. That colony pleaded for an amendment to the constitution which would enable her to enter the confederation at a later date as an original member should she choose to do so. The New Zealanders also asked for a clause which would open to them the High Court of Australia for appeals from their own courts, and they furthermore requested that provision be made in the constitution of the Commonwealth for co-operation between Australia and New Zealand in matters of common defense.

The Australian delegates in London, however, were commissioned to put the bill through, if possible, with no amendments, and they stoutly refused to yield to the New Zealand commissioner. Chamberlain took the position that the dispute was outside his jurisdiction and that it was a question for the colonies to decide for themselves. Mr. Reeves, for New Zealand, had no positive assurances to offer that New Zealand would join the confederation. He argued that the New Zealanders had been falsely informed in regard to public sentiment in Australia, that they had believed the bill doomed to defeat at the hand of the Australian electorate, and that, on that account, they had not thought it necessary to make up their minds. But it was now too late to delay further, so said the men of Australia, and no more attention was paid to these belated protests from Auckland and Wellington.

Only one more obstacle remained before federation was an accomplished fact, that of an appeal to the Privy Council

from the High Court of Australia. The more radical delegates at the constitutional conventions desired to abolish it altogether, the more conservative to place Australia in this matter on the same footing as Canada. A compromise resulted forbidding appeals on constitutional matters. This, Chamberlain did not like; it cut off still further one link of Empire and one which seemed to him important. From Bengal and Cape Colony, from British North Borneo, British Columbia and British Honduras, from Ceylon, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and a large part of the rest of the world, appeals were heard by the Law Lords of the Privy Council. Aside from the Crown it was the only visible bond of empire-unity. Chamberlain had sought to strengthen this court by the inclusion of colonial judges. To impair its influence seemed to him most unfortunate. Yet he would not offend the sensibilities of the delegates. If they wanted to weaken the prestige of this court it was their affair. He did, however, insist that the Australian Parliament should at least have the right to grant appeals from the High Court of Australia, even on cases of constitutional interpretation. This, the delegates would not admit. They were well pleased with the record of the Supreme Court of the United States and they intended their own High Court to be paramount on all questions rising out of the interpretation of their own constitution. The only compromise which they admitted was that the High Court should have the privilege, when it chose to exercise it, of certifying appeals to the Law Lords of the Privy Council.¹ Whereupon the British government yielded, accepted this compromise, and by an act of Parliament placed its imprimatur on the new constitution. In January, 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia became a fact.

¹One attempt has been made to carry an appeal to the Privy Council over the head of the High Court of Australia. The Privy Council refused to entertain it. Quick, Sir John, *The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth*, 702.

The political history of the Commonwealth during the thirteen years which intervene before the Great War is complicated. The elementary business of merely setting the new house in order, the formulation and the application of economic programs, the judicial interpretation of federal powers, the relations of Australia to Great Britain, the settlement of waste land, the building of the federal capital (somewhere, sometime), methods of bringing West and South Australia in closer touch with the populous regions of the east, immigration, and the defense of the new continent against invasion, white or Asiatic; these are the more salient problems which engaged the attention of the Parliament of Australia.

For the most part we may simply enumerate them. The immensely interesting way in which Australian judicial development followed American precedents by giving emphasis to the powers of the High Court, and the violent criticism which that august body met with by declaring unconstitutional the "Trade Mark Act" of 1905, the "Excise Tariff Act" of 1906, and the "Australian Industries Preservation Act" of 1907, must be reluctantly omitted. Nor can space be given to the battle incessantly fought between capital and labor, or perhaps more accurately, between liberalism and labor. In no other country in the world, subject to parliamentary government, has that contest been as intense in the early twentieth century, in none as protractedly waged, in none more dramatic in character or more dubious in outcome. Nevertheless, the story of it is somewhat alien to the purpose of this book. And therefore controversies mainly economic in character, such as those which arose over Commonwealth banking, protective tariffs, land legislation, the "baby bonus," and other proposals of philosophic as well as economic interest must be strictly taboo.

From the standpoint of Australian history these problems are of vital concern; from that of the Empire less so. They affected Australian citizenship and thereby influenced the

morale of the Empire as well as its well-being. But their solution, one way or another, from the imperial point of view was not as important as the maintenance of geographic unity and racial solidarity in Australia. These twin essentials of national cohesiveness were obstructed if not entirely blocked by certain physical circumstances with which Australia had vigorously to cope, and to them and their influence on Australian history the remainder of this chapter is devoted.

Among the underlying facts upon which Australian nationality rests are: the enormous yet poorly articulated area of the Australian continent; paucity of population; and proximity to the overcrowded home lands of China and Japan. With upwards of three million square miles, Australia in extent slightly surpasses the United States; but nature has not been overkind in supplying the means of communication. There are no great mountains, it is true; but there are also no great rivers, with the possible exception of the Murray-Darling; and between the eastern seaboard and West Australia, between Adelaide on the south and Port Darwin on the north lie no fertile prairies such as link together the more favored United States of America. Instead, one finds a vast region, call it that rather than desert, of more than dubious economic value, a fact perhaps indicated by statistics. With a total population of under four million at the time of federation, concentrated in the far south and southeast, with an urban congestion already noticeable in Melbourne and Sydney, the remainder of the continent was virtually without white settlers with the exception of the thinly populated Queensland and a quarter million on the western perimeter.

Furthermore, at the opening of the century, the Australian population was augmenting very slowly. The death rate was low; but so also was the birth rate, and from Britain the stream of immigration had become a trickle. Meanwhile northern Australia had proved itself a magnet

for Asiatics, particularly the Chinese. Five thirteenths of Australia lies within the zone of the tropics and white labor could or would do little to exploit the north. Therefore to that region, especially to the sugar plantations of Queensland, the Chinese came trooping. And Australia feared their coming.

Now as to whether or not Asia, awakened and self-consciously powerful, would insist in time on the admission of its nationals to these undeveloped lands it is idle to debate, nor is it profitable to inquire into the equity of Asiatic exclusion from territory which cannot be occupied by the white peoples to any extent for many decades. The one fact which is of supreme importance is that rightly or wrongly Australia considered the danger both real and imminent, and to protect herself against Asiatic contact was prepared if necessary to make many sacrifices.

The Government of the Commonwealth, aware of these three denationalizing influences, early in its history took measures to combat them. By railway building, by new land laws, by the exclusion of Asiatics, and above all by a system of national defense it sought to build up and to strengthen Australian unity.

Among the first endeavors was the construction of a transcontinental railway which should unite the more outlying portions of the country to the centers of population. This might be built either north and south, joining Port Darwin to Adelaide, or east and west, thus connecting the more thickly settled east and south with Perth in West Australia, distant by steamer some five days. The first route was quickly discarded for various reasons. In the neighborhood of Perth there were already many settlers and in the hinterland of that city many miners. To the north the people were numbered by the hundreds rather than by the thousands. Furthermore, Queensland, adjacent as she was to the Northern Territory, already drew toward Brisbane some of the commerce of north Australia; and there-

fore that state was not over-eager that a railway north and south should be constructed. West Australia also was blessed with a good climate and her immediate future seemed bright. In accordance, therefore, with these considerations the railway was projected from Adelaide in South Australia (already in railway connection with the other states of the Commonwealth) to Perth in West Australia.

The better part of a decade passed, however, before the transcontinental railway made much progress. The Australian problem was far more complicated than that of Canada and the United States in regard to rail connection for two reasons. In the two latter countries, valuable land along the proposed route was sufficient inducement for the investment of private capital. Also in America and Canada there was no difficulty about the gauge that was adopted. Both countries already used the standard. In Australia, however, the most enthusiastic "realtor" would find difficulty in predicating even potential value to much of the land. From Perth the railway already penetrated inland to Kalgoorie; in South Australia the line already existed from Adelaide to Port Augusta toward the west. But between Port Augusta and Kalgoorie for a distance of five hundred miles stretched the Nullarbor Desert. No trees there, somewhat ironically was proclaimed by its name. The Government of West Australia, in whose bailiwick this desert is located, claimed that there was water to be had for the digging. By sinking a number of bores, water was found in one instance within a hundred feet of the surface, and in two instances the water was said to be fit for human consumption. For the most part, however, "even when found by boring it contains solid matter and acids, necessitating filters and other devices. In some cases it is salt and condensers have to be erected," a not very favorable condition for railway building. The Nullarbor plain, to be sure, is only five hundred miles across; but the rest of the terrain crossed by this railway was not promising. With a rainfall

of under ten inches, many years must elapse before sheep could be pastured on the scanty herbage it produced, and therefore, from the sale of land the Commonwealth could expect nothing for an indefinite period.

As for the gauge, a battle royal raged in regard to it. Of the various states New South Wales had the largest mileage, built almost entirely on the standard gauge of four feet, eight and a half inches. Victoria, on the other hand, with mileage little less, had early adopted like Ireland and India the broad gauge of five feet, six inches. Queensland, with its rugged terrain, and in the early days with population both poor and scattered, had built its railways on the narrow gauge of three feet, six inches, as had West Australia and Tasmania. South Australia combined the narrow gauge with the broad, using the latter on the connecting line with Victoria. What should be the gauge of the Commonwealth railway?

There was much to be said for the wide gauge and the subsequent unification of all Australian railways upon it. India, very wisely, had adopted it, since it lowered the center of gravity, made lateral oscillation less and tremendously increased the capacity of freight cars of normal length. As the American railway president, Harriman, said, "the standard gauge is too narrow to permit a properly designed fire box and this causes great waste of fuel. The tall and heavy locomotives rock on the track like ships at sea and cause an excessive wear on both track and machinery."¹ Canada, of course, could be quoted as favoring the standard; but then, Canadian statesmen wanted to provide for the trans-shipment of American goods and America had already adopted the standard. This reason could not hold for Australia. Now was the time for a final adjustment of this question on scientific lines. It was even urged that since Japan had built on the standard, Australia should

¹ Quoted in the Australian Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (Australia), 1911, LII, 3155.

in self-defense go in for the broad in order that the Japanese could not use the Australian railway system in case of hypothetical invasion.

But the standard gauge was to win the decision. Experts from England had urged its adoption as early as 1897 on the ground that it would be easier to convert the already existing lines to standard than to make them all broad. Tunnels, embankments and bridges had already been constructed. In many cases they would have to be built anew should the broad gauge win. The initial cost of the standard was also somewhat less. It was a hard decision for Victoria to accept. That state had constructed her railways on the broad gauge after New South Wales had passed an act in 1852 forbidding the construction of any railways on any other than the broad. New South Wales had shifted then to the standard. Victoria had protested "Home" in vain. And now New South Wales was to gain another victory. The adherents of the standard gauge had a majority in the federal legislature and the standard was adopted for the transcontinental.

The construction of the railway proceeded very slowly. None of the Australian states were particularly interested in its early completion except West and South Australia. After Lord Kitchener arrived and demanded that the line be finished as a matter of federal defense, preparations were greatly accelerated; but so much time was consumed in endless debates in regard to costs, gauges, and contracts that actual construction was delayed. The engineering problem was simple, but that of water and materials, to say nothing of labor, was difficult. West Australia pumped water for hundreds of miles and South Australia gave free land; but the federal Parliament continued to discuss. Jarrah wood, which resisted white ants and dry rot, was expensive to use for sleepers; karri wood, cheaper, was subject to a process called "powellizing," presumably rendering it immune to attack. Which kind should be used? On

matters of this sort there was much to be said, and in consequence the line was not in operation until 1917.

The settlement of the Northern Territory seemed to many Australians almost as important as the building of the transcontinental. Here was a region of 523,000 square miles with a white population of about one thousand. "Fill up your north" was the sapient advice of Theodore Roosevelt to Australia. Fill it up before Asia begins to do so was the thought in the minds of many, and the battle cry in the mouths of the politicians. But how was the Northern Territory to be filled?

Originally it had been a part of South Australia. That wise state had saddled it, with its debts, on the Commonwealth at the beginning of the century, with the understanding that a federal railway would be driven north and south across the continent, a promise still, in 1927, unfulfilled, and not at all likely to be kept. From Oodnadatta at the boundary of South Australia going north there is for seventy miles nothing but desert. Ensues then, every ten miles or so, a water hole, sometimes dry. Two hundred and ninety-five miles beyond Oodnadatta the Macdonnell range is found. Here nature is less niggardly; the rainfall is ten to twenty inches and sheep may find pasturage. There follows more desert, further uplands with slight rainfall, and finally the descent from the upland plateau of some fifteen hundred feet to Port Darwin and the sea. It was plain that Australia faced difficulties with the Northern Territory.

And not the least troublesome was that of land tenure. Leasehold had long been heralded in advanced circles in the Antipodes as the true antidote to land monopoly: but could men be found to occupy the Northern Territory without greater hope of profit than that afforded by the leasehold system? As one Australian Liberal put it: "If you want to get the best out of a man on the soil, if you want to give him heart and encouragement to make a home in which he

will take pride, you must let him feel that he is not a mere tenant living in an atmosphere of uncertainty but an actual possessor.”¹ Settlers would be chary about taking up land in the “back blocks” and there facing floods, drought, loneliness. “If people find that they are only going to get the bare value of their work and that when public works have created improvements in value, those values have been taken away from them, the effect will be to deter people from settling in the Territory. They will not be content to go to a country which is hundreds of miles away from civilization to obtain merely the bare results of their labor when they can obtain greater advantages under more favorable conditions.”² Yet the law was very clear. “No Crown land in the territory shall be sold or disposed of for any estate or freehold except in pursuance of some contract entered into before the commencement of this act.”

The Labor members of Parliament, nevertheless, stood staunchly by their guns. They wanted the Northern Territory occupied, but they objected to capitalism. It was said that a hundred thousand acres was necessary if a man was to obtain a living. This they disputed, claiming that it could be done on five thousand. The grass was there and the sheep could live upon it. Of course the sheep would die in large numbers on the way to market and the difficulty of transporting the clip would be serious. Still, the climate was stimulating although hot, and the elevation was high although the equator was not far distant. Canada obtained immigrants. Life in Canada was lonely, the wheat farmers of the prairie contended against heavy snow storms in winter. Everything favored Australia where they were unknown. They must bide their time.

The Commonwealth government made careful investigation of the north. For transport, camels were imported. Sir George Reid was sent as High Commissioner to Darwin

¹ *Parliamentary Debates* (Australia) 1912, LXV, 1651.

² *Ibid.*, 1912, 1869.

with a salary of five thousand pounds. The railway from that center already had been pushed south many miles to Pine Creek. But it was not carried further. As Senator Rae said, to commence building from the north to the south is to offer our assistance to enemies, who may invade us by our own railways. To commence on the south, on the other hand, was to strike a desert which it took the camels three weeks to pass. A railway seemed out of the question but not so a telegraph line which the Government proceeded to construct. It supplemented this work of progress by appropriations for surveys, medical attendance and educational facilities where, as in the case of Port Darwin, some slight population had gathered.

At any rate the Australians resolved that if white settlers would not occupy the Northern Territory and northern Queensland, neither should the Asiatics. In 1901 the federal Government passed its first Immigration Restriction Act. This followed closely that of New Zealand and prohibited the landing in Australia of "any person who fails to write at dictation a passage of forty words in length in a European language." Already by the census of 1901 there were domiciled in Australia some 54,000 aliens who were colored, among them many Kanakas from the Pacific islands. The increase of Asiatics was much feared. As a New Zealand writer conversant with Australian conditions stated: "The Japanese nation is young, unanimous and irresistible. Tomorrow it will be reinforced by three hundred million Chinese whom Australia recognizes, if England does not, as the smartest traders and the most industrious men in the world."¹

Parallel with the Australian efforts to make more cohesive their unwieldy state were preparations made for the defense of it. In 1903 the first steps were taken in this direction by a law which provided for the organization of a federal

¹Scholefield, G., *White Peril in Australasia*, Nineteenth Century, 58:198-203 (Aug., 1905).

militia and a permanent force of thirteen thousand men and officers. This act, following directly after the first flush of imperial enthusiasm engendered by the participation of Australian units in the Boer War, was the precursor of several laws which, on paper, would seem to imply a thoroughgoing conversion, if not to militarism, at least to a high ideal of military efficiency. Already, by 1907, there was talk of universal military service, and two years later it became a fact, the Commonwealth being thus the first of the English-speaking countries to adopt such a policy.

But it did so on lines distinctly its own. The Australian armed forces were to consist for the most part of boys. School children, aged from eleven to fourteen years, were to be enrolled as junior cadets, and light exercises were to be given them. From the age of fourteen to eighteen the boys of Australia served as senior cadets; they now had uniforms, real rifles and drilled several times a month. Between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, all men who had served as cadets theoretically were subject to occasional drills as members of the Australian militia. They then entered the reserve, unless service in the permanent force or the military instruction of the young appealed to them. The permanent force was to be kept quite small, utilized mainly for coast artillery.

The system did not function smoothly. It depended for its efficiency according to Lord Kitchener, on the merits of the area officers selected to supervise the school boys. These supervisors were too few in number and appointed over districts too large to handle.

Distances in Australia are phenomenal, and many lads whose homes were far away found great difficulty in attending drill. Those on distant stations were, of necessity, excused altogether. Weary of the monotony of drilling, many began to absent themselves; others, earning their own living in whole or in part, found their added military obligations an intolerable burden. The very devotion to

outdoor sport, so characteristic of Australia, served as a deterrent to the creation of a perfect military machine.

British officers imported for the purpose of making this young army function felt, in many instances, completely baffled. The federal authorities were loath to enforce penalties for absence from drills aside from fines, reprimands by magistrates, and by automatically increasing the number of drills required from delinquent boys. It was noted in Parliament that fifty per cent of the youthful army frequently absented itself. Some of the senators did not care. "We ought not to pay too much attention to the opinion of the Imperial officers who have grown up in an army where routine and custom have been settled for generations and where discipline and force is destructive of originality and initiative."¹ Thus said one of them.

Certain of the British officers seem to have been wanting in tact. One, a cavalry instructor, aroused great indignation by insisting that the Australians did not know how to ride. "We don't want showy riders in our country," it was maintained in Parliament, "but good rough country riders." Furthermore, the examination papers and maps were brought from "Home." They contained terms unheard of in the Antipodes, *heaths, fens, fells, hedgerows*. Why should Australian soldiers be expected to understand such words? These imported officers were greatly needed, at least in the beginning, and for every one brought into the Commonwealth an Australian was sent to India or to England. None the less many were the criticisms made in regard to them and the army which they were modeling.

Yet military service appears to have been popular, among the adults. The area officers, despite their small remuneration of one hundred and fifty pounds per annum, worked hard at their task; the Government built cordite and woolen factories, and a small arms factory as well, in accordance with Australian sentiment that everything used in the coun-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates* (Australia) 1912, LXVIII, 6445.

try should, if possible, be locally manufactured. Few objected to the army, except the editors of the *Brisbane Worker*, and the Labor Party was heartily in its favor. It criticized its management. "The Army of a South American Republic in comic opera could scarcely be more farcical," said Mr. Hughes in 1909. But when Labor came into power it made little change in the system. In fact, the war was to arise before it could possibly assume the proportions outlined by Lord Kitchener in his proposals for eleven years of service from the ages of fourteen to twenty-five.

In naval affairs a greater advance was made, and an Australian navy was already in existence by 1914. For its creation both the Labor and the Liberal Parties claimed the credit, and with some show of reason since the former was the first to suggest a separate Australian navy while the latter was the first to make it really effective. Until 1907 Australia clung to the old subsidy system, having increased her subsidy to the Admiralty in goodly proportions after the imperial conference of 1902. Mr. Deakin, the Prime Minister, proposed keeping on with the subsidy and in addition placing a thousand young Australians on British vessels for training. But the Fisher government (Labor) coming into power actually began the construction of an Australian flotilla, to consist for the most part of a mosquito fleet. Followed then the naval scare of 1909 and the temporary return to office of the Liberals. They retained the Fisher scheme but augmented his program after consultation with the Admiralty. A naval unit was decided on, a battle cruiser, three unarmored cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines. In 1913 the battle cruiser *Australia* arrived from England and the light cruisers *Melbourne* and *Sydney*. By the outbreak of the war, docks had been built at Sydney, a naval college was in operation and the Australian fleet was a reality.

Just why Australia was so much more ready to adopt a policy of naval defense than Canada may perhaps best be

shown in the chapter on Imperial Coördination. The Commonwealth, however, never grew enthusiastic about the elaborate naval program laid down for it by Admiral Henderson in 1910. Fifty-two vessels and a personnel of fifteen thousand was considered somewhat large, even in Australia. But for her own military and naval defense she was prepared to stand sponsor and to do her part in upholding the *Pax Britannica* in the South Seas.

CHAPTER V

CANADA AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

Equal to Australia in undeveloped wealth but surpassing her in population stood Canada, Britain's oldest Dominion. The men of the Commonwealth believed the latter fact due simply to propinquity to Europe and to earlier settlement. That any one would really prefer the rigors of the north to their own mild and equable climate seemed beyond belief. They did not sense the majesty of the long clear winters, nor had they felt that bracing stimulus to mind and nerve and muscle which the northland gives her children. Land of forest, prairie, and swift-flowing water, with rich and virgin resources: what more than this could Canada look for?

Three adverse circumstances, however, greatly perplexed Canadian statesmen. They were: American influence, lack of geographic unity, racial jealousy.

Canada, by very fact of physical location, felt strongly the pull of gravity to the south. The wealth, the population, the markets of the United States drew the Dominion like a magnet. Neither the American nor the Canadian people desired union. Both were busily occupied with their own concerns; both were content for the most part with the status quo. None the less in the political as in the physical world there works unceasingly the force of gravity. And in this instance its weight, imponderable but real, troubled perhaps more than it should the thought and the imagination of those intent on making Canada a nation.

A more important factor was the lack of geographic unity. Only the southern stretches of the vast area of British North America gave promise of a fair sustenance for a nu-

merous people, a territory three thousand miles in length and, roughly speaking, from six to sixteen hundred miles in width. Furthermore, east and west throughout the southern half of Canada there was no natural line of communication. The maritime provinces and the settled portions of Quebec and Ontario were, indeed, connected by water; but the St. Lawrence emptied far to the northeast, thus making railway connection necessary if St. John and Halifax were to be brought into close contact with Montreal and Toronto. Going west, the terrain for an interval of many miles was inhospitable. Between the fertile prairie provinces and the St. Lawrence valley lay rough and rocky regions of huge extent and slight economic worth. And westward, yet again, the Canadian Rockies barred, seemingly, commercial intercourse between the Pacific slopes and the interior.

The Dominion was not merely disunited physically; it was likewise in the grip of racial feuds. It could not well be otherwise since there lived within its borders, side by side, two races, distinct and separate in language, religion, customs and historic antecedents. The French Canadians had refused to enter confederation at all without constitutional recognition of Quebec's particularism. Nor had they any intention of confining their clannishness, or perhaps better, racial integrity, to Quebec alone. To Ontario and Manitoba they emigrated in large numbers, and soon from these provinces were heard loud cries for French schools with religious instruction exclusively Catholic, demands which found full vocal expression in Canada's new Parliament. And if the French Canadians were obdurate and narrow in their point of view it must not be forgotten that the descendants of the United Empire Loyalists were none too prone to meet half way their fellow citizens of French extraction. The Catholic hierarchy in Canada might hinder, as was alleged, all intermixture of the two races: but if it did so, it had its counterpart in the influential Orange lodges equally determined to uphold pure Protestantism.

Despite these obstacles to union, Canadian nationality by the end of the century had become a reality. The Inter-colonial Railway now linked east to center, and the Canadian Pacific, constructed by resolute men in the face of all obstacles, supported by politicians for once equally resolute, wound its way through prairie and over mountain to the Pacific. Likewise, incredible though it seemed to many, a Roman Catholic French Canadian had become, in 1896, Prime Minister of her Majesty's first overseas Dominion.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier was no new figure in Canadian politics. From the Quebec legislature he had graduated years before to that of the Dominion and there, by quiet charm, conciliatory manner, and sheer hard work had risen to the leadership of the Liberal Party. A loyal communicant of the old church, he had for many years resisted ultramontane tendencies within it; an equally loyal representative of the French Canadians, he had worked and fought with those of purely British stock for the success of a Canadian Liberal party on a nationalistic basis. His ideas were clean cut and tangible. He was a Liberal of the older British tradition rather than of the new, a man intensely devoted to the cult of individualism, and at the same time attached both by affection and conviction to the British Crown.


His name is revered by many as that of Canada's foremost statesman. The fifteen years of his premiership (1896-1911) marked an unparalleled expansion of Canadian trade and commerce; but it is not for his economic sagacity, which might be questioned, that he is held in honor. The worth of a country does not lie in bank deposits nor yet in railway mileage. The construction of the C.P.R. during the premiership of Sir John Macdonald might be followed by that of the Grand Trunk Pacific; a Transcontinental might be initiated, thus adding a third connecting link between east and west; to Hudson Bay a railway might be planned; and land values in Medicine Hat and Saskatoon might soar to the empyrean; and still Can-

ada would not be a nation. Nor, for accomplishments of this nature, would Laurier choose to be remembered.

He was not an economist; he did not seek happiness and well being for his Canada primarily in the full purse. His interest lay in creating a just and permanent equipoise between the federal and provincial governments on the one hand and between the federal and British government on the other. Loyalty to Quebec he did not consider as inconsistent with loyalty to Canada. Nor did his ever stiff maintenance of the prestige of his own Canadian country ever appear to him detrimental to the larger interests of the Empire. In these broader aims Laurier was to an astonishing degree successful, as he was also, during the greater part of his Parliamentary career, in his efforts to demolish the barriers of caste and suspicion that separated French from British Canadians, both to him British citizens, and both obligated to live in harmony and concord that the unity of the Dominion might be real and permanent.

As soon, indeed, as he began his premiership he was assailed by his French Canadian compatriots for betraying their cause. In the newly created province of Manitoba a quarrel had broken out over the management of the public schools. The English-speaking inhabitants demanded that instruction in them be in English: those who spoke French insisted that separate schools be established for the immigrants from Quebec, that the Catholic religion be taught in them, that the French Canadians should be exempt from taxation for other schools. The outcome of this conflict is noteworthy. Laurier put through Parliament a compromise by which provision was made for instruction in the French language, and for religious instruction under the direction of the Catholic bishops: but there were to be no separate schools supported by the state under the control of the Church.

The Canadian hierarchy was furious in its attack on Laurier. The Prime Minister appealed to Rome over the



SIR WILFRID LAURIER

head of the bishops, and Cardinal Merry del Val was sent by the Pope to Canada as his representative to settle the controversy. Upon his return to Italy there came an encyclical from St. Peter's. It characterized the Laurier compromise as "defective, imperfect and insufficient." But on the other hand, it continued, perhaps the Prime Minister did as well as he could under the circumstances. "Let no one lose sight," it stated, "of the rules of moderation, of meekness and of brotherly love." And again, "from the standpoint of intellectual culture and progress of civilization there is nothing but what is great and noble in the plans conceived by the Canadian provinces of developing public instruction, of raising its standards constantly, and making it something higher and more perfect; there is no kind of study, no advance in human knowledge which cannot be made to harmonize with Catholic doctrine."¹ The agitation against Laurier and his treatment of the Church now died down, at least in public.

And as it did so, two other problems engrossed the attention of the Laurier administration, one, the continued settlement of the west, the other, the relations between Canada and the United Kingdom. In regard to the former, the Prime Minister took prompt action. No more land to the railway companies, free land to the immigrant was his policy. And to obtain new settlers a mammoth advertising of the Dominion was inaugurated both in Europe and America. Agents of Canada and also agents of the C.P.R. went to Germany, penetrated into Russia, gave lectures in England and spoke at county fairs in the United States. Persecuted Russians took refuge in Canada. Ruthenians and Germans came likewise, and so ubiquitous were the Canadian agents in the German Empire that Lord Salisbury, the British Premier, complained that they caused the Foreign Office no little inconvenience. The German press also was indignant and claimed, at least in one instance, that

¹ Skelton, O. D., *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, II, 42.

"the attempt to lure our fellow countrymen to this desolate, sub-arctic region is, upon human grounds alone, to be denounced as criminal."¹ Meanwhile in Iowa, Illinois and other settled commonwealths in America the farmers sold their land, attracted by free homesteads on the northern prairies; and from the old country likewise there set in a flood of settlers even larger than from America. The virgin soil of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan could support many million, so it was estimated, though as to just where and how the market could be found for the enormous quantity of wheat raised there, the optimistic Canadians were somewhat hazy.

In the midst of this great land boom came the Boer War. The English-speaking provinces, particularly Ontario, eagerly advocated Canadian participation; French Canada was either indifferent or aloof; and Laurier's first hope was to keep his country united. The action which he took was peculiar: he advocated what amounted to a semi-official Canadian contingent. Volunteers were called for; but their transportation and support was made a British rather than a Canadian charge. There was to be no summoning of the Canadian Parliament nor was the sending of the volunteers to be considered as a precedent for the future. In accordance with this curious arrangement the Canadian forces embarked for the South African war.

Laurier now was attacked on either flank. The smoldering hostility in certain quarters in Quebec caused by his school policy broke out in open criticism. Henri Bourassa, a clever journalist, led a revolt against him of his own French-speaking countrymen, and the *Trifluvien*, published at Three Rivers, claimed that Laurier had "sacrificed the sweat of workingmen, the backbone of industries, even the blood of our children."² In the interim from the Tory camp the lukewarmness of Laurier met with hearty repro-

¹ Willson, B., *Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal*, II, 294.

² Willison, J. S., *Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party*, II, 234.

bation. Sir Charles Tupper, the Conservative leader, however, had denounced the Prime Minister (in Quebec) as an imperialist, and as being too English for him, a criticism which disarmed those ultra patriots who hoped to drive Laurier out of office. Furthermore, the matchless oratory of Sir Wilfrid stood him in good stead. Toward England he was sympathetic, and his glowing tributes to the Canadian dead were gratefully received in London. One suspects, however, that the reserved Mr. Chamberlain was more impressed by the following dictum of the Canadian statesman: "I claim for Canada this, that she shall in the future be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she chooses."

The theoretical justification for this point of view lay in Laurier's interpretation of the British North America Act, establishing the Dominion of Canada, and in what he believed to be the true spirit of the British constitution; its practical justification was to be found in the temper and racial characteristics of his fellow Canadians. An elaboration of this point of view is essential to an understanding of Laurier; it is also necessary to any explanation, however brief, of the imperial conferences held in London subsequent to 1897, and therefore must reluctantly be left to the chapter which concerns them.¹

For this attitude of sturdy independence adopted by Laurier there was much to be said, and certainly at this juncture it was generally upheld in Canada and tended, from the point of view of his friends, to vivify and keep warm the affectionate regard in which Canada held the Motherland. Even Laurier's pointed criticism of British diplomacy, and his assertion that fair play and judicial equity had been violated by the settlement made in London of the Alaskan boundary dispute met with widespread Canadian approval. A similar triumph was his also in his skirmish with Lord Dundonald over the control of the

¹ Cf. *infra*. Chapter VI.

Canadian militia. His fellow citizens were not displeased at the defeat of the famous soldier by this rural attorney. In these matters they considered that he but upheld the dignity and prestige of Canada. When it came to the two greater issues of his later life, however, American reciprocity and the naval program of Canada, the influence and authority of Sir Wilfrid diminished rapidly, and Canada seemingly stood willing to reverse old historic trends to which the Dominion long had been habituated.

Chronologically, the naval question first emerged on the horizon; but inasmuch as the reciprocity fight intervened between the preliminary and the final stages of the naval dispute, it may well be considered first.

In 1910 came rumors of a proposed change in the Canadian fiscal system which relegated even the naval question to a temporary retirement. It was said that Sir Wilfrid proposed a renewal of negotiations with the United States leading to reciprocity or even free trade. The Canadian Minister of Finance, Mr. Fielding, and the Minister of Customs, Mr. Paterson, had visited President Taft at Albany, American representatives had come to Ottawa, Canadian officials had journeyed to Washington. The rumors were true. Canada, at the request of the United States, had made an agreement, not a treaty, for the extensive lowering of the tariff barriers between the two countries. Would the Canadian people, through their representatives, approve?

For a brief period only had there been anything which resembled a free interchange of goods between the Dominion and the United States. From 1854 to 1866, while the Elgin-Marcy Treaty was in operation, this had been the case, with mutual profit to both sides of the border. But that treaty had been abrogated by the American government, and Canada had sought for thirty years in vain for a free market to the south. Even with the adoption in the late sev-

enties of the *national policy* and the emphasis which that gave to economic self-sufficiency, the door to reciprocity remained open; and from time to time efforts were made by Canadian statesmen to persuade Washington that the tariff wall brought injuries to both countries. The Canadian emissaries, as their spokesmen woefully acknowledged, wore out their shoe leather in going back and forth between Ottawa and Washington, and of this they grew weary. In 1898 came the last venture. Laurier, already Prime Minister for over two years, ended these maneuvers, and said finally: "I have made my last pilgrimage to Washington." Reciprocity seemed a dead issue, almost forgotten. By neither party was it repudiated; by neither party was it held sufficiently important to serve as a campaign issue. Now suddenly it revived again after more than ten years, and this time at the suggestion of the United States where the increased cost of living, combined with heavy Democratic voting, had brought uneasiness to Republican politicians.

The pact or agreement drawn up between the Canadian and the American governments was a far reaching one; it provided for an extensive free list in natural products and for a substantial lowering of the tariff on manufactured goods. Apparently both countries stood to profit and, at first glance, Canada the more so, since her wheat, unfinished lumber, fish, potatoes and hay were to find a free market in the United States, while the manufactured goods of the latter were still to pay a duty, although a reduced one, upon entering Canada. Yet in both countries a strong opposition arose to this agreement; powerful enough in the United States to delay action in the American Senate many months and to necessitate an extra session of Congress; violent enough in Canada to wreck both reciprocity and the Government of Laurier which supported it.

What happened at Ottawa to render this the outcome? Had not the long desired markets to the south been at last opened and at the request this time of the United States?

The fishing industry of Nova Scotia was under-developed, and the long overhaul to the centers of Canadian population made any great expansion of it difficult. The same conditions affected the growers of potatoes in Prince Edward's Island and the owners of apple orchards in the Annapolis Valley. Surely free trade in these products with industrial New England would prove a boon and blessing. The French habitant in Quebec could now, it was hoped, obtain four dollars a ton for his hay, the Ontario lumberman would immediately profit, as would the wheat rancher of the prairie provinces and the fruit grower of British Columbia. Canada had sought for reciprocity for years; why should she now reject the offer?

The reason was more a political than an economic one. This was a tariff measure, simply; but the implications drawn from it were political, and in character so profound and fundamental that they brought disaster to the advocates of the proposed pact. The Canadian opponents of Laurier did not envisage the agreement principally as a matter of dollars and cents. To be sure, like good business men, the Conservatives fought it on this ground; but not by means of economic arguments did they defeat it. Exhaustive studies of tariffs and of tariff history this book shunts to one side. It is not germane to our purpose to inquire as to whether horse breeding in Ontario and the sale of farm horses from that province to the prairies was or was not threatened by the bill. The prospective dangers of the invasion of the Canadian market by the American meat interests; the competition to which the market gardeners of Southern Ontario would be subjected: these were matters not of indifference but of subordinate concern, not only to the historian but to many Canadians, who rightly or wrongly conceived of this step as one which would undo what Canada had accomplished for herself—the making of a Canadian nation. They thought of it also as a measure which would weaken the Empire, and this they disliked, for

they were loyal to the imperial tie. But more immediate to their heart lay their own country, for in her life they had found their own, and in her birth they had suffered travail. Sir Wilfrid's proposals seemed to threaten this dear object, and therefore they would have none of it.

Now Laurier was unquestionably a good Canadian, almost too good a Canadian from the point of view of many enthusiasts for imperial federation who found this man of gracious presence and agile mind less interested than they in the Empire's visible bonds of union. Laurier thought first of Canada: but to him there had never been any doubt in recent years of the security of the Dominion. Reciprocity meant more prosperity for his fellow citizens; it suggested still further settlement of the western prairie; it promised an increase in the population—greater strength and virility for Canada, not less.

All of this might be true, but the advantages thereby attained were at the risk of dangers which the Canadian electorate thought it wiser to avoid. The lines of railway communication in Canada had of necessity been laid east and west. The Canadian Pacific, the Grand Trunk Pacific and the proposed Transcontinental, the construction of which entailed genuine sacrifice, all took that direction. Trade north and south had been denied by the American tariff laws. The wheat of the prairies was shipped both east and west and in return, fruits came to Winnipeg from Vancouver and plows went from Toronto to Medicine Hat. This east and west movement would be checked by the reciprocity bill, if the Conservatives were to be believed. In the northwestern states Mr. James J. Hill was said to have built branch railways all ready to spring across the border, once the bill was made law. The wheat from Manitoba would then go south to St. Paul or Minneapolis to be milled, and not via Montreal and the sea to old England. The fish of Gaspé would go south to Boston, the wood pulp

of Quebec south to the paper mills of the Connecticut valley, and Canada's pride and labor in her great railway system would be lost. And besides, exclaimed Mr. Foster, the ex-Minister, "was it ever dreamed in England, Sir, that a time would come when a change in policy would be inaugurated by the men who petitioned for the money, who pleaded for the capital . . . that built these railways."¹ If the bill was approved, Canada's excellent credit in London, largely due to the success of her railway projects, would be impaired.

Certainly, if the great arteries of commerce were to be adversely affected by the proposed law this would be a damaging argument not only from an economic but also from a national standpoint. The geographic problem of Canada was unique. A country of tremendous breadth, the strip available for intensive agricultural purposes was not wide, except in the northwest. Furthermore, there exists "the bridge," as the rough and not particularly fertile stretch of land to the north of Lake Superior is called. The only way that Canada could be bound together was by lateral lines of communication. These now existed in 1911 and more were planned; and beyond the borders of Canada one extended far to both east and west, for the steamship lines of the C. P. R. stretched from beyond Yokohama to Vancouver on the Pacific and from Montreal to old England on the Atlantic, an all-red line of Empire, strategically sound, economically profitable.

Would reciprocity injure this east and west communication? Not at all, asserted Laurier. We already ship grain to Europe via America in bond, he said, and without tax. That grain goes over our line of railways because they are shorter. Removing the tariff will not change this. Montreal has not been built up as a great port by the tariff. It is because the line is shorter to Europe by way of Montreal than any other. Nor would it axiomatically follow that the

¹ *House of Commons Debates* (Canada) 1910-1911, 4757.

more trade north and south, the less trade east and west. Improved economic conditions would stimulate both immigration and the birth rate. Traffic then would increase in both general directions. Admitted that this is so in the long run, affirmed his opponents, for the time being the C.P.R. will lose trade and the future development as pictured by Sir Wilfrid is problematical; and they pointed to certain unfortunate references made in the past by Sir Wilfrid in London to the effect that only by legislation had it been possible to make strong and permanent the trans-continental connection.

It was not, however, the five hundred million dollars raised for the railway companies nor the fifty-five million free acres given them, nor the hundred million dollars yet to be spent on the line to Hudson Bay and the Transcontinental that aroused the ire of so many Canadians. Far more important is the fact that many of them believed that "it is common talk on the streets in the great American cities that if the reciprocity treaty becomes a fact it is only a question of time before Canada becomes a part of the great American Union."¹

Unfortunately in America there was talk among idle and irresponsible persons of this very thing, and even those in high station were not always felicitous in their references to reciprocity. When President Taft spoke of Canada standing at the parting of the ways, he had not the slightest intention of hinting at any hypothetical annexation of the Dominion: but his statement was welcome ammunition for the opposition in Canada. And Mr. Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture in Mr. Taft's cabinet, they also found fair game. "Under it,—the reciprocity bill," he said, "our relations with Canada will become more intimate, and we will become more and more one people." Surely, said the Conservatives, this implies political union; and although their logic was perhaps faulty, it was at any rate, specious.

¹ *Ibid.*, 6691.

Many newspapers in America, particularly those controlled by Hearst, were then as now devoted to "eagle screaming," and quotations from them found a ready welcome among the Canadian foes of reciprocity, and so also certain speeches of American congressmen, which were quickly echoed in Canada's Parliament. The childlike intellect of Mr. Bennett of New York led him to introduce a resolution in the House of Representatives in favor of the annexation of the Dominion. And this was duly noticed in Ottawa, as was also the vaporings of one Hill, of Connecticut, who delivered himself of an appeal for "one government from the Rio Grande to the Arctic Sea."

But more serious by far was the oratory of Mr. Champ Clark, which perhaps more than anything else killed reciprocity. "I am for it," said the Missouri Solon, "because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions clear to the north pole." Now Mr. Clark was the Speaker of the House of Representatives, a leading candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, a person of influence and position. The wordy nothings of Mr. Bennett might be forgiven, but the exuberance of the Trans-Mississippi tribune was rightly regarded in Canada with suspicion. It was all very well for the Canadian Liberals to say this was a figure of speech, or American humor. Mr. Borden maintained that Mr. Clark was in deadly earnest and not only the Canadian Conservatives believed him but many of the Liberals as well.

The expansive Champ Clark dealt reciprocity its death blow. He was not in deadly earnest nor did he try to be humorous; he simply played true to type as an American politician of the bye-gone days. For many generations American politicians and American school boys had utilized the whole of the North American continent as a convenient symbol of the spacious and generous homeland of the Star Spangled Banner. Mr. Clark indulged in this ancient

figure of speech, this antique theatrical property, which had been worn so threadbare as no longer to appear even on the Fourth of July. His remarks aroused no interest in the United States: but they did awake a nation to the north. They of Canada were persuaded that a country of seven and a half million people would inevitably, in the course of time, be drawn into political union with the ninety million to the south if the barriers of trade were lowered. It was natural that they should be. The blatant and more irresponsible across the border they heard in full chorus; to the more sober and representative body of American opinion they paid little heed. Nor would they recognize the fact that despite the extensive immigration into their prairie provinces of Illinois and Iowa farmers, despite business connections which grew closer and closer year by year, tariff or no tariff, the electorate to the south when it thought of Canada envisaged not annexation but the three thousand miles of undefended border, and the peace and concord of which it was the token; a picture far more appealing to the imagination than the presence of Canadian senators at Washington.

Meanwhile, in considering reciprocity, thought was given to the trade relations already extant between Canada and the Motherland. Sir Wilfrid Laurier had won much popularity in both England and Canada by his gift in 1896 to the United Kingdom of a twenty-five per cent preferential tariff. This preference had been raised to thirty-three per cent and had been the one major argument in the armory of the tariff reformers in Great Britain. How would reciprocity with America affect this arrangement?

It cannot do harm to British interests, said Sir Wilfrid; its results would be ruinous, exclaimed Mr. Borden, and his stand was promptly reflected by the British Tories. "I feel," stated Mr. Austen Chamberlain, upon whom had fallen the brunt of supporting his father's tariff policies, "that the independent growth of Canada within the Empire will be

seriously menaced by the overwhelming strength and the overwhelming wealth of its great neighbor." The tariff reform movement overseas was linked up with the Canadian preference. How can we expect a British preference for our wheat, reiterated the Canadian Conservatives, if we destroy the preference we have already given, an argument not unpromising.

As a matter of fact the preference that had been granted was not of much importance to either Canada or Britain. It looked significant, a reduction of one-third in the customs duties: but if the tariff is fairly high, a reduction of one-third does not destroy its protective character. No injury was done to the sale of any article manufactured in Canada by this preference; all that it accomplished was a reduction in the cost of living in Canada and a friendly gesture toward the old country. Nor did reciprocity with the United States in any appreciable degree diminish its value. When imports were put on the free list it followed, of course, that the preference was wiped out: but the free list consisted of raw products, and salt was the only one thus affected.

And this reasoning in regard to Britain held good in the case of twelve other countries which would, hypothetically, vantage largely by the reciprocity pact. With all of them Canada had treaties pledging the lowest duties, apart from the British preference, granted to any nation. They would now be subject to the same customs duties as America, a fact which meant that Norwegian fish, Danish butter and Argentine beef could enter Canadian ports free of duty. But the Canadians already had their own beef and fish and butter, and even in the case of the Argentine Republic it seemed absurd to picture South American beef sold in Montreal simply because wages were low on the pampas. Both Canada and the Argentine competed with each other in London markets. Surely this was evidence that the Canadian meat industry was not threatened from below the

Equator. Nor was it likely that Swiss cheese, Danish butter or Norwegian fish would ruin the livelihood of the Canadian farmers and fishermen.

Other objections of even less moment were thoroughly threshed over. The opposition held it desirable to establish reciprocity with the British West Indies rather than with America, a logical inference had it not been demonstrated that British Guiana was the only British colony in all that region which had responded favorably to Canadian overtures leading to a commercial treaty. The government of Laurier was said also to have no mandate for reciprocity, to which it was retorted that the Canadian system of government was the representative and not the delegate system. It was further assumed that American capitalists were trying on the one hand to sidetrack public attention from their own wickedness by focusing it upon Canada, while on the other endeavoring to gain Canada for the American Union in order that her white population might offset the more or less mixed races shortly to be annexed in Mexico.

There was little that the debate did not involve: but ever did it come back to the one Canadian ideal, the binding of the scattered provinces and the making of a nation. "Reciprocity binds," as one member of Parliament put it, "but it binds the other way; it binds British Columbia to Washington and Oregon; it binds the provinces of the northwest to the states immediately to the south of them; it binds Ontario and Quebec to the states south of us; and it binds the maritime provinces to the states of New England." It was not primarily an economic issue; as a matter of pocket-book politics reciprocity would now be on the statute books. Nor was it even a question of imperial unity; the Canadian idea of empire was not one of closed commercialism. But in absorption by the United States there was, to many minds, a real danger. At one time, yes, from the United States this assistance would gladly have been welcomed:

but that was years ago, and in the interim off went Canadian coats, and to the ruck and sweat of nation-making Canadian hearts and hands had been devoted. A nation had been created and this nation they intended to preserve.

The fight to do so was a long one. Sir Wilfrid's majority was large, throughout the early months of 1911 public opinion was behind him, and the plea that reciprocity was anti-national not readily accepted. "Englishmen," said one unconvinced Cobdenite, "sell where prices are highest and buy where they are lowest, and forget to ask whether as a result they are less English than before." And presumably, until the spring of 1911, this represented the major opinion of the country. By summer, however, it had swung toward opposition; and while Sir Wilfrid Laurier attended the imperial conference in London his foes at home made rapid headway. On his return the uproar which they created showed no sign of abatement. Laurier's enemies were not anxious to vote and Sir Wilfrid, rather than apply closure to the debate, dissolved Parliament and appealed to the country.

For six weeks Canada was in the throes of an exciting election. Mr. Borden led the attack, frankly emphasizing the issue of patriotism. His definition of nationality made at St. John is an interesting one. "A nation," he said, "is a partnership of the dead, the living and of those unborn; and I appeal to you," he continued, "the loyalists of St. John, you the descendants of the men who sacrificed their homes and all the comforts of life and came and hewed out homes in the wilderness in order to live under the British Crown. I call on you to be true to the flag of your fathers."¹

And his party followed Borden, with variations, particularly in Quebec. In Ontario, the maritime provinces and in British Columbia it was safe to talk about the Empire; in Quebec one needed to be chary. Yet in this ancient stronghold of Laurier's power the Conservatives made deep

¹ *House of Commons Debates (Canada) 1911-1912*, 147.

inroads. The unpopularity of Sir Wilfrid with the adherents of Bourassa had increased. For reciprocity they cared little, one way or another; but to knife their old leader and to exalt their own particularism they were most keen. The French Canadians, above everything else, desired the maintenance of their own autonomy and therefore were readily aroused by any talk of annexation. "By the Quebec Act of 1774," as one of their representatives assured the House, "our language, our faith, our customs, our usages have been respected in a privileged manner by his Britannic Majesty and the Imperial Government. We know what has been the fate of our countrymen in Louisiana; they have lost their identity."¹ Let this be a warning to keep free from the perfidious United States. And thus it happened that a working alliance was formed between the French advocates of a Canada for Canadians alone and the British apostles of the new imperialism.

Election day brought defeat to Laurier. His majority of nearly fifty in the House of Commons was reversed. The two cabinet members who negotiated the pact lost their seats. Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and Alberta supported Laurier, a majority of the provinces; but British Columbia, Prince Edward's Island, Manitoba and Ontario swung the other way. Outside of Ontario the popular majority was his; but that province turned the scale. Laurier resigned and Mr. Robert Borden became Prime Minister.

The manufacturers of Ontario had won. Their province had less to gain from reciprocity than any other. Perhaps it might be fairly argued that it had nothing to gain. The enemies of reciprocity had held that point of view and had brought forth and displayed every known variety of protectionist argument. But in the background they ever draped the Union Jack, not from motives purely sentimental or emotional, but because it meant that north of the 49th

¹ *Ibid.*, 4038.

parallel could be found Canada, a nation. And to the Tories in England who followed Chamberlain's banner came joy and gladness.

Meanwhile, there loomed on the horizon the naval question. It had long lurked there; but the storm which it aroused came gradually. It was first felt in 1909, rose to some magnitude in 1910, temporarily lay in abatement during 1911, while the reciprocity struggle held public attention, only to break forth in full fury in 1912 and 1913.

For a full decade or more before the war Canada was a thorn in the side of the British imperialists. In a most tantalizing manner the Dominion had taken the lead in offering Britain favored economic treatment, only to refuse *in toto* to display interest in naval coöperation. This reluctance on the part of the Canadian government had not only thwarted Chamberlain's plans in 1897; it continued to do so in 1902. At the imperial conference in that year the fact was advertised that New Zealand, Australia, Natal, Cape Colony and even Newfoundland by the payment of subsidies had given aid to the British navy. Only Canada had refused. The oldest and wealthiest Dominion continued impervious to hints from the Colonial Office, and Sir Wilfrid had definitely stated that Canada refused "to be drawn into the vortex of militarism." The utmost that those interested in the naval defense of the Empire had been able to obtain from him in the way of a promise was that Canada would take the question of naval assistance under advisement, and that in the future she might do something.

Five years later came the conference of 1907, and again it was apparent that not only had the other Dominions continued their subsidies but that little New Zealand had increased hers from forty to a hundred thousand pounds and Newfoundland in like ratio. Again it was held that Canada had done nothing, a point of view that was instantly repudiated by Sir Wilfrid and his Minister of Fisheries, Mr.

Brodeur, who asserted that the imperial dockyards at Esquimaux on the Pacific and Halifax on the Atlantic had been taken over by the Canadian government, and that for the protection of the fishing interests armed vessels in the service of Canada had been commissioned on both oceans. The representatives of the other Dominions were not, however, particularly impressed by this argument. Canada had spent much for her militia, it is true, and the last British regulars had left her shores in 1906; but what would she do for the navy?

Now at this same conference an effort had been made to place the Dominions on record in regard to the navy by a resolution which assumed that it was the duty of the Dominions to make a contribution, "to take the form of a grant of money for the establishment of local naval defense." This resolution was never put to a vote. Laurier said that if it was, he should vote against it; and since without unanimity such a resolution would do more harm than good it was left in abeyance.

Two years later the naval question was injected into the debates of the Canadian House of Commons by a resolution sponsored by that energetic Conservative, Mr. Foster, to the effect that Canada "should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibilities and financial burden incidental to the suitable protection of her exposed coast lines and great seaports." To this resolution Laurier made no direct opposition. But he did move and carry an amendment adroitly adding a clause to the effect that a money payment by Canada would not be considered a satisfactory solution, and he quoted at length the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Deakin, as follows: "The problem before us is how to associate our small naval strength with the great organization of the fleets of the mother country . . . without sacrificing our rights to the constitutional control of our own funds and of a flotilla built and maintained at our own costs."

Noncommittal as this resolution was it created some little flurry. Many members from Quebec either opposed it or else desired that some definite understanding be had that Canada should determine under what circumstances her vessels should be used. Mr. Borden, for the Opposition, objected to Sir Wilfrid's amendment in regard to cash payments and he besought the House to insert some such word as "prompt" or "immediate,"¹ a suggestion which was not accepted. Mr. Foster scored a triumph, however, and both Canadian parties were now on record as favoring naval activity of some form or variety.

Laurier's government, spurred on by this resolution, sought the advice of the British Admiralty as to how a modest sum might best be spent in establishing, on a small scale, a Canadian fleet. Armed with information obtained from England, Sir Wilfrid then moved the following year that Canada forthwith commence a naval program by creating a fleet unit, ultimately to consist of one armored cruiser, four light draft cruisers and six torpedo boat destroyers.

Mr. Borden, for the Conservatives, after congratulating Laurier on his change of heart and his acknowledgment that "when Britain is at war, Canada is at war," found instant fault with the proposal. "It either does too much or too little," he stated, "if Canada is to create her own navy the undertaking is too extensive for carrying on experiments in the organization of a Canadian naval service." If Canada is to bring instant aid to Britain, the proposals are inefficient. The crisis, he argued, is at hand. Germany year by year is approaching Great Britain in the rapidity of her naval expenditure. By all means, he said, let us build a navy of our own, for though from the strategic point of view it would be better to make periodic and stated contributions to the British navy, from the political standpoint it would be inadvisable. But at the present time the Moth-

¹ *House of Commons Debates (Canada)* 1909-10, 3522.

erland is in danger, and the only way which will help now is an immediate gift of money to the British Admiralty.

That this emergency existed the Liberals stoutly denied; Great Britain had plenty of money; she could build all the dreadnaughts she needed; let Canada defend her own shores and train her own men. To call the boats she would build a "tin pot navy" was absurd. If war came the Canadian cruisers would be of instant use. And they voted down the Conservative motion to appropriate funds for presenting England with two capital ships in addition to those built for Canada.

The wrath of many French Canadians at the passage of the Laurier naval bill was astonishing. Bourassa, the brilliant editor of *Le Devoir*, had long been ill disposed to Laurier, not only on account of his past compromises on the school question in Manitoba, but also because of renewed contumacy in the same direction in the newer provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. And now came his opportunity. At the very mention of the word "navy," the French nationalists held up before the eyes of the Quebec habitant the pleasing spectacle of the "disembowelment" of his sons and grandsons in the imperialistic wars of Britain, and this despite the fact that the men called for, some five thousand, were to be obtained by voluntary enlistment alone. Some of the French Canadians wanted no navy at all, others thought that a plebiscite should be taken first; still others supported Laurier loyally and voted for the bill. But this was not done until there broke forth in fresh eruption many half buried animosities, hints on the part of English-speaking Canadians, of little tact and less vision, of a long sought French Roman Catholic republic on the banks of the St. Lawrence, and counter hints of imperialistic plots, vile and abhorrent.

From naval debate the country turned to reciprocity, and with its defeat to naval debate once more. Mr. Robert L. Borden now became Prime Minister in place of Sir Wilfrid,

and much curiosity was aroused in regard to his attitude toward the naval program adopted by his predecessor. Borden neither repealed nor enforced the Laurier law; nor did he propose one of his own. Instead he went to England. Here he spent many hours in conference with the Imperial Committee of Defense, and many days as well in being wined, fêted, lionized. Borden kept his own counsel. At a banquet of the Royal Colonial Institute he stated significantly, "Our ideal has been, one King, one Flag, one Empire and one navy, the latter powerful enough to vindicate the flag and to maintain the integrity of the Empire." And at the same time he gave warning that Canada was not an adjunct of Great Britain, and that with responsibility for Empire defense there must be a share in determining peace or war. But beyond that statement he would not go until he introduced his naval bill in December, 1912.

His speech on doing so was a long one, recalling the history of Canadian relations with the Empire and stressing the necessity of combining coöperation with Canadian autonomy. Britain can no longer bear the burden alone, and in proof thereof he read a memorandum from the Admiralty drawn up at his request. Among the statements made in this document were the following:

"In 1905 Great Britain was building 4 capital ships and Germany 2; in 1906 Great Britain reduced to 3 capital ships and Germany increased to 3; in 1907 Great Britain built 3 capital ships and Germany built 3; in 1908 Great Britain further reduced to 2 capital ships and Germany increased to 4.

"In home waters in the Spring of 1915 Great Britain will have 25 Dreadnaughts and 2 Lord Nelsons. Germany will have 17 Dreadnaughts. Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers, Germany will have 6 battle cruisers. . . . These margins in new ships are sober and moderate.

"In 1902 there were 160 vessels on the overseas stations against 76 to-day.

"The aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in terms of ships or money. Any act on the part of Canada which would increase the power and the mobility of the im-

perial navy would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the Empire.

"The Prime Minister of Canada having inquired . . . we have no hesitation in answering . . . that it is desirable that such aid should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can supply or money can build."

In view of the situation herein pictured Mr. Borden stated that his bill called for the appropriation of thirty-five million dollars by Canada for the construction of three dreadnaughts, to be built in England and to be placed at the service of the British Admiralty, with the provision that in the future, after due notice, they might be recalled by Canada for her own purposes.

For more than four months the Canadian House of Commons debated this bill, a period during which the excitement created by the reciprocity bill was easily surpassed. For some six weeks the Conservative ranks replied to the Liberal onslaught with a brisk counter-fire. They then, with the exception of a few undisciplined sharpshooters, abstained from speech. Confident in his comfortable majority Mr. Borden decided to let the Liberals talk themselves out. By day and by night the debate continued, if a continuous series of speeches on one side of a question may be called a debate. Mr. Borden misjudged his mark; the well-spring of Liberal eloquence gave no sign of drying. And meanwhile, from platform and press came echoes of widespread dissension, violent controversy.

One may group, for the sake of clarity, the multitudinous arguments for and against this naval bill under four general heads. They were: the question of emergency; that of moral obligation; that of the constitutional issue involved, and finally, that of ways and means.

Sir Wilfrid held that the memorandum of the Admiralty showed no immediate emergency. The facts evidenced were not new. The British margin in ships was not large; but it was safe. Besides, England was not without allies

on the Continent. The French navy was not to be despised, and it could be depended on to supplement that of the Motherland. It was true that the concentration of the navy in the North Sea had left the outlying stations unprotected. All the more reason for the Dominions to possess their own navies and to guard their own shores.

This argument of Sir Wilfrid's was elaborated upon by a whole troop of Liberal speakers. They quoted freely from British statesmen to prove their point, and particularly the versatile Mr. Churchill who had assured the House of Commons that British preparations were adequate. The First Lord of the Admiralty had affirmed that "cool, steady, methodical preparations, prolonged over a series of years, can alone raise the margin of naval power. It is no use plunging millions of dollars about on the spur of the moment." Furthermore, Mr. Asquith had announced "There never has been a moment and there is not one now when we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which could possibly be expected against us." This did not look like an emergency. Naval scares had been chronic in Britain for decades, first France was the country feared, then Russia, then France again, and now Germany. At the present time the diplomatic relations between Britain and Germany were considered satisfactory by British statesmen. No one is going to refuse an offer of thirty-five million and the British Admiralty is pleased with Canada's. But that any emergency existed, they denied.

The memorandum of the Admiralty does show an emergency, asserted the Conservatives, it tells what the Germans are doing, and we know the Germans. What is more, in the very words of the memorandum, "The Lords of the Admiralty are prepared to compile and to supplement *in a form which can be made public, confidential communication . . .*"; Mr. Borden is a Privy Councilor. He has attended the meeting of the Imperial Council of Defense; he

has information which he may not divulge. The memorandum asserts that such is the case. He acknowledges that it is so. We must trust him for the sake of the Empire.

Furthermore, there were the Germans, and as far as the electorate was concerned it displayed, apparently, more interest in the new tales of Teutonic intrigue than it did in secret information given Mr. Borden. To make good their claims to the country that a crisis did exist the Conservatives were tempted to exhibit in lurid colors both facts and fancies anent German imperialism. Conservative orators dwelt everywhere on the undemocratic government of Imperial Germany, viewed with alarm the growth of the German navy league, and denounced with vigor the increase in the Germany army. Liberals on the other hand minimized these assertions, stressed constantly the contentment of the Germans, the wealth of German capitalists, the well-being of German workmen, and quoted as they did so Premier Asquith and Sir Edward Grey in proof that a smooth sea lay ahead for British diplomats. Against militarism they were in the war to a finish.

As might be expected a wordy and somewhat futile war arose in regard to the moral obligations of Canada to Great Britain. Mr. Borden gave special emphasis to it. He assured the House that so far as official estimates are available the expenditures of Great Britain for the naval and military defense of the provinces which now constitute Canada during the nineteenth century were not less than \$400,000,000. . . . From 1870 to 1890 the proportionate cost of the North Atlantic Squadron which guards our coasts was from \$125,000,000 to \$150,000,000.”¹ He held that Canada, now wealthy, owed a partial repayment at least of this immense sum. The Conservatives, indeed, considered this situation disgraceful, and traced over and over again the way in which big Australia and little Newfoundland had gladly, for the sake of the commonweal, laid on their own

¹ *House of Commons Debates (Canada)* 1912-13, 691.

backs greater and greater burdens. Even in 1907, when some action was finally promised, it proved niggardly. The Admiralty had asked for the coöperation of all of the Dominions and had promised to build a fleet unit for China and India, to complete another in part constructed by New Zealand, provided that Australia and Canada each complete one. This would provide four fleet units on the Pacific coast, sufficient for its protection. But Canada would have none of this. She wanted ships on the Atlantic as well as the Pacific, and the government of Laurier had insisted that for the time being she could only spend two or three million dollars a year on her navy. And what was the best that could be done with that amount? The result had been the purchase of two protected cruisers, the *Niobe* and the *Rainbow*, one on either ocean, both undermanned, and the *Niobe* out of commission after ramming a rock. This was a pitiful display of loyalty.


But, exclaimed the Liberals, you cannot argue this way. Remember that England has invested two billion dollars in Canada and draws from our country eighty million dollars or more annually in interest. We are a debtor, she a creditor nation. Since 1905 Britain has paid \$350,000,000 of her national debt, and has easily upheld her maritime supremacy, while remaining much wealthier than we are. Every year, as it is, we must borrow money in the British market. The development of our western land and of our railways has just begun. We would do far more for the Empire in the long run by spending our money at home.

And they countered the moral argument of the Tories by one of their own. You are sending three empty ships to England. This is worse than the jingoes of old who were always willing to contribute men, as well as ships and money. Are you going to pay Britain to do the fighting for Canada? And to good effect they quoted the vitriolic imperialist, Mr. Foster, as stating in 1909: "The first and greatest objection which I have to a fixed money contribu-

tion is that it bears the aspect of hiring somebody else to do what we ought to do." This is where the disgrace lies, affirmed the Liberals. If these ships are simply loaned to the imperial authorities, as the bill assures us, then George Bernard Shaw is correct when he writes that "Canada is putting her ships out to nurse with the British fleet, at the expense of the British taxpayer, until the time comes for recalling them to form an independent navy for the Dominion." The British Admiralty will find the men and we will escape scot free by the payment of tribute. Think of the 400,000 immigrants to the Dominion last year. Remember how surprised they were to hear that Canada paid no tribute to England, and how gladly they gave evidence of a desire to become Canadian citizens. How can you expect to make loyal Canadians of these men if they discover that you have been deceiving them?

The Conservative Party, they continued, is a hybrid organization. In Mr. Borden's cabinet are Canadian nationalists from Quebec who are both anti-Laurier and anti-navy. For fear of their opposition you do not dare execute the present law which calls for Canadian ships, manned by Canadian men. Driven by this unholy alliance you think to keep your ten Quebec nationalists on your side of the House by offering money alone, thereby implying that Canadian citizens may be excused from fighting. The first moral obligation of the Borden government is to be honest to the electorate of this country and not to say one thing to the French habitant and another to the British born. You cannot stress nationalism in one province and jingoism in another.

The constitutional question involved in the vote of thirty-five millions was a serious one and Mr. Borden did not try to shirk it. Canada, he said, must remain autonomous and must work out a method by which she can retain some control of the use to which ships donated by her should be put. As a temporary solution he was content with a place for





a Canadian Minister on the Imperial Committee of Defense which met in London, an unofficial body, but one consulted freely and constantly by the British cabinet. "No important step in foreign policy," he assured the House, "would be undertaken without consultation with such a representative of Canada." Ultimately, his Government would work out a better plan, and one more distinctly juristic, for unity of action between Britain and Canada. But such a scheme required time, thought and the coöperation of the other Dominions. For the present the need was urgent and the place on the Defense Committee gave a real share in determining foreign policy. Canadian autonomy, meanwhile, was not injured. The vote of thirty-five million was in no case to establish a precedent. It was only for one year, a temporary measure which involved no tribute or even a system of contributions. It bound Canada in no way. In fact, Great Britain was under obligation to return the ships after a reasonable notice.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier in reply asserted that "the diplomatic service of England is carried on by a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and it is today in as good hands as it ever was. These transactions are very minute and are very serious, and sometimes must be carried on in great secrecy. If Canada had anything to do with them; then must also, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South Africa. The resultant council would be clumsy, inept and unwieldy. You are asking us to participate in the domestic economy of Persia, to help decide the boundaries of Afghanistan, to be responsible for Egypt and to become privy to the Agadir affair." Canada would do well to act very slowly before assuming such obligations. Laurier did not dogmatically assert that she should remain free from contact with them; but he did consider that the time had not come for such a momentous decision. If the problem of defense presses, let us go ahead with our own navy.

Laurier and his followers scented imperial federation

trailing in the wake of the Borden policy and against it they were ready to fight to the last ditch. The Conservative argument that "we are not mere allies, we are not a federation, we are all members of the same body" did not appeal to them. Nor did the argument that autonomy was the Canadian policy of the nineteenth century and that to push on further would result in independence. The Liberals were quite satisfied with the existing status; they denied that they wanted independence and remained content with demonstrating that the whole tenor of constitutional development in Canada had been away from, and not closer to, concentration of authority. Laurier, himself, repudiated the idea of separation, conceded freely that when the Empire is at war we are at war; and then added: "It does not follow that because we are at war we are within the conflict."

This statement of Laurier's aroused much interest. It showed clearly the chasm which existed between Liberal and Conservative thought. Laurier, in cool and dispassionate manner, enumerated nine wars in which England had engaged since she annexed Canada and proved that Canada had only participated officially in three of them. The consent of the Canadian government, he affirmed, is necessary before Canada fights, a declaration which the Conservative leader earlier had brought into sharp emphasis by the following dialogue:

Mr. R. L. Borden: "I understand the Prime Minister to say that our ships would not fight until they are ordered to do so, and therefore in effect they would be neutral until the Governor in Council had made an order that they should participate in the war. Have I misstated my honorable friend's position?"

Sir Wilfrid Laurier: "No."¹

Meanwhile Mr. Foster, the most brilliant speaker in the Borden cabinet, was asserting: "Whatever men may say and whatever men may do; the destinies of Canada are absolutely and irrevocably bound up with the destinies of the Empire."

¹ *Ibid.*, 1048.

On its practical side the Conservatives ridiculed the idea of a Canadian navy, built and manned in Canada, subject to orders from Ottawa. They made much of the authoritative dictum of a great naval expert to the effect that "sea power to be truly effective must be held by a homogeneous navy in which jealousy of rank, priority of station, distrust and antagonism of colony, Dominion, Union or Mother country must be eradicated if the British Empire is to include the Empire of the seas." To build a navy in Canada would take, they insisted, two decades; and it would prove a very costly navy, for the shipyards did not exist in the Dominion, and they would have to be erected before a keel was laid. The cost, even then, would exceed that of construction in Great Britain by thirty to forty per cent. The personnel did not exist in Canada, and would need to be trained. And the point of danger was not the North Atlantic anyway but the German Ocean. Sir Wilfrid proposed building two units, one for the Atlantic, one for the Pacific, and this would mean that Canada's navy never could be concentrated. Far better it would be to trust to the fleets of Britain. The gift of thirty-five million did not preclude a Canadian navy in the future; there was no time to build it now.

To these claims the Liberals entered a general denial. They too quoted Winston Churchill, but to the effect that "the division of labor between the Mother country and her daughter states is that she should maintain the sea supremacy against all comers at the decisive point and that they should guard and patrol all the rest of the Empire." They quoted Lord Charles Beresford in regard to the crying need of more cruisers in the British navy. They asserted that the Empire really needed trained men rather than more ships or more money and that Canada should train them. They denied that anything like twenty years would be required to build a navy, and they pointed to the rapid growth of the Fore River shipyard in Massachusetts as proof. The

hardy sailors of the maritime provinces would gladly man a real Canadian navy, if an opportunity was given them. They had hitherto failed to enlist because Canada's naval policy was too fluctuating. There were only two vessels now flying the Canadian flag; but that was the fault of the Conservatives. The Laurier government had asked for bids for ships to be constructed in Canada; but Borden's government had returned nearly two years ago the certified checks of the British firms which would have started construction. He, Borden, was responsible for the fact that the Canadians had now practically no fleet. The coal, the iron, the steel, even the nickel for armor plate, Canada had them all—and also splendid harbors. Initiative and enterprise could build a navy. America had done so, why not Canada? ¹

Month after month the debate wore on. In Canada closure had never been practiced, and Canadian statesmen are fond of public speaking: but in this instance the intent of the Liberals by vocal batteries to force a dissolution was evident. Borden and his followers had done so two years ago, why not they? But Borden caught his enemy napping and by a parliamentary trick, the ethics of which seemed dubious, the closure or guillotine was adopted for the first time in the history of the Canadian federation, and the naval bill forthwith was approved by the Canadian House of Commons.

The measure now went to the Senate which threw it out, thus leaving Borden the option of a new election or seeing his work go by the board. The Senate had hitherto kept quiescent, as was the custom of that honorable body. Filled with old politicians appointed for life, after the Canadian practice by the Prime Minister, the majority of its members owed their comfortable security to Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

¹ See the Canadian Annual Review for 1912 and 1913 for an excellent summary of the naval question. The full story of this debate fills several portly volumes in the Canadian Hansard.

Their tenure was secure; and so also were their affections. Sir Wilfrid and the Liberal party were the chosen objects of their regard. And the bill was now lost, for Mr. Borden did not dissolve the House and appeal to the country.

And why? For one reason, perhaps, the fear lest he be not sustained; for another, the golden moment for Canada's help had gone by. Britain decided, not to build three additional dreadnaughts at her own expense, but so to hasten the construction of three already provided as to bring about the same result. Furthermore, the naval quarrel had side-tracked important public business, and Mr. Borden contented himself with the announcement that Britain would have her three dreadnaughts anyway, and that in the future his Government would bring in a bill for their payment out of Canadian funds.

From one point of view imperialism had been thwarted, extravagance checked and Canada saved from the maelstrom of militaristic competition; from the other, the Dominion had forgotten her heritage and had failed in her duty. The old country did not need the money, thirty-five million dollars she could spare: but she did need the moral support of the Dominions overseas, and this, Canada in 1913 had refused to give.

CHAPTER VI

IMPERIAL COÖRDINATION

In 1897 Chamberlain's plans for a unified Empire broke on the rocks of colonial indifference. In 1902 he renewed them, and for their sake party ties, political ambitions, even health and life were sacrificed. The vision of a strong Britannic federation had been caught by him; the sprawling heterogeneous Dominions with their ten million people were transformed as if by magic into one great populous region bound by statute and by constitutional usage not merely to England, the Motherland, but to each other, in a union as firm and permanent as the United States of America.

The imperial federation movement which he headed was never widely popular. The imperialists who supported it were either too idealistic and impractical, on the one hand, or else too arbitrary on the other. Possibly, as a class they were too wealthy, too cultured, too well educated in a conventional sense, to feel at one with their own countrymen whose lives, by very force of circumstance, had been more roughly spent in making civilized the wilderness. The enemies of federation spoke of it as "based upon racial instincts rather than community of interests, upon sentiment rather than reason," and as appealing strongly "to that very large class of persons to whose minds military glory and world dominion are matters of chiefest importance."¹ And in this savage onslaught there was much truth.

On the other hand, to every cause there hasten cheap and shoddy recruits; and if it is amply financed and led by men of some importance in the world of society as well as

¹ Ewart, J. S., *The Kingdom of Canada and other Papers*, 159.

politics, the number of such adherents is considerable. To condemn thus, as a class, the men who held that imperial ties throughout the Empire should be made more lasting and more permanent is absurd. Except in a few instances they did not want a reincarnated Rome. The Empire meant something more than trade and commerce, something more tangible than good will, a common language, law, church, and Crown. It could not remain static. Centrifugal forces were active within its borders which Joseph Chamberlain and his friends hated. It was reasonable that they should; not racial pride alone but true community of interests dictated that they should. That they loved the Empire was not to their discredit; for seeking to improve it in both quality and fiber they deserved commendation.

The Boer War revived the hopes of imperial unity seemingly destroyed by the resolution of the colonial premiers in 1897, which laid emphasis on the satisfactory character of the existing constitutional status. Had not many thousand British citizens from beyond the limits of the United Kingdom seen service in South Africa; was there not now a united Britannic front against a jealous and a hostile world? The war was over, the victory won, and not alone by Britain. Pride of Empire ran high in the Dominions; exuberant was the expression of it. Failure at the Queen's Jubilee might be atoned for by success at her son's coronation. Therefore, to the crowning of Edward in the Abbey the premiers of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the self-governing colonies were invited, and to a new colonial conference as well, that of 1902.

The purpose of this meeting was threefold: to recommend measures looking forward to a closer constitutional union of the self-governing colonies and Dominions with the United Kingdom; to determine upon some means for securing joint military and naval preparedness, obtaining meanwhile an increased contribution from the Empire at large for the support of the British fleet; and finally to

study and report on the possibilities of more intimate trade relations within the Empire.

The first and second of these *desiderata*, it will be remembered, had been advanced by Mr. Chamberlain in 1897; the third represented a new-born conviction of the Birmingham statesman upon which he was to concentrate all the energies of his later life.

Chamberlain had learned his lesson in 1897. The complete refusal of the colonial premiers on that occasion to see any necessity for change in British constitutional practice, as far as the Empire was concerned, made him skeptical about their reversing their position after five short years. He may have overemphasized the unifying tendencies of the Boer War; he may not have realized that the South African conflict influenced the Dominions in the opposite direction by tending to make them more self-reliant, more self-conscious of their own nationalism. But Chamberlain was not a sanguine dreamer; and therefore at this conference he bent no energies on obtaining a colonial placet for his well known belief in imperial federation based on an imperial council.

Nor did he regard the conference as of primary value from the military and naval point of view. The Admiralty and the War Office both tried, as in 1897, to gain colonial financial backing or at least coöperation, and with indifferent success, a fact which Chamberlain had already largely discounted. His mind was fixed on bigger game than increased naval contributions from Australia, which in any case could be but a pitiful part of the total costs of his Majesty's navy.

The Dominions and the self-governing colonies evidently were not ready for political union; but perhaps by commercial union coming first the major end might ultimately be secured. This was his new idea, an old one in so far as the general concept went, quite new in regard to its application.

As far back as 1894 the self-governing colonies at Ottawa had arranged among themselves for intercolonial preferential tariffs; and the suggestion had been made that Britain join them. Chamberlain, himself, had favored imperial free trade as a means of securing imperial unity and had met with no success. The self-governing colonies had already built up infant industries by tariffs, and they had long been accustomed to obtain their revenue from such a source. To free trade they would not listen; Great Britain in the nineteenth century would agree to nothing else. But this was the twentieth, with nationalistic lines growing more pronounced throughout all the world. Why should there not be a preferential tariff between Britain and greater Britain, thus retaining colonial tariffs and at the same time unifying imperial trade? This Chamberlain proceeded to advocate, and his suggestions met with warm approval.

Every premier present voted in favor of a resolution to this effect. Canada, which already gave a preference to British goods, promised further endeavor in this direction if Canadian wheat obtained some preference in British markets; the South African colonies agreed to reduce their tariff on goods imported from England; and the Australian and New Zealand premiers were willing to urge similar measures. The Canadian preference had increased British trade with that Dominion. Mr. Chamberlain now saw a new light. Let England reciprocate in trade matters; once bound together by economic ties the political union would be the more likely. Had this not been true of the German *Zollverein*; why not also of the British Empire? A spirit of give and take in mutual trading, made plain and evident by imperial statute; and thus through counting house and factory and store, political unity might yet be won, more prosaic than on the battlefield, but more enduring. The idea appealed to him as a business man.

Once convinced that a preferential tariff paved the way for imperial unity Chamberlain lost no time in spreading

the new gospel. He began with the Cabinet. Here he struck two obstacles, one immediate and possible to remove, the other less tangible but ultimately more resistant. They were: the Unionist free traders on the one hand, the Prime Minister on the other.

Ritchie, Chancellor of the Exchequer, followed English fiscal tradition. He did not believe in protective tariffs and he offered fight; but it was possible to set him to one side. The Duke of Devonshire, the Lord Hartington of Gladstonian days, said to be the most respected man in England, also opposed protection. But the Duke was slow in his mental processes; perhaps he might be won over; if not, he must go. Thus argued Chamberlain.

As for the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, who cared little for dogmas, Cobdenite or otherwise, there should be no trouble. Had not the nephew of Lord Salisbury shown himself a true imperialist? In Irish and South African difficulties he and Chamberlain had fought side by side. For his mental acuteness Chamberlain had profound respect; this should make him give ready ear to the new proposals. Furthermore, Mr. Balfour, greatest of the Cecils though he might be called, was not noted for firmness of will. Chamberlain had more confidence in his own.

But strength at times may lie rather in elasticity than in firmness, a fact which was eminently true of the Prime Minister. Policies, programs, formulas, meant little to Balfour; the Conservative party and his own leadership thereof, much. And to maintain it the adroit and facile casuistry of this brilliant Cecil was devoted. What effect this had on the last fight of his Colonial Secretary we shall see.

In December, 1902, came the first skirmish. Chamberlain, before sailing for South Africa, tried to obtain a pledge from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the slight duty on imported corn of one shilling a quarter, levied for the purpose of war revenue, be retained in the 1903 budget.

This duty he hoped might become, by the process of remitting it for colonial and Dominion corn, the first wedge of a preferential policy. Mr. Ritchie would not pledge himself in advance; Chamberlain sailed for South Africa, returned in the spring, found Ritchie impossible to convince and in consequence, in May, 1903, appealed to the public. Let pressure be applied and the Cabinet would yield.

His method of doing this was to demand in a speech at Birmingham an inquiry into the fiscal situation, not of Britain alone but of the Empire. He desired it because he was convinced that imperial unity was the need of the hour and that by closer economic ties it could be best secured. "In my opinion," he said, "the germs of a federal union that will make the British Empire powerful and influential for good beyond the dreams of any one living are in the soil; but it is a tender and delicate plant and requires careful handling."¹ Unless something was done the glow of imperial patriotism aroused by the Boer War would fade. He, for one, feared a relapse into the old selfish policy of isolation of the preceding century. From the colonies had come generous offers of preferential treatment for British trade. The United Kingdom had done nothing to reciprocate. It should do so. Canada had increased her preference given to British trade from a 25 per cent reduction in her tariff to a 33 per cent reduction. She was even willing to do more if Britain would give some indication of a willingness to favor Canadian products.

German unity had come about as the result of the trade agreements of the early nineteenth century: why should not the British Empire thus coalesce? He was a free trader and not a protectionist; but he wanted to be free to make a difference between those who treated Britain badly and those who treated Britain well. He would not be bound by any technical definition of free trade. Great Britain should have her hands free to negotiate as she saw fit, to retaliate

¹ Chamberlain, J., *Speeches*, II, 131.

if necessary, to defend and to protect always. The welfare of the Empire was the first consideration and it should remain such, even at the cost of financial sacrifice.

Chamberlain's speech was not sensational; yet it created a sensation. Free trade had become woven into the fiscal orderings of Great Britain for many decades; it had become an axiom, a fetish, almost a part of the constitution. And now Britain's foremost statesmen, at least such in the public eye, had questioned its validity. He had termed himself a free trader; he had disparaged protection: but if Canadian wheat was to have a preference in the British market, wheat from elsewhere must pay more. A tariff duty on foodstuffs, however light, was implied; there could be no doubt about that. Was Mr. Chamberlain speaking for the Government? No one knew. Did the Unionists propose to betray free trade and to upset the citadel upon which the United Kingdom had waxed strong and mighty, or was the Colonial Secretary speaking for himself alone? He had asked for a public discussion. Unquestionably he obtained it.

First in the field in reply to Chamberlain were the Liberals. Heartened by the end of the war, and the accumulated proof of the Government's inefficiency in the conduct of it, they welcomed this new issue with glee. Free trade had been the historic inspiration of their party; Cobden and Bright its prophets. And the name of Chamberlain had been anathema in orthodox Liberal circles since his apostacy at the time of the first Home Rule Bill. The tide had now turned against the Tories; surely this economic vagary would increase it.

How stood the Government, no one knew, least of all, Mr. Balfour. Concerning the retention of some existing duty he had no qualms; but a food tax was an innovation. Mr. Balfour did not like innovations, particularly those which threatened cleavage in his own ranks. To prevent this he talked largely of an open mind and the necessity of inquiry. And thus throughout the early summer he

staved off decision. Meanwhile, the manufacturers organized for tariff reform, for who knew but that the new tariff might be a general one? And in opposition the mercantile and shipping interests lined up to contest these heresies which they believed would hurt their pocket books.

The political weather looked stormy and Mr. Balfour shortened sail in preparation by inventing a new formula. He wrote and lay before his Cabinet a tract on economics, as irrefutable in logic as it was clear in diction. *Economic Notes on Insular Free Trade* reflects the master mind of him who penned it. Within its thirty pages one may find arguments which afford comfort to both free trader and protectionist. The weight of them, however, inclines toward the Chamberlain direction. But so restrained, so quiet is the language, so numerous the ifs and buts, so tentative the hypotheses of the statesman-philosopher, that few could take offense. In regard to colonial preference he says nothing: that retaliatory tariffs may be used to good effect against dumping surplus goods below cost price by foreign manufacturers, he cautiously affirms. Evidently Mr. Balfour was prepared for some tariff change, but not for a tax on food—not yet. Chamberlain, then, in all friendliness resigned to push his ideas further at the bar of public opinion. Mr. Balfour kept back this resignation until the free traders in his own Cabinet followed him of Birmingham; if he had told them of Chamberlain's departure they might not have resigned. If Balfour would not fight for Chamberlain he could at least drive out of office his enemies; and to show his affection for the ex-Secretary for the Colonies he appointed his son, Austen Chamberlain, as successor to the departed Mr. Ritchie. The Laodicean equipoise was thus again restored; he looked for no further secessions.

But it was in vain. By October, 1903, Mr. Balfour in an unguarded moment made a declaration which was, for him, uncompromising. He said in a public speech that he de-

sired "fundamentally to alter the fiscal tradition" of his country. Just when and how, he was careful to add, need not now be determined. The speech, however, determined the Duke of Devonshire. He resigned from the Cabinet and the Tory party seemed torn asunder. The Chamberlainites, bountifully supplied with money, began to flood the country with tariff reform pamphlets; the Unionist free traders in the House of Commons prepared for battle and organized their free food league under the direction of Michael Hicks-Beach, ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer. The rupture seemed complete.

Chamberlain now went one step further. A tax on food-stuffs would increase the cost of living, so the simple Duke of Devonshire said, and that would never do. Yet if Australia was to receive equal treatment with Canada her meat should receive preferential treatment as well as the former's grain. The answer, said Chamberlain, in part is this: We shall take off three-quarters of our heavy tea duty; we shall cut heavily the duty on cocoa, coffee and sugar. This will offset the very slight increase in the cost of bread and meat. But as a result of these transactions the experts have estimated that the Exchequer will be short some £2,800,000. He proposed to raise this sum, and more in addition, by a moderate duty on all manufactured goods imported into Britain, not, of course, by way of *protection*, but as a combined method of raising revenue and preventing dumping.

And with this speech the tariff reform movement entered into a new phase. Chamberlain was willing to defend British industry, already established, against foreign competition. He had originally simply favored a slight tax on food; now he favored the Prime Minister's proposals as well as his own. Would Balfour reciprocate?

No one could tell. When Parliament opened in February, 1904, that statesman was ill. The Liberals, nevertheless, determined to smoke out the enemy. Rallying to the

attack, they vehemently supported a declaration in favor of free trade, in the form of an amendment to the address from the Throne. Mr. Gerald Balfour, in replying for the Government, denied that they were protectionists. There were four kinds of opinion in Great Britain, he declared, in regard to the fiscal system. "First, you have the free importers; next, those who approve of the Government's policy; there are those who follow the right honorable, the gentleman from Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) and who favor preferential arrangements with the colonies; and lastly, there are the protectionists."¹ The free importers he dismissed briefly as being free traders in intent but not in reality. "Free trade in its essence," he said, "is bilateral. The characteristic mark of the free importer is not free trade. It is the refusal to adopt any other method than that of moral suasion in order to bring about free trade. They are the Quakers of Finance." Tariff reformers refuse to surrender the term free trade. Mr. Balfour was a tariff reformer: but it was not fair to make an uproar in the House while he was ill; there was no bill pending involving fiscal changes; why this maneuver, except party politics?

Much to the delight of the Liberals, however, several Unionists spoke in behalf of the Liberal amendment. The deposed Mr. Ritchie claimed that it was foolish to be disturbed about foreign goods dumped on the English market. In case bounties were given them abroad their importation should be limited, but not otherwise. They generally came either in the form of raw materials or else semi-manufactured goods, and thus helped rather than hindered the British manufacturer. Lord Hugh Cecil, the recalcitrant cousin of the harassed Prime Minister, thought the arguments of Mr. Chamberlain lacking in cogency. The tariff, he considered, had no bearing on any centrifugal influences at work within the Empire. If deep enough passions were

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, IV Series, 1904, CXXIX, 656.

aroused, and nothing else could bring secession, it could not be stopped by a two-shilling duty on corn. The analogy of the German *Zollverein* did not apply. The German system had operated by "taking away barriers which stood in the way of a natural unity." Great Britain was in different case.

As for the Liberals, they maintained that the colonies had not asked for preference; that they did not offer anything commensurate for preference; that bargains led to disputes, anyway, and that it would be impossible to equalize the treatment given Canada and Australia. Furthermore, it was an entering wedge; if Canadian grain was subject to preferential treatment, how about Canadian lumber, and so on through a list of other products? Sir Edward Grey made much of the fact that the colonial desire was not for free trade within the Empire but for a British tariff against the foreigner. "I am more interested," he stated, "in the duties which the colonies impose on British goods than in those which they impose on foreign goods." Canada is not apt to lower hers; Mr. Deakin of Australia says that free trade within the Empire is impractical. Where is there any evidence of enthusiasm for it in the colonies? Naturally, and this the Liberals admitted, the colonies would be glad to receive a British preference: but none were so eager as to offer free imports for British manufactured goods within their own protected borders.

The Government, on the other hand, did not lack supporters. But there was an evident schism in their ranks. Some, following Chamberlain, defended the Dominions hotly, affirming that they did ask for the preference, although not begging it. And they ridiculed the idea that tariff reform meant a return to the corn law days. Others, following Balfour, spoke not of the Empire but of the trade of the United Kingdom, and how foreign competition had made inroads upon it. These urged a retaliatory tariff but denied emphatically that they approved of any tax on food.

Was it possible to find a common denominator of these contending views?

With rebellion seething in his own ranks Balfour thought of a way out. Late in the year in Edinburgh he advanced his *two elections plan*. "First there must be a general British election; then, if a Unionist government was returned to power it would call a colonial conference, a *free conference* at which the whole question of preference could be discussed between the representatives of the overseas Dominions and the representatives of Great Britain. Then, the decision of this conference would be submitted to the electorate again before any definite steps were taken. Imperial unification must not be hastily forced on public opinion and it must be looked at from the political and patriotic standpoint rather than from that of economics and profit and loss."¹

Would Chamberlain accept this proposed compromise, this postponement of his cherished hopes until after two elections? If he did not, all likelihood of unity in his own party was irretrievably lost; if he did, years of delay must intervene before a victory. Chamberlain was a fighter; he was also a man of sense. He decided to accept.

This did not signify, however, that Mr. Balfour was very heartily enlisted on his side. As late as March 8, 1905, the Prime Minister spoke as follows in the Commons: "I dare say there are gentlemen in the House who are in favor of a protective taxation of food, I am not." But this did not mean, although it might so appear, that the statesman was opposed to a tax on food. In Manchester in the preceding year the implication was clear in a speech by him that he would look with approval on such a policy. There was a string attached, of course; the tax had to be a part of a "great imperial idea." Furthermore, it should not be imposed until "the whole subject has been thrashed out not merely in the House of Commons, not merely on the

¹ Raymond, E. T., *Mr. Balfour*, 119.

platform, but in every household throughout the country. Then and not till then it will be, if you adopt it, a firm and abiding basis of a closer union with the Colonies.”¹

The position of the Prime Minister seemed obscure. Yet at any given moment, owing to the magic of his scholastic logic, it appeared lucid. Chameleon-like, however, it seemed to change its color as the occasion demanded. Speech A never quite coincided with speech B.

The tariff reformers, for their part, were in as great a quandary as Balfour. Many of them felt that had a dissolution taken place in 1903 a fair chance of victory might have been theirs. And now, in 1905, the Unionists were losing ground steadily in the constituencies. As for Balfour, he adopted new tactics; he refused to take part at all in tariff debates in the House of Commons and frequently absented himself entirely. Having postponed the question until after a new election, how could it be a practical issue? Throughout the country Mr. Chamberlain and his friends kept up an incessant din, stressing the cost of living, unemployment and imperial unity. The first, they asserted, would not be affected, one way or another; the second would be relieved; the third was the crying need of the hour. The elaborate character of their propaganda was impressive; within their own party organization, at least, it made decided headway.

In December, 1905, Mr. Balfour found the pressure too great. Many of his own adherents, practically all of the Chamberlainites, wanted a decision from the country. The Prime Minister thereupon resigned to be immediately succeeded by Campbell-Bannerman. And the following January the election was fought out on the hustings. It was warmly contested. The Liberals had a superfluity of issues, prominent among them being: Anglican control of education; Chinese labor in the Transvaal; and the retention of the old established fiscal tradition of Great Britain. The

¹ Balfour, A. J., *Fiscal Speeches*, 137.

Unionists, to all practical purposes, were reduced to two: the danger of Home Rule, in case of a Liberal majority; and tariff reform. And the former was only a bogey which frightened no one, while upon the latter they were divided among themselves. "Whole Hoggers," "Little Piggers" and "Free Fooders" they were derisively called, depending on whether they followed Chamberlain, Balfour or Devonshire. And they finished at the polls in the order named; 109 Chamberlainites, 32 followers of Balfour and 11 free fooders being returned. To such straits was the party of Disraeli and Salisbury reduced that it was outnumbered three to one by the triumphant Liberal and Labor members. There would be no protective tariff for many a year; the election decided that.

And to what causes may be ascribed the Tory defeat? Prominent among them were: the conservative character of the British democracy, suspicious of anything breaking with tradition; indignation at the treatment of the Chinese in South Africa and of the Nonconformists in Britain; the apparent absence of any clear call from the Dominions for a preferential tariff; and finally, an open rupture in the Tory ranks. The ingenious Mr. Balfour had kept his party together; only a few members crossed the gangway. The price, however, had been heavy. And when, in 1906, their leader finally committed himself to the doctrines of Chamberlain the tariff reformers knew they had won something; they had captured the Unionist party; what there was left of it.

Decisive as was the election of 1906 the adherents of inter-imperial trade preference continued their agitation. The Unionist minority in the House of Commons might be helpless to advance it; the United Kingdom might be thoroughly weary of its discussion; the spirit of Cobden might reign: none the less new reinforcements from a new quarter hastened in 1907 to reopen the entire question.

It had been constantly maintained, sometimes by open

thrust, sometimes by innuendo, that Chamberlain's proposals were without support and backing in the Dominions overseas. This charge is not altogether capable of disproof. But lukewarm, or perhaps unenlightened as Dominion opinion might have been in 1903, in four years it was to turn strongly toward the program of the ex-Colonial Secretary, as may be evidenced by the proceedings of the imperial conference of 1907.

The work of this body, if judged by objective and obvious standards, was largely futile. In only one of the three fields of mutual coöperation between Motherland and self-governing colony, namely defense, constitutional machinery and trade agreement, was it to accomplish anything of note; yet in all of them it was to be a remarkable conference in so far as it brought sharply to light the difficulties which lay in the way of closer imperial unity.

This is clearly shown by the arguments advanced in regard to preference. As the tide in Britain turned against it, so did that in the Empire at large turn in favor of this new method of empire-unity. The colonial conference of 1902 had urged closer trade connections in a way rather general; that of 1907 should be more specific, so thought the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Deakin. In consequence he moved an additional clause urging the Mother country to reciprocate the advances of the Dominions with a preferential tariff of her own in their favor.

Now in Australia an election had recently been held and Mr. Deakin had behind him a fresh majority. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of New Zealand as well as the Prime Ministers of the Cape Colony and Natal also stood staunchly behind him. What would the Imperial Government do?

They decided to combat this amendment on every possible ground, advancing first, Mr. Mackay of the India Office to demonstrate how evil the effects might be in India, advancing secondly, Mr. Asquith, as Chancellor of the Ex-

chequer, in general defense of free trade, advancing thirdly Mr. Lloyd George, as President of the Board of Trade, to disclose in detail the economic fallacies of the scheme; and finally Mr. Winston Churchill, a recent arrival in Liberal circles, was to conclude the anti-protectionist arguments of the preceding three advocates by illustrations drawn from the political rather than the economic field.

Said Mr. Mackay: "It is a matter of deep regret that those responsible for the Government of India should find themselves at variance with the distinguished statesmen representing Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa." But India had a large trade with foreign countries, exporting to them more than she did to the United Kingdom. This, he considered, would be jeopardized if the United Kingdom gave a preference to colonial products since in such case foreign countries would penalize India as the easiest way of demonstrating their disfavor.

Mr. Asquith, ever a better lawyer than a politician, fought to win points rather than to persuade. His introduction of Mr. Mackay as the representative of India was an evidence of this. Mr. Mackay did not represent India, not at least in the sense that Dr. Jameson represented Cape Colony. He was the nominee of the India Office and therefore of the British government. Mr. Asquith won a point (of the argument) and as he did so lost the sympathy of his opponents. If the Prime Minister of England had been content with a general defense of free trade and a simple statement that preference was impossible owing to the results of the last British election he would have created no particular irritation. But this was not sufficient for Mr. Asquith. He insisted, in somewhat unchivalrous fashion, in questioning the validity of the existing preferential laws of Canada, New Zealand and Australia, all three. Lawyer-like, he did not mention Cape Colony, for the argument here was against him. There could be no question of the Cape's preference. The simple-minded Sir Joseph

Ward he also caught in a bad trap. The New Zealand Premier had made objection to the heavy tolls of the Suez Canal which limited its use to the wealthy while "the poor unfortunate tramps which go to and fro from our country have to travel the oceans of the world and to take ten days or a fortnight longer to carry our products to England." The British statesman led him on:

Mr. Asquith: "So you would not allow the Germans to go through free of toll?"

Sir J. Ward: "Not at the same rate; why should we?"

Whereby the representative of New Zealand was shown to know little of the history of the Suez Canal as an international thoroughfare and Mr. Asquith won another point.

Mr. Lloyd George took up the cudgels for the Government with more success. A bitter war of figures and statistics took place between him and Sir William Lyne, Minister of Trade and Customs of Australia. According to his usual manner, Mr. Lloyd George skillfully combined business shrewdness with clever appeals to sentiment, and the desperate struggle for existence on the part of the poor of the United Kingdom. How this would be intensified by a rebate on wine and tobacco imported into Britain from the Cape he did not show; nor did he successfully combat the Australian argument that a larger area in that country devoted to wheat would result in cheaper marketing facilities, thus offsetting in its final effects any small duty on foreign wheat imported into Great Britain.

And finally, Mr. Churchill, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the assembled premiers how disturbing their proposals would be if put into effect by the Imperial Parliament. Unfortunately, Mr. Churchill proved too much. He stated that the proposed preference, being in the form of a treaty, could not well be varied; and at the same time he objected to the preference appearing year

by year as part of the British budget, thus opening up an acrimonious dispute.

The representatives of Great Britain won the debate: yet it should not have been a debate but an effort to develop a common point of view; and in this they failed. Since they were more clever than their opponents (Laurier and General Botha, for the most part, were silent) they were the more to blame for the failure. The intentions of the British government were excellent; they would treat this matter seriously and so compliment the Dominions. The point of view, however, of the British overseas they did not understand, nor did they seriously attempt to do so.

Finally, on the motion of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the conference contented itself with a reaffirmation of the more general resolution of 1902, and to this the British government acceded with a strong caveat to the effect that this was not to be taken as modifying the existing fiscal system of the United Kingdom. And thus came to an end until after the Great War all direct effort to achieve tariff reform, as Chamberlain envisaged it.¹

From the point of view of the Chamberlain school the defeat of their plans for achieving imperial unity through the means of a protective tariff served at least one useful purpose; it left the way clear for the resurrection of imperial federation through political rather than economic agencies. The idea that the outlying portions of the Empire should share in some measure with Great Britain the duties, responsibilities, and likewise expense, of governing and protecting the entire Commonwealth had been a favorite one with Chamberlain. Even before his time it had been widely discussed and its origin may be ascribed to no exact date. The Imperial Federation League was organized in 1884;

¹ The somewhat bitter account of the meeting of the premiers as given by R. Jebb's, *The Imperial Conference*, should be tempered by the actual debates as reported in the *Sessional Papers* for 1907, LV (cd. 3404). For the extracts quoted in this book it has not been considered necessary to make separate references.

but eight years earlier Sir Francis Young had written on *Federation*, and in the sixties well known publicists like Goldwin Smith had commented on its feasibility. Until 1907, however, or perhaps even 1911, imperial federation may be said to have been clad in academic robes. Its earlier advocates had been altogether too sanguine. "It must be either federation or disintegration," they had said. But the men who settled Canada and Australia were not interested in logic; they were more concerned about taxes, and with the true instinct of the pioneer they preferred to be left alone.

In the early twentieth century this feeling had changed somewhat, particularly in New Zealand and Australia. In these newer Dominions was the purer British stock; here, all things considered, a more unanimous British patriotism. The isolation of these lands and their great distance from the Mother country were factors which contributed to it, as well as the problem of Asiatic immigration, the complications of which were greatly augmented by the alliance between Britain and Japan. Hence it came about that in both the conferences of 1907 and 1911 Australia and New Zealand committed themselves, and attempted to commit the rest of the Empire as well, to certain tentative steps in the direction of imperial federation.

Among the last accomplishments of the dying Balfour government was the sending of proposals in 1905 to the Dominions for the forthcoming colonial conference of 1907. Mr. Lyttleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, suggested that henceforth, instead of the words, "colonial conference," there be substituted the title *Imperial Council*. He also intimated that it would be desirable to create a permanent commission or secretariat in London, entirely advisory and consultative in character, for the purpose of preparing the agenda for the periodic meetings of the Imperial Council thus proposed.

The first question discussed by the conference of 1907

was that of the feasibility of these changes. Australia and New Zealand warmly supported Mr. Lyttleton's ideas only to be instantly rebuffed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The Canadian statesman was suspicious of the term, *Imperial Council*. He thought it looked like the beginning of a super-legislature, and to this he was bitterly opposed. The word *Imperial* he had no objection to since the Mother country took part in their deliberations; but a council, no! Laurier then brought forward as a substitute, *Imperial Conference*. This was accepted without debate. The real crux of the Lyttleton proposals, the secretariat, was then discussed.

Laurier said that he had an open mind in regard to this, and that he wanted to hear more about it. Whereupon Deakin of Australia, Ward of New Zealand and Jameson of the Cape Colony attempted to enlighten him. All of these premiers wanted a change in the relations of the Dominions and self-governing colonies to Great Britain. They sought primarily a permanent organization in London apart from the Colonial Office and directly responsible to the Prime Minister of England. Their desire was for a secretariat which should not only prepare the agendas of the succeeding conferences but which should also act as an intermediary between Great Britain and the Dominions, and keep the latter constantly informed of matters of imperial interest. No legislative power was given to it, that was to be understood. "What we had in mind," said Deakin, "was not an extension of power; it was an extension of inquiry, and improvement of method, a system of obtaining complete information."

Thus far Mr. Deakin's speech was innocent enough; but he added this statement which the alert Laurier was quick to notice. "It is desirable for us," he continued, "to keep in touch with the foreign politics of the Empire. Our information in regard to such matters comes at present from channels which are circulatory and indirect."

Now, if the Dominions were to be officially informed in regard to the foreign policy of Great Britain it would be but a step toward participation in it. This, to Laurier, was anathema. The Prime Minister of England, he argued, had enough to do without heading the proposed organization. If it was considered desirable to have a secretariat let it be under the Colonial Office.

New Zealand promptly was displeased with this suggestion. Sir Joseph Ward on her behalf urged that the High Commissioners of all the self-governing colonies and Dominions sit permanently in London. He did not like their being in any way under the control of the Colonial Office as if they were Crown colonies. It belittled their status.

This brought Lord Elgin into the field. The Secretary of State for the Colonies felt called upon to defend his own post. Presiding as he did during the absence of the Prime Minister, he was fully conscious that he represented the Crown, perhaps too much so. He spoke frequently and all too often without much show of tact or conciliation of manner. He did not like the assumption freely made that the Colonial Office had all the work that it could properly handle without including Dominion affairs; and he made strong objection to the way in which the proposed secretariat would diminish the prestige of the colonial governors, unless, of course, it remained under his direction.

"But," exclaimed Mr. Deakin, "the Colonial Office deals with dependencies and so becomes habituated to an officiousness which "is very foreign and sometimes antagonistic to those principles upon which the affairs of the self-governing colonies are conducted and must be conducted." And again, the Australian Premier stated: "The complaint which we have to make is of an attitude of mind, a certain impenetrability, a certain remoteness, perhaps geographically justified, a certain weariness of people much pressed with affairs and greatly overburdened."

Australia in this matter spoke with some bitterness. The

Emigration Board in London had recently, according to Deakin, misrepresented the conditions which confronted the white workers in the sugar industry in Queensland, and Deakin considered this typical of the unsympathetic attitude of the British bureaucracy. A secretariat such as he had in mind would remedy such a state of affairs. The official information given out in Britain in regard to Queensland was very faulty. The climate was really subtropical and not tropical, as described. The white worker who broke down in the sugar industry there, did so on account of liquor and excessive meat eating and not because of the climate. The work in the sugar fields was only four months in the year anyway, and many varieties of remunerative labor occupied the time of the immigrants during the remainder. Why should not official pamphlets tell the whole truth? The reason was that there was no body of men in London sufficiently interested.

Two insuperable obstacles stood in the way of Mr. Deakin's plan; one, the refusal of the Prime Minister to assume responsibility for any secretariat directly under his supervision; the other, indifference verging toward hostility on the part of certain other colonial premiers. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at the opening of the conference had struck the keynote to its proceedings from the point of view of the then British government. Freedom and independence were the two words which the Prime Minister stressed in his opening address; and this having been delivered, the remainder of the proceedings was left to the less skillful hands of Lord Elgin.

Furthermore, Laurier's opposition to anything and everything which might end in the Dominions becoming responsible for British foreign policy received support from General Botha. With the Transvaal and Canada both standing with England in this matter it was hopeless to continue further. The ex-Boer general made his position quite clear. In reply to Dr. Jameson, who urged that the original Aus-

tralian resolution was quite harmless, he stated that "it was only a seed and that of course we may have visions a thousand years hence of a closer union." General Botha was not pleased even with the vision, and in reply he quoted Chamberlain's dictum of 1902 in regard to a colonial conference that "the object would not be completely secured until there had been conferred on such a council executive powers." This implied a super-government in London. Both Botha and Laurier demurred.

The upshot of the controversy, therefore, was that the conference resolved that it was desirable that a permanent secretarial staff be organized under the direction of the Colonial Secretary and that every four years a meeting of the imperial conference should take place for the discussion of matters of common interest.

Four years afterwards the imperial conference again convened. During the interval Mr. Asquith, who presided, had succeeded Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister. In place of Lord Elgin, Mr. Harcourt was Colonial Secretary. Mr. Fisher (Labor) took Mr. Deakin's place for Australia. Sir Joseph Ward again represented New Zealand and General Botha the Union of South Africa. Meanwhile, of especial imperial interest during the interval between the conferences were the creation of Dominion navies and the federation of South Africa.

Certain of the more important sessions of this conference were held *in camera*. The speech delivered before it, for instance, by Sir Edward Grey on the foreign policies of the British government was never published; nevertheless, Sir Edward himself assured the assembled premiers that it was a more complete and full account of the international situation than had ever been presented by him before the Cabinet. Although much, however, remains obscure about the deliberations of the conference, its record is of peculiar interest for three reasons: a full-blown although hastily constructed plan of imperial con-

federation was presented to it; the conference was apparently instrumental (at last) in reorganizing the antique methods of the Colonial Office; and finally it was successful in obtaining a voice in the foreign affairs of the Empire.¹

The champion of imperial confederation in 1911 was the Premier of New Zealand, Sir Joseph Ward; and it is quite evident that his ideas in regard to the future of the Empire did not coincide with those of England's Prime Minister. In opening the conference Mr. Asquith spoke feelingly of "the life blood of our polity" being the fact that each of us intends to remain master of our own household. There was no hint of imperial unity in this suggestion. Nor was it to be found in Laurier's opening speech. "I have the happy privilege of representing here," said the Canadian, "a country which has no grievances to set forth and very few suggestions to make. We are quite satisfied with our lot." This complacency did not satisfy the representative of New Zealand. "It is essential," he exclaimed, "to take a step forward, and an important step forward if we want to prevent . . . disintegration."

The plan which he had in mind to avert this calamity was a far-reaching one. Shortly after the conference opened the New Zealand Premier sponsored a resolution which read as follows: "That the Empire has now reached a state of imperial development which renders it expedient that in all the self-governing colonies of the Empire, in theory and in practice, there should be an Imperial Council of State with representatives of all the self-governing colonies of the Empire in theory and in fact advisory to the Imperial Government in all questions affecting the interests of his Majesty's Dominions Overseas." Ward wanted, in other words, a species of super-parliament to decide on peace and war, treaties and a common policy of defense. In urging his resolution he spoke at length on the popula-

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1911, LIV (cd. 5745). For all subsequent quotations from the debates of this conference consult this volume.

tion actual and potential of the great Dominions, advocating the welding of them into a greater whole before it was too late. Pressed by his fellow premiers to be more specific, he urged the creation of an imperial House of Representatives chosen on the basis of electoral units of 200,000. This, he said, would give Canada 37 members, Australia 25, South Africa 7, New Zealand 6, Newfoundland 2, and the United Kingdom 220. He also advocated a council of defense with two representatives on it from each Dominion and also two from the United Kingdom.

Unhappily, Sir Joseph Ward's plans were crudely drawn. It seems that he formulated his resolution on shipboard and decided to advocate a complete form of imperial federation without due thought or preparation. The result was a speech open to easy attack. Laurier instantly perceived this. The resolution, he pointed out, urged one thing—*advisory powers*; but the speech, another—*legislative powers*. Did Sir Joseph stand by his resolution or his speech? It developed on further questioning from Asquith and Laurier that Sir Joseph stood by his speech. What he sought was a Parliament, a new Parliament with new powers. He asked for home rule all around, for Scotland, for Wales, for Ireland, a reconstruction of the entire British system on a federal basis. He did not expect this all at once. For the time being his new Parliament was to be restricted purely to the question of imperial defense. Even here, its powers were to be limited. It could vote money for that purpose, but it had to be raised by the existing Governments; and furthermore, the per capita assessment of the Dominions for the ensuing ten years was limited to fifty per cent of the per capita assessment of the United Kingdom.

The theories of the New Zealand statesman seemed fanciful. They were clothed with all the generous idealism of a Sieyès or a Condorcet, but unlike the French constitution mongers of the latter eighteenth century they were,

in almost every detail, vague. Sir Joseph Ward injured the cause he would assist. What would seem to be a fair interpretation of his speech would be this: something needs to be done; the Dominions, if they are to assist in the military and naval defense of the Empire, and they are doing this more and more all the time, should have a voice in determining foreign policy, peace and war. To secure this I think the best plan would be a thorough reconstruction of our constitutional machinery.

Viewed in this light Sir Joseph's position seems logical enough; but the New Zealander was opposed by a clever logician, Mr. Asquith, who saw fit to puncture this ambitious project by ignoring the causes which gave birth to it, and by stressing the practical difficulties in the way. The New Zealand plan, said Asquith, "would impair if not altogether destroy the authority of the government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the maintenance of peace, the declaration of war, and indeed all those relations with foreign powers necessarily of the most delicate character which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government . . . that authority cannot be shared." Faced with unqualified opposition on the part of the Liberal government of Great Britain, Sir Joseph Ward withdrew his resolution.

Having failed in regard to the Council, New Zealand next essayed a reorganization of the Colonial Office and to this effect brought up a series of six resolutions. They provided, *inter alia*, for the complete bisection of the Colonial Office, for the separation of Dominion affairs from the concerns of the Crown colonies, and also for the granting of additional recognition to the High Commissioners of the Dominions in London. These commercial representatives of the Dominions Sir Joseph would organize into a council which should consult with and advise the Imperial Government.

The Colonial Office objected to its own bisecting, but agreed to submit if Sir Joseph was generally supported by his fellow premiers. The Colonial Secretary claimed that the reorganization of the department subsequent to the conference of 1907 had accomplished all that might be gained in this matter and that it would be expensive and awkward to separate the functions of his office further. Australia, Newfoundland, Canada and South Africa supporting Mr. Harcourt, this motion was also withdrawn.

In regard to the High Commissioners of the Dominions being organized into a standing committee of the conference the Colonial Office was willing, but the majority of the premiers were not. Laurier was fearful lest any such committee attempt to limit the authority of the various Dominions, even if only by indirection. He did not want to be in the position of refusing to follow the advice of a standing committee. As for General Botha, he was quite scornful. "Sentiment and mutual interest bring us together," he said; "now it is sought to create committees." He disapproved heartily of this. The British government would have to consult the committee before doing anything for the Dominions and that might cause delay at a critical moment. Furthermore, the High Commissioner of South Africa was sent over to buy railway equipment, etc., and it was not expected that the commissionership should be political in its spirit. "Let us stick to the work we have gone on with," he concluded; "it is slow work, but it is sure work." Since none of the premiers except Sir Joseph Ward thought highly of this second proposal it likewise was discarded.

But one minor suggestion of Sir Joseph's now remained, that which provided for the interchange of civil servants. The Colonial Office agreed heartily to this, provided that certain minor changes be introduced into the resolution. There was no use, for instance, in interchanging post~~al~~ clerks. The Colonial Office suggested the use of the word,

"visits." This met with everybody's approbation and Sir Joseph was at last a victor; his victory, however, was somewhat exiguous.

Australia was to fare somewhat better. An important resolution was proposed in her name which read thus: "It is regretted that the Dominions were not consulted prior to the acceptance by the British delegates of the Declaration of London; that it is not desirable that Great Britain should adopt the inclusion of article 24 in regard to food-stuffs, in view of the fact that so large a part of the trade of the Empire is in this article; that it is not desirable that Great Britain should adopt the provisions of articles 48 to 54, permitting the destruction of neutral vessels."

The importance of the debate on this complicated resolution does not lie in the details of the Declaration of London. A much better debate on that subject took place in the House of Lords. The significance of the situation from the point of view of the Empire's constitution is that the conference debated it at all. It is a proof that the conference intended to take a hand in deciding upon the foreign affairs of Great Britain directly after being advised by the Prime Minister that Britain could permit no division of authority in that matter. Into the highly technical provisions of the Declaration of London it is not necessary to plunge in order to grasp the significance of the debate upon them. Sir Edward Grey won the premiers over to an approval of the declaration. He did so partly by close argument and clever reasoning; he did it also by the offer of an important concession to Dominion feeling. He promised that in the future the British government would consult with the Dominions before committing itself to any of the proceedings of the Hague conference. Whereupon Mr. Fisher asserted that the Dominions wanted to be informed in regard to all treaties. To this Sir Edward Grey made objection, but when pressed by Mr. Fisher agreed to do so whenever possible.

Thereupon Sir Wilfrid Laurier joined the discussion. He had no desire to be consulted. "How are you," he said, "to give advice and insist upon the manner in which a war is to be carried on unless you are prepared to take the responsibility of going into the war?" . . . "We have taken the position in Canada that we do not think we are bound to take part in every war and that our fleet may not be called upon in all cases." He would leave the negotiations to the head of the family, "the one who has to bear the burden in part on some occasions, and the whole burden, perhaps, on others." But in this Sir Wilfrid stood alone. Even his ally, General Botha, deserted him. The South African statesman announced that "it was his profound conviction that the Imperial Government should not definitely bind itself by any promise or agreement with a foreign country which may affect a Dominion without consulting the Dominion concerned."

The third major topic for discussion at the conference of 1911 was the defense of the Empire. Joint action to provide for this was a policy dear to Chamberlain's heart: but he had not been able to accomplish much toward this end. The principal difficulty was that the interests of the Dominions were widely divergent. Australia and New Zealand were much more keenly interested in imperial defense than either Canada or South Africa. To New Zealand, indeed, it was a matter of paramount concern. Smaller than the other Dominions and more isolated, she was above all things troubled by the specter of an awakened Asia demanding expansion in the Pacific. On the other hand Canada was not only far distant from Asia but protected as well (with apologies to the Canadians) by the Monroe Doctrine, upheld by her neighbor to the south. In any case her larger cities, Montreal and Toronto, were well protected by their inland situation against any attack.

As for South Africa, her position lay intermediate between that of Canada and the Pacific Dominions. The Orange

Free State and the Transvaal were certainly not distressed at any hypothetical plight of Cape Colony and Natal. South Africa also was poor, very poor after the Boer War, and primarily interested in reconstruction.

The racial diversities in the Dominions added greatly to the complications of the situation. In New Zealand there were none; the inhabitants of pure British stock felt more keenly than elsewhere their allegiance to the British Crown. In Australia, on the other hand, the Irish were to be found in large numbers, and the weight of their influence went toward stressing Australian nationality over British citizenship. The French in Canada exerted a similar influence as did the Dutch in South Africa. In both Canada and South Africa an influential, and on the whole wealthy, minority was more British than the inhabitants of Great Britain, and its voice was raised frequently above the tumult; but it did not set the pace nor control the Parliaments of these two Dominions.

Under these circumstances, therefore, it is not remarkable that in 1897 and in 1902 the efforts of the Colonial Office to obtain participation in imperial defense were so largely unavailing. Not until 1907 did the Empire's naval defense emerge as a vital consideration, and that it did so was due to Australia rather than to the Mother country. The Liberals, in control of the British government at that date, were endeavoring to "soft pedal" all talk of armament, and the premiers were told that the Home Government did not ask them for money but simply for their coöperation. Australia, at this time, proposed the creation of separate naval establishments with the cordial blessing of the Admiralty, and Dr. Smartt of Cape Colony attempted to commit all the Dominions to participate in the naval defense of the Empire. This, however, Laurier fought shy of in any form. He stated emphatically that he would be forced to vote against any motion which called for common action.

Since a resolution which was not unanimous was not worth while, Dr. Smartt withdrew and the whole question lapsed.

But within two years, in 1909, a special sub-conference was summoned in London for the purpose of discussing naval affairs only. It was caused by the German naval program which had frightened the British government into laying the keels of eight battleships. The news of this was bruited around the Empire and created much furor. New Zealand cabled, offering a dreadnaught; the Australian state governments of New South Wales and Victoria threatened to do likewise unless Commonwealth action was taken. Altogether, the Admiralty thought the time was at hand for another conference.

The premiers of the overseas Dominions did not attend, being represented by Cabinet delegates; the meeting was held in secret and simply the results made known. Australia agreed to provide a fleet unit on her own responsibility; New Zealand was to give an armored cruiser which was to be stationed in Chinese waters; and Canada announced her intention of starting a small navy of her own. The Admiralty wanted a fleet unit, but was prepared to take what it could get, and therefore it fell in with the Canadian proposals.

- At the conference of 1911 a great step forward was made by the inclusion of Canada among those countries really interested. Sir Robert Borden on her behalf proposed three battleships; the Australian flag actually appeared on the high seas; and laws were drawn up which codified and regulated the relations of the Dominion navies to that of Britain. Meanwhile South Africa continued her modest appropriation of £85,000 per annum for the British Admiralty.

The action of 1907 and 1911 was hailed joyously as indicative of an advance toward imperial unity. Unfortunately, however, there were two or three drawbacks which must be mentioned. Canada, for instance, refused to ratify the convention made by Mr. Borden. Australia also was

somewhat unhappy since the British Admiralty, considering the Japanese treaty a sufficient guarantee of imperial interest in the Pacific, had sought the withdrawal to home waters of the Australian battle cruiser. Furthermore, after the Australian Parliament had proceeded with the construction of a fleet unit on the advice of the Admiralty, that august board had seen fit to reverse itself and had encouraged Canada to adopt the old system of subsidies. Neither was New Zealand pleased with the placing of her battleship in the North Sea. She yielded to requests made for it, but none the less felt that the Pacific was unguarded despite her sacrifices. The Premier of New Zealand still clung to his dream of a vast Australian-Canadian-South African-New Zealand combined fleet, making safe the Pacific. This did not fit in at all with the proposals of the masterful Mr. Churchill that the battle cruisers of all the Dominions foregather at Gibraltar as a flying squadron. New Zealand was a long way from Gibraltar; so it seemed to Sir Joseph Ward.

On the military side less was accomplished. Chamberlain had suggested in 1902 that certain military units be earmarked for service outside the Dominions, an idea which was promptly vetoed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In 1907 all that the imperial authorities requested, to the relief of the Dominion politicians, was the creation of an imperial general staff. This was acceded to; and shortly after came the amazing experiment in universal service in New Zealand and Australia. But the creation of these citizen armies had come about not so much because of a desire for imperial coöperation as because of the isolation of the South Seas Dominions.

Thus it came about that Chamberlain's proposals were rejected, one after another. Neither in armament, political coöperation or in economic policy were the Dominions and the Mother country anxious to be drawn closer. The dead weight of inertia, for one thing, was too strong. In both England and the Dominions more pressing problems occu-

pied the political stage; inter-imperial relations, so the majority thought, could wait.

Furthermore, three stubborn facts stood in the way of closer union: the free trade tradition of England; the necessity of quick, authoritative decisions in regard to foreign policy; and Dominion nationalism. To the average Briton free trade was not a theory but a truth. In addition, it was a British truth, possibly the more cherished because denied by the remainder of the world. Military and naval contributions, on the other hand, meant either taxation without representation or else a Dominion voice in foreign policy. To either alternative there were grave objections. The larger Dominions, meanwhile, thought of themselves as nations, British nations, it is true, but perhaps on that very account proud, self-reliant, and absorbed in their own domestic concerns. Europe was far distant, her problems not theirs. Only the shock of war could make them feel otherwise.

CHAPTER VII

THE DOMINIONS AND THE WAR

To the Dominions as to America the Great War came as a complete surprise. Europe was far distant, and even there the clouds which gathered darkly in 1911 had somewhat lifted by 1914. Nevertheless, the unanimity which characterized public opinion in Great Britain was reflected strongly in the Dominions, with the exception of South Africa.

The invasion of Belgium was their warrant for the war. In Canada and Australia the diplomacy antecedent to that nefarious episode was unknown. The Dominion statesmen were even less aware than the members of the House of Commons of what happened during the last fatal days of July. The Germans had struck at Belgium and the Mother country had stood by her plighted word; that was sufficient.

To be sure, the excitement overseas was less intense. The rush of the Teutonic hosts for Paris was not as easily envisaged in Winnipeg as in London. Nor were the men of Sydney, Halifax, Auckland or of Durban enlisted in the British expeditionary force that fought so gloriously on the retreat from Mons. The war, in consequence, in its earlier stages was less personal to their countrymen. None the less, it was their war, and they made haste to take their share of its sacrifice and death.

Australia, of the three larger Dominions, put forth the greatest effort. It was natural and proper that she should, since her population was far more pronouncedly British than that of the other two. Some few thousand Germans were in South Australia, and a sprinkling of Kanakas and Orientals elsewhere; but the remaining folk of the island continent

came almost exclusively from the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth was on the eve of an election. Despite the war it seemed advisable to hold it: but the campaign issue as presented by both political parties was the placing of responsibility for even permitting an election at such a critical time. The new Government (Labor) entered upon its war duties with vigor. It instantly placed the Australian fleet under the control of the Admiralty, and Australian vessels promptly conveyed the troops of New Zealand to Samoa. The raider *Emden* was sunk by the Australian cruiser *Sydney*, and Australian soldiers saw service almost immediately in New Guinea, which they captured from the Germans after a brisk fight.

New Zealand, meanwhile, by the fifteenth of August, had embarked her troops for the conquest of Samoa. Shortly after, her first European contingent sailed for Egypt, some 8,500 men. It was but the beginning of that loyal Dominion's effort to sustain the man power of the Empire.

With the coming of 1915, however, the chronicle of victories won quickly by these British from the South Seas came to a sudden termination. And now they were confronted with a campaign the severity of which has few parallels in history. To break through the Dardanelles; to separate European from Asiatic Turkey; to open communication with Russia: these were the objectives of the Gallipoli campaign. And for its execution the War Office relied chiefly on the Australian and New Zealand auxiliary corps, familiarly known as the Anzacs. Other troops participated in this enterprise, Indian, French, Irish, British regulars and his Majesty's Marines. But the brunt was born by the Anzacs, and to them should go the greater glory.

To open the Straits it was essential to occupy the peninsula which guarded them on the European side, otherwise a cross fire from shore to shore would make the passage impossible. The tip of this peninsula was captured easily, but to advance inland against the entrenched Turks on the

heights was extremely difficult. Hence came a decision to strike on the flank; to land troops where the peninsula was narrow; to press across and to sever communication with Constantinople, thus compelling the surrender of the Turk and making possible the navigation of the Straits. On all the northwestern shore there was no harbor, but the beach in places seemed extensive and a sudden attack, planned between the setting of the moon and the sun's rising, would it was hoped outflank the enemy. By a miscalculation, however, the British landed a mile too far to the north. Of beach there was but the narrowest and the soldiers jumping into four feet of water, with food, rifles and full equipment, were compelled to work their way upward as best they might through rough and hilly country in the face of a nasty fire.

Whereupon next day all Hell let loose. The terrain was precipitous, in places several hundred feet in elevation and broken by deep gullies. A number of the Anzac detachments in their eagerness to press forward had taken advanced positions from which they could neither go forward nor retreat. They were now at close quarters with the Turks and were horribly mauled by the machine guns of the enemy. To support them by new columns; to dig in, entrench and bring up supplies; to carry back the wounded and to make permanent such slight foothold as they had: these occupations taxed the endurance and the courage of the Anzacs to the utmost.

The toll of life was enormous and for a while it seemed as though the invaders must withdraw. But they clung on to their slippery advance posts with grim resolve to extend them. The fighting was almost entirely at close quarters. Distances at Gallipoli were measured in yards not in miles. At their very greatest the British lines extended only four miles inland, nor was their total length more than sixteen. First here, and then there, within these narrow limits, did the 90,000 soldiers of the Empire drive straight against the foe.

Through the Turkish lines they could not hew their way. Then came May and the New Zealanders, operating from the tip of the peninsula, strove mightily to capture the heights of Krithia. A place called the "Daisy Patch," one hundred yards before their line, was made crimson by their blood; but the heights behind remained uncaptured. The Eighth Light Horse of Australia, meanwhile, was virtually annihilated as in three successive waves it dashed to inevitable death against the Turkish trenches. Despite all efforts no advance was made. Failing to make headway at the peninsula's tip or at Anzac Bay, a third attempt was made further to the north. But here again they were checked, and all hands settled down to a long hot summer of hand to hand encounter with the Turk.

Then, as the pitiless sun beat down on the Anzacs in their narrow bit of conquered territory, disease stalked abroad. The trenches of the foe were but a few feet distant; the dead in many cases only half buried; and myriads of flies, attacking dead and living alike, brought with them dysentery, typhoid and other fevers. Thirst was added to their sufferings since drinking water there was none, except the precarious supply brought up by donkeys from the launches. And sometimes heavy weather made these keep their distance, days at a time, from the beach.

And as the long summer wore itself away black storms lashed the Ægean and descended on the ill-housed and half-sick soldiers. Then broke the winter and a great snow storm, a new sight to Australian eyes. And sentries were found frozen at their posts, and soldiers who a short time before had been blistered by the heat now were tormented by the cold.

In December came word to abandon this ill-fated enterprise and the Anzacs, triumphant at least in their difficult task of evacuation, withdrew from the Dardanelles.

Their next opportunity came on the western front where they fought during the remaining three years of the war.

We cannot trace their campaigns here since to do so would necessitate writing the military history of the war. But at the Somme in 1916, in the Ypres sector and before Messines Ridge in 1917, and close by Amiens in 1918, when Ludendorff drove at the junction of the Franco-British lines in March, the men of New Zealand and Australia continued to add new laurels to their military reputation. So also was it in the Sinai peninsula and in Palestine and Syria under Allenby where the danger from the enemies' bullets was not as great as in Flanders, but where physical exposure in the sunken valleys of the Jordan or on Judea's exposed plains was the more dangerous.

The military aid rendered the Mother country by the Anzacs in the war was generous and instinted. But the historian, much wedded by tradition to political events and constitutional crises, can find space but to mention it in briefest outline. Australia, however, even from his point of view, should obtain more space within his volume than New Zealand, not simply because of the mammoth size and greater population of the former but for other reasons.

New Zealand's story is a brief one for the major reason that within her borders so unanimous was public sentiment, so united her political parties, that there is nothing much to chronicle. There were not here two different points of view as in Australia, to analyze, to understand and if possible with which to sympathize. The citizens of New Zealand, if not more British in their outlook than those of Australia at least felt more dependent on the Mother country, and on that account, if no other, were the more willing to follow closely advice from London. Conscription in New Zealand was welcomed with even less friction than in Great Britain. Thus, England's staunchest and most loyal Dominion, from the start of hostilities to their conclusion, showed a spirit of loyalty and patriotism both fervent and superb.

Australia stood upon a somewhat different footing. The

Commonwealth was not only more self-sufficient; it also contained within its borders certain classes not altogether inclined to make sacrifices for England. The Irish, ever a numerous element in Australia, were of this number, and more unquestionably antagonistic to any hearty participation in the war were the left-wing socialists, the syndicalists or Industrial Workers of the World, as they liked to term themselves. Even New Zealand among her coal miners, found their propaganda annoying; but in Australia they were more numerous and consequently made more trouble.

They did not dare to do this openly; but as 1915 came to a close it was noted that despite growing casualty lists, volunteering had slackened. Posters, speech-making, white feathers sent through the mail made no difference; fewer men came forward. Hints were dropped of conscription. Hughes, the new Prime Minister, did not yet advocate this. But he did try to speed up the war. The British government was promised by him an additional 50,000 men over and above Australia's monthly quota of 9,500, and early in 1916 Hughes sailed for England to consult with the British cabinet.

Now Mr. Hughes, like his fellow Welshman, Lloyd George, was volatile in language and an orator born. Convinced of the righteousness of England's fight he grew ever more eloquent. To the English public his arrival in 1916 was a godsend. The long hard drag of war had set in; the Germans were hammering at Verdun; the allied cause made no progress. And now from the Antipodes came this fiery and determined friend of England who spoke in language simple as the Gospels, and who by downright repetition of straightforward truth implanted greater heart of courage in his audience than any man more subtle could have done.

"We have fought and we are fighting," he said, "this battle as if it were a battle of life and death. It is a battle of life and death. We did not enter it lightly nor shall we quit it while life remains in us. . . . The Australian is

coming out to do battle for the country that made him. . . . Australia is a great country. It is, indeed, a continent. It is a country in which free men live and can thrive. It is a country in which men imbibe the spirit of liberty . . . in which men would rather die than lose the spirit of liberty. . . . They are coming out to do battle for the country that made them. They are showing today the mettle of their pasture. . . . They are fighting this battle in deadly earnest. It is a battle to the death. . . . And we shall win. We have encircled this tremendous foe with a wall of steel which despite his most frantic efforts he cannot break.”¹

And up and down Great Britain traveled Hughes, delivering ever the same message, at Westminster, in Glasgow, in his native Wales and elsewhere. His words were a tonic to the British; they dined and fêted Hughes; they made him a member of the British cabinet, the first Dominion statesman to be thus honored; they showed him the battle-front. And Hughes saw, eye to eye with British colleagues, the Great War's magnitude and to the Mother country pledged Australia's help up to the very hilt. For Hughes knew life's stark realities when he saw them. "These great liberties," he said at Bristol, "that we now possess and have enjoyed as Englishmen these many centuries, every one of them is the fruit of battle. . . . we must fight. . . . we will win. . . . Australia is a great country; it is a country to which the British people may appeal with confidence in their hour of peril." And to prove that this was so he returned shortly to Australia there to arouse his fellow countrymen to a renewed zeal for the war.

Now a majority of the Australians thought that they had been doing fairly well in the conflict. By April, 1915, the number of soldiers overseas had risen to 70,000, by the end of May to 82,000 and by August 6th, to 116,000. Yet in November the Government had promised 50,000 in addition, and had more than kept its word. By May, 1916, no less

¹ Before the *Pilgrims*, March seventeenth, 1916.

than 250,000 had joined Australia's army—and the battle line 12,000 miles away. Was not this satisfactory for a country which had but 5,000,000 inhabitants; how much more could be expected of it? Yet to Hughes it seemed as though the war should be greatly speeded. England in the summer of 1916 had adopted universal service; New Zealand had fallen in line and in Canada conscription was a mooted question. Australia, he believed, ought immediately to adopt it.

Had not his Labor government, returned to office after the war began, promised support to the last man and the last shilling! The need for more men at the front was instant, yet enlistments in the Commonwealth had dropped to 6,000 a month. To maintain 100,000 soldiers always at the front required a second 100,000 in reserve or in England. Casualties were heavy; the journey to England on the troopships long; and preliminary training in Australia highly desirable. The War Office assured him that 32,000 men were needed now and 16,000 additional per month for at least half a year. How else could they be had except by compulsion?

As leader, therefore, of the Labor Party he sought a ruling of its caucus in favor of conscription. This he was in duty bound to do, since in the Labor Party the caucus was regarded as the ultimate source of authority. But Hughes, unable to obtain a favorable vote, demanded of Parliament a popular referendum, intimating that if it was not granted he would resign.

Promptly the political temperature of the Commonwealth rose several degrees; and until the conclusion of the war there raged a contentious debate in Australia on the merits of universal service. The arguments in favor of this policy seemed sufficiently cogent and conclusive. The Empire needed more men; Australian enlistments had fallen behind; the war had reached a critical stage and it was Australia's fight as well as England's. Furthermore, it was the only

democratic, the only socialistic (this to act as a labor magnet) method of raising soldiers for the army.

"Now is the hour," proclaimed the Prime Minister. "Unless a nation fights for its liberties it can neither earn nor deserve them. I want to tell you plainly that if the Allies are defeated we go down. But once the allied line is broken in France there is an end to us. . . . The destinies of Australia are now being settled on the battlefields of Europe . . . to those men who say they are remaining in Australia to defend the country, I say the only chance they have or ever will have of fighting for Australia is to go down and stand by their comrades in the trenches in France."¹

There was not only the question of need; that of real fairness and equity to all Australia was equally important. The voluntary system had drawn into the war many heads of families who should have remained behind. It was asserted in Parliament that "there are at least 30,000 fatherless homes in Australia today because of our cowardice in hesitating to bring into operation a system of conscription."² Men were not free, it was argued, under the existing method of raising troops. Many who were married or who supported dependent relatives were harassed and troubled by a conflict of duties: many shirked their obligations while others made unnecessary sacrifices.

On the other hand, the anti-conscriptionists, for the most part members of the Labor Party, advanced reasons which seemed to them to more than counterbalance the arguments for conscription. Australia was doing her share; she would continue to do so. The French and British might enlist greater numbers per capita than the men of the Commonwealth. They ought to, the war was at their doorstep. It was 12,000 miles away from Australia. Commodities and not men were Europe's first need. Let wealth be conscripted as well as lives. Universal service might lead to the impor-

¹ Hughes, W., *Manifesto to the People of Australia*, 1916.

² *Australian Hansard*, Series of 1914, 1915 and 1916, p. 8901.

tation of colored labor to do the work of white conscripts; it might be the forerunner of industrial conscription, and perhaps might bring about the destruction of the labor unions.

Australia, the trade unionists asserted, had already under the voluntary system exceeded per capita the contribution of Canada. "In older countries," they said, "it is possible to supplant the ordinary male worker or mechanic with woman or child labor or perhaps with old men."¹ But in Australia this could not be done since her industries, more basic in character, required stronger muscles—nor were there old men or women available. Anyway, the labor unions had done their share; if they consented to conscription there was a strong likelihood that it would lead to the inclusion of married men. It was much easier for the wealthy to be patriotic than the poor. The former might cry to high Heaven about equality of sacrifice—there could be none with conscription since the widow of a laboring man was in much greater straits than one who inherited money.

The Labor Party was suspicious; it feared an attack on the unity of its disciplined ranks. Many of the extremists were convinced that the conscription issue at bottom was an effort to destroy their organization. As one of their leaders was reported to have said at Melbourne: "Mr. Hughes was a traitor and a renegade to the labor movement. If the Prime Minister got his own way Australians would be placed in a worse position than Irishmen during the Irish rebellion. Mr. Hughes has been bribed during his recent visit to England to saddle conscription upon Australia so that it would be a lever to foist a similar measure upon Canada and South Africa."²

This argument might have been absurd; but it was not without influence. Historically speaking there seems ever to have been suspicion attached to the leaders of the work-

¹ *Ibid.*, 8924.

² *Ibid.*, 8936.

ing classes who consort with those of high degree. "Billy" Hughes, as the guest of dukes and earls, was ferociously assailed at Sydney and Brisbane as a turncoat. And as the elections drew near silly attacks on organized labor by people who should have known better did not add anything to the Government's chances of winning.

The electorate, by a majority of 60,000, voted down Mr. Hughes' proposal. Even the soldiers overseas were not very heartily in favor of it. The advocates of conscription on platform and in press had let enthusiasm and overstatement outrun tact and intelligence. Government censorship had done its part, causing news of slight importance to be suppressed and thus giving free rein to wild rumor. By withholding notice of the arrival of a few Maltese in Australia credence was given to a report that the Government was importing cheap labor. The confiscation of cartoons of the Prime Minister and raids on union headquarters did more harm than good; by such procedure the working classes were made the more bitter. The fires of old class hatred blazed anew. Australian privates, the labor leaders said, were not permitted to ride first class on Egyptian railways; they could not buy drinks at the two leading Cairo hotels which were reserved for officers; their pensions were miserably inadequate; and if they died a miserly country forgot their wives and children. If the Government would remedy these evils, tell the truth about the war and make the rich men pay for it, a sufficient number would come forward to join the army.

Mr. Hughes, although defeated in the referendum, did not resign. In Parliament the Liberal Party continued to support him, as did a rump of the old Labor Party, now known as the National Labor Party. Hughes was, however, expelled from his old union in Sydney and in orthodox labor circles his name was anathema.

Followed then the year 1917 when the provisions of the constitution made a Parliamentary election obligatory. The

Prime Minister greatly desired to avoid one during the war, and had his own Parliament agreed by concurrence with that of Great Britain such an outcome would have been possible. But the Australian Parliament would not agree and in consequence the regular elections were held.

To the surprise of many they resulted in Mr. Hughes' favor since the coalition which he had formed between his labor friends and the Liberals, the National Government, increased its majority in both House of Representatives and Senate. The people of Australia preferred him to Mr. Tudor and the main body of the Laborites. The latter were reputed to have lost their ablest leader and therefore were not to be trusted with the conduct of the war.

Hughes continued, indefatigably at work. His word had been passed that no further attempt to conscript would be tried without further referendum. Encouraged, however, by the somewhat narrow margin against conscription in 1916, and by his own recent triumph in 1917, his mind reverted to the compulsory idea in a new form. He would try a reinforcements referendum. By it, modified conscription only was proposed. If at any time the number of volunteers fell below 7,000 a month the Government would be authorized to bring the number of recruits up to that number by a draft taken by ballot from the single men. Surely this suggestion was sufficiently moderate.

None the less the people would have none of it. Their Prime Minister had cried "wolf" so often that they suspected him of undue pessimism in regard to the military situation. As one legislator said, "this year we have taken from the Germans more prisoners and four times as many guns as we have lost to them during the war. If, in 1916, 16,500 men per month was the minimum and the situation has now become so grave that we are standing on the edge of a precipice, how can it be said that 7,000 a month are all that are required?"¹

¹ *Australian Hansard*, 1917-1918, 2995.

To claim that Australia was dishonored and debased was no reply. To attack as slackers, cravens or social lepers those who opposed this referendum was no answer. The year before 90,000 soldiers voted no to 103,000 voting yes; surely the minority among these fighting men were not slackers? And in 1917 conscription was again defeated. The Australian people had proved that they could fight; but they would not be bullied or blackguarded into doing so.

Canada, although slightly behind Australia in respect to the ratio of soldiers to civilians in her total population, in one particular made an even better record than the Commonwealth—a greater proportion of her citizens saw service overseas. And of Canada's 8,000,000 inhabitants some 3,000,000 were not of British blood.

The sacrifice of man power which the Dominion made was notable. Some 418,000 Canadians saw service in Europe, and of these approximately 50,000 were killed in action and 150,000 wounded. And this was the price paid by a country with a total military establishment before the war of some 3,000 men and a militia numbering on paper 75,000, subject to only casual drill and still more casual discipline. Within six weeks from the commencement of the war Canada's First Division of 32,000 men was on the high seas; and as it went into encampment on Salisbury Plains, a second was forming in the Dominion, and by January 1915 a third. This year witnessed also a veritable baptism of death for the men of the north country. Sent to the Ypres salient, they lay exposed to a heavy German fire. The land was low and flat and the French troops whom the Canadians relieved, depending as they did on their superb artillery, had dug shallow trenches only. As the newcomers attempted to dig themselves in more securely the Germans attacked, using for the first time poison gas. In 1915 there were no gas masks worthy of the name and the Canadians suffered severely. They held their ground,

however, and the enemy did not break through. But the loss of life in some Canadian battalions ran as high as fifty per cent and a total of over 5,000 men met their death.

The Canadians fought through 1915 in Flanders; and at Festubert, Givenchy, St. Eloi and Mt. Sorel both gave and received heavy punishment. The Second Division, meanwhile, joined the First and Canada's forces in the autumn of 1915 became an army corps.

Came 1916, and the Canadians were put into the battle of the Somme, taking in that long and sanguine conflict the sector left vacant by the Anzacs whom they relieved. The terrain here differed widely from that around Ypres. A thickly populated region of numerous towns and villages, woven into one common defense system by railways and freshly constructed trenches, the Somme district proved difficult to penetrate. When the Canadians arrived the British offensive had already been in progress nearly nine weeks. It was characterized by many new features. Among them were the tanks and creeping barrage fire. To the public the tanks seemed wonderful, but to the military men their first appearance was disappointing. The barrage fire, however, proved an effective innovation, provided always that the infantry moved with clock-like speed and promptness. The Canadians had long been drilled for such machine-like fighting, and through all the autumn of 1916 they were in the midst of it. The gains in territory were slight, the losses in men terrific, over 26,000. But the offense served its double purpose; it relieved pressure on the French front at Verdun; it also wore down Teutonic morale. The war of attrition had set in.

The Canadian corps was now moved up to what had hitherto been a comparatively quiet area. It was that occupied by the British First Army, one wing of which was the Canadian corps, and comprised that section of the allied line which approached to the edge of the French coal region with Lens as a center. Near here, in 1915, had occurred

the sanguinary and indecisive battle of Loos. In 1917 it was to be the scene of Canada's choicest exploit in the war.

Confronting the Canadian lines lay Vimy Ridge, a hill some four hundred feet above sea level and strongly fortified by the Germans. Between the Ridge and the Canadian trenches were several craters too wide to bridge, and scattered near were many nests of machine guns. Intricate and numerous communication trenches, moreover, added greatly to the strength of the German defense.

The British offense of 1917 started at the beginning of April, and on the 9th day of that month came the major victory of the British forces, the capture of Vimy Ridge by General Byng's Canadians. The attack had been long planned and the execution of it was intrusted entirely to the men of the Dominion. It involved four different assaults defined minutely by artillery barrage, and was beautifully and accurately accomplished in the midst of atrocious mud and sleet, the shell holes containing so much water, partly frozen, that the wounded who fell in them usually drowned. The slopes of Vimy, once reached, were only captured after the most vigorous hand to hand encounters. From numerous unknown dugouts Germans came pouring up through the earth to pounce on Canadians from the rear. Certain battalions from overseas they well-nigh did annihilate; but in four days of action the objective was won.

The last year of the war, as far as the participation of Canada from the military point of view is concerned, is difficult to summarize. The troops of the Dominion were widely scattered, some were in northern Russia at Archangel; some were at Vladivostok in Siberia; still others were building railways in Palestine and along the western front. Even the Canadian army corps lost for a time its identity in the evil days of March, when the Germans smashed through the Allied lines and almost captured Amiens. In the hasty reorganization of the British army after that defeat the Canadians were divided, and therefore to recount the

work of each division in holding back the Teutonic hosts would involve much writing in detail. The identity of their corps was, indeed, reestablished, but so fast came British victory in the late summer and early autumn of 1918 that to differentiate Canada's part in it from that of the rest of the Empire seems scarcely worth the telling.

But for Canada as for Australia there were two fronts, the political as well as the military. And in the Dominion the political contest was even more dramatic than in the Commonwealth.

The French Canadians from their bastions in Quebec had spread out rapidly in all directions; and their attitude toward the war was an enigmatic one. Furthermore, in the prairie provinces were many thousand Americans, Doukhobors (Russian religious pacifists) and Germans. Who then could tell how the Canadian electorate would regard the war? A few years before, and in a fever heat of national enthusiasm it had killed reciprocity with the United States. A year or two later the same Canada was seemingly reluctant to follow Mr. Borden's lead in naval aid to Britain. The Germans did not expect that Canada would count materially in the conflict—a point of view perhaps logical but mistaken.

The opening of the war found even in politics much concord and friendliness between old foes in the presence of a common enemy. No man living had a deeper appreciation of the spiritual greatness of the Empire than had Sir Wilfrid Laurier. And, although markedly an intellectual and subtly minded, it never seems to have occurred to him that anything could ever be said for the German point of view. Liberals and Conservatives alike, then, responded to the war's appeal and, except for some slight muttering about imperialism in rural Quebec among the benighted followers of Bourassa, there was genuine frontier hospitality shown toward the war and Canada's participation in it.

The remarkable unanimity of the Canadian people con-

tinued unimpaired for over a year. Both party leaders had stated that there would be no conscription, and as late as January, 1916, Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister, reaffirmed that announcement.¹ Criticism of the administration's efficiency of course there was; the delay in getting men overseas, high prices paid for ancient horses, inadequate pensions, munition profits, favoritism shown contractors who voted Conservative; these charges made up the bulk of it. But when the Prime Minister at the beginning of 1916 asked for 50,000 additional troops, an increase of 100 per cent, there were few to protest; and even his plea for the postponement of the Parliamentary elections of that year was acceded to by Laurier—"the present war," said that statesman, "is an exception to all things."

But war or no war, upon one thing the Canadians could not agree, the teaching of the French language in the schools of those provinces predominantly British. In Ontario the old feud broke out afresh as a result of a provincial law confining, apparently, in practice the use of the French language as a medium of instruction to those schools in which hitherto it had been taught. French as a subject of instruction, like botany, of course remained. The people of Ontario were determined to keep their province an English-speaking bailiwick. Their anti-French prejudices were exacerbated not only by the influx of French Canadians into their eastern districts but by the refusal of the French in Quebec to enlist in larger numbers. Education was a provincial affair, so they considered, and the Dominion government had no right to interfere.

In this Laurier heartily concurred; none the less he made an impressive plea for harmony by urging the men of Ontario to think twice before legislating against French in the schools. By the original act of capitulation to Great Britain, the French, he said, had been granted civil rights, and these had always been interpreted as including the use of their

¹ *Canadian Hansard*, Session 1916, 26.

own language in the schools. No one wanted to make Ontario less British or to interfere with her autonomy; but it had to be remembered that the bitterness in Alsace-Lorraine against the Germans had been caused largely by their hostile attitude toward the French language. This was an evil precedent for Ontario to follow; let her only protect the small minority within her borders as the Allies fought to protect small minorities overseas.

But Laurier's olive branch met no response in Ontario. The British in Quebec were outnumbered by the French five to one, yet two-thirds of the recruits in that province for the war were of British stock. This fact, they of Ontario would not forgive. Why should they make concessions to these French Canadians who would not even fight for France?

Late in 1916 Borden began to hint at a more drastic military policy and began to talk of "the last 100,000 men that Canada will place in the firing line" saving the Empire and the world. And as he did so, Sir Wilfrid, scenting conscription in the air, laid special emphasis on attempts made to force ideas of German militarism on British peoples.

The rift in the lute was spreading; the next year it widened perceptibly. Sir Robert Borden, returning from England and a meeting of the War Cabinet in the spring of 1917, brought forward his long heralded conscription bill. "Throughout the English-speaking provinces," it was written, "there was instant relief and rejoicing." It was not so in French Canada. Great public meetings in Quebec and Montreal applauded violent speeches and adopted condemnatory resolutions. Meanwhile, wrote Bourassa, "here in Canada is being forged about our necks militarism unparalleled in any country." The impression made by this announcement was not favorable. Canada again seemed to be a house divided against itself.

The long contest over the conscription bill followed somewhat Australian precedent, except that in the case of Can-

ada it was the opponents of conscription who sought a referendum and the proponents of a Canada forward policy who opposed it. The debate on the bill need not detain us long. In both Canada and Australia it ran on parallel lines, the military need of reinforcements and its denial, the equity and justice of forced service, and the rebuttal of this philosophy of politics. But where the campaign differed in the two Dominions was in this: in Australia it became a class contest; in Canada a racial one. Sir Wilfrid Laurier did his best to minimize this feature, to stress organized labor's opposition to conscription, to defend the constitutional use of the referendum—he had never before been a warm advocate of it. But beneath the surface one major fact showed clearly: Quebec, a populous province, had only contributed to the war, according to the figures of the Government, some 14,000 French Canadians. To force service on the reluctant men of Quebec conscription was advocated, more than for any other reason.

Why was it that the French habitant was unwilling to volunteer? Unlike the Boer he was without antipathy to England; and in this war two Mother countries were involved. With old France bleeding to the death what would be more natural than aid and succor from the million French-speaking folk in Canada? Nevertheless, for the most part they held sullenly aloof. Possibly the statistics of the Government were faulty, perhaps they had enlisted in greater numbers than the army gave them credit for; but even their own defenders seldom placed the number above twenty or twenty-two thousand.

And the province of Quebec alone had a potential strength of 100,000 fighting men!

The reasons were various. Sir Wilfrid elaborated on two of them; the tenuousness of ties which bound them to the old country, and the tactlessness of recruiting methods used. The very fact, he stated, of the long historic occupation of the banks of the St. Lawrence by the French made them less

interested in European affairs than their English-speaking neighbors. The British in Quebec, the British in Ontario, were very largely recent immigrants having behind them in the old country friends and relatives. But there had been no French immigration to Canada since the eighteenth century; the French population had been cut off altogether from France since that time; with but now and then a rare exception the French in Canada had no kin in Europe.

Secondly, explained Sir Wilfrid, recruiting had been carried on in the province of Quebec in very foolish fashion. A distinguished Methodist clergyman had been placed in charge of it in Montreal. What would Toronto have said if a French Catholic bishop had been intrusted with a similar duty in Ontario? Furthermore, the detachments of the French Canadian enlisted men had been brigaded in with the English-speaking Canadians, a foolish policy since if they had been kept separate they would have aided in building up the *esprit de corps* of the French Canadians. For these two reasons enlistments had been slight.

He might have added two others: one, the abhorrence of the French Canadians for what they held to be the atheistic record of the Third Republic in the twentieth century; the other, a conviction that Canada was in a peculiar sense *their* country, and one entitled to hold aloof from the international quarrels of the old world which in no way concerned it.

Sir Sam Hughes, military genius extraordinary, claimed that the lack of French Canadian interest in the war was "chiefly to be placed on the expatriated ecclesiastics of old France."¹ Canada was even more Catholic than it was French and the habitant, angry at the Third Republic for its treatment of the Church, and enraged at the English for their educational program in Ontario, felt no call to cross the ocean to participate in distant encounters.

Moreover, was not *he* the original Canadian and entitled

¹ *Round Table*, VIII, 622 (June, 1918).

to speak for Canada? In the words of one of his representatives: "The French Canadians did not come over to this side of the ocean in palatial ships. When the Frenchman came to America he did not proceed to the Windsor Hotel there to spread out a map of Canada before him, pull out his check book and decide where he was going to invest his thousands of dollars. . . . His capital was courage and a stout heart. . . . What he wanted to create was a home for his descendants, to worship his God according to his creed and to find happiness for his family by his fireside. . . . They (the gentlemen on the other side) call us the white livered brigade. Do you think we are going to follow their footsteps?"¹

Sir Wilfrid and his Liberals were in sorry plight. Many of them believed heartily in conscription, and it was idle to argue with these that a referendum was desirable or that Americans would soon take the places left vacant in the trenches by the Canadian dead. On the other hand, the citadel of Canadian Liberalism was Quebec, and brilliantly as Mr. Meighen, the forthcoming leader of the Conservatives might argue, Quebec would have none of the bill. Even if the habitant did marry early, and even if the first three classes called to the colors were the unmarried, Quebec all but unanimously opposed. What would Laurier do?

He decided to stand by his own people. Temperamentally a disbeliever in compulsion he was also, in the best sense of the word, a good politician. He saw discord rather than unity following in the wake of conscription, and in his heart he believed that the few additional men which it might put in the army would not atone for the increased bitterness in Canada. Besides, conscription, he shrewdly recognized, would be adopted anyway. Half of his own English-speaking Liberals would vote for it; Canada would vote for it: but only he, Laurier, could persuade his own people to obey the law. As he wrote to a follower in On-

¹ *Canadian Hansard*, Session 1916, 2698-9.

tario: "If I were to waver, to flinch, to hesitate, I would simply hand over the province of Quebec to the extremists."¹ Therefore Laurier refused to enter a coalition cabinet with Borden on a conscription basis and contended vigorously against all compulsion.

The conscription bill was passed, a number of Laurier's oldest allies from English-speaking Canada voting in its favor. And in the election which followed at the close of 1917 the flood gates of racial enmity were opened once again. The Conservatives took no chances; by a new election law which they put through the old Parliament all Canadian citizens born in the German or the Austrian Empires, and naturalized after 1902, were temporarily debarred from voting, a somewhat unnecessary insult many thought to good Canadians born in Posen or Galicia. Also, on the plea that a number of soldiers would be unable to vote, it decreed that all wives and sisters of men at the front should be endowed with the franchise, a curious innovation in electoral practice for which many good arguments were advanced both pro and con.

The bitterness of feeling at the election following was extraordinary. The coalition government, formed by the alliance of Borden's Conservatives with the pro-conscription Liberals, was determined to make French Canadians fight; to win the war at all costs was their intention, and behind them stood the majority of the electorate. The victory was theirs; only eighty-three adherents of Laurier were returned to Parliament as opposed to one hundred and fifteen Conservatives; and in alliance with these latter were thirty-eight coalition Liberals who backed conscription. Of the shattered remnant of the old Liberal party sixty-two came from the province of Quebec alone.

To enforce the law proved difficult, more on account of the large number of exemptions claimed and granted than because of actual resistance. By the end of March, 1918,

¹ Skelton, O. D., *Life and Letters of Laurier*, II, 515.

but 28,000 men had been added to Canada's army by it; and of these practically none saw actual fighting. Conscription, Laurier said, had won the election but not the war. In this he spoke the truth, but perhaps not all of it. Had German victories and not defeats marked the passing of 1918 Canadian conscription might possibly have turned the scales a succeeding year against the Germans; who can say?

The military assistance given Great Britain by South Africa was not, as a result of the political situation in the Union, extensive. But in variety of interest and quality of sacrifice the work done by South Africans was extraordinary. From West Africa to East Africa, from Egypt to the western front the South Africans shifted their battle line, and in each area were confronted by conditions of war sufficiently divergent and difficult to test their calibre.

The South Africans began with a campaign for the capture of Windhoek, the capital of German South-West Africa, reputed to contain the second largest wireless station in the world. Now there were but a handful of Germans in Windhoek and, for that matter, in all German South-West. None the less their country was enormous in extent, half again as large as Germany, and in addition its defenders possessed two allies, the rebellious Dutch in the Union (elsewhere spoken of) and nature. The land was inhospitable. There were 1,400 miles of railway connection, but the capital lay securely back from the coast, 150 miles. Half of this distance was barren desert, where dust and sand and glowing heat, instead of water and green fields, met the invader. So rare, indeed, was water that various natives of the region were said never to have seen it except in the juice of the melons they consumed. And the water which Botha's expedition used, like everything else, had first to be transported hundreds of miles before reaching his soldiers. Despite these adverse circumstances, however, his campaign here was fierce, brief, successful. German

rule in South-West Africa ended in the earlier stages of the Great War.

The story of German East Africa is different. Against that colony Britain sent an expedition consisting largely of South Africans, Boers in the cavalry, British in the infantry. To this force were added detachments from Rhodesia, Kenya, India and the Mother country, bringing the total British force up to 47,000, aided and abetted by such military assistance as the Belgians might offer from the Congo and the Portuguese from the south. Whereupon, Von Lettow-Vorbeck, the German commander, vastly outnumbered took to the hills, and so skillfully maneuvered his exiguous army as to avoid surrender until after the armistice in November, 1918.

The German campaign, by which Von Lettow-Vorbeck with a few hundred Germans, aided by 1,500 negroes, kept free from Britain's hands throughout the entire war, was a brilliant achievement. But it does not discredit the work of the South African forces. Here again was an enormous country, thickly wooded, with a high plateau region in the interior from which it was difficult to eject the Germans. And General Smuts took no risks. Little by little he drove Von Lettow-Vorbeck out of East Africa. Thinking his task about finished Smuts left for the War Council in London. But Von Lettow-Vorbeck escaped from East Africa to Portuguese territory to the south and from there to Northern Rhodesia, a free and independent fugitive in the enemy's land.

The South African forces thus far engaged had been under Union generals, except at first in East Africa, and had received Union pay. But many in South Africa, and especially those of British stock, insisted on their right to share in the greater death in France. The Government was willing that enlistment should take place but was unable, so it said, to make good the difference between British army pay and that given their own men. Despite this, however,

the South African Brigade was organized for service with the British army on the western front. In 1915 it sailed for England and the following year was ordered into active service against the *Senussi* in Egypt where, in conjunction with the New Zealanders, it chased back into their desert haunts those troublesome protagonists of a militant Mohammedanism.

Then came in that same year the fire-baptism of the Somme, a name to South Africa as memorable as Gallipoli to the Anzacs or Vimy Ridge to Canada. The Somme campaign was one of many battles, and of these none was more noticeable for courageous daring and British pluck than that of Delville Wood. In this encounter the South Africans for five nights and six days held the most exposed post on the British front, a corner of death on which the enemy's fire was concentrated continuously from three sides, and into which fresh German troops, vastly superior in numbers to the defense, made periodic incursions, only to be broken and driven back.¹ There went into this particular fight some 3,153 South Africans. At its conclusion there were, alive, 750!

In 1917 in Flanders, and in 1918 in the counter-attack against the Germans, the brigade suffered heavy punishment. Its casualty list at the conclusion of the war was some three hundred per cent over its original enlistment, a distinguished record.

The political reaction of South Africa to the war differed widely from that of the other Dominions. Only twelve years had gone by since the Boers had laid down their arms and but five since the adoption of the Union constitution. Unanimity, therefore, in regard to the war could scarcely be looked for. On the one hand British patriotism burned brighter here than elsewhere; had not the members of the Unionist Party been a staunch British garrison for decades among these hostile Boers? The Union Jack meant

¹ Buchan, J., *The South African Forces in France*, 73.

more to them in passionate devotion than to the average Londoner. On the other hand no sympathy awakened on the back veldt for England's cause. Might not even her difficulties prove a God-given chance for the recovery of the old independence, never forgotten and not long lost? As for Botha and the more moderate Dutch Afrikaner whom he and Smuts led, what might be expected from them?

The Prime Minister's answer came quickly. South Africa was a part of the Empire; the Union must fight to defend it. The British had requested his Government to prepare for military action against German South West Africa. In a special session of Parliament, summoned on September 9th, 1914, he sought permission to do so; and this he obtained, despite vigorous objection from the followers of Hertzog who asserted that it was not their duty to attack Germans who had never been ill-disposed to the Dutch Afrikaner. "The Boers," they said, "would be less than men if they felt on this subject as Englishmen did."¹

When Botha tried to give effect to this Parliamentary sanction there took place a rebellion against the Government which was serious. It was estimated that at least 10,000 Boers were engaged in it, and there would doubtless have been more, as Smuts acknowledged, had he, as Minister of Defense, distributed arms more freely among the men of the Free State.

Concerning the origin of this civil war, despite blue books, debates and a most thorough judicial inquiry in 1916, there remains much that is obscure. But certain facts are outstanding. Colonel Maritz, in command of the Union forces on the frontier, went over to the Germans and apparently had thought of so doing even before the European war began. General De la Rey, the hero of the western Transvaal, a man of genuine piety and also superstition, was likewise clearly disaffected. Some months before fighting

¹ *South African Hansard*, Fifth Session, First Parliament, 112.

began he had fallen under the influence of a certain sooth-sayer and interpreter of dreams, and he seems really to have believed that the vision of the goading of a red bull by a gray one foretold the destruction of the British Empire by the Germans.

Now De la Rey, a man of outstanding influence, was an intimate friend of General Beyers and the latter, in command of the Union forces, had appointed Maritz on the border. Furthermore, after plans were laid for the invasion of German South-West Africa, Beyers resigned, saying he could take no part in it. This act won a stinging rebuke from Smuts, who wrote to him as follows: "For the Dutch-speaking section in particular I cannot conceive of anything more humiliating than the policy of lip loyalty in fair weather and a policy of mutiny and pro-German sentiment in days of storm and stress." Why, if Beyers disapproved of the expedition, he added, did he remain in the war council while plans were drafted for carrying the campaign forward?

Beyers, De la Rey and General De Wet attended meetings and made speeches, fierce and uncompromising, in opposing military action against the Germans. Botha did his best to dissuade them from so doing, either in personal interviews or by endeavoring to enlist the help of old ex-President Steyn to the same end. But Steyn gave no succor to the Government; he said he could do nothing unless free to denounce in person the proposed expedition against the Germans.

Meanwhile, De la Rey was accidentally shot, and in reverence to his memory no one either knew or cared to tell what his plans were. Beyers and De Wet, however, both rose in arms and announced their intention of joining Maritz on the German border where rifles and munitions were promised by the friendly Teutons. The latter, overjoyed, had signed a treaty with Maritz recognizing the indepen-

dence of South Africa, the Boer leaders on their part agreeing to the cession of Walfisch Bay to the German Empire.

Botha now took the field against the two revolting generals. To encircle and capture their forces he employed only men of his own Dutch blood. If civil war was inevitable it need not involve the British. As for its actual beginnings, they were haphazard. Certain of Botha's troops met a detachment of De Wet's men. A rifle shot became a fusillade and De Wet's son, Danie, was killed. If that old Boer had any doubt before, he had none now. The die was cast and the revolt in the Free State became a reality.

Beyers had made it such in the Transvaal. But against both rebel chieftains Botha was successful. General Beyers was drowned while swimming a river and De Wet was gradually tracked to earth by armored motor cars across the high veldt. The wily guerrilla warrior could not escape as easily as in the pre-motor days of 1901.

The rebellion once subdued, the Government showed surprising leniency. None were executed, except certain officers in the Union defense force who had fought for the rebels without first resigning their commissions. The vast majority of the captured burghers were instantly dismissed to their homes. Only De Wet and a few score ringleaders were imprisoned.

According to Botha and Smuts the honor of South Africa had been vindicated, and the latter did not hesitate to lay the entire onus of the rebellion on General Hertzog. It was planned, he asserted, before the government made any motion against German South-West Africa, and that expedition there had really saved the country since the preparations for it made possible the crushing of revolt.

But Hertzog denied indignantly that this was the case. The attack on German South-West, he explained, was simply "booty seeking" and empire-expansion; and he opposed it, warning the Government what the results would be. After the Boer War many of the Dutch had sought refuge

within the borders of German South-West and it was absurd to consider that they were the enemies of the Afrikaner. Why should the Boers attack their old comrades-in-arms because they now lived under the German flag? Maritz might claim that he (Hertzog) had instigated the revolt; but he would make no reply to this charge, and Botha had insulted him by demanding an explanation.

Now, the cause of the revolt may have been Hertzog, but proof of this there was none. Many witnesses said that *they had heard* that Hertzog was supporting them in revolt. One of them even quoted from a conversation with the General in which he said that there was going to be trouble, "and if any trouble arose he was going to stand by his own people, and if he had to be killed he would rather be killed by the side of his own people than elsewhere." But beyond this it was impossible to incriminate the leader of the extreme Boer faction.

As a matter of fact the causes of the rebellion were various ¹ and the invasion of the German colony had more to do with the revolt (*opstand*) than the Government would admit. It gave the discontented and the reckless among the Boers a new grievance against Botha and Smuts; many of the more ignorant were persuaded that they would be conscripted to fight Botha's war; they had been told that an armed protest was all that would be necessary to prevent it; that they could maintain neutrality if they so desired. At their *volksvergaderingen*, or county meetings, the wildest and most absurd rumors were afloat, reports of the capture of Cape Town by the Boers, intimations that both Botha and Smuts sought independence for them under cover of opposing it, and that these generals secretly hoped that their *opstand* would prove successful. Some had risen for one purpose, some for another. In regard to one thing only was there agreement: "the sons of the mothers who

¹ *An inquiry into the causes of and circumstances relating to the recent rebellion in South Africa, Cape Town, 1916.*

had died in the concentration camps in the Boer War should not be sent out to German South-West to extend the British Empire."

That a plot did exist for the recovery of their lost independence was self-evident; that the expedition ordered by Botha led to its spreading, there can be no doubt; but as far as the up-country farmers were concerned, who were caught with their rifles in their hands, they were no more cognizant of what they were going to do, or why, than the Dartmoor peasants who rose with Monmouth against James the Second.

As for General Hertzog, he said: "The rebellion has been against the unconstitutionalism of a constitutional government." ¹

The parliamentary elections of 1915, fought largely on the issue of the war, were for Botha neither a victory nor a defeat. General Hertzog had now organized a new political party, exclusively Dutch, called the Nationalist, with an open program of full amnesty for all rebels and non-participation in the war; and with a secret program, it was suspected, of South African independence. This party polled thirty per cent of the electorate and returned twenty-seven members. It carried every seat in the Free State except one. On the other hand it carried none in Nātal. Meanwhile Botha's own following was reduced to fifty-four. Over the Nationalists he had a comfortable margin. But since forty Unionists were returned it was evident that for the first time since his premiership began he was without a majority.

The Unionists were bent on prosecuting the war with vigor, which meant, *inter alia*, an expeditionary force to Europe, paid for by South Africa. This, Botha balked at. Personally, he said, he approved of the expedition, but since the Dutch-speaking majority did not he would have to vote against it. The Unionists were furious. Their loyalty was intense. "Born in travail, grown under ceaseless test and

¹ *South African Hansard*, VI Session, First Parliament, 786.

opposition, nurtured in neglect or worse in the early days, fed upon struggle and strife, it had stood every test of time and trial." And now South Africa in their eyes was again disgraced. But Botha calmly persisted in his course. He would not fan to still wilder flames the fires of racial hate. And so it came about that the British-born were forced to yield lest in turning Botha out of office more harm than good result to the Allied cause. They could, however, enlist in the British army and several thousand of them did so.

And as they accepted this compromise they acquiesced also in the wholesale indulgence shown to the late rebels by a forgiving Government. By 1916 all but a few were out of jail; a year later and there were no prisoners at all. Still Hertzog found cause for complaint, for Botha had insisted on the payment of fines and also on pledges of good behavior for the period of the commuted sentence. As for the Unionists, they grimly scented future plots and more uprisings, and kept what self-control they could as the fortunes of war in Europe swayed first one way, then another.

Throughout the entire period of the war South Africa remained a house divided against itself. Economic prosperity, thanks to the high price of wool, the South Africans could enjoy; but unity of spirit and of feeling there was none. No further rebellions actually took place; but two at least were planned, concerning one of which General De Wet himself informed the Government. Even Hertzog now felt it the better part of wisdom to quiet his own following and to announce that independence was impossible while the war was in progress.

But while sufficiently sensible in regard to fratricidal strife of a physical kind, the general was in no wise adverse to a policy of pinpricking. Thus, in the matter of the Government buying the entire wool crop in 1917 at an advance of 55 per cent over pre-war prices he made much of the fact that in the open market prices had soared still higher. When the *Lusitania* sank and the Government

brought in a bill against trading with the enemy Hertzog was the first to oppose it. In regard to the expedition to German East Africa, the enlistment of negro labor battalions, and even in the promulgation of constitutional theories quite academic in character he seemed ever anxious to cause trouble.

Thus, in 1917, a great uproar arose in the Union Parliament over the so-called republican program of the general and a motion of censure against it was passed by the Assembly. But this made little difference to Hertzog, and with the defining of war aims in the last year of strife by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, the alert general began to seek out in South Africa some formula which might serve his purposes at the peace conference. The old republics, he argued, could and must be restored on grounds strictly legal and constitutional. There should be no more fighting among brothers.

Nevertheless, as late as June, 1918, Botha gave formal warning of an expected uprising; and one Nationalist member of Parliament, at least, demanded judicial incarceration for himself that summer for the purpose of establishing an alibi should the worst eventuate.

Despite the energy and activity of the Dominions displayed in the prosecution of the war it was two-thirds over before they took common council, with themselves and with the Imperial Government, as to how it should be won.

By the joint resolution of 1907 the imperial conference should have been held every four years, and the one which was due in 1915 had been postponed at the request of the British cabinet. This, to the more enthusiastic advocates of closer imperial unity was unfortunate. They spoke of it as "a failure of vision and statesmanship"; they could not or would not make allowances for the unparalleled confusion of that hectic year in both Britain and the Dominions.

By the end of 1916, however, the situation, political as

well as military, had changed. A national Government, formed under the ægis of Lloyd George's enthusiasm, had driven party strife to cover in Britain; General Botha had secured a mastery over South African sedition; Canada and Australia had recovered from the first shock of war and were bending every effort toward its successful outcome; and the military deadlock on the Continent seemed to indicate that it might last for years. A momentary breathing space, therefore, in which to take stock of the Empire's resources and to decide upon joint action seemed both wise and feasible. And that it might be utilized to good advantage the Dominions, and India as well, were invited to a special war conference in the spring of 1917.

Great, indeed, were the accomplishments prophesied for this body; it would decide on a common policy, not only for the conduct of the war but for the settlement of it; it would work out a scheme of imperial defense for the future; it would draw up a program for Irish Home Rule, reform the constitution and lay the foundation for an Imperial Legislature; it would bring economic harmony out of chaos and provide for inter-imperial free trade, or at least for imperial preference. These were among the suggestions offered.

Such sanguine expectations, however, could scarcely be looked for. The war must first be won. To secure greater efficiency in Britain the more important members of a large and unwieldy cabinet had been drafted into a special war cabinet. So, in the same way, the work of the war conference was directed into two different channels. The Dominion prime ministers, meeting from time to time with the British War Cabinet, now formed what was known as the Imperial War Cabinet, an inner, authoritative, imperial committee on the winning of the war. But they also met in the regular semi-public sessions of the imperial war conference under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, an organization which was simply

the lineal descendant of the old imperial conferences of the nineteenth century, with advisory functions alone.

The Imperial War Cabinet, however, was a real departure from precedent since, for the time being, it assumed supreme authority for the carrying on of the war; and in its existence many thought that they had discovered the birth of a genuine imperial federation.

As might be expected, the most optimistic of the Dominion representatives in this respect was Sir Joseph Ward of New Zealand. "The British Empire," he said, "is one great Empire-Home, one great Empire-Family, one great Empire-Heart. . . ." He had no doubt whatever but that "in the near future a cry not only from the public men but from the people themselves will arise for the introduction of a Federal Empire Parliament, empowered to deal with affairs fiscal, defensive and Imperial."¹ And at this general result Sir Robert Borden strongly hinted, in his speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association at the House of Commons in April, 1917. In regard to the Imperial War Cabinet he stated that "a new era has dawned, a new page of history has been written. It is not for me to prophesy as to the future of these pregnant events; but those who have given thought and energy to every effort for the full constitutional development of the overseas nations may be pardoned for believing that they discern therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth."²

This was, perhaps, overstating the case. General Smuts gave cautious warning at the time that it was unwise to think of the Empire developing along bookish and formal lines. Others there were who spoke of Empire partnership as far as India was concerned, as being something highly desirable but exceedingly difficult to establish.³ And as a

¹ Ward, J. G., *Reconstruction after the War*, *Empire Review*, 30:530 (Jan., 1917).

² Published under authority of Empire Parliamentary Ass'n.

³ *United Empire*, VIII, 539 *et seq.*

matter of fact it was soon recognized that the Imperial War Cabinet, in spite of its high-sounding title, was an emergency organization and that its future function or even existence was highly problematical.

During 1917 this imperial war committee continued the newly invented constitutional experiment, and at its last session it voted unanimously to reassemble annually. In the summer of 1918 it met again, renewed its sessions after the armistice and continued them throughout the period of the peace conference.

It began to look now like the nucleus of a real federal movement, an appearance which became the more realistic as the Imperial War Cabinet resolved that in the future the Prime Ministers of the Dominions had the right to confer directly with the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, thus shunting to one side, as far as the Dominions were concerned, the Colonial Office. It also sanctioned another resolution favored by the Dominion premiers, namely, that during their absence from London they might appoint representatives to take their place on the Imperial War Cabinet, an act which seemed to add further likelihood to its permanence.

Meanwhile, the war came to an end, leaving the constitutional status of the Dominions still in abeyance. The pendulum in the future might swing either way, toward greater harmony and closer legal unity on the one hand, toward wider divergence and individual aloofness on the other. At Paris the pull in both directions was clearly seen. The Dominions wanted separate recognition at the peace conference; they got it. They desired to sign the peace treaty separately; they did so. At the same time their representatives, Mr. Massey, Mr. Hughes, Sir Robert Borden and General Smuts not only took a lively personal pride in the Empire but also a deep interest in its future constitution on a basis more closely coördinated. But the decision was left, neither to these four gentlemen nor to the

Prime Minister of Great Britain. The course of political events in the overseas Dominions, and in India, now formally an integral member of future imperial conferences, was to determine that.

As for the war: it gave added impulse to imperial unity; it showed the need, pointed the way, and aroused old loyalties, dim to consciousness and half-forgotten. And as it did so, it augmented by sheer force of circumstance the semi-dormant forces of Dominion nationalism. Whether these two somewhat divergent tendencies could be brought into harmony one with another remained to be seen.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM OF IRELAND

In 1893 the second Irish Home Rule Bill was defeated in the House of Lords by a vote of four hundred and fourteen to forty-one. The Lords Spiritual and the Lords Temporal had done what everybody expected them to do. Although the bill had passed the House of Commons their Lordships rejected it by an overwhelming majority—and saved the country, it was said, from disunion and disaster.

Thus ended the second effort of the Gladstonians to dissolve the Union formed by William Pitt and to set up an autonomous government in Ireland. And an indomitable old man had met a new defeat and his last. Gladstone was now to take his exit from the stage political. The contemporary verdict had been given; Home Rule was not for Ireland, not yet.

With the public career of William Ewart Gladstone this book has no concern, for it begins as he departs, both from the premiership and from the House of Commons, the stage which he had trod for sixty years. But in his going there was great glory, and the historian of recent Irish history would do well to pay full honor to this man. Annoying though Gladstone is to those of us of lesser clay, who quickly tire of overstressed moralities, insistent righteousness; declamatory, vague, impractical and visionary though we find him; still, like Woodrow Wilson, he could see beyond the present and he knew where lay the path.

The second Home Rule Bill, like the first, may have been full of inconsistencies, may have offered no final, even semi-final solution, and doubtless did not, for the Irish problem. But Gladstone sensed the right direction and knew the way

to friendship, amity and true union, not based on force, conventions or legalities, but broadly resting on foundations more secure because less worldly—mutual good will and friendliness of spirit.

Into the vexatious sea of historic Irish troubles it is not the purpose of this book to plunge. To trace with some approach to equity and fairness the last twenty years of Irish history is difficult; to delve into the passions, hates and turmoils of the mid-nineteenth century, and in a few pages to describe the hopes and fears and true meaning of those turbid years is impossible. Glint and gleam of the current of Irish national life cannot be found by tangling oneself in the whirlpool of Irish politics of that period; certainly not by any analysis of the Home Rule movement. Behind Parnell and his obvious political objective lay economic misfortune, malpractice and misery; and in the farther hinterland lurked historic enmities and bitterness, social and religious wranglings, racial jealousies and feuds, Ulster colonists, Cromwellian settlements, Elizabethan tyrannies, defeatist psychology, rooted fast, embedded deep, in memories that never died.

In Ireland, Imperial Britain found its greatest problem, and in Ireland it was confronted with its greatest failure. The Royal Standard might fly over Dublin Castle; in British regiments in India the sons of Erin might enlist; to England's Parliament the Irish members might duly be elected; the King's writ might be enforced from Cork to Derry: but this did not make a United Kingdom. How could it, while in village church and hut and cabin, in Dublin tenement or in desolate Donegal were hostile hearts and hostile hands?

Nineteen long years intervene between the second Home Rule Bill and the third, years of continual agitation and some accomplishment, years of improved relations between landlord and tenant, of increased peasant proprietorship and decreased emigration, years also in which Britain became

more trustful of her neighbor and in which Irish bitterness was somewhat lessened. And this change was brought about in part by Irish action and in part by English intelligence and understanding.

The Irish continued their struggle for autonomy but varied somewhat its method; they also worked hard to make live that which was at once both new and old, a genuine culture of their own: and as they did this England sought to *kill Home Rule with kindness*, an ineffective policy as far as Home Rule was concerned, but none the less conducive to a better state of feeling between Britain and Ireland.

In 1893 the cause of the Irish Nationalists seemed desperate; disunion in their ranks, discouragement in Ireland, Unionist preponderance and Liberal indifference in England, all worked together to wreck their hopes. Charles Stewart Parnell, their ex-leader, had not been one to retire gracefully from the scene of battle, however thick might be the murky cloud of personal scandal; and ranged behind him had been a fighting minority of the Irish Nationalists. Parnellites fought against anti-Parnellites, and kept on doing so after Parnell's death; and as the conflict continued, the personal henchmen of Mr. Dillon and Mr. Healy seemed on the verge of forming parties of their own. The Irish had a common cause; but this was under an eclipse, and now they were not only leaderless but in the grip of faction. Two years later came fresh disaster. The general election in the United Kingdom of 1895 gave to the Unionists a tremendous majority. The ancient foes of Ireland had triumphed, and what was worse their former friends had grown lukewarm. Lord Rosebery, Liberal leader, had no use for Home Rule. To all practical purposes it had disappeared from the agenda of Liberal reform.

While the fortunes of Erin were still at this low tide there gradually came to the fore a new spokesman. John Redmond, staunch follower of Parnell, had been in Parliament

since 1881. Of the cup of victory he had nearly tasted twice; and now, in rout and disaster, he surveyed the cause of Ireland and took fresh heart of courage. He knew his Irish brethren and won, if not a mastery—and who can do that with the Irish—at least a reputation for good judgment and a will that knew not surrender. It took Redmond a long while, he was that kind of man, slow of speech and slow of thought: but he spoke with seriousness and dignity as became the representative of a nation, and his thought was ever headed without divergency of aim toward the main issue, Home Rule.

Redmond became chairman of the Irish Nationalists. His rule was not absolute; he did not want it to be. But the Irish Nationalists followed his guidance and, except for the brilliant and erratic O'Brien of Cork and his tiny following, from the end of the century to the opening of the Great War John Redmond spoke for Nationalist Ireland and for the millions of her sympathizers overseas.

His position was difficult. A friendly man, the exigencies of his post made friendship with the British members of the House of Commons almost impossible; since the party which he headed was launched for one sole purpose. For protest it was created; it neither could nor would take part in the ordinary give and take of British politics; it had no program which would ally it with either Liberal or Conservative; it was a force apart and sought but one reform; and until that was wrested from a legislature by turns hostile or indifferent, compromise there could be none.

Now Redmond might have followed Parnell's method and by nuisance-making have sought to gain his end; or it was open for him to adopt more revolutionary methods and by mutiny and sedition to work for Irish freedom. He did neither, but rather through calm insistence and patient endeavor, the plight and the aspirations of the Irish were incessantly to be dinned into obtuse British ears until they gave evidence of hearing. Redmond understood the psy-

chology of the understatement long before it was capitalized by American advertising agencies. His speeches in the House of Commons are masterpieces of restraint, his life the embodiment of it. Ireland within the Empire was what he sought, a free nation within a free commonwealth, of equal dignity with Canada or Australia, and due to him more than to any other Irishman came a willingness to co-operate, to conciliate, to go halfway when the whole distance was impossible; and at times to keep silent under heavy provocation.

As politician fought with politician within the ranks of what had been the powerful machine created by Parnell, there came a new hope to the "most distressful country," feeble at first and from an unconventional quarter, but soon to prove its worth and merit.

If freedom by means of constitutional machinery, the ballot and the rostrum, could not be had, let Irish nationality look to other forms of self-expression. The island was desperately poor; let thought be taken as to how new wealth might be created. Economic circumstances might be unfavorable, land laws unjust, railways inefficient and insufficient, taxation a burden and unjustified; but even so, by thought and energy these handicaps might be overcome. Existing poverty was synonymous with disease, illiteracy, prejudice and laziness. With the pig in the house and the gombeen-man at the door the peasant was not ready for political liberty. A fair share of economic independence must first be had; and the way to it was through intelligent co-operation in industry, particularly agriculture.

Furthermore, the native Gaelic tongue had almost been forgotten: revive it that Irishmen might find another bond of union. Consciousness of power, so characteristic of the English, came in no small measure from pride in England's past. But Ireland, too, had traditions, not simply of defeat and disaster but of victory. Why not make them live again, give tone and touch and color to the bygone, brew



JOHN REDMOND

some new magic based on self-respect and ancient glory? Let not Ireland give all her time to bickering with the Saxon, but fortify herself by the resurrection of her old particularism, her native and indigenous culture, and look to her own strength.

The first man to give effective voice to this idea of self-help was Sir Horace Plunkett. To him, politics offered little that was attractive. By tradition, social standing and belief he was a Unionist; but his mind did not turn toward political channels. What he sought primarily was the economic rehabilitation of his country through non-political organization, and to that end he founded in 1894 the Irish Agricultural Organization Society, the I. A. O. S. as it was familiarly called.

Membership in this Association was open to every Irishman of every creed and party. Plunkett, a Protestant, was at its head; but the rank and file were mainly Catholic and his more active collaborators also. Furthermore, it bore the imprimatur of Irish nationalism in an even more distinct fashion. In 1895, during the Parliamentary recess, Plunkett had persuaded Redmond and some of his adherents to consult with well known Unionists on the economic reorganization of Ireland on non-political lines. To that meeting came not only the Lord Mayor of Dublin but the Lord Mayor of Belfast, a prominent Jesuit and also the grand-master of the Belfast Orangemen, all willing to discuss agriculture.

This recess committee, as it was called, agreed to the appointment of commissioners to study agriculture in other lands and to make reports. Their work was speeded, the reports published, and Plunkett with untiring zeal began to advertise methods of coöperative buying, to organize coöperative creameries and butter selling agencies, and to urge coöperative banking on the minute scale so successfully put into operation by the Raffeissen peasant banks in Germany.

The idea took root. In ten years the I. A. O. S. had affiliated with it some 800 agricultural societies with over 80,000 members, all looking to the mother organization for aid and advice; and from it went up and down all Ireland specialists in packing and grading eggs, in fertilizers, in potato culture, in flax, in farm bookkeeping and accounting, preaching a gospel of hope that might be realized irrespective of England.

Plunkett now carried his ideas further; he secured in 1901 the establishment of an independent department of agriculture for Ireland. The importance of this step lay not simply in the fact that larger sums were thus made available, but also in that the new department was in part to be controlled directly by the representatives of the people. It was given large powers; to protect Irish fisheries, to lend money to fishermen, to plant oyster grounds, to establish canneries, to build piers, to give free seed potatoes, to direct lectures, to control agricultural education: but what was more important, the democratically elected Irish county councils were to share in its management.

Meanwhile, another Irish Protestant, Dr. Hyde, approached the problem of Irish nationality from a different direction. The use of the native Gaelic had steadily declined in Ireland for many decades. Dr. Hyde set about reviving it as a spoken tongue, while at the same time resurrecting the ancient Irish literature of the past.

To accomplish this he organized the Gaelic League, popular in Protestant Ulster as in the south, and before long destined to become strong and influential. So Dublin Castle discovered when the official bureaucracy was confronted with the demand that Irish be taught in the schools, and that teachers must be acquainted with that language before obtaining their certificates. In 1900 a Viceregal commission in Dublin sat in solemn session to discuss the usefulness of Irish. Dublin University and English authorities denounced Gaelic. *Imbroglío, mélange, ominum gatherum*; these and

similar epithets were hurled at it, and many held it was no true language at all: but on the other hand, there rallied to its support staunch defenders, continental authorities spoke highly of it, the Irish people wanted it, and ultimately the Castle was compelled to yield.

Although almost dead the Gaelic revived quickly. Teachers sprang up everywhere. Newspapers appeared daily with a Gaelic column. Railroad companies were asked for tickets in Gaelic and were requested to mark their depots in that language. Bank managers found checks endorsed in Gaelic; and witnesses appeared in law courts who spoke, so they stated, only Gaelic. Literary men asserted that Ireland's ancient Gaelic literature antedated that of Greece, and that Gaelic was the oldest literary form extant¹ and that it was a treasure house of rare and priceless worth.

The Gaelic League extended its activities, embarked on the publishing business, inaugurated an Irish stage, held athletic meets on the old Irish model, organized dancing and singing classes and stimulated research in ancient jewelry and the history of ladies' clothing; its scope was generous.

To measure accurately the social and political effect of a renaissance such as this, is a delicate task. Between language and nationality there would seem to be a close connection. Sinn Fein was scarcely yet in Ireland; but the Gaelic League must have rendered the social atmosphere favorable for it. One would hesitate to record the reaction to this general and genuine revived interest in old Irish and old Ireland as profound. Yet it may be presumed that to the Irish love of country there now was something added, pride in a worthy heritage, hope intangible for the future, and a resolve, perhaps, to pattern modern lives after those long dead, to whom belonged the rusty armor and the broken spears, famed in their song and story.

Concurrent with these attempts on the part of Irishmen to solve their own social and economic problems came sev-

¹ Yeats, W. B., *North American Review*, 169, 855 (Dec., 1899).

eral noteworthy laws placed on the statute books by the Conservatives. The phrase, *to kill Home Rule by kindness*, had already been coined by Mr. Balfour, and the attitude of the British government toward Ireland (1895-1905) gave clear indication that such was its policy. The work of the Congested Districts Board, granting mandatory relief powers in Ireland's western counties where famine still was prevalent, is proof thereof; so also the construction by the Government of light railways in the more remote districts of the island. But the main evidence of a Tory change of heart lay in the passage of the Irish County Councils Act of 1898, and the Wyndham Act of 1903.

The first statute revolutionized the system of local government. Under that which had been in vogue the Irish grand juries had been the mainstay of local administration. These bodies were appointed by the high sheriffs of the various counties who, since they owed their own appointment to the Lord Lieutenant at Dublin Castle, were accustomed to select almost invariably the local gentry as grand jurymen. Capable and well educated as the landlords might be, they were, after all, the *English garrison*; Irish to be sure, since their ancestors had lived long in the land, but Protestant almost to a man and in sympathy not accustomed to feel at one with the Catholic population amid whom they lived.

The grand juries, aside from presenting indictments, were in charge of the county roads, public buildings, asylums, courthouses; they levied the poor rates and conducted county business in general. These administrative functions they now lost entirely, since by the new law they were transferred to county councils elected by everyone admitted to the broad Parliamentary franchise.

The effect was instant, and disappointing to the Government. It had trusted the Irish democracy and had thought that the new elections would be put through with an absence of partisan spirit which would result in the return of

many of the more experienced members of the old grand juries. But the opposite was the case; the new councils were immediately seized upon by the Nationalist Party to further Home Rule. The councils gave, indeed, an added vent for the demand for Irish freedom, although by their very existence they seemed to many a standing disproof of its necessity.

Apparently the new councils functioned well. Such criticism as was levied against them seems immaterial. They were accused of passing intemperate and carelessly worded resolutions, which is quite likely; they even permitted, it is said, the use of court houses for the meeting of disloyal assemblies, and in certain instances they are accused of refusing to vote light and heat for his Majesty's judges: but with corruption and speculation they do not seem to have been charged. The Government, indeed, took unto itself great credit for their creation, claiming that the councils had knocked the bottom out of Home Rule and that now there was no Irish Question.

The second ameliorating law passed by the British government came in 1903, the Wyndham Land Purchase Act. Land tenure, it was considered by many, had been at the root of Irish discontent, and now, in the King's Speech came a specific promise of a bill to deal with that vexatious problem. So great was the immediate interest aroused that even before the Government's proposals were defined a brilliant debate took place in the House of Commons, on what might be, it was hoped, the general purpose of that bill.

Redmond, in his accustomed restrained and courteous manner, began it. He wanted the House to know what had taken place in Ireland, he wanted the Government to understand how at last the dawn of a brighter economic day had risen, how for the first time in the troubled history of Ireland landlord and tenant had come to a common understanding.

A landlord had besought the Landowners' Convention

that it should agree to a conference if one was suggested by the tenants. No one heeded his suggestion, whereupon a Captain Shawe-Taylor, to use Mr. Redmond's own words, with a directness and an audacity which took away man's breath in Ireland, issued in his own name an invitation to representatives of the landlords and tenants. He said, "Why go to the Landowners' Convention or why go to the United Irish League? I will invite a conference myself."¹

And this conference succeeded. To it came Irish Nationalists and Irish Unionists, the tenants and their representatives, the landlords and their spokesmen, and an agreement was reached. This Redmond stated was unparalleled; it had no bearing on Home Rule which would be agitated as before, but it did offer a solution of the land question and on a basis divergent from Gladstone's far-famed land act of 1881.

That law, designed for the relief of the Irish tenant and drawn up on the principle of the three F's—fair rent, fixed tenure, free sale—had, despite its promises, not brought relief. Gladstone sought justice and knew that first of all it lay in an equitable solution of the land problem; but his method had proved unfortunate. His law necessitated, practically, a dual ownership and the fixing of rents by judicial review. The process had proved expensive, the dual ownership a failure. What the agreement reached in Ireland between landlord and tenant without governmental interference or suggestion provided, was peasant proprietorship. Nearly twenty years earlier tentative steps had been taken in that direction. Now both parties of their own accord welcomed it, and for its accomplishment were willing to make mutual sacrifices. The landlords offered to sell their property on the basis of the last judicial revision of rent, the tenants to buy on a basis somewhat lower. A gap would be left, but by no means an impossible one, between what the landlord might reasonably expect and what the

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, IV series, CXVIII, 810.

tenant might reasonably offer. This gap, it was hoped, the state might fill.

The Nationalist leader argued that it should do so. He pleaded in the House of Commons for the Irish Unionist as well as for his own clientele. "May I, without offense," he urged, "say that you owe something to the Irish landlords! They have been your garrison in Ireland, and if now they are in a position with ruin staring them in the face and there is an opportunity of rescuing them from that position I certainly think that you are in honor bound to go to their relief, at any rate to a moderate extent. But as to the reason for the whole of this demand, I say that this is a great policy of national appeasement, the value of which no man can appraise in mere pounds, shilling and pence."¹

The temper of Redmond's speech was approved and seconded by Liberal and Unionist alike. To it John Burns added the plaudits of the radicals, and such an atmosphere of good will seemed engendered this year as never before or since characterized a general debate on Ireland in that House.

Mr. Wyndham's measure proved thoroughgoing. The Government proposed to buy out the landlords and to make available for that purpose ultimately no less than £150,000,000, beginning with a preliminary expenditure the first year of £5,000,000. This money was to be obtained by issuing securities at $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, a low rate but obtainable in view of the excellent security offered, since the value of the land was the first charge and the Irish Guaranteed Fund the second, the latter being the total sums set apart yearly by the British Treasury for the expenses of administration in Ireland.

Furthermore, for the expense of putting through this gigantic operation and in order that the peasants might not pay too high a price, a bonus of £12,000,000 was granted by the Imperial Exchequer. An opportunity was thus given

¹ *Ibid.*, 869.

the occupier to obtain possession of his own farm by the help of a British loan, and at a price below the market valuation. By these means the old strife over land tenure was to be ended.

The land act was not perfect; the rate of interest was too low to prevent the new securities from falling below par and the means adopted for bolstering them up were not altogether successful. But land purchase did continue at a rapid rate for a number of years; and this, in conjunction with the agricultural propaganda sponsored by Plunkett, did bring, if not prosperity, at least a greater modicum of well-being in Ireland than had been experienced in decades.

The span of life of the British Unionists had but three more years to run, yet in them Mr. Wyndham sought still further to befriend Ireland by a scheme of devolution which would, had it been inaugurated, have given large financial control of Irish expenditure to officials chosen by the Irish electorate. His plan, however, came to an abortive end in 1906, when the Liberals swept into office with a majority so great that there was no need for Irish support.

For the next six years Irish affairs caused little commotion at Westminster. Mr. Bryce became chief Secretary for Ireland, to be followed by Mr. Augustine Birrell; but for Irish liberty these celebrated authors did very little, unless university reforms, supported by Birrell, be so considered. The British Liberals had gone to defeat twice on Home Rule, and in 1906 had been returned to power with at least negative assurances to the British electorate that the old issue would not be brought back to life. Social reform in Great Britain and autonomy for South Africa, yes, but to Ireland only vague protestations of friendship. Nevertheless, shadowy as the prospects were, Redmond stood by the Liberals and in 1909 supported Lloyd George's budget. The lion in the path he knew to be the House of Lords. If the Liberals and the House of Lords fell out there might be

Ireland's chance; and so it proved. Over the budget they quarreled and to pass the Parliament Act of 1911 limiting the power of the House of Lords the coöperation of the Irish Nationalists was essential. Mr. Asquith, the Premier, saw a new light; he pledged Home Rule for Ireland if the constituencies supported him against the Lords, and they did so by a slender margin.

And in 1912, as Asquith introduced the third Home Rule Bill, the Irish received their reward. Bitter had been the fight over the "robber" budget, more bitter that over the Parliament Act, most bitter of all it was to be over this bill. From its first reading to its final passage, every stage was contested hotly, and if in Parliament words ran high, in the country they ran higher. By 1913 civil war seemed possible as a result of the Irish Question; in 1914 it was imminent, until the more ominous happenings of late July and early August made even Irish problems seem immaterial.

The debate on this bill in both Parliament and on the hustings ranged over every phase of Ireland's relations with Great Britain. Many members of the Commons had witnessed the rejection by the House of Lords of the Home Rule Bill of 1893, not a few had voted on the occasion of Gladstone's defeat on the same issue in 1886. The great majority knew more about Ireland in the nineteenth century than about that island in the twentieth, and history's disputed pages bore a heavier share in the debate than they should have. The good historian of the third Home Rule Bill, and of the Empire, would do well not to turn too many of them, but to focus rather on the general principles involved in this bill; to make clear, if possible, the salient features of the intricate mechanism which it set up, and to describe the reaction to it of the electorate. The explanation of historical controversy by more history is the easiest way; it is not the best method, in this instance, of clarifying the situation which in 1912-14 aroused such violent contention, civil strife.

The measure in question was a cautious one; it created a Parliament in Ireland, and granted autonomy to a limited extent: but it by no means made for Ireland a status comparable to that of the Dominions. To the British Crown were still reserved important constitutional and administrative functions, not only those naturally expected, the army, navy and foreign affairs, but also many of a more domestic nature, such as the control of the Royal Irish Constabulary, land settlement, old age pensions, the National Insurance Act, the collection of taxes, and to some extent, the levying of them.

The Parliament established was one of two houses, a Senate nominated in the first instance by the Government, a House of Commons elected by popular vote. A ministry, exclusively Irish, was provided for, dependent on Parliament, and, after making a goodly number of safeguards with regard to religious liberty and the veto power of the Crown, the bill granted the new Irish government control over all matters of domestic concern not reserved to the Crown. It likewise provided for the presence at Westminster of forty Irish members instead of the hundred odd given by the Act of Union, thereby neither excluding the Irish altogether as did the first Home Rule Bill, nor continuing their excessive representation as did the second.

At first glance, the proposed law seemed to be an act of tardy justice. Its advocates could urge with convincing logic that neither coercion, laissez-faire, tyranny, nor generous concession, educational, economic, religious or even political, had abated for half a century past the will of three-quarters, if not more, of the Irish people to determine their own destinies. Ireland stood in 1912 where Ireland stood in 1893, 1886, and 1870. For better or for worse, rationally or irrationally, Irishmen sought the abolition of Castle government and the creation of a Parliament of their own. Improved economic conditions had not weakened their resolution; English bounty had not undermined it.

Eighty Irish Nationalists were continuously and protractedly sent to the House of Commons with but the one mandate—a strong argument this, and deserving foremost place.

Others could be advanced. The Nationalists could argue fairly that the bill was moderate, that it contained very many safeguards which would protect not merely the Protestant minority in Ireland, but likewise imperial interests. They could also show that Home Rule for Ireland was a popular plea in the British Dominions, that the granting of it would pave the way for imperial federation or at least the strengthening of imperial ties.

The Empire's strength came straight from one source, self-government. This had been proved in Canada; it had been proved in South Africa. To the Transvaal had been given autonomous institutions, why not to Ireland?

Minor arguments abounded. The statistics of the Unionist government at the end of the nineteenth century demonstrated that Ireland in the past had borne more than her fair share of taxation and that the proposed bonus which the bill gave to Ireland to set up housekeeping was but a fair return. Furthermore, the pressure of business in the House of Commons grew constantly heavier. Was the time of that venerable body to be wasted with debates on the outrageous behavior of police in Tipperary or lack of postal facilities in County Mayo? Home Rule would promptly relieve the Mother country of this time-pressure which had been so long a burden.

But these reasons were all subordinate to the first, the recognition of an Irish nation, free to direct its own affairs. This was the keynote of the Prime Minister's position, as it was that of Redmond's. And the Irish leader begged the House to consider the act not as one concerned primarily with financial haggling but as one founded on principles of reconciliation and justice. "Equality, Liberty and Loyalty

in the great sisterhood of nations,"¹ these were the factors, he exclaimed, that made the Empire.

The opposition to the bill, however, was not only vehement and exhaustive; it was also intelligent and logical, and at times convincing. The Tories might not have the better cause; but they did, it seems, advance the better argument, and why?

The answer is two-fold: the fight was not a fresh one, it belonged to the nineteenth century; and more important, the Liberals were not in deadly earnest. Home Rule was an issue of the Victorian era, so Britain thought. Ireland was not far distant geographically; measured by a psychological meter, however, it was remote. The sticking of insurance stamps in a government booklet was an immediate interest that arrested the eye; there was nothing visible about justice for Ireland. As for the Liberals, during five full years of power they had heeded Ireland not at all. The fighting strength of Liberalism, as represented by Lloyd George, had gone to win fair play and social decency in Great Britain. Ireland was an unwelcomed fact which stood ignored until the two elections of 1910 made it clear that without Irish votes the Government would fall.

The Tories said that the Liberals bought them, and now were making good their contract. Direct proof of this there was none. But it is apparent that the Lloyd George Budget of 1909 was opposed to Irish interest; it involved land taxes, a proposal anathema to the Irish mind; it likewise increased the levy on whisky, an important Irish product. Yet the Nationalists supported the budget to gain their major objective. The Liberals accepted their aid. What was the reward to be?

Handicapped then by the inertia of his own party, Mr. Asquith introduced the bill and with his usual clarity and Parliamentary skill did justice to it—at the first reading. But during the nine long days of debate on the second read-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, Series V, XXXIII, 1453.

ing the Prime Minister was absent and the measure left to less experienced hands. Winston Churchill took part, but at no great length and with enthusiasm somewhat chilled after his recent visit to Belfast. Also from the Treasury bench speeches were made by Mr. Birrell, Sir Edward Grey, Colonel Seeley, and others.

The strength of their speeches lay in exposition. In energy and combativeness they were inferior to those presented by the Unionist leaders, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Walter Long, Mr. Bonar Law. The Liberals did not hit as hard; they had not as much interest in the bill. Perhaps a more friendly judgment would be that they did the best they could and that nature had not endowed them with the aggressiveness of the Unionists. This, one is inclined to think true of the unfortunate Mr. Birrell, who ever seemed at sea in politics. But the very fact that Mr. Birrell, without any disparagement to him or to his splendid literary talent, should have been made Secretary of State for Ireland is good evidence of the subordinate place given to Irish affairs in the general Liberal scheme of things.

As for the Unionist arguments, some of them had little validity. Home Rule, Mr. Asquith had stated, was but the first step in a general process of devolution, or decentralization which would apply also in time to England, Scotland and Wales. What, cried the Opposition, is the nature of this scheme; why start with Ireland; how do you expect it to work; make clear its fantastic details! Now this was but the reappearance of the familiar herring. It was certainly not necessary to discuss at this juncture any plan of imperial federation, devolution, or local autonomy which the Unionists well knew had not been thought out or adopted by the Cabinet. The argument was not germane to the issue.

And so too of certain others. Mr. Balfour suggested that in so far as the proposed Irish Parliament would have little to do, only inferior men would be elected to it, a line of

thought that did not do the ex-Premier justice. It was also hinted freely that the Irish were contented and did not want Home Rule,—a statement contrary to fact. And in addition a tremendous hue and cry was raised over religious contentions, most of them long since buried but now exhumed and placed on oratorical display. The Unionists made a great point also of the Irish members left at Westminster and showed how illogical it was that they should vote on English matters whereas English members of Parliament could not vote on those which concerned Ireland. Here there was some ground for complaint; but, as Redmond and others pointed out, the real beauty of the English constitution lay in the fact that in many instances it was built upon anomalies that worked. Also, as long as the countries remained yoked together, and as long as the British Parliament remained definitely supreme, as it did by this bill, it was essential that a certain number of Irishmen be members of the House of Commons to explain and defend there the acts of the Irish Parliament. How many, it mattered not. In cutting down their number to less than half what it had been, rough justice had been done.

A more salient criticism, but yet after all a matter of detail, was the disposition to be made of the Royal Irish Constabulary. For six years the direction and the pay of that body was reserved to the British government, yet at the same time the constabulary was to serve the new Irish government as a police force. It would now have two masters. Suppose the constabulary enforced a law of the Irish government in a slovenly manner, or stubbornly refused to do so at all; suppose a warm-hearted and patriotic constable in some disputed instance obeyed Irish rather than British officials. What would be the outcome?

But the Tory Unionists had better weapons than these in their armory and they used them with deadly effect against the bill's weakest provisos: the financial clauses and Ulster.

A stock argument of Irish orators in the United States

during the last century was that England had played the tyrant in Ireland not only through the agency of her landlords but also by unjust and over-high taxation. Both accusations were, to some extent, justified. The past iniquities of landlordism, however, had been largely remedied. The question of equitable taxation remained. The Irish paid no special taxes, nor had they, in any way as individuals, received different fiscal treatment from the inhabitants of England, Scotland, Wales. Taxes throughout the United Kingdom were and had been uniform, whether in the form of inheritance or income taxes or customs duties. Nevertheless, the result had been unfair to Ireland. The incidence had been heavier because the country was poorer. The basis of taxation had been laid by and for a highly developed industrial country; and Ireland for the most part was not only given over to agriculture, but to the branch of it which under ordinary circumstances breeds slight wealth, namely cattle raising. In consequence, the burden of civil administration conducted from Dublin Castle had borne heavily on her people.

Now expensive as this alien government had proved itself to be, the Irish revenue at the end of the nineteenth century had been estimated by British officials at £8,000,000 a year, whereas local expenditure in Ireland at the same time was but £6,000,000. Great Britain thereby had received £2,000,000 annually from Ireland over and above what she expended there. In the last decade, however, the situation had been reversed. For the land settlement act of 1903 the British had already pledged their credit for £110,000,000 and to carry out the excellent plan of Mr. Wyndham to completion it was now estimated that nearly £100,000,000 more would be required. Furthermore, the old age pension act was a direct charge on the imperial treasury and that, plus added agricultural and educational expenditure, had changed a favorable fiscal balance (from the British point of view) to a deficit of £1,500,000. Was

Ireland now in Britain's debt or was the latter country still to be accountable for British extortions in the past, and if so, for how many years and for what sums? Under circumstances such as these it was difficult to determine the fiscal relations of an autonomous Ireland to Great Britain, and particularly so if it be remembered that certain functions of government in Ireland were to remain directly under the Crown.

Mr. Asquith proposed to deal with these financial problems as follows: all existing taxes in Ireland were to be collected by the British officials, and any new ones which the Irish might levy. From the amount received the British government would first deduct the cost of all reserved services, such as the administration of land purchase, payment and maintenance of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and then to the Irish treasury would be remitted the difference, which the Irish cabinet might spend in any way it saw fit on the non-reserved services, such as sanitation and the Post Office. It was recognized that this would give the Irish government practically nothing to start house-keeping without increasing taxation, and therefore a bonus of £500,000 was granted for the first year with provision for its continuance at a diminishing rate. If the Irish wanted more money they could increase the existing taxes or create new ones; they were also at liberty to decrease taxes to which they were at that time subject: but in either case Great Britain was to be the collector.

Both Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Walter Long, for the Conservative opposition, riddled this scheme. The former might not have been a broadminded statesman, but his understanding of fiscal problems proved superior to that of any speaker on the other side of the House. The bill, he said, was illogical. Great Britain under it had the onus of collecting all Irish taxes, but the Irish government was to spend the money. "The British go to the Irish taxpayer in the sole capacity of tax collector and the Irish govern-

ment is the fairy godmother distributing gifts which have been collected by the British ogre.”¹ The Irish government is at liberty to add to or subtract from the customs duties, it is true, only 10%, but that means, nevertheless, the setting up within the narrow limits of the British Isles of two different tariff barriers. All true confederations, said the Conservative leader, consider fiscal unity fundamental; but this statute throws this axiom to the winds. For instance, under the proposed law, land purchase is a reserved service but rent fixing is an Irish service. If the Irish government should lower rents the value of all land would decrease and automatically the guarantee of the £110,000,000 already pledged on the security of that land would be adversely affected. “You are deliberately lowering,” he affirmed, “the value of the security for this immense sum.”

This argument was again and again thrust home by Mr. Long and Mr. Balfour. The former, Secretary of State for Ireland after the resignation of Mr. Wyndham, was well acquainted with many phases of the Irish Question, particularly the financial, and he now demonstrated the apparent folly of placing the Congested Districts Board, which had large powers in land expropriation in western Ireland, partly under the British government as a reserved service and partly under the Irish Parliament. The same officials, he contended, served two masters. If they please one and displease the other are they subject to dismissal and by whom? The bill makes Great Britain responsible for years to come for Irish land purchase. But, asserted Mr. Long, “What about your credit; what does your credit depend on; not merely upon transactions between landlord and tenant, not merely upon the work done by the estates commissioners of the Congested Districts Board, but it depends upon the value of the property in Ireland. . . . Suppose a campaign of rent lowering is started in Ireland, what is going to happen. . . . The estates commissioners of the Congested Dis-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, V Series, XXVI, 685.

tricts Board will be compelled to buy on the ordinary terms of purchase and prices will depend largely on the rent fixed by the law. Do you think for a single instant that a man is going to consent to pay an annuity on land this side of a ditch based on old prices when the man on the other side will be paying on the new prices, the result of your handing over the valuation of land to the Irish government.”¹

These arguments were difficult to refute, and others were added to them. The Post Office, in which there was a deficit, was handed over to the Irish, while the Postal Savings Department was reserved. But inasmuch as the Post Office administered postal savings it was evident that either two sets of employees would be required or that one set would be under two distinct employers. Old age pensions were likewise administered through the Post Office, yet old age pensions were reserved by the Crown. A conflict of jurisdiction seemed inevitable.

The Liberals made but feeble effort to meet these specific criticisms: they preferred to ignore them. As for the Irish Nationalists, they had very evidently decided that this bill must be fought through by the Liberals and that for themselves, the better part of wisdom would be to stand to one side. Not so, however, the irrepressible Mr. O'Brien who had never given in to petty party discipline and from whom there now came frank recognition of these fiscal inconsistencies. He said that Ireland had a better bargain even from Mr. Gladstone when a £3,000,000 contribution by the bill of 1886 was levied annually for the support of the British army and navy, for that bill divorced English from Irish finance as it should have been divorced. “Ireland is not bankrupt,” maintained the Irish spokesman, “Ireland at the present moment is producing a revenue that more than suffices to run, I think, almost any of the third rate states in Europe, even those which have armies.” He thought more highly of Gladstone’s financial settlement than

¹ *Ibid.*, 1737.

he did of Mr. Asquith's, but he was prepared to vote for the bill rather than to lose Home Rule altogether.

These criticisms of the bill were, indeed, very damaging and the silence of the Government in regard to them even more so. Was the Chancellor of the Exchequer so wrapped up in breaking the power of the Church of England in his native Wales that he could not devote an hour to answering them on the bill's second reading; were not these very Tory criticisms made by Mr. Asquith's own financial committee of inquiry whose findings he had disregarded? The notorious "in and out" clauses of the Gladstone bill of 1893, by which the Irish members of the Parliament of the United Kingdom were to vote on measures which concerned Ireland and not on those of purely English interest, were paralleled by these clumsy in and out financial clauses by which neither Britain nor Ireland were to control Irish finance. The suspicion of the Unionists that the Government measure provided for the collection of all Irish revenue by the imperial treasury in order to persuade Ulster to submit to Irish taxation seemed not without justification.

But the real rock of opposition was Ulster and that province, or rather the northeast corner of it, threatened fight, not only on the bill, but afterwards—physical resistance to its enforcement even if made law.

The more salient facts in regard to Ulster were these: the province was but one of four in Ireland, yet concentrated in it, roughly speaking, were some seventy per cent of the Irish Protestants, and likewise the major part of Ireland's manufactures. Of the whole Ulster population about fifty-five per cent were Protestant. Five of the nine Ulster counties had a Catholic majority and the Protestant majority of the entire province was only obtained by the concentration of the Protestant element in the northeastern tip of Ulster. At the time when the third Home Rule Bill was introduced the Parliamentary delegation stood, sixteen Nationalists to seventeen Unionists. By the time the bill

had passed the numbers had been reversed and the Nationalists had a majority of one.

The men of northeast Ulster, far more influential than their mere numbers would indicate, since under their control was a large share of Ireland's wealth, insisted stoutly that they would oppose Home Rule in any form. They were content, they affirmed, with the Act of Union, with their present British citizenship, with the status quo. If Home Rule was passed by Parliament it made no difference to them. Fealty would not be rendered under any circumstances to a Parliament that met at Dublin.

They took this stand for a variety of reasons; first, because Ulster was more prosperous than the rest of Ireland, and they feared heavier taxes and looked forward to crippled if not ruined industries if Home Rule came; second, they were genuinely alarmed lest the Roman Catholic south, with its numerical majority, attempt reprisals for the long years of Protestant oppression in centuries past; third, they were proud of their British connection and considered, not without reason, that the British electorate would refuse to sustain Mr. Asquith if they refused to have it cut.

Of these three reasons the first was perhaps the most fundamental. At any rate, it was the most logical; but it received the least attention. Uncompromising and free spoken as the men of Ulster were, they did not like to base their case upon the purse. Even to themselves, it seemed of less importance than religion or British citizenship. "You may call it what you like," to quote Mr. Craig, "we in the north of Ireland believe that a Parliament in Dublin would be dominated by the Roman Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church being what it is we do not believe, to use a colloquial expression, that the Protestants would have a fair show."¹

Craig's speech beat once more the old Orange drum and a loud instrument, as usual, did it prove. The echo which it

¹ *Ibid.*, V Series, XXXVI, 175-4.

made, however, was not warranted by the facts. For a century past a few hundred thousand Protestants had lived in south and central Ireland, little islands in a sea of Catholic neighbors. Concerning religion they had not quarreled, and although in the early days politically in the ascendant and in control of the local Irish government, that power had been lost by the local autonomy given to Ireland by the Unionists in 1898 without detriment to them in any way. In fact, the whole history of the Home Rule movement had indicated an aloofness to sectarian influence on the part of the reformers. The original leader of the Home Rule party, Mr. Butt, had been a Protestant, Charles Stewart Parnell had been one also, and had been in bad odor with the Catholic Church. Mr. Redmond himself had stood out staunchly against the hierarchy, and it was freely hinted that in so far as the Catholic bishops took active part in politics at all they were unfriendly to Home Rule. Their influence already was predominant, and they stood to lose rather than to gain by an Irish Parliament assuming control of Irish education, as no less a man than Lord Charles Beresford, a noted Unionist and very good Irishman, asserted.¹

Lord Charles Beresford, however, was not a typical Protestant. That bluff sailor, believing religion, as he stated, to be merely a matter of birth, had drifted far in his wanderings from the orbit of the Protestant Irish and particularly those in the north. Nine-tenths of their fears might be imaginary, but they were none the less real to them. Protestant Ulster had succeeded, Protestant Ulster lived clean, so they claimed, paid its debts, worked hard, could not be crushed, and to King and Country had been faithful—and the Protestants of Ulster would maintain their position as an integral part of the United Kingdom.

The Conservative party in Great Britain supported them in their resistance, and in opposition to Home Rule found

¹ *Ibid.*, V Series, XXXV, 2103.

not only a patriotic battle-cry but a channel as well through which they might pour their stored up venom against the great social and constitutional reforms of Liberal England (1906-1911). Ulster is a minority as well as Ireland, they argued, and any argument in favor of Ireland is also an argument in favor of Ulster. These British citizens shall not be left in the lurch; and in a famous speech Bonar Law asserted, "he could not imagine any degree of resistance beyond which he would not go" in standing by Ulster, a declaration of militancy which the more subtle Mr. Balfour approached but never attained.

Politics had been at fever heat through the years 1909-1912, and the Parliament act of 1911 in clipping the wings of the House of Lords had aroused most bitter hatred. The Tories matched the Liberals in numerical strength in the House of Commons and outmatched them in debating vigor. They sought to prove the Parliament act useless by forcing a referendum on Home Rule, a precedent which would really give the House of Lords more power than in the old days, for then it hesitated long before throwing out bills, while by the referendum plan it would ever be free to check the Liberals and to force a count of noses on every measure which displeased it.

The Conservatives did not put their case thus: they said, you have no mandate to coerce Ulster, you have no precedent, in this Empire teeming with political and constitutional precedents, which would warrant this compulsion against men ever loyal to Britain. We and the country will not permit it.

But Ulster was a part of Ireland and Ulstermen held themselves Irishmen. Should Ireland be mutilated to placate this minority; and if it was done, was nothing due in all equity to the Catholic minority in Ulster itself? It was, of course, possible to give Ulster a position of especial dignity and power in the New Ireland, to make her status similar to that of Quebec in the Canadian federation. This, the

Irish Nationalists would reluctantly have agreed to, but not the Ulstermen. Other alternative, apparently, there was none except the exclusion of Protestant Ulster from the jurisdiction of the Irish Parliament. This the Irish Nationalists would not agree to, nor, for that matter, would the Unionists accept it as a compromise. They would agree to nothing except the defeat of the measure, and to emphasize the hostility to Home Rule in Ulster much dramatic play was made of a great covenant of all good Protestants to resist in every way any effort to enforce it. "We stand by one another," it read, "in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom and in using all means that may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule plan in Ireland."

This covenant was signed in public by thousands. The Bible, the Union Jack, the Ulster Covenant, all three were cleverly associated through the histrionic abilities of Ulster's leader, a south of Ireland barrister, Sir Edward Carson; and to emphasize that the Covenant meant what it stated, Ulster began to drill and arm.

Now anyone may threaten to resist most violently, even to the death, a projected law, and so commit no crime. But if Ulster was permitted to make these threats why should not Connaught, in case Home Rule should be defeated, or the London dockers, for that matter, if their pay was not raised? Ulster wanted nothing new, she said, and of course a difference might be discovered here. But even hypothetical rebellion against the dour north of Ireland background looked full ugly. And if in London streets objection was taken to the appearance of the Host in the twentieth century, how much more bitter and inflammable were the frantic minds of Belfast and of Derry. The Pope was very near to these people, and but a short time since their ancestors had held him Antichrist.

Did Ulster's leaders bluff? Sir Edward Carson said, "it

will be our duty shortly to take steps . . . for making Home Rule absolutely impossible. We will challenge the Government to interfere with us if they dare. . . . They may tell us if they like that this is treason." These words are clear, the purpose firm, the enunciation of them, with all due respect to Sir Edward Carson, safe.

After weary months of reiterated argument the Commons in January, 1913, passed the bill. The Lords, naturally, gave it short shrift: but it is not without significance that as they threw it out, from Londonderry, ancient city of Protestant ascendancy, a Nationalist was elected to Parliament.

This discouraged Carson, apparently, not one whit. "The case of Ulster is assured," he asserted, "because the Unionist leader and ex-leader have declared that she had behind her in armed resistance the whole force of the whole Conservative and Unionist party . . . you may jeer at us if you will, but we will go on and we will defeat you." ¹

And the Ulstermen did go on. They had already organized a provisional government equipped with a subordinate military council, and various other committees to take over their proposed new Ulster administration. An increased number of volunteers was sought and obtained, and a fund of a million pounds was begun to indemnify these citizen soldiers against possible loss of life. From Britain came valuable support. Bonar Law was as unyielding as Balfour; for the first time in many years Mr. Balfour seemed to know his own mind, and the Tory press howled for a general election or at least a referendum on the Home Rule Bill. Here and there in England there was talk of the King refusing to sign the bill, and in Ulster even some mention of a great European monarch who might come to the rescue of the oppressed Protestants in the north.

To this defiance of the Unionists the Irish Nationalists offered reconciliation and, within bounds, compromise.

¹ *Annual Register* for 1913, 131.

O'Brien attempted through an *All for Ireland League* to bring Ulstermen into a conference. Redmond, both in the House of Commons and on the Liberal platform, stoutly upheld his faith in the sanity of Irishmen. "The Unionists," he said, "could have any reasonable safeguards consistent with a free Irish Parliament and an executive responsible to it; but twenty-eight counties could not let themselves be intimidated by four." As for religious bigotry and hatred, it was largely a matter of the past. "There were more Catholic students in Protestant Trinity College, Dublin, than ever, and in the University at Belfast, twenty-five per cent were Catholic. Galway College, whose students were mainly Catholic, had elected two Protestants over Catholics to professorships. He would not have been a Home Ruler unless Home Rule meant a free Ireland." And with a generous gesture Redmond exclaimed, "anything which would mean burying the hatchet, anything which would mean the consent of these Irishmen to shake hands frankly with their fellow countrymen across the hateful memories of the past would be welcomed with universal joy in Ireland."¹

But even as Redmond spoke the Ulster volunteer force had increased to 88,000, and under General Richardson was rapidly whipped into military form, a fact which the Government somewhat tardily recognized by prohibiting, in December, 1913, the further importation of arms and ammunition into Ireland.

Came January and February, 1914. The hypothetical rebellion of Ulster obsessed men's minds. It was not illegal; there had been no overt act; the Home Rule Bill was not yet on the statute books. These men of Belfast were British citizens: had the British Parliament any right to divorce them from their own country, force them to a loathed participation in the government of another? Men forgot that Ulster sent fewer Unionists to Westminster than

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, V Series, LX, 1657.

Nationalists, forgot that the Catholic minorities in Ulster had as good a claim to self-determination as the Protestant minorities in all Ireland, forgot the ample safeguards in the bill against persecution, forgot that Ulster was and always had been held an integral part of Ireland. The appeal of that province was at once both subtle and direct: we want nothing, we ask for nothing except to remain British citizens. Throughout long centuries we have remained loyal. You cannot kick us out of our own country, and if you try we will prevent you.

Now the Prime Minister knew that his majority in Parliament apart from the Nationalists, was a slender one; in England proper the Liberals were even in a minority. He had been returned to power early in 1910 with a mandate for the Lloyd George budget and again in the same year to limit the power of the House of Lords. He had pledged himself to Home Rule in the second election, it was true; but that issue had been, both to the mind of the electorate and his own, subordinate. To coerce Ulster was unthinkable; to betray his Nationalist allies, a disgrace; to continue calmly until the Home Rule measure became law and then decide, too dangerous a solution for this fast aging statesman. For Asquith was essentially a Parliamentarian, a statesman of the ballot box, skilled leader, generous hearted, high-minded, but not one to delight in danger made glorious by the presence of the Almighty.

And so he gave way, perhaps wisely, and sought a compromise. Sir Horace Plunkett had suggested an interesting one. He proposed that Ulster should accept the bill with the provision that if that province found union with the rest of Ireland distasteful in a given number of years it might vote itself out. Asquith took his plan, reversed and modified it. He brought forward a scheme by which every Ulster county should determine by plebiscite whether or not it chose to enter the New Ireland; if it voted for exclusion, for six years it was to remain a part of Great Britain; if

after that period, which covered the term of two stated Parliamentary elections (1915 and 1920), the British Parliament did not intervene, the counties were to be included in Ireland and excluded from Britain. This compromise, said Asquith, was the last the Government would make; beyond this we will not budge, said Redmond—and it will not satisfy us at all, asserted Carson, aware that behind him were drawn up in battle array the Tory chiefs and all their cohorts.

Of course it did not satisfy them. Home Rule in any sense they held obnoxious; and having won this real concession they were athirst for more. The wickedness of the British government in the matter of Ulster had been their meat and sustenance for two good years. "No six year suspension of death for Ulster," cried Carson; the decision must be made now.

And as he said it the Tories overreached themselves, and to the blind and non-appreciative Liberals they gave a gift both rare and precious, but useless to those who could not sense its value. Disaffection had broken out in the army, officers resigned, the hypothetical rebellion threatened to become real, and Asquith replied with brave words. How clear (perhaps) the solution! Cashier the officers, dismiss them dishonorably from the army and then, if Parliament did not support him in full measure, to the country with the cry: the civil government and democracy against military cliques and aristocratic pretense. Did not the Liberals derive their major support from the Nonconformists, none too eager to join in alliance with the Roman Catholic Irish? Relegate the Pope, then, to the background and make the issue clean cut and fresh so as to appeal to both Liberal and Laborite alike; and from the electorate seek a mandate to restore civil authority at Westminster, and to mar and destroy this plot that would encourage such trifling with military honor.

Here would have been a glorious issue, a fight for democ-

racy that would have meant something, a fight not based on privileges of taxation, or of voting, minor matters these in comparison with the age long fight against systems of snobbery and caste that despiritualize and corrode.

But insight to see this was not given to Asquith. He took one step only in the right direction; he took the War Portfolio, and then did nothing. As a matter of fact the army officers were not altogether to blame. The supine civil authorities had been in part responsible for their insubordination. Sir Arthur Paget had received instructions to protect certain of his Majesty's stores in the north of Ireland. He had been furthermore instructed, apparently, to test the good will of his officers and to give leave of absence to those domiciled in Ulster. Just what he said to his officers is in dispute. Many of them thought that they were given the option of resigning or of taking active steps against Ulster. In consequence, when ordered to advance for the protection of ammunition supplies, amounting to hundreds of tons, he wired the War Office:

"Regret to report Brigadier and fifty-seven officers prefer to accept dismissal if ordered north."

Now if these officers in reality had been given permission by Paget to resign, their resignations might have been immediately accepted, and Paget's asked for if he had exceeded his instructions from the War Office. But instead, the Government ordered the officers of higher rank to London and there bargained with them for their continued service; a beautiful object lesson, this, to the British Laborites who knew, as did everyone else, that this option of obeying orders was never extended to private soldiers in suppressing strikes. And an object lesson to the Catholic Irish of the south it proved as well, who knew, as did everybody else, that these same officers would march south from Curragh to overawe Catholic Cork while to the north and to Protestant Belfast they would not step.

The weakness of Mr. Asquith at this juncture brought

additional trouble; his enemies carried the war into Africa and now tried to prove that the Liberals intended to provoke Ulster into fighting in order to compel obedience to Home Rule. This weird tale they unwove from the conversation and correspondence of young army officers. In fact, it became quite evident that whatever misunderstanding might have occurred in regard to the forward movement of troops, there could be none in one respect: officers in the army were playing politics, were asking and receiving the advice of Unionists in Parliament, were publishing letters in that Tory citadel, the *Morning Post*. And as they did so the Tory leaders took a further step toward war.

The end of April found the Ulster volunteers seizing two Irish ports. Here they cut telephone and telegraph wires, brought on shore ammunition and distributed it by automobile throughout the province. Southern Ireland now followed Ulster's lead. For a long while many had chafed there at Redmond's pacific attitude and trust in England. Sir Roger Casement, a Protestant, and other eager advocates of Home Rule now organized national volunteers and sought to arm them. Redmond, reluctantly, was forced to recognize the necessity of this drastic action. Enlistments in the south grew rapidly and by summer the national volunteers outnumbered those of Ulster.

Events followed in quick succession. The King in person called a conference of political leaders in Buckingham Palace, and Carson and Redmond faced each other. Before them hung a great map of Ulster, the river valleys and the ports, Protestant; the hinterland, Catholic. Four counties were Protestant, five Catholic; the division might have been made: but neither side would yield County Fermanagh or County Tyrone where the Nationalist majority was very slight.¹ King George's efforts proved futile, and the day after the conference a parade of armed men, Ulster volunteers, marched through Belfast, none interfering. The next

¹ Gwynn, S., *John Redmond's Last Years*, 122.

day his Majesty's troops fired near Dublin on National volunteers engaged in gun-running. One province in Ireland evidently could and did arm openly; in the other three provinces men were shot down if they copied this example.

The news of the Dublin shooting was published on the same day as that of the rejection by Austria of Serbia's reply to her ultimatum. One week later Redmond rose in the House to declare Ireland's stand in the coming war. England, he said, need have no fear for Ireland. She may withdraw her forces altogether from the island. In the past his country and England had been estranged, but that day he hoped had gone by. "The shores of Ireland would be defended, if it were granted, by both Protestant and Catholic Irish." The British cheered this statement, and meanwhile watched with taut nerves the German siege guns hammering Liège.

CHAPTER IX

THE IRISH FREE STATE

With the war's advent the status of Ireland was still undetermined; and so it was to be for many a year. Perhaps this was inevitable; but the result was a steady drift toward anarchy and violence which culminated in the outbreak of crime and civil war that marked the years 1919-1921. The relative extent to which English mismanagement and Irish hostility—to use the mildest words possible—contributed toward this state of affairs it is impossible to estimate. But one generalization only may be freely made by the historian; namely, that these years were scarce surpassed in Irish history for bitterness of feeling and viciousness of act.

The response of Ireland in 1914 to Mr. Redmond's pledge of support was more one of tacit approval than of intense enthusiasm. The country was not unwilling to fight for Britain; but return guarantees were looked for, and Redmond was expected to secure them. For a time it looked as though he might do so. Since the inauguration of Home Rule must inevitably be postponed he asked permission for the Irish to fight in their own army, under their own officers. Let the Nationalist Volunteers be taken over, he urged, in their own units, both for the defense of Ireland and the offense on the continent. And to this slight qualification for Ireland's wholehearted volunteering for the war the Prime Minister gave his warm approval.

But this plan, which so happily provided both military aid for Britain and unity for distracted Ireland, was prevented by two factors. One of these was the narrow-mindedness of the British War Office; the other, the un-

willingness on the part of the more radical Irish to follow Redmond's lead.

Kitchener had no confidence in Irish support—that is, south of Ulster. Irish Unionists rather than Nationalists were placed in charge of recruiting; the formation of the Irish division was delayed; drafts were made from it to fill divisions already in the field; of the officers appointed less than one in five were Catholic; the donation of flags and standards made by Irish women was rejected; and special insignia to distinguish the Irish troops were frowned upon.

Meanwhile, to Ulster the War Office was most gracious. The Ulstermen were permitted to keep their pre-war organization intact; the officers of the old Ulster Volunteers were immediately commissioned instead of attending a training camp; Ulstermen, like the Welsh and the Scots, were authorized to wear distinctive insignia on their uniforms; and General Richardson, in command of the Ulster Volunteers, announced without reprimand that “when the war was over . . . thoroughly well trained and with vast experience, they would return to the attack and relegate Home Rule to the Devil.”¹

Although these grievances, in view of the condition of Europe, were slight, they were numerous. And when in the spring of 1915, a Coalition Government was formed in London, with Sir Edward Carson in the Cabinet as chief law officer of the Crown, recruiting in Ireland dwindled.

Instrumental in bringing this about were those radical agencies in Ireland already opposed to the Nationalists before the war broke. Among the more important were: the Irish Republican Brotherhood; the Dublin Transport Workers; and Sinn Féin. The first of these, the rump of the Fenian movement, still sought the independence of Ireland by war. Its adherents were not numerous, and they derived their chief support from the more sentimental of the Irish Americans. The Transport Workers, on the other

¹ Gwynn, S., *John Redmond's Last Years*, 163.

hand, closely associated with the Syndicalists in France and the Industrial Workers of the World in America, were primarily occupied in fomenting industrial strikes. They were socialists and, theoretically, not interested in Irish nationalism.

The Sinn Fein movement was at once more recent and more significant. It was scarcely a decade old, and owed its political origin to the activities of a Dublin editor, Arthur Griffith. Ireland, according to him, should rely more on her own strength. He heartily indorsed the purposes of the Gaelic League, political as well as literary, but this was not enough. Ireland must stand alone, self-reliant and free. The constitution of 1782 should be revived, a sovereign Irish Parliament created. To a King, ruling over both Ireland and Britain, he had no objection. The Irish Nationalists were endeavoring to obtain these ends, but by a method fundamentally wrong. His suggestion was that the Irish abstain from voting, refuse to elect members to the British Parliament. Let his countrymen summon a national assembly for Ireland; let them supplant the law courts of the English by arbitration tribunals of their own. Peacefully, but none the less completely, the British régime in Ireland should be boycotted.

Even before the outbreak of the war these three groups, Sinn Fein, the Republican Brotherhood, and the Transport Workers, showed a tendency to draw together. They all had one common enemy, the Irish Nationalists. The Sinn Fein element, the more conservative of the three, gradually substituted republicanism for a limited monarchy; the Irish socialists tended to emphasize patriotism somewhat more and internationalism somewhat less; even the Republican Brotherhood gave indications of a willingness to coöperate, talked less of immediate rebellion and more of what would be the hypothetical duty of Irishmen should aid be given them by some enemy of Britain's in a European war.

Representatives of all these three groups were to be found

among the National Volunteers. The latter had been organized to offset the military preparations in Ulster and not for service in the Great War. Redmond had nothing to do with founding their organization; yet he insisted on controlling it, a fact which disgruntled many members. Redmond, they held, was only chairman of the Nationalist Party; he did not represent Ireland. Furthermore, why this foolish pledge of his at the outbreak of the war? He should have simply promised Ireland's neutrality and then have bargained for her support. The quixotic generosity of the Irish leader, they said, would not be met in like spirit by the English.

The volunteer movement, as a whole, followed Redmond. But the members of it who belonged to Sinn Fein, the Brotherhood, or to the Transport Workers did not; instead they organized the *Irish* as distinct from the *National* Volunteers. They were in a minority but they knew what they wanted: "We serve neither King nor Kaiser," said the labor leader, Connolly. The Sinn Feiners were scarcely less emphatic: "The confidence trick has been too often played upon us to deceive us again. If the Irish Volunteers are to defend Ireland they must do it under Ireland's flag and under Irish officers. . . . Germany is nothing to us in herself, but she is not our enemy."¹

The course of events during the first two years of the war favored Sinn Fein, a blanket term now generally applied to all dissentient groups within the ranks of the Irish Volunteers. Home Rule was on the statute books, although postponed for a year until an amending act dealing with Ulster was added; but now for a second time it was again postponed and with every additional delay the less likelihood did there seem of its enactment. The Government, meanwhile, was suppressing Sinn Fein newspapers and rumors were rife of the coming of conscription. And from America there came not money alone but advice. Germany, it was

¹ Henry, R. M., *The Evolution of Sinn Fein*, 184.

said, would help Erin obtain her freedom without asking anything in return aside from the discomfiture of the British. Were the Irish fools not to seize this opportunity?

The chances of a successful revolt seemed to many of the Irish Volunteers well worth the hazard. Particularly was this true among a number of young literary men on the one hand and the Dublin Transport Workers on the other. The former, restive and nervous at the comparative lack of sacrifice which their inactivity seemingly entailed, were anxious to wake Ireland up by offering their lives, if need be, on the altar of their country's freedom. As for the latter, these spiritual ecstasies did not hold. But life was cheap in Dublin, and death fairly near under all circumstances. The Dublin laboring men were also willing to risk their lives, if the chance of winning was a fair one.

One fails to see how it could have been such. It depended, in the first place, on obtaining guns from Germany, a most precarious adventure. When the split came in the ranks of the Nationalist Volunteers in the autumn of 1914, 11,000 followed the call of Professor MacNeill to refrain from aiding Britain and to "keep their arms for Ireland's enemies." These arms, however, were metaphorical. The 11,000 followers of the Sinn Fein professor were by Easter week, 1916, nearly 16,000 in number; but at the most they had only two or three thousand rifles. Furthermore, many Irish felt a disinclination to do anything which would help Britain's enemies. They had no love for Britain; but they had less for her foe. Sir Roger Casement's best offers to the Irish soldiers captured by the German army had netted him but two per cent of their number. When Casement was captured landing from the German submarine in April 1916, and the merchant vessel sunk which conveyed German ammunition to Ireland, the likelihood of possible victory seemed faint.

The insurrection, nevertheless, broke out. The capture of Casement, it was argued, would result in the suppression

of the Volunteers by the authorities, and now if ever they must strike. There were but few troops in Ireland; they could be taken unaware; the countryside would rise; the Germans would create a diversion, either on the high seas or at the front; a bold stroke, and independence might come.

Thus argued Pearse, the Poet-President of the Provincial Government and James Connolly, head of the old Citizens' Army of Dublin, now in liaison with the Irish Volunteers, and the commander of the united rebel forces during Easter week. But the committee which headed the Irish Volunteers was sadly divided on the possibility of success, and whatever chance of it ever existed went glimmering when MacNeill countermanded the orders for a formal parade on Easter day, the agreed-on signal for mobilization.

This mad adventure, so futile yet so significant in view of later happenings, began on Easter Monday, 1916, and lasted throughout the week. The insurgents seized the greater part of Dublin, including the Post Office and a majority of the railway stations. They also proclaimed the Republic. Dublin Castle, however, was not captured nor did the people of the city rise. Instead the British army came.

Outside of Dublin there was but trifling assistance given to the revolt. In Galway, Wexford and County Dublin there was fierce but sporadic fighting. Rebel Cork, on the other hand, did not rise, the Nationalists being in control of the situation there. As for County Clare and the west of Ireland, the failure of Casement to land his rifles made rebellion impossible in that region.

Within the capital the fight was decently but fiercely waged. The British, tightening up their lines and receiving further reinforcements, soon proved even to the rebels that resistance meant only death. The latter surrendered at discretion. Ireland breathed easier and made no resistance to the imprisonment of nearly two thousand men, some of

whom were taken with arms in their hands, others as suspects.

Sinn Fein was almost dead and might have died had not Great Britain revived it. The nerves of the English, already made taut by the protracted war, and the long winter past of choking struggle on the western front, seemed to give way at this evidence of what they considered Irish treachery. They could not see the point of view of Irish rebels who claimed they could not be disloyal to Britain since they had never been loyal to her. The mercy shown by General Botha toward the revolting Boers in South Africa in 1915 was not copied by the British one year later. Nor, on the other hand, did they establish at this time a reign of terror in Ireland. It was an armed rebellion; well, then, let the army deal with it. Thus argued the British cabinet, and General Maxwell, armed with full powers, proceeded to act in straightforward, unimaginative military fashion. This meant death, but not slaughter. It meant likewise a total blindness to the psychological, almost pathological, factors involved in Ireland's case.

Tried by court martial, fifteen prisoners were condemned to death. But with a stupidity unexcelled the execution of these men came at intervals covering a period of nine days, and the announcement of the trial was made simultaneously with the announcement of the execution. None knew how many more were to follow. Possibly the British army intended to work through the entire list of prisoners. Certain of the men executed were unknown to the public; all trials had been held *in camera*; none knew what the charges were; none knew who might be the next victim. One British captain, afterwards declared insane, had three prisoners executed without any trial at all. Connolly, the rebel commander, had been badly wounded and could not immediately be executed. To give him hospital treatment for several days in order that his career might be officially ended seemed incongruous.

Throughout these days a wave of disgust and fear and rage swept through Ireland. Prisoners who had been hissed in the streets by their fellow Irish at the beginning of May were heroes by the end of the month. Pearse, the poet, had built better than he knew. By throwing his life away he had made Sinn Fein.

The British government, as usual, was its own worst enemy. For military reasons it had announced everywhere that the rebellion was not serious, only a glorified street riot. The Irish Volunteers were but a minority anyway and the rebels were but a minority of a minority. If the English "had laughed at it, tried the promoters before a magistrate and ridiculed the whole thing, with no general arrests and no vindictive sentences they could have done what they liked in Ireland."¹ This, however, they had not the wit to do.

From the rebellion to the war's end the anti-British drift of Irish thought and action steadily increased. As the influence of Sinn Fein spread, that of the old Parliamentary party faded; De Valera and Griffith, new stars on the political horizon, shone more brightly than Redmond and O'Brien. Uncertainty as ever paralyzed the councils of the Empire. What to do with Ireland, nobody knew, the Cabinet least of all. From harshness it swung to leniency and back again. But as far as Ireland was concerned it made no difference now which way the pendulum swung.

The Irish had decided that this new thing, Sinn Fein, was what they wanted. The English had said that Sinn Fein had stirred up the rebellion; the Irish liked it on that account. The men imprisoned through the agency of their old enemy, Dublin Castle, were said to be Sinn Feiners, surely this was another item in favor of the latter.

Many of the interned men knew hardly anything about Sinn Fein; but they now had time to learn and good

¹ O'Hegarty, P. S., *The Victory of Sinn Fein*, 3.

teachers. Griffith, the founder, was in their midst; De Valera, also, whose military exploits during Easter week had been somewhat brighter than those of the majority; and among those present was MacNeill, whose fortunate order countermanding the Easter parades had saved his own life and probably many another one. But all the Sinn Feiners were not interned, and those who escaped found ready audiences in Ireland. English rebels, they said, would have had a public trial; German prisoners would have been imprisoned; only the Irish were shot down like dogs. "Up the rebels," Ireland's old war cry, must be sounded anew.

Had Redmond and the Parliamentary Party not been so largely shorn of influence this demand for complete independence and a republic would not have echoed so loudly. But Redmond's efforts to stem the tide were fruitless. His old allies, the Liberals, seemed for a while to favor putting the Home Rule Bill into effect: but even their cautious proposals were whittled down after consultation with the Unionists, and Redmond felt that duplicity as well as weakness characterized his former friends. Meanwhile, his colleagues within his own party now showed much restlessness, not so much against their leader as against the House of Commons. And among these, Dillon, as far as scorn hurled at British duplicity was concerned, scarce could be distinguished from Sinn Fein. Finally, and most important, the Irish in their bye-elections began to hang out "no confidence" signs, one after another.

Christmas, 1916, Mr. Lloyd George celebrated his access to power over his late chieftain, Mr. Asquith, by liberating the Sinn Feiners in the internment camps. Instead of being grateful for their release they clamored the more loudly for the eviction of the British from Ireland; and at the head of this liberated band was their founder, Mr. Arthur Griffith, whose paper, *Nationality*, came to life once more in February, 1917. A Parliamentary election this same month returned a Sinn Feiner. The Government

countered this new blow by deporting once again a number of the newly released prisoners. In May came another election and another Sinn Fein victory. Redmond's political machine had failed; the party of Parnell no longer retained the confidence of the Irish voter.

At this juncture Major Redmond urged his brother, the chairman, and all other Irish Nationalists to resign. They had lost touch with their own countrymen, let the younger leaders see what they could do. But the European war was on; and Redmond felt in duty bound to try one more proposal of the Government. This was a convention, in Ireland, of representative Irishmen to determine once and for all the relations between Britain and their own country. But Sinn Fein, although invited to the Convention, refused to attend. Lloyd George did not trust the Irish people, it proclaimed; the delegates, it was pointed out, were not to be chosen by any general election, and the findings of the Convention must not exclude Ireland from the Empire. On the other hand Ulstermen, Nationalists, Labor delegates, southern Unionists and representatives of the Catholic hierarchy did attend and worked hard for a common settlement. At one time it seemed almost possible. The men of Ulster were less intractable than in the past. The southern Unionists almost got their consent to a scheme which would have given added minority representation to the north while at the same time, to some extent, guaranteeing imperial control over taxation. But the men of Ulster finally balked at the financial clauses and refused to sign the report which was accepted by the other delegates, including the southern Unionists.

The Convention came too late; it lacked popular support. The death of John Redmond's brother at the front on the eve of its opening showed the strength of its contemptuous enemy, Sinn Fein. The soldier of the Dublin barricades, De Valera, was elected to the seat in Parliament held hitherto by the soldier of the Empire. Possibly Sinn Fein did

represent the will of the people. John Redmond, himself, was mobbed at this time by his own Irish; and at the funeral of one of the rebels of 1916 the Sinn Feiners marched in military array.

During 1918 came the failure of the Convention, the death of Redmond and the fatuous resolve of England to force conscription on the Irish. Redmond's worst fears were realized. To make conscription a reality was impossible; the Government knew this well. But the measure might prove a sop to public opinion in England and a spur, possibly, to enlistments in Ireland.

The conscription act once passed, the British agreed not to enforce it provided that voluntary enlistments increased sufficiently. To secure them, Ireland was circularized with President Wilson's speeches. These, the Irish people read; but they did not enlist. As for the Nationalists, they left Westminster in a body for their native land, considering that the conscription act was a breach of faith with Ireland. There were available, all told, but slightly over 150,000 men of military age, and to have dragooned them into the British army would have proved difficult. Canada and Australia, it was pointed out, were permitted to choose for themselves whether conscription should be adopted or not; but Ireland had no such option. She could, however, vote. And in the Parliamentary election following the armistice the Sinn Fein candidates, pledged to an independent Ireland and to an appeal to the peace conference to procure it, won seventy-three out of a hundred and five seats; the Unionists carrying twenty-six and the Nationalists six.

Vastly encouraged at this result Sinn Fein convoked at Dublin the *Dail Eireann*, Ireland's ancient assembly, passed there a Declaration of Independence and appointed delegates for the peace conference at Paris. And fortune, to some extent, seemed to follow them. At the request of President Wilson passports had been issued to an American committee representing various Irish societies which sought to investi-

gate conditions in Ireland. In the American Congress there was evidently a majority, composed in part of Irish sympathizers and in part of the President's enemies, which might support Sinn Fein. Even the President, himself, received the Irish delegates in Paris. "You have touched on the great metaphysical tragedy of today," he is reported to have admonished them, . . . "My words have raised hopes in the hearts of millions." Nevertheless, with Koreans, Egyptians and Persians hovering near, the President could not well approve their purpose. The American peace delegates refused to meet the Irish and, although the American Senate passed a reservation to the peace treaty in their favor, Sinn Fein realized that it was an empty gesture, and that independence could not be won by dependence on outside help.

The Irish Republicans, therefore, adopted new tactics: they boycotted the Royal Irish Constabulary, and they inaugurated Sinn Fein courts of law. Since the members of the constabulary were Irishmen, the refusal of the community round about them to engage in any form of intercourse was an effective weapon. Farmers refused to sell to the constabulary; women would not sit by the members of it in church; no good Irishman, so said Sinn Fein, should even speak to these upholders of an alien rule. Meanwhile, British judges traveled about on empty circuits and held vacant courts. From fear or preference, or both, the people made use only of the irregular and illegal tribunals set up by Sinn Fein. Within a year these were the only courts functioning over a large part of Ireland.

Came then 1920, a year so black in Irish annals that to find its counterpart one must look to the seventeenth century. And now between Irish and British an actual war arose, none the less war although there were no battles, but only raid and counter-raid, murder and counter-murder. For a year and a half blood was to flow freely in Ireland. The sworn servants of the Crown vied with the members of the Irish Republican army in a saturnalia of crime and

cruelty. The British, to assist the fast thinning ranks of the constabulary, introduced into Ireland an auxiliary police force, clad in the old army khaki, but with black glengarry hats. The "Black and Tans," as these soldiers of the King were called, were hated venomously by the people who accused them of wanton murder. To wear their uniform anywhere in Ireland soon became foolhardy; to wear it after dark or without friends at hand was to invite death. To belong to Sinn Fein, on the other hand, or to be related by marriage to Sinn Fein politician or soldier was all too often held sufficient warranty for prompt execution. Throughout all Ireland the country districts were dangerous localities for anyone in which to live, and even in large cities the sound of the curfew bell gave warning to beware of assassins (on either side) before sun-up.

The details of this unhappy strife, the names and rank of the victims, need not concern us here. Between the responsibility of Sinn Fein on the one hand and Dublin Castle on the other the historian can draw no fine distinction. In the words of Mr. Griffith, Sinn Fein's founder: "The military mind is the same in every country. Our military men are as bad as the British."¹ They were. The Sinn Fein army, commanded by Michael Collins, a youthful agitator, was ill-disciplined, widely-scattered, and composed largely of young boys. By it many acts of vicious cruelty were perpetrated, such as dragging unarmed British officers from their beds and slaying them in cold blood. The "Black and Tans," on the other hand, well paid, seasoned veterans in many instances of the Great War and hardened to suffering and misery, did not hesitate to burn and destroy the homes of those held suspect, and to shoot in the back prisoners whom they told to run for safety.

With the advent to office of Sir Hamar Greenwood in the spring of 1920 the evil days in Ireland reached their climax. To his enemies the new Secretary of State for Ireland soon

¹ O'Hegarty, P. S., *The Victory of Sinn Fein*, 47.

took rank with the Duke of Alva. And however odious that comparison may be, it is evident that British public opinion in the twentieth century, perhaps more sensitive to human cruelty than in earlier centuries, grew uneasy over the result of his labors. Sir Hamar, relying on the huge coalition majority in the House of Commons, began by emphatically denying that the "Black and Tans" under his control engaged in retaliation, looting, burning and at times killing. The evidence to the contrary, however, was too extensive. Whereupon Sir Hamar practically admitted retaliation by refusing to discuss it, and instead denounced the ferocious treatment meted out to British soldiers by Irish ruffians. And of this, there was sufficient evidence.

These facts, however, did not condone the use of hostages, the penalizing of whole towns and villages, the murder of many unarmed Irishmen by the forces of the Crown. That acts of this description took place there was likewise abundant proof, as Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy and other fearless Englishmen demonstrated to a hostile House of Commons. And when Lord Robert Cecil, with the prestige which his name and character gave him, took the same stand Sir Hamar Greenwood was again forced to change ground. He now admitted the reprisals, claimed that the burning of houses and factories in Balbriggan and other towns was necessary, and held firmly to the doctrine of retaliation. If the "Black and Tans" were ambushed let them destroy somebody or something to make the balance even. And since victims were hard to find, and country cottages of small value, creameries and factories might be destroyed. The "Black and Tans," operating in accordance with this principle, carried fire and sword before them; and as they did so the Republican guerrillas cut off their supplies, sniped their outposts, ambushed their motor lorries.

In Parliament Sir Hamar stood staunchly by his men. The retaliation which they practiced would end the murder gang. But a year of stern experience seemed to indicate

that a larger army than that of the 60,000 men already in Ireland would be necessary. Either the countryside would have to be laid waste or else the British must retreat to the larger towns on the seaboard. No other alternative there seemed to be, except surrender. And, until the King's speech in Belfast in the summer of 1921, if we may trust to the firm words of the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, the Cabinet was sternly resolved to make an end to Sinn Fein, the "murder gang," as they generally termed it.

The presence of the King in Belfast was owing to the fourth and last of the now celebrated Home Rule bills. By imperial law, now duly passed and sanctioned in 1920, Home Rule had been granted to Ireland. The measure which bestowed it represented what was said to be the final concessions which Britain would make. By the law two Irelands were created, a Northern Ireland, comprising six out of nine Ulster counties, a Southern Ireland which included the rest of the island. In the two Irelands were to be two distinct Parliaments; but provision was made for a council with representatives from both Parliaments, thus insuring a formal kind of unity.

In accordance with this law elections were held in both the Southern and the Northern Ireland. In the former practically none but Sinn Feiners voted, and the men elected, as was expected, refused to take their seats. In the latter the Sinn Feiners and the Nationalists, fighting against each other, captured but one-fifth of the seats, and the triumphant Unionists controlled the Parliament of Northern Ireland, which was now opened formally by his Majesty.

Now the King's speech, as everyone knew, reflected the King's government, and when therefore George V. stressed *forgiveness*, *forbearance* and *conciliation* it was evident that Lloyd George was preparing one of the dramatic revisions of policy which seemed to characterize his later years. Two days later his purpose was revealed. The Prime Minister

asked for a conference with De Valera; and Britain by this act held out an olive branch to Sinn Fein.

The reasons for this change in front were various. Mr. Lloyd George gave a somewhat jaunty explanation to the effect that the times had to be ripe before a just settlement could be made: in 1917 they were not ripe and it was necessary to wait until they were. This his Government had done. Churchill and Austen Chamberlain were more frank. The British army was tied up in Ireland at a time when the political and military horizon in Egypt and India was clouded over. The Washington Conference was approaching, and as a result of the anarchy in Ireland friendly relations with the United States were strained. To conquer Ireland, which could be done, a larger army and additional sacrifices would be called for. Rather than prepare for further enlargement of the sphere of martial law in that country it seemed the better part of wisdom to seek by conference some understanding with the Irish.

In regard to Lloyd George's proposals, De Valera and his friends were exceedingly wary. A military truce was, however, arranged; Sinn Fein prisoners of influence were released from jail; and with General Smuts acting as an intermediary between Sinn Fein and Downing Street, preparations for a conference went forward.

The British meanwhile published their terms. They seemed generous. Ireland was offered Dominion status with entire control of her own finances, taxation, police, law courts, etc. In return she was asked to concede the control of the seas around the island to the British navy; the right of the British army to recruit soldiers in Ireland; the establishment of stations in Ireland for the use of the Royal Air Service; the assumption of a proportion of the debt of the United Kingdom; a limitation of Irish armaments; free trade within the United Kingdom, and the right of the Northern Parliament to contract out of the proposed agreement.

But Sinn Fein sought independence, and De Valera was unwilling to enter upon any negotiations which did not leave the Irish free to demand it. The Dail Eireann, meanwhile, having rejected the British terms, Downing Street proposed that a conference be held to discuss one single proposition: "how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire" might best be secured. But, said the British note of invitation, the independence of Ireland cannot be considered. De Valera would not enter any conference until this provision was excised. He had his way; and for three weeks the representatives of Sinn Fein and of Britain, unhampered by any prior agreement, sat around the council table.

They came to an understanding; the British again giving way in certain important particulars. Great Britain was to recognize the existence of an Irish Free State with constitutional status similar to that of Canada. With this Free State a treaty was proposed in which the Irish were to swear allegiance to the Free State and "to be faithful to the King by virtue of their common citizenship" in the British Commonwealth. A number of guarantees hitherto demanded by the British were included, a number quietly omitted. For instance, the Irish agreed to limit their army in so far that the number of soldiers to civilians would never exceed in proportion to population the number in the army of Britain. Provision was also made for the defense of Ireland by the imperial navy and for sharing in the national debt. But of free trade between Ireland and Britain there was no mention nor was provision made for the use of Irish land by the imperial air service. Ulster was to be a part of the new Ireland; but opportunity was given to the Northern Parliament to withdraw should it elect to do so. If this was done a commission would determine the boundaries between the Free State and Northern Ireland.

Opposition to the proposed treaty rose immediately in both Great Britain and Ireland. In the former country it

was urged that the form of oath prescribed was absurd. The Irish swore allegiance to the Free State alone; to the King they only promised to be faithful. The use of the word *faithful*, modified as it was by the succeeding clause, seemed to imply, so said the critics, that the Irish might reserve the right at a future date to secede from the Commonwealth. Lloyd George had also spoken manfully about six conditions that Britain would insist upon. What had become of them now; what mention was there in the treaty of British recruiting in Ireland or of the air service? Then too, there was the case of Ulster. In 1920 Northern Ireland had been promised that its six counties might remain in the United Kingdom. Why then this talk of a boundary commission? Were the six counties to be whittled away to placate the "murder gang"? The British government were, indeed, weak and vacillating to make this sudden and un-called-for change in policy, lacking not only in consistency but in self-respect. As one publicist put it: "You cannot reiterate one day that men are criminals and on the morrow treat and smoke cigars with them and retain your dignity."¹

Thus spoke the British opposition, but it could command few votes. The British public was sick of the Irish question, altogether. And with Lloyd George, Asquith and Bonar Law for once in agreement ratification was assured.

Not so, however, in Ireland. The Dail Eireann was composed of young and inexperienced men elected as Republicans. They had sworn to defend the Republic, and now their representatives brought back a treaty which created something less than that; it seemed a point of honor to many of them to insist on the Republic's recognition. In this they were confirmed by De Valera, their President, who urged that the treaty should be rejected. He maintained that his own delegates had deceived him; they had exceeded

¹ Falls, C., *Ireland, Some Truths*, Nineteenth Century, 91:222-8 (Feb., 1922).

their instructions; they had been tricked by the British; their signatures had been obtained by British threats. He was willing that Ireland should be associated with Great Britain; but even the modified oath was abhorrent to him. The utmost he would agree to was that "Ireland should recognize his Britannic Majesty as head of the Association." And even this proposal he finally withdrew as inconsistent with republican principles.

A long and bitter wrangle now ensued in the Dail. The pro-treaty faction urged a plebiscite; but De Valera would have none of it, and when a vote was finally taken in the Dail the treaty won by a bare majority of seven votes out of a total of a hundred and twenty-one.

De Valera then resigned, determined to fight, but not by the ballot. To his side rallied a large proportion of the army; and Griffith and Collins, treaty advocates and leaders of the new provisional government, found rebellion and anarchy staring them in the face. Rather than plunge Ireland into civil war they temporized with De Valera and postponed an election.

But this did not save Ireland. Armed squadrons of irregular troops, utterly beyond control, stole motor cars, looted banks, burned houses. The British army was forced to remain in Ireland in order that open war should not break out on the Ulster border. In Dublin the Republican rebels seized and fortified a section of the city, refusing obedience to anyone, while in the country districts pro-treaty Irishmen and those of contrary mind were at each other's throats. In London clubs men said they always knew this would be so.

The provisional government, meanwhile, continued at work drawing up a constitution. The result of their labors was a document which followed along usual constitutional lines and which contained but one unique feature: cabinet responsibility for certain executive heads of the Irish ministry combined with a definite term of office for others. The

people, however, were indifferent about the form of the new government; what concerned them was the establishment of law and order of some description. Owing to the troubles of the times even this seemed impossible. One way of doing it might be to compound the differences with De Valera, and this was done. For the ensuing elections an official Sinn Fein panel was declared, the two divergent groups within the party, the Nationalists (favorable to the treaty) and the Republicans (opposed to its acceptance) dividing between them the seats in the new Dail in proportion to their strength at the time of the treaty vote. This pact, of course, was but a makeshift which continued for the time being the status quo. But since it involved also the sharing of the executive with the Republicans the outlook for future peace became darker than ever.

The electorate, however, disregarded the official panel, voted for the pro-treaty Sinn Feiners, and opposed other pro-treaty Irishmen to the Republicans, thus electing a new Dail with a heavy majority in favor of enforcing the treaty, 480,000 votes being cast for pro-treaty candidates, 150,000 for those hostile to it.

This decision De Valera ignored. He would have nothing but the Republic, and open war broke out, furious and bloody. The Irish Nationalist army, or that section of it which followed Collins, now tried to dislodge the Republican irregulars who had fortified themselves in a district of Dublin. After ten days of battle and the destruction of several million pounds of property the rebels were dispersed, De Valera escaping.

That leader betook himself elsewhere to raise the rebel standard, and there followed for several months a most squalid jacquerie. The Republican front stretched in straggling fashion across southwestern Ireland. "Mike" Collins with his Irish National army strove to break it. Aided and abetted by the majority of his countrymen, and the Catholic hierarchy, he succeeded in doing so. To the admonitions

of the bishops, De Valera issued a counterblast; but his power gradually slipped from him and he became a fugitive. Before this occurred, however, a number of bloodthirsty executions disgraced both sides. Collins was killed in ambush, and Griffith, ablest of all the Sinn Feiners, worn out by years of worry and overwork, did not long survive him.

The Free State, although victorious by 1924 over its republican foe, was now at the point of economic and social ruin. The constitution stipulated that Gaelic was the official language; but where could judges and magistrates be found who knew both this language and the law? The Old Age Pension Act of the paternalistic British government had proved a godsend to Ireland; but where was money to be had now for such a luxury? For many years Sinn Fein, as a public duty, had discouraged the payment of the income tax; and many had formed a habit in this respect which was difficult to lay aside. With taxes higher than in England the Free State was immeasurably poorer. Also, while business had been paralyzed by several years of civil strife the country was confronted with a debt of £20,000,000 alone for the suppression of De Valera. In addition, there loomed in the offing a settlement with England for Ireland's share in the debt of the United Kingdom; and this might well be ten times £20,000,000.

President Cosgrave and his Cabinet strove hard to solve these problems. The army was cut to the merest skeleton; old age pensions were reduced; arrears of back taxes were ruthlessly collected and a protective tariff placed upon the statute books. As a result, within one year the credit of the Free State had sufficiently revived to float a loan at non-usurious rates. From Germany and Belgium aid was sought. From the latter country came experts in agriculture, from the former engineers and an army of workmen.

The River Shannon was to be dammed, hydro-electric power obtained, industries restored.

And as Ireland emerged from economic chaos in these latter years a final settlement was made with Ulster. The Parliament of Northern Ireland had lost no time in exercising its option to withdraw from the Free State. Aside from this act, however, it ignored altogether the treaty and refused to appoint any representative to serve on the boundary commission. From the Ulster point of view there was no boundary question.

But two of Ulster's six counties had a Catholic majority and a rectification of boundaries had been promised. The Free State called for the execution of the bond. The British government, therefore, by special statute established a commission on which Ulster, through her contumacy, had no representative. The report of this commission, although drawn up, was never made public. An unofficial report of its findings intimated that Ulster would lose but little territory: as a matter of fact she lost none, and emerged completely victorious, her six counties intact.

The British genius for compromise had again come to the fore. If the Free State would agree to pay certain slight additional compensation to British citizens whose property had been damaged by the recent disturbances in Ireland; and if it also would consider the Ulster boundary questions permanently settled on the existing basis of the six counties; then Britain would offer the Free State that which far transcended in money value a few square miles of Ulster, namely, the cancellation outright of the entire share of the Free State in the British national debt. The Irish Free State promptly accepted.

There were those who sneered at this compromise, who claimed that Britain only surrendered that which she could not hope to collect. None the less as a practical solution for an age long source of Irish friction the British offer had much to recommend it. The yoke might rest the heavier

on the British taxpayer; but Ulster and southern Ireland no longer would be at each other's throats.

There remained other problems, among them the status of the Free State in the Empire. But in the meanwhile, the last of the British troops embarked and Irish nationality had been achieved.

CHAPTER X

INDIA, 1899-1917

India as the subject of historical inquiry presents many problems. So many are the racial antagonisms, religious prejudices, caste distinctions, historic enmities, linguistic barriers which divide and separate the 300,000,000 human beings who inhabit this sub-continent that one is bewildered by their mere enumeration. How may one even hope to describe them with clarity and justice?

Yet India is, in many ways, the heart of the Empire. A Commonwealth of British nations there might be, without India. A British Empire would still exist were the last Englishman to return home from India: but it would be a dismembered one, shorn of its greatest glory. Here, for many decades, imperial Britain has held full sway; here is the story, in full detail, of the imperialism of our own day. By the British record in India it may in part be judged. If the record is a fair one, then to a not inconsiderable degree is imperialism justified; if the record is tarnished, then is imperialism condemned.

As the twentieth century dawned two major indictments were brought against the British raj in India; the one, economic in character and largely without foundation; the other, more political in nature, and in certain respects fully justified.

The more important economic accusation was that British policy had brought famine to India, causing the death of many millions. Specifically it ran as follows: famines increased rapidly in India while diminishing in Europe. This was due neither to overpopulation nor to an excessive birth rate nor to lack of water. The Government of India

alone was responsible. It overtaxed the people, drained the resources of the country to England, wasted money in costly services which India could ill afford, built railways that were not needed, maintained an expensive army. Meanwhile, the people perished.

To what extent is this true? Historical comparisons are dangerous. For instance, we have the record of twenty famines in the British Isles in the eleventh century and sixteen in the fourteenth as opposed to two and three respectively for India in the corresponding periods. Statistics show that famines disappeared in Great Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but in India increased with great rapidity. Hence, certain Hindu writers argue, since India largely escaped these horrible visitations before the coming of the British, the latter must be responsible for them.

The fallacy here is obvious. We know British history in much greater detail in the eleventh century than we know that of India. Famines in India may have been much more numerous a few centuries ago than our records state, for they are scanty. Furthermore, because an increasing number of famines are listed in India in the nineteenth century it does not follow that death from starvation is on the increase. For what is a famine? There is a dictionary meaning for this word; there is also a local use of it, technical in nature and peculiar to India. By the *Oxford Dictionary* famine is defined as "an extreme and general scarcity of food." But whenever a crop failure is noted in India it is termed, in customary parlance, a famine. During certain of these crop failures, technical famines, cases are on record in which no deaths at all took place from starvation.

Moreover, our knowledge of famine conditions during the first half of the nineteenth century is largely guesswork. There was then no census, no bureau of vital statistics, no famine commission, no assumption of eco-

conomic authority by the Government. With the extension of British control and the increased use of statistical data during the latter nineteenth century more famines have been reported than during the earlier years. But this does not demonstrate, of itself, poorer economic conditions in British India.

The number, even approximately, of those dying of starvation in the last quarter of the nineteenth century is unknown. The most extreme figures place it at 26,000,000; but this estimate is based on what the population of India would have been had earlier rates of increase been continued, a most dubious hypothesis. Nevertheless, if we accept it, to what may be ascribed this loss of from one-half to one-third of one per cent annually of the entire population?

The principal causes, it would seem fair to assume, are rainfall and density of population. India's rainfall is heavy; but it is uncertain and in widespread areas very slight. An excess of rain in Bombay is of no avail in Sindh. In the famine of 1889 in the latter locality the rainfall was reported as under one-hundredth of an inch, and in the northern part of the Punjab it was under two and a half inches. As for India's population, it is true that the peninsula has fewer people to the square mile than England or even Belgium. But deductions drawn from this fact to prove that India is not overpopulated are false. A large part of India is entirely untillable, and so congested is that part which is subjected to cultivation that there is little more than one acre per person available, thus proving, in view of the uncertainty of rain, that the margin of existence must be slight.

The British, confronted with this situation, spent large sums of money in irrigation. Due largely to their initiative, there were, in the early twentieth century, over 40,000 miles of canals and under irrigation some 23,000,000 acres. A British engineer could even estimate in 1913 that the land

artificially supplied with water was five times the acreage available for agriculture in Egypt.

Nor did the activity of the Government of India cease with money expended for irrigation. To provide for unforeseen famine contingencies a fund of £1,000,000 was set aside each year. Constant watch was kept over every rural district. The coming of the rain in spring and autumn, its density and duration, was noted and reported. Local police scrutinized closely the movement of the population, always accelerated by approaching scarcity. Inspectors kept track of the cattle, their number, food and condition, and the crops as well.

By these means famine was anticipated and the Government prepared for its coming. If it did occur the steps taken were these: the land tax was remitted, the importation of rice encouraged by bounties and the exportation of foodstuffs forbidden. Provisions were then shipped in by the state railways and relief camps established. A famine commission was appointed, under the direction of which the war against poverty and disease was carried on with vigor. Public highways were mended, new ones built, railways constructed, irrigation ditches dug, and work offered to all.

The death rate did, of course, advance. Many Indians wandered away to die in other provinces. Others sold, gambled or stole the blankets, stores and supplies meted out by the Government. The officials were not always efficient, and those of native birth, from the point of view of the British, were sometimes indifferent to the sufferings of the poor peasants of a caste inferior to their own. Yet despite these drawbacks it would seem as though famines, by the early twentieth century, were well under control. For illustration one might take the famine in the United Provinces in 1907, where the death rate rose only from 32 per thousand to 36, or the one in Darbhanga, the year following, where the usual high mortality from malaria was

so reduced by the drought which caused the famine that the death rate actually dropped in a famine year.¹

The death rate in India was very high, but not primarily as a result of famine. Infant mortality was one major reason, running as high as 22 per cent of the births in an average year. "This may be ascribed," we are informed, "to the immaturity and ignorance of mothers and the physical labor which the majority are called upon to perform, to lack of competent midwives and to the exposure of infants to all the influences of an unsanitary environment."²

Equally destructive of human life was malaria, the worst disease from which the people of India suffer. To combat it an imperial malaria conference was summoned at Simla in 1900, and a central malaria bureau created with museum, laboratory, reference library and training school. From this school graduates were sent all over India with the double message: kill mosquitos and take quinine. The Government of India had already undertaken the growing of cinchona so that the price of quinine might be lowered. In addition, it distributed large quantities free, 7,000 pounds in 1908 to the inhabitants of the United Provinces alone. All over India it disposed of it for the smallest coin minted and advertised its use extensively.

And what was done for malaria was duplicated for the bubonic plague. The Black Death had apparently disappeared in the nineteenth century, even from India. "Doctors forgot how to treat the plague, governments ceased to guard against it. But it had never left the earth. From somewhere in Asia, probably by boat from Hong Kong, it made its reëntry into India" toward the end of the nine-

¹The above three paragraphs written by the author and reprinted with permission from the *Outlook*, 104:25-30 (May 3rd, 1913).

²*Sessional Papers*, 1913, XLVI (Statement on Indian conditions for 1911-1912 and preceding nine years).

See also, Mayo, K., *Mother India*, *passim*, for hospital records in regard to child-birth. Hindu authorities assert that this book gives an exaggerated picture.

teenth century, and by "1904 it was taking toll of Indian lives at an annual rate of over a million."¹

The British, confronted by this sore thing, acted wisely. The Viceroy appointed a commission; he visited the stricken districts; he submitted with his entire staff to the new bubonic vaccine; and he financed an investigation carried on by the Royal Society and the Lister Institute. The origin of the plague was now traced back, after centuries of ignorance, to the fleas of rats. In consequence, the destruction of rodents now began, a difficult task at best, but peculiarly so in India, where all forms of life are sacred. Nevertheless, the Government persisted in this unpopular pursuit, even to the extent of compelling the evacuation of contaminated areas and destroying dwelling houses.

But, it was urged, the sum total spent on famine prevention, irrigation, forestry and plague prevention was small in comparison with the enormous sums drained yearly to England; and in consequence, the British in the last analysis are responsible for India's economic misery.

Here again a distinction should be drawn, which many Indian Nationalist writers refused to make, between interest paid on capital drawn from England and money sent to England by Indian officials of British birth, or forwarded by the Government of India to its retired officials. Without foreign capital the modern development of India would have been impossible, and it is not to be assumed that it could have been obtained at cheaper rates from any other country. As for salaries and the pension list, the amount forwarded was large since capable officials must be paid well. The cost of the Indian army was also a burden and the argument is a fair one that the size of the army was determined not by India's needs but by the Empire's. Nevertheless, if we remember India's colossal extent, the amount spent on the army does not appear particularly extortionate; nor the

¹ Fraser, L., *India under Lord Curzon and After*, 265.

way of raising it, or the other funds needed by the Government, vicious.

For instance, if we take a typical budget, as that for the year 1909-1910, we find raised by taxation something over £50,000,000, or a per capita assessment of about 3s. 4d., the lowest of any civilized country on earth. This revenue was derived from taxes on imports, salt, legal transfers, incomes and a general land tax. The last of these was particularly singled out for opprobrium, its amount and incidence exaggerated and misunderstood. Less than one-half of India's revenue was derived from this tax, and under its operation, therefore, less than 2s. per capita taken from the people in the course of a year. Never did it take, as frequently alleged, half of the products of the soil. In certain sections of India, where the Government was the legal owner, the tax was as high as 50 per cent of the rent—a different story. But even this was a decided exception and occurred only in a special kind of land tenure, the *zamindar*. On the average the tax ran from 10 to 16 per cent of the rent. In a number of cases it was a heavy burden on the cultivator; but lest anyone consider it peculiarly oppressive let him compare the taxation of British India with that of the autonomous native states. Mysore, for example, during the same year, with a population of 5,000,000, raised per capita in the neighborhood of 6s.; Hyderabad, with 11,000,000 inhabitants, 5s. 5d. per capita; while Baroda, to pay for the extravagance of her overlord, drew from its population of nearly 2,000,000, 10s. per capita, 300 per cent more than the rate in British India. If taxation was responsible for Indian misery one is tempted to inquire how the peasantry even existed in the native states.¹

The second charge in the general indictment brought against Britain was directed against the system of government established in India. This, Indian Nationalists as-

¹The above paragraph reprinted from the *Outlook*, 104:25-30 (May 3rd, 1913).

serted, was autocratic to a degree, wasteful, expensive and conducted primarily for the interests of Britain, rather than for the welfare of the country. In many important respects this charge was justified. The British still kept the Government of India almost exclusively in their own hands. Despite promises made many decades before, Indians were practically excluded from the Government of their own country.

The real control of India did not center in London. A member of the British cabinet held, it was true, the portfolio of Indian affairs and a council, exclusively British, assisted him. Theoretically, India was a direct imperial charge. To this great dependency, however, the British Parliament paid slight attention. At Westminster ministries might rise and fall; wars might come and treaties follow; but India remained a place apart. A peculiar sanctity was attached, seemingly, to the India Office in London. It was not so much above criticism as beyond it; and Indian affairs were seldom debated in the House of Commons. That august body never received, as a general rule, the yearly report of the Indian government until the close of the annual session, too late to discuss it at any length, even had the desire to do so existed.


At times, of course, it had been different. A Burke might arraign a Warren Hastings; Lord Roberts might perform prodigies of valor at the head of Indian troops; the siege of Lucknow might thrill a nation. But aside from these and other dramatic incidents in the distant peninsula Britain was content to leave well enough alone; to take for granted the achievements of her sons in governing India, to rely on their judgment and to pay scant respect to signs and omens of disaster, unrest and possible revolt.

Nor could one say with fairness that the real government of India centered in the Viceregal office. The Governor-General (Viceroy) appointed for five years, and his Executive Council, exclusively British, comprised in a tech-

nical sense the Government of India. It was practically omnipotent, subject to no authority except that of the Imperial Parliament, since the Legislative Council, to which a few Indians were appointed, was only an extension of the Executive Council and not an independent body. As a matter of fact, however, the Government of India did not pretend to administer India. Policies it could and did determine; but India was too vast a region for it to administer intimately. The success or failure of the British occupation is not primarily to be determined by what the Government of India decreed.

It rests rather on the character of the Indian Civil Service and that of the district officers, also exclusively British. Of the latter there were several hundred, for the most part civilians; and to their charge and keeping was delivered the administration of justice, the collection of taxes, the enforcement of the laws. Their powers, in theory limited by the control exercised over them by the provincial governors and by the Government of India, in practice tended toward the absolute. The district officers alone came in direct contact with the native population, the practical governance lay in their hands. Their esprit de corps was excellent, their labor hard, their salaries high, their accomplishments noteworthy. Slovenliness and inefficiency did not characterize their work; neither to sloth nor peculation did they devote their time. Justice, peace and order had been triumphantly upheld by them for several decades. None the less the system of government which they exemplified was grievously in error in one particular—it was too thoroughly a British system.

The Indian Civil Service was recruited exclusively in Britain. Indians might receive appointment to it; but the examinations were held in London and could only be taken by men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four. Furthermore, the examinations were of such a character as virtually to limit success in them to the classically



trained graduates of the British public schools and universities. If an occasional Indian passed these examinations and received an appointment he almost never rose to the higher ranks of the administrative hierarchy. Even the lesser services, such as education, forestry, engineering, were generally monopolized by the British. "According to a calculation made in 1904, out of 1370 appointments with a salary of £800 and upwards 1263 were held by Europeans, 15 by Eurasians and 92 by natives of India."¹ In the subordinate positions alone did the Indians really share in the Government of their own country.

That this situation was unjust can scarcely be denied. No matter how efficiently the Government might function, it was a Government by the outsider; leading, inevitably, to class distinctions on racial lines; breeding, inevitably, pride and arrogance on the one hand, jealousy and dislike on the other. The British at one time had thought to reform it; but they had for the most part neglected to do so. Before 1900 there had been little open pressure from Indian public opinion; why act in advance of it?

Aside from being autocratic and alien this Government by foreigners was expensive. The Civil Service was well paid, the period of active work confined to twenty-five years with generous pensions at the termination of it. To obtain good men the remuneration must be generous, said India's rulers—a wise policy, but one not highly appreciated by Indians of the upper classes debarred from the enjoyment of what, to Indian eyes, were princely incomes. Furthermore, this foreign Government maintained an expensive army, paid for by revenues derived from India. An army of 225,000 seemed altogether too large a force for a poor country like India, and of this number one-third were British troops drawing Indian pay. This also was objected to. But first and foremost in the opinion of the Indian nationalists came the alien character of the Government, so arbi-

¹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, XIV, 386.

trarily forced down upon them from without. It was not a question of democracy; the Indian nationalists did not seek that. Their motto rather was—India for the Indians.

Before the coming of Lord Curzon, however, the complaints of these critics of the British raj were not particularly vociferous; and it is the record of his viceroyship to which we should turn if we would understand the rapid momentum given to Indian unrest in the twentieth century.

In 1899 George Nathaniel Curzon was appointed by Lord Salisbury as Viceroy of India. From many points of view the appointment was an excellent one. The Indian post had been the constant dream of Curzon's youth and throughout his early manhood he had placed himself in training for it. He not only knew India well but also Asia. Time after time he had gone there, not as a sightseer but as a student. He had held long conferences with Chinese officials in Peking; he had been closeted with the Amir of Afghanistan; he had penetrated through Russian Turkestan; and the geographic frontier of the Indian North-West Province was as familiar to him as the boundary of his own English county. Furthermore, in the House of Commons, Curzon had sat as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the world complexity of British polity had been his daily concern. In dealing with Indian problems he would not be apt to lose sight of the broader interests of the Empire.


And now for several years (1899-1905), with high hopes, great power and indomitable will, he was to administer India. As Viceroy he accomplished much; he safeguarded and extended the frontiers; he overhauled and improved the system of Indian administration, educational, economic and sanitary. But he also repressed sternly each and every Indian impulse toward self-government, quarreling the while with his own British colleagues. And this course of action compelled him at length to retire, a defeated

man, the chosen target of every radical attack throughout the British world.

The frontier policy of Curzon has been assailed as aggressive, militaristic and opposed to the real interests of India. It was certainly aggressive; it was also old fashioned. India, to the Viceroy, must remain British. To insure this it must remain isolated from Russian and other European contact. The frontiers of India, however, Curzon tried to protect not only by guns and soldiers but also by diplomacy; and toward this end no little portion of his energy was directed.

The open way to India from the northwest first attracted his attention. From the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 until his coming the outer districts of India had been the constant scene of riot, murder, sporadic foray. Between Afghan and British outposts was a no man's land where sanctity for life there was none. The Government of India did not even attempt to administer law and order all the way to the legal frontier. It distinguished boldly between an *administrative* frontier and a *political* frontier; to the confines of the former it offered the civilian some modicum of protection; from thence to the political frontier, none whatever.

Occasionally it intervened with force; but plan or program, apparently, it had none. For more than half a century the Indian government spent men and money freely on intermittent warfare, inflicting heavy punishment on isolated tribes but never securing a permanent peace. The conflicts with the natives were sanguinary as well as frequent. As one British writer puts it: "The tribesmen were rarely obliging enough to come out into the open, but fought from behind rocks, fired into our camp at night and cut off unwary patrols. We never profited by our bitter lessons. Sometimes we built a small fort in an isolated position in tribal territory, and generally had to rescue the



LORD CURZON

garrison from a siege afterwards; but for several years butcher and bolt was our only maxim of frontier warfare." ¹

Curzon would end this situation. There seemed to be but three possibilities for so doing. One was through the conquest of all intermediate districts; a second was the withdrawal of the British garrisons and the establishment of the frontier on the banks of the Indus; a third, that chosen by Curzon.

His lordship held that conquest would be altogether too costly, particularly since the maintenance of it could only be secured by the construction of railways. Equally foolish, on the other hand, seemed the withdrawal of the troops. Such an act would be interpreted in India, in Afghanistan and in Russia as evidence of weakness. The British post at Chitral, for instance, was close up to the Hindu Kush, separated by a thin mountain wall of Afghan territory from the Russians on the Oxus. This "hole in the wall" needed guarding; so also did the Khyber Pass, Kurram and other strategic centers. A third way out must be devised.

And Curzon discovered it. His plan was this: to detach the frontier districts from the Punjab province, already sufficiently occupied with problems other than military; to create a new administrative district, the North-West Province; and within this bailiwick to entice, cajole and bribe the tribesmen to friendship with the British and the preservation of the King-Emperor's peace. To do this "tribal allowances" were to be granted by the Indian treasury. By these means peace, comparative that is, was enjoyed along the frontier for the first time in many decades.

To the south and west of the new province lay Baluchistan and beyond Baluchistan, Persia. European access to India by land was possible from this direction, and also by water. For Baluchistan was adjacent to the Gulf of Oman,

¹ Fraser, L., *India under Lord Curzon and After*, 41.

and the Persian Gulf, still further to the west, empties into that body of water. Sennacherib, Nearchus, the Chinese, the Arabs, Albuquerque and his Portuguese, all had fought in the Persian Gulf. And now Britain, supreme in these waters for three hundred years, feared several new arrivals. Curzon prepared to dispute their coming.

On the Arabian side of the Gulf of Oman lay Muscat, and here the French had endeavored to obtain lodgment. But owing to the quick action of Colonel Meade, sent thither by Curzon and supported by a warship, their attempt failed. Farther to the north and west and on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf lay Koweit, the proposed terminus for the Bagdad railway, a German enterprise. The Teutonic emissaries sought in 1900 a concession from Mubarek, Sheik of Koweit, for purposes of harbor construction. But Curzon was forehanded; one year before, his agent, Colonel Meade, had made a treaty with the Sheik, in accordance with which all requests for concessions were to be refused.

Now Turkey claimed suzerainty over Koweit and over the fort of the Sultan flew the Turkish flag. The Turks, therefore, in the interests of their friends, the Germans, brought pressure to bear on the local potentate; and when, in 1900, he returned to his capital after a disastrous foray in the interior, he found a Turkish warship at Koweit demanding that his city be delivered to the Turkish authorities. The British navy, however, at the instigation of Curzon, forbade its surrender and the Turks, discomfited, withdrew. Whereupon, Mubarek became firmly attached to the British interests and announced that he was a "military officer of the British army."

Meanwhile, on the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf Russian agents had appeared in ever increasing numbers, representing what was said to be Russian commercial interests. At the height of the Boer War, when England's cause was at its darkest, a Russian gunboat stopped at

Bandar Abbas at the entrance of the Persian Gulf and ordered coal from Bombay. The captain ordered much more than was needed and requested permission from the Persian authorities to leave part of the supply on shore. But coal on the coast of Persia would require a guard, and a Russian guard protecting Russian coal would come perilously close to a Russian coaling station—so thought Curzon. His Majesty's ship, *Pomone*, now arrived at Bandar Abbas and the Persians refused the Russian request.

The anti-Russian activities of the British Viceroy continued. At Bushire on the Persian Gulf and at Seistan in the interior he checkmated every Russian threat toward southern Persia. Finally, in 1903, accompanied by a naval escort more impressive than any fleet which the Persian Gulf had witnessed since the days of Albuquerque, the Viceroy made a grand tour of these historic waters. Great Britain, it was said, had long been their protector from the pirates; she would continue to act in this capacity against European aggression.

Turning now to the north and east, the energetic Curzon may be found *en vedette* lest Russian intrigue in lands near India succeed in making coterminous the boundaries of the Russian and British empires. Particularly dangerous was the situation in Tibet. The tutor of the Dalai Lama, a Russian named Darjjeff, had visited St. Petersburg conveying friendly greetings from his pupil to the Czar. He was reported to have done more than convey greetings. However that may be, it was rumored that 500 camels loaded with gifts, among which guns and ammunition bulked large, pursued their way to Lhasa from Russian Turkestan.

And as the hearts of the Tibetans grew warmer toward the Russians they became cooler toward the British. The way from Tibet to India was long and difficult, but there was a pass through which communication might be made, through which even commerce, of a sort, was conducted. At this pass the Tibetans behaved very badly. "Boundary

pillars were thrown down, trade was boycotted, our communications returned," thus writes the head of Lord Curzon's punitive expedition. And for these reasons, ostensibly, the Viceroy sent a small but well equipped army into Tibet for the purpose of effecting a settlement.

In a curious fashion all their own the Tibetans tried to prevent its advance. They built barriers across the road and watched the Indian troops remove them; they nestled down behind their barriers like sheep to be elbowed out of the way by the advancing enemy. At Guru they even made a slight pretext of fighting before bowing to the inevitable. Colonel Younghusband, having thrust them to one side, proceeded to the capital of Tibet and forced the Lama to agree to a treaty which, *inter alia*, forbade the establishment of foreign agencies at Lhasa without British approval. The frontiers of India might now be considered safe unless fear be felt for the far eastern border where Siam impinged upon British Burma.

From the point of view of the British hegemony in Asia this frontier policy redounds greatly to Curzon's credit; and as a proconsul of the Empire his career, thus far, was a noticeable success. It might be urged that from an Indian point of view these imperialistic ventures were not necessary. Why should Indian treasure be poured out to secure British control? On the other hand, the security of India as well as that of the Empire was the Viceroy's objective, and Indian opinion did not in general oppose Curzon's activities in this respect.

Nor could it justly find fault with his economic policy. No Viceroy ever sent from England showed more interest in irrigation than did Lord Curzon. It was he who appointed the famous engineer, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff, to head an irrigation commission; it was he who constantly secured increased appropriations for this service. And if we look at his last budget speech we shall find a large part of it devoted to this theme, with proposals for twenty years

of canal expansion, and with very frank warning that with climate as variable as that in India the people must not look for the millennium, even to the engineers.

But Curzon, admirable administrator and farsighted statesman that he was, failed utterly in winning the co-operation of both Indian and Anglo-Indian. A fatal weakness ever dogged the Viceroy's footsteps, destined to dim his reputation and to wreck, in part, his public life. His lordship was too autocratic, at least in manner, for the twentieth century. Whether the frozen and haughty mien of this great proconsul was germane to his character or the mere cloak in which he hid a spirit hypersensitive to criticism might be a matter for speculation; but that it impaired his usefulness there can be no doubt. No ordinary autocrat was Curzon. He was not content like Cromer to possess power; he demanded also the appearance of it. "God's butler," the Oxford undergraduates had dubbed him, and thus with clever insight drove the rapier of ridicule into Achilles' heel. The Viceroy was born several centuries too late. The inelasticity of his nature, the arbitrary character of his public manner and of his public acts, the cold reserve and Olympian disdain of all criticism, both Indian and Anglo-Indian; these were the factors which led to his resignation in 1904.

Of his policies which brought on failure two are particularly worthy of note, his educational program and the partition of Bengal.

Higher education in India, as conducted by the state, dated back to the days of Lord Macaulay. The aim of the British raj had been excellent, the training of natives of ability in western ideas of government, liberty, freedom and law through the establishment of universities. But the result had not been felicitous. The five universities in British India had grown very rapidly, since success in the competition for civil service positions under the Government depended largely on securing a university de-

gree. The latter, however, in Curzon's opinion, was of doubtful value. There was no personal instruction in the universities, and the preparation for examination was mechanical and standardized; nor did the universities concern themselves in any way with the life led by their enrolled students. The Viceroy insisted that this situation be changed. He wanted actual instruction as well as examination, and also the creation of regular colleges in which students were to live. This meant, of course, either fewer students or more money, or both. The loss of students did not trouble Curzon; there were too many anyway, falsely trained to pass parrot-like examinations. And since he could not have his own way readily, he arbitrarily changed the governing boards of the universities to secure it. The Senate of the University of Calcutta was particularly nettled at this act, and protests were loud and vigorous. Lord Curzon, with more frankness than tact, assured the university in a public address that truthfulness was a western characteristic which it behooved the eastern people to emulate. He also, on the same occasion, informed his hearers that there was, as yet, no Indian nation. These two statements did much to ruin Curzon's reputation in the sub-continent.

A fiercer tempest arose, however, over Bengal, a great and mighty province which the Viceroy sought to improve and benefit by a reform as unfortunate as it was logical. Bengal was a large country in itself, since its population was over 80,000,000; and within its borders lay Calcutta, India's largest city. Hitherto the Government of Bengal had been highly centralized, and the administration of the province under the control of a Lieutenant-Governor had become topheavy and cumbersome. The pressure of business was great, the climate of Calcutta terrible, the distant districts toward the frontier neglected. Reform was in order and the Viceroy took the shortest steps to secure it; he divided Bengal and made two separate provinces

where there had been one. To eastern Bengal was assigned Assam, an inland territory not previously considered sufficiently important to warrant separate organization. And of this province, where Moslems were in the majority, Dacca was made capital. To western Bengal, with its overwhelming Hindu population, a few districts were added to the south and west, and of this new province Calcutta was to be the capital. But to the Bengalis, patriotically inclined, the old Bengal had been a sacred Motherland. Now it is true that the Bengalis had never been a nation, in the juristic sense of that word; but they were, it was claimed, one race and talked one language. In consequence, at the partition of the province they became furiously indignant. Appeals were made to the Viceroy and were not heeded. In England it was considered but a little storm; but in India on the anniversary of the partition it was written that "thousands and thousands of Indians rub dust on their foreheads; at dawn they bathe in silence as at a sacred feast; no meals are eaten; the shops in cities and the village bazaars are shut; women refuse to cook; they lay aside their ornaments; men bind each other's wrists with a yellow string as a sign that they will never forget the shame; and the whole day is passed in resentment, mourning and the hunger of humiliation." ¹

The partition in itself was not an act of peculiar tyranny; but it hurt Calcutta's pride; it injured her, somewhat, commercially; and the Bengalis in the east looked down upon the Assamese and did not relish their new political bed-fellows. And what is more important, it marks the real beginning of the political unrest in India which was to gather headway with such tremendous momentum in the next two decades.

Indian unrest in the shape of a nationalistic movement was an old phenomenon in British-Indian history. As early

¹ Nevison, H. W., *New Spirit in India*, 169.

as 1885 an Indian Nationalist Congress had been summoned for the purpose of obtaining greater Indian representation in the government of the country. But it had been led by quiet, conservative leaders, among whom Gopal Krishna Gokhale was preëminent. The Servants of India society had been founded by him for the furtherance of Indian liberty and in order that a national sentiment might be engendered through lives of self-sacrifice and humble service. By deputations to England, by newspaper articles, by personal example, Indian nationalism of a non-militant kind had been advocated for over fifteen years.

With the turning of the century, however, a new element began to gather headway in the congress or annual meeting of the Nationalists. It was led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a newspaper editor and orthodox Hindu. Like Gokhale, he wanted autonomy for India, not independence; unlike the Servants of India, he believed in immediate action to obtain it. Tilak would bring pressure to bear on the British by making unworkable their existing control. To do this he suggested a strict boycott of British goods—which might, or might not, result in an attack on those buying them, or even selling them.

The partition of Bengal found these two leaders opposing one another in the Nationalist Congress. With many thousand delegates present, parliamentary practice was perhaps irregular; but at any rate the militant wing of the Nationalists obtained the upper hand and then lost it. No agreement could be had; the breach between the two factions was too wide and the congress broke up in confusion.

Meanwhile Curzon returned home. With the British he had quarreled as well as with the Hindus. An entire British battalion had been sharply reprimanded by him to the chagrin of the military; he had opposed Kitchener's ideas in regard to army organization; and his resignation was accepted. Justice to Curzon meant much, liberty little.

Mr. John Morley, celebrated author-radical, shortly after

assumed control of the India Office, with Lord Minto as Viceroy. Backed as Morley was by the huge Liberal majority of 1906 the chances seemed fair that the partition of Bengal might be undone and Indian discontent alleviated. Was not Morley the friend and biographer of Gladstone; was not he a student and expounder of ideas of liberty from Locke to Mill? Mr. Gokhale hoped for much.

But two things he did not realize. Mr. Morley was an old man. His work was finished in the nineteenth century, and his lingering on into the twentieth was an accident. Also he knew next to nothing of India and therefore could not well escape the Anglo-Indian influence which permeated the India Office.

The new Liberal cabinet had no especial interest in India, the internal administration of that dependency had ever been somewhat beyond the perimeter of Liberal concern. And Mr. Morley, perhaps wisely, felt it necessary to lean rather heavily on the advice of those who were experienced in Indian affairs. On assuming office he promptly issued a warning note against "hurry and precipitancy," spoke in general and in none too fervent a way about free speech and the spirit of English institutions, and then made prophecy as follows: "For as long a time as my poor imagination can pierce through, our government of India must partake, and in no small degree, of the personal and absolute element."¹ The tenor of this speech was not encouraging to those who looked for a brighter day in India; nor was Mr. Morley's defense of the Indian deportations of the succeeding year (1907) more encouraging.

Disturbances in both eastern Bengal and the Punjab had been serious and many, and to curb them certain Indian Nationalists, including Lajpat Rai, had been summarily deported by the Government of India. Mr. Morley defended this action on curious grounds. Lajpat Rai, he said, was

¹ Morley, J., *Indian Speeches*, 34.

responsible for the agitation which had resulted in the Sikhs being reproached for standing by the British at the time of the Mutiny. The people were also told by agitators that the foreigners brought the plague with them, the proof of this being that the English did not frequently die from it. It was therefore necessary to deport the ringleaders. If they had been tried by a law court, said Mr. Morley, they would have become martyrs, and a great deal of unnecessary publicity would have been given to their propaganda. These seem strange words to have come from the historian of the eighteenth century philosophers.

Meanwhile, rumors of reform were in the air. Mr. Morley invited two Indians to share in the deliberations of the India Council at Whitehall; and from Calcutta there came recommendations of a stronger character, afterwards to be known as the Morley-Minto reforms.

These were officially promulgated in 1908, and were prepared in Calcutta by the Viceroy at the suggestion and with the advice of Morley. In form they were far from revolutionary. Provision was made for a Council of Notables to advise the Government of India—this by way of offset to the Indian Nationalist Congress. To the Executive Council of the Viceroy an Indian member was now summoned. To the Legislative Council, which was greatly increased in number, Indians were to be elected; but they were not to have a majority, even in this house of little power. On the other hand, their number in the Provincial Councils was increased, and here it would be possible for an Indian majority to pass resolutions condemning anything it saw fit. In addition, the right of interpellation was granted.

These reforms were not ungenerous. Some considerable time had elapsed, it is true, since the Queen's proclamation of 1858 in regard to Indian participation in Indian administration; but there had been a step in that direction with the establishment of the councils, and now the elected mem-

bership was increased. In the eyes of the Indian moderates the reforms had real merit; the very fact that the presence of one Hindu on the Executive Council caused a storm of protest among the Anglo-Indians was a clear proof of their worth. But nothing was said about the partition of Bengal, an affair which Mr. Morley said had been permanently settled. In consequence, throughout the period of his occupancy of the India Office, from 1906 to 1910, an intermittent state of unrest continued, characterized by riots and culminating in bombs thrown at the Viceroy.

During this time the voice of England was John Morley; the hand of England, that of her Viceroy in India, Lord Minto. The former, "soon to dwindle into a Lord," was frequently disturbed over Minto's free use of the British equivalent for the *lettre de cachet*, namely deportation.¹ And from time to time he chided his Vicerory therefore, threatening his own displeasure. But his reproofs never seem to have taken a serious form and on one occasion, at least, the British cabinet forced Minto to set at liberty an entire batch of exiles whereas Morley had only timidly suggested the release of two or three. The Secretary of State for India had for twenty years defended Irishmen for acts which now closed prison doors in India. Lord Morley said Ireland and India could not be compared; his more indulgent friends feared that he was growing old.

With the passing of Morley in 1910 the British raj did that which it had previously announced it never would; it rescinded the partition of Bengal. Assam was once more reduced to a frontier province and the new western districts of Bengal were made into a little province of their own. The Bengalis were now united. Only, as one of them remarked, "the Government have wiped our eyes and have knocked out one of our teeth in doing so."² In other words the seat of government had been moved from Calcutta to

¹ Morley, J., *Recollections*, II, 327.

² *Round Table*, III, 408 (June, 1912).

Delhi, a city more centrally located, nearer Simla and the mountain country, and the site of India's capital under the great Moslem rulers of the past. The transference was logical, certainly; but it did not make the Bengalis more friendly toward the British.

But whether the capital was at Calcutta or Delhi, or whether Bengal was partitioned or not, the rise of Indian nationalism was inevitable. The victory of the Japanese army in Manchuria was one cause of it; were not the Russians, Europeans; and had not even the British been afraid of the Russians? The spread of British education with its emphasis on English literature and history was another cause, carrying with it, as it did, a passionate devotion to political liberty. The Indians were quick to draw analogies between the India of their day and England in the days of King John or Cromwell. And yet a third explanation of this phenomenon would seem to be the general wave of unrest in all semi-dependent countries against European control, whether French, British or Russian. Young Egypt, Young Turkey, Young Persia, Young India—everywhere the twin forces of liberalism and nationalism, set free by the French Revolution, were making headway fast. That they should blossom out in Madras, Calcutta and Bombay was inevitable.

Typical of India was the way in which nationalism developed in the King-Emperor's domain. Religion and not politics seems to have been at the root of it, and religion of a kind and type more familiar to Europe of the sixteenth century than to Europe of the twentieth. The repercussion of western civilization on that of India paved the way for a revival of the indigenous religions of the sub-continent, and particularly Hinduism. Christianity in India had made headway, it is true, but not to any extent among the educated. To the outcast it brought a message which was gladly heard; but to those of high caste, the intellectuals,

it made slight appeal. Although readers of Macaulay, Mill and Burke, they turned for their religion not to St. Paul and the Gospels but rather to the Hindu Vedas, and in the revived study of the ancient Hindu classics they found renewed inspiration and hope for a renaissance of Hindu culture.

An important influence in bringing this about was a society known as the Arya Samaj. In the census figures at the end of the nineteenth century the Samaj was listed as a Hindu sect. From the point of view of the authorities it was such; but its founders never regarded it in that light. The Samaj to them meant a purifying of all Hindu thought, a revival of spiritual power and purity to come about not so much by the denial of the unessential syncretism which had attached itself to Hinduism throughout the ages, as by contemplation of, and faith in, the original message of salvation which the early Aryans had brought with them to India.

The thought and philosophy of Dayand Saraswati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, were no more radical than that of Martin Luther. Both men were essentially conservative in their point of view, looking ever to the past for their inspiration, and believing that the ills which characterized their age were due to the world's forgetfulness of the original revelation of the All High. But in both instances the result of their labor was revolutionary since their followers under other leaders logically and inevitably were led to repudiate the organization of society under which they lived.

According to the comfortable theory generally held in the past by British administrators, and still largely held at the present, there could be no genuine nationalist movement in India. Not only was the Hindu majority to be sharply differentiated from the Moslem minority and a rapprochement between them believed incredible, but even the former were thought to lack all sense of unity. Neither

in race nor in language nor in religion were the Hindus one. The caste system, devised historically to preserve racial purity, had failed to do it. In southern India the Aryan element in the racial blood stream had all but disappeared and the Dravidian preponderance was overwhelming. In central India the Dravidian element probably was dominant and even in northern India a considerable mixture of this earlier blood was a noticeable fact.¹ Furthermore, the Bengalis spoke a language unknown to Madras, and the people in Mysore could not understand those in Bombay. Even Hinduism seemed to vary so throughout all India as to possess few common factors beyond the existence of a priestly caste, the Brahmin, and a universal taboo against eating beef. From an abstract scientific view Hinduism was defined as "a disintegrated religion."

But the Arya Samaj denied this. The writings of its founder spoke feelingly of an Indian Motherland in the bygone where neither child marriage nor "debased worship" were known, of a past day when widows were not oppressed by cruel social customs, when idol worship was not in vogue—and when the foreigner was not. Historians might claim that such a golden age was but a figment of vain imaginings and that there never had been a Hindu Motherland. But whether this was so or not was immaterial; the story many times repeated of its glorious splendors was quite sufficient to stir enthusiasm and to lead to action.

The method adopted by the Arya Samaj to revive this hypothetical Hinduism of the past was primarily educational. It organized schools where a pristine vigor was demanded from the pupils: swimming before dawn in the Ganges, outdoor games, hard beds and simple raiment. And in these schools the medium of instruction was always Hindustani, never English; this they held was of supreme

¹ According to Kroeber, A. L., *Anthropology*, 46, the indigenous peoples of southern India occupy an intermediate position between caucasians and negroes. The question of race origin in India is veiled in obscurity as may readily be seen by turning to Kroeber or to the *Britannica*.

importance. The Samaj also sent out missionaries to persuade, admonish and beseech the Hindu people to reform their daily living and to hold true to ancient faith.

And the society prospered. By 1911 it had enrolled some 131,000 members, not a very large number; but the members were influential and earnest and, from the point of view of the Government of India, dangerous. Now it is true that Lajpat Rai, the historian of the Samaj and its leading sponsor in the twentieth century, proved that the society was not anti-British by quotations from the writings of the founder, and it is also true that the work of the society was strictly religious in so far as its purpose was to create a spiritual renaissance of the Hindu people. None the less the British authorities were correct in its diagnosis; it was dangerous.

The teachings of the society recognized the legality of the British rule; they did more. They frankly held that foreign rule in India was directly due to "mutual feud, difference in religion, want of purity in life, lack of education, child marriage . . . indulgence in carnal gratification, untruthfulness and other evil habits."¹ But suppose these vices once eliminated, then what? Mr. Gokhale and the early reformers had looked forward to responsible government within the Empire. But, according to the Swami Vivikandra,² "the British are not a spiritual people, they are either a fighting race or a commercial nation." And again, this teacher stated: "Foreign government, perfectly free from religious prejudice, impartial toward all natives and foreigners, kind, beneficent and just though it may be can never make a people happy." The drift of the Swami's

¹ Lajpat Rai, *The Arya Samaj*, 176.

² The Swami Vivikandra was a disciple of Ramkrishna, the founder of a society of that name. Vivikandra interpreted the teachings of the founder to the public. They were in many respects similar to those taught by the Arya Samaj and varied principally in that they were broader in scope and application. See: Bose, S., *Some Aspects of British Rule in India*, (Bulletin of the State University of Iowa, Vol. V., No. 1).

political thought is not obscure; it is in the direction of particularism and independence.

In reply to the Swami the British might have said: "We disagree with your hypothesis. We think that for both you and us an amalgam of eastern and western culture is better than these exclusive eastern ideals which you foster. But if you think otherwise and persuade us that a majority of the inhabitants of India agree with you, we shall be happy to evacuate India, bag and baggage, provided there are guarantees given for the protection of minority groups in your vast Empire, and also for the security of the capital we have invested in your economic development." The answer, however, was of a different description. It was a proscription if not of the Arya Samaj, at least of many of its members. Lajpat Rai, the best known of them, was exiled without a trial, and if his story is to be trusted, the authorities attempted to drive all members of the society out of the army and out of the Civil Service. And this not only strengthened the Samaj but also gave to its work a color more distinctly political than that intended by its founder.

Meanwhile, the Moslems in India were growing uneasy. As long as the very lowest positions in the Civil Service only were filled by Hindus, the Moslems were indifferent. But as pressure was brought to bear to extend the better paid positions to educated Indians the Moslems began to feel disturbed. In consequence there came the founding of Aligarh College by Sir Saiyid Ahmad, a Moslem institution where modern science and modern thought were taught through the medium of the Urdu tongue and made to blend with the Koran. The Moslems, like the members of the Arya Samaj, were becoming racially active.

With the introduction of the Morley-Minto reforms the Moslems bestirred themselves still further. The Hindu politicians claimed that representation in the enlarged councils should be on the basis of population, hoping thus to swamp the Moslem minority. But the latter, alarmed at

the outlook, pleaded with the British authorities for electoral districts on the basis of religious faith. The Government of India sided with them in this demand and the discomfited Hindus were compelled to submit.

The Moslems, having gained this point, would perhaps have sided with the British against the Hindus in the matter of Indian nationalism, had it not been for various events in the Moslem world outside of India. The veiled partition of Persia between England and Russia in 1907 had resulted in a great outcry from Persian Moslems which had been heard by their co-religionists in India. The disintegration of Morocco, brought about by the French but supported by the British; the snubbing of Egyptian nationalism; the Italian attack on Tripoli; these setbacks to Moslem countries had their due repercussion on the Indian followers of the Prophet. And then came the Balkan Wars and the defeat of Turkey. Were not the Turks a collateral branch of the true faith; should not the Moslems of the whole world stand together? Thus ran the tale as told in the bazaars of the Punjab.

In Government circles in India it had long been an article of faith that any agreement between Moslem and Hindu was impossible. The British Viceroys had not tried to rule India by a policy of *divide et impera*; it had not been necessary, nor had the British raj been so unprincipled as to adopt such methods. But it had been quietly assumed that the differences in belief were so fundamental that they could not be bridged. Only a few who understood the Indian point of view and habit of life from within thought otherwise. They held, rightly or wrongly, that the differences between Hindu and Moslem were of a surface character and that they were essentially in matters of "purification and domestic practice, not in religion or dogma."¹ And whether this strong statement be exaggerated or not, it would seem to the layman that, in regard to their more spiritual teach-

¹ Noble, M. E., *The Web of Indian Life*, 154.

ings, there were many common points of contact between the great religions of the world. The Hindu, for instance, could not well deny the Christian doctrine of the Virgin birth, nor could the Moslem really prove that the Hindu worshiped idols. The Bhagavad Gita, the Song of the Blessed One, with its story of the Lord Krishna, had much in common with the finer teachings of both Moslem and Christian.¹ Fierce sectaries there were, Christian, Moslem and Hindu: but some approach to a common understanding between the latter two at any rate was possible, as subsequent events demonstrated.

To the religious and political fermentation among both Moslem and Hindu there was added unrest from a different quarter. The Industrial Revolution in Europe had early affected Indian history; but not until the twentieth century did the factory system reach any considerable development in India. The power loom, which worked such havoc among the handloom workers in Europe, had almost brought about the abolition of the handloom in India. None but the finest products of the Indian looms, the cashmeres and the cambrics, could withstand competition with the new machines, and as these became perfected even the finer cloths were made in England. The Indian people, as a result, had been thrown back on the land more than ever before. There was an abundance of labor in India, there was also coal. Within her borders, however, the coming of the factory was long delayed. In Lancashire the cotton industry had been long established. Not until the twentieth century did surplus capital seek for an outlet by the establishment of factories in India. But with their erection in Bombay and other Indian cities came the concomitant results, overcrowding, high rentals, disease, misery and discontent.

The Government of India was not altogether oblivious to these conditions and it had passed remedial legislation;

¹ *Ibid.*, 222 *et seq.*

but in character it was far from drastic. According to the report of its commission in 1908 the hours of labor in those mills which were not lighted by electricity were thirteen and a half in summer and eleven in winter. Mills lighted by electricity continued in operation twenty-four hours a day. The employment of children under nine was supposedly illegal; but this law was only half-heartedly enforced. Children from nine to fourteen were permitted to work half a day. This period was defined, however, as from seven and a half to eight hours. The labor of the adult male was unrestricted.

The factory laws of India, then, were far from advanced, and the overcrowding of industrial cities, such as Bombay, possibly the worst in the world. At times it was necessary in that city to turn the very streets into sleeping quarters. At either end barricades would be erected and the *charpoys* (movable cots) would crowd the space between. Under such conditions agitation grew apace; and in this environment Gandhi first won his reputation as a holy man by going without food for many days in order that the striking mill workers might be encouraged to hold out further in their demands for increased pay.

Nevertheless, from the inauguration of the Morley-Minto reforms to the opening of the Great War, there was no noticeable increase in the nationalist movement. The Moslems still held aloof, and Mr. Tilak and the extremists were unable to gain control of the Nationalist Congress. Just how far they went in advocating violence is problematical. Tilak has been quoted as having said that, "Divine Krishna, teaching in the Gita, tells us that we may kill even our teachers. . . . Do not circumscribe your vision like frogs in a well. Rise above the penal code into the rarefied vision of the sacred Bhagavad Gita and consider the acts of great men."¹ And even that sturdy defender of Indian nationalism, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, has stated that, "the Indian

¹ Lucas, Sir C., *Empire at War*, V, 159.

assassin quotes his Bhagavad Gita as a Scottish Covenanter quoted his Old Testament. And the Gita is more cruel in the devotion and self-sacrifice it inspires than the most awful of the Old Testament passages which have been brooded over by the austere fanatics of our own history.”¹ Just what particular passages in the Gita Mr. Macdonald had reference to are not stated. Unless that epic has been deleted of much blood lust in the ordinary translations his remarks would seem somewhat extreme.

Tilak disclaimed all responsibility for such few assassinations as occurred during this period. That they might have been more numerous had not the Government resorted to deportations is arguable; it might also be contended that the deportations increased the number of disturbances. The Government of India, none the less, resorted to deportations freely, in one case, apparently, exiling a man “because he was treasurer of a fund collected for the defense of his nephew, whose trial ended in an acquittal.”²

And thus the situation presented itself in 1914; sporadic acts of violence on the one hand, stern repression on the other; the partition of Bengal undone; Indian representation on legislative councils increased; but still no active association of Indians and British in the actual administration of India.

There is no good evidence to prove that the Great War was keenly felt in India; that realm of the King-Emperor was too remote, too profoundly lethargic to European affairs, to be much concerned with it. Yet it was to influence the trend of Indian affairs to no small degree, hastening fundamental changes in the structure of Indian government which were to be inaugurated soon after its conclusion.

At the outbreak of hostilities the Government of India drew freely from the 159,000 Indian and 77,000 British

¹ Macdonald, J. R., *The Awakening of Asia*, 189.

² *Ibid.*, 294.

troops within its borders, and in very short order dispatched to Marseilles 16,000 Indian and 28,000 British soldiers. These, landing in October, 1914, were of substantial if not vital assistance in holding the lines in northern France against the second German offensive of that year. Meanwhile, in Egypt, China, Gallipoli, Palestine and Salonica Indian soldiers served the cause of the Allies: and in the Mesopotamia campaign of 1915-1916 they bore the brunt of the fighting.

The Mesopotamian expedition, in which there were 4,500 British to 12,000 Indian troops, had been sent to the Persian Gulf for the defense of an oil pipe line. But the lure of the seemingly defenseless hinterland was a strong one and General Townshend, in command, yielded to it. Slowly he worked his way along the line of the Shatt-el-Arab and Tigris Rivers to Kut-el-Amara, some 300 miles from the Gulf. Beyond lay Bagdad, some 150 miles; why not seize that prize while the Turks were still engaged at Gallipoli? But General Townshend had only 11,000 effective troops for this enterprise and an advance further was fraught with danger.

Nevertheless, it nearly succeeded. The General reached Ctesiphon, within fourteen miles of Bagdad; but he was held there and forced back to his base at Kut. Here the triumphant Turks surrounded him. For months the Anglo-Indian army waited rescue. The heat was terrific, medicine scarce, disease rampant. Three expeditions sent to his relief were stopped. The marshes to the south had become great shallow lakes with the change of the season, thus making succor difficult; and the withdrawal of the British from the Dardanelles had set free large Turkish forces for the attack. By the end of April, 1916, Townshend's army gave up hope. Flour for men and grain for horses had all been consumed; there was nothing on which to live except horse flesh. Therefore, after a siege of 147 days, Townshend surrendered.

Meanwhile, in India as the British regulars left the Territorials took their place. The exchange of troops frequently was delayed and at one time there were in India less than 30,000 British soldiers of any description, a situation unparalleled since the Mutiny. But no new one broke out. There were a certain number of plots, fathered by the revolutionary socialists and financed by the Germans; or, if you will, a number of German plots supported by revolutionary agitators among the industrial workers. But the attitude of India, in general, was one of apathy. Over 1,000,000 Indians had been enrolled in the army; but what are 1,000,000 men to India? And of these, half came from the Punjab, and a large part of the remainder were either sent by native princes or enlisted from the fighting tribesmen of the frontier. A great part of India did not even know there was a war, and a greater part still took no interest in it, despite glowing speeches in legislative councils.

During the conflict, however, certain events of grave moment occurred. Among them were: the death of Gokhale, and the control over the Indian Nationalist Congress thereby gained by Tilak and the extremists; the distress of Indian Moslems at the reverses of the Caliphate; the Russian revolution; and the advertisement given in India, as well as elsewhere, to the winged words of Woodrow Wilson. The fact that an Anglo-Indian army had been captured by the Turks also made a great impression on India. It was the first time in history that British troops had ever been compelled in any number to surrender to Asiatics! Mr. Tilak's influence grew, and was increased still further through the agency of Mrs. Annie Besant and the Theosophists. That strong-minded woman, although maintaining that true religion was a synthesis in which both Hinduism and Christianity shared, quite evidently was more enthusiastic about the Vedas than the Gospels. Her advocacy of Indian nationalism grew so vigorous that the Government decided to deport her.

New Moslem leaders, meanwhile, made further trouble for the British raj. Among them were the Ali brothers, both of whom had been deported during the war. The Hindu Nationalists saw their opportunity. The All-Moslem League which, in 1911, had refused to coöperate with the Hindu Nationalists, was now won over. In 1916 the Moslems came to an agreement with the Hindus, to the consternation not only of the Government of India but also to that of Great Britain, now taking a leading part in the disposal of territory wrested from the Turk. Moreover, Russian revolutionary enthusiasm, running like wild-fire through Turkestan, penetrating Afghanistan, found its way to India; and this the British feared.

In view of these facts, then, compromise seemed the better part of wisdom. India had been summoned with the Dominions to the imperial conference of 1916. The war fought for democracy must be concluded. American orators had no monopoly of that shibboleth; Britons had spoken of it freely: Britons had died for it. Why not embrace at least a part of the Wilson program; why not signalize democracy's triumph by a manifestation of its power in distant India?

And thus it came about that in August, 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, spoke as follows in the House of Commons: "The policy of his Majesty's Government with which the Government of India is in complete accord, is that of increased association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."¹

These words, although not flowery, promised a far more radical solution of the Indian question than ever Gladstone or Morley hinted at. Those statesmen had stopped short of representative government, and here was mention of re-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, V Series, XCVII, 1695.

sponsible government which implied popular control of the executive as well as the legislative branch of the administration. To be sure, Mr. Montagu gave no particulars; he was simply announcing a general policy, to be more sharply defined after consultation in India. And it is true, also, that he stressed the phrase, *gradual development*, going so far as to state that "The British Government and the Government of India . . . must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance." None the less a new day was promised for India and toward its coming some looked forward as toward the millennium, while others foretold naught but evil as a result of this effort to occidentalize the Orient.

CHAPTER XI

INDIA SINCE 1917

The year 1917 is a landmark in the history of British India. The British cabinet had committed itself to Indian devolution. As a preliminary step there now came a thoroughgoing investigation of the Indian situation. By Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, and Mr. Montagu, the Chief Secretary, it was conducted, and the result of their labors may be seen in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918.

In order that this might be as comprehensive and catholic as possible, these two representatives of the British government held in India a series of interviews in regard to the projected reforms; and widely divergent in both tone and substance were the opinions expressed in regard to them.

On the one hand stood the Anglo-Indian officials of the Civil Service. Serious, hardworking gentlemen, for the most part, were these servants of the Crown. They had not gone to India to seek wealth; a decent sustenance they had expected, and that, certainly, they had obtained. But one or two thousand pounds a year, or even three or four for the higher branches of the Indian Civil Service, could scarcely be considered wealth.

Other motives, for the most part, had taken them to India. Love of adventure had been one, and pride in the achievements of the Empire had been another. And perhaps even more influential had been that scorn of trade and commerce and middle class ascendancy which characterized the landed gentry of England, even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For pelf or plunder in factory or in counting house these few thousand men refused to strive. But to live in steaming jungles or on the baked plains of India,

there to administer justice, both high and low, to levy or remit taxes, to warn, admonish, praise and punish the many millions under their control; and above all to enforce the peace of the King-Emperor: these things they would do.

And now they fought bitterly the diminution of their power. For so doing two major reasons were advanced by them. In the first place, they asserted, the only Indians with sufficient education to rule the country were the Brahmins and these, in the opinion of the Civil Service, would be cruel and brutal to the mass of the Indian peoples, comprising as it did those of lower caste and the "untouchable." The Government of India stood between the poor and the money-lender, the corn merchant and the proud priest—their oppressors. If the Englishman went back home, God help the weak and the unfortunate in India.

Secondly, they argued, the British raj intervened between Moslem and Hindu, protecting the gentle lamb-like Hindu from the domination of the children of the Prophet. Before the British came to India had not the war-like Moslem swooped down upon Hindustan to conquer and destroy? If the British once withdrew, this untoward event surely would be repeated. Beyond India was Afghanistan with her fiery tribesmen. "The Afghans ravishing the virgins of Bengal" might be a slightly futuristic prophecy: but peace between Moslem and Hindu, they knew, could only be kept by a third power superior to both.

And supporting in general this point of view were three other sections of Indian opinion. The European business men agreed with the Civil Service, as did the Eurasians, quite numerous although uninfluential; and finally many Indian landlords, particularly among the Moslems, who felt that Home Rule was apt to mean, in the long run, Brahmin rule.

On the other side were the Indian Nationalists, both moderates and extremists. The former would have been well content with an Indian legislature possessing genuine power

in which there was an Indian majority. But the extremists demanded control over the executive as well, complete responsible government. The latter controlled the Indian Nationalist Congress and elected as President thereof, Mrs. Besant, now privileged to return to India.

The charges which the Nationalists brought against British rule were in part specific, in part intangible. Their old economic grievances were retold in regard to famines, the extravagance of the Government and the expense of the military establishment. They demanded a protective tariff against imported goods from England, and they claimed that the five per cent excise duty on cloth woven in India was a direct bounty to the English manufacturer. But more serious and weighty were the charges which they brought against the spirit of English rule. As Mrs. Besant put it: "A rule which engenders a sense of inferiority in the ruled has no living roots and must wither in the end." To her and to her Indian friends it was inevitable that the British should look down on the Indians, and that the latter could not gain their self-respect until they should emancipate themselves from British control.

In regard to these accusations Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford speedily saw that the last was the *burra sahib*, the substantial one. The excise levy of five per cent on cloth was only a counterbalance to the five per cent customs duty, levied for revenue purposes. The army cost was heavy; but India was a large country with a dangerous frontier. To maintain, as Ramsay Macdonald did, that ninety per cent of the cost of the army should be an imperial charge was poor logic. India paid nothing for the upkeep of the British navy and this, in part at least, was an equivalent for that portion of the army expenditure which might be said to be imperial. Under any circumstances India would need an army with real striking power.

India also needed self-respect, and this she could not hope to have while ruled by others. The grosser forms of racial

arrogance, the driving of Indians off sidewalks in the cities, the crowding of Indians out of railway carriages in which Whites chose to travel; these were not commonly practiced, at least not by the gentlemen of the Civil Service. But there are subtle ways of showing class superiority which hurt far more than physical violence; and in this respect the British officials in India were not altogether guiltless. From the Indians they held aloof. The reason for so doing is scarcely the one so innocently advanced by England's ex-Premier when he stated that this "was due in many cases not so much to haughtiness as to an Englishman's instinctive shrinking from the unfamiliar."¹ More fair would it be to say that the men of the Civil Service never had regarded it as part of their social duty to cultivate personal friendship with those whom they controlled. They worked hard, and when leisure came they considered it their own, to spend in their own way, among their own compatriots. To expect that this national reserve could or should be broken down was to demand a great deal, an unfair sacrifice.² Nevertheless, in this situation was to be found the real crux of the Indian problem, and the only permanent solution for it was self-government.

After carefully canvassing the opinion of all classes Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford came to the conclusion that a sufficient number of educated Indians were prepared to participate in the Government of their country to warrant fundamental changes in its structure. Therefore, in the next year, 1919, the celebrated Montagu-Chelmsford Report with recommendations to this effect was presented to Parliament. This was in the nature of a rough draft for a new constitution. It was the basis, however, for the Gov-

¹ Macdonald, J. R., *The Awakening of India*, 77.

² There seems to be some indication that the quality of the Civil Service has deteriorated since the war, owing in part to the fact that posts in it are less attractive than formerly, and in part to the heavy mortality during the war in that social class from which it formerly was mainly recruited.

ernment of India Act, placed on the statute books of the Imperial Parliament in the same year.

The new law revolutionized British Indian policy, and by many it has been held comparable in importance to the Reform Bill of 1832. By its provisions the Indian government was recast in three different ways; it was decentralized; it was made more democratic; it was organically and structurally changed by a device, new in constitutional practice, the dyarchy.

The decentralization of the new constitution consisted in the grant of greatly increased powers to eight Indian provinces—Burma and the North-West Province were not included in this scheme of provincial devolution. Both the central and the provincial governments were now partly democratized. An electorate of 5,000,000 was created for the purpose of electing members of the central and provincial legislatures, and to these bodies a certain real control of the administration of affairs was granted.

The special feature, however, of the new constitution which distinguished it from all others was the invention of the dyarchy or double government. It applied to the eight provinces only and operated thus: certain governmental functions were stated to be *reserved*, such as the administration of justice and the control of the police. Where this was the case they were kept apart from the purview of the elected legislature, and members of the Civil Service in charge of them were responsible to the governor alone. Other functions were held *transferred*, such as education and sanitation. Where this took place the officials in charge of the transferred subjects were responsible to the legislature. The governor was thus presented with a kind of hybrid ministry, in part responsible to him, in part responsible only to the elected legislature.

The inventors of this unique theory of government thought simply to provide temporary machinery for a transitional period in which the Government might be changed

from an autocracy to a democracy. By these novel means the Indians would first gain experience in real government, a little at a time. If they succeeded in the limited tasks assigned them the latter could be broadened in scope. Something had to be done; the problem was, what?

The provincial governors had suggested increasing Indian representation on their executive councils; but this was simply along the old path of the Morley-Minto reforms, tried and found wanting. What the new law sought to do was to create absolute freedom and responsibility for the Indians in their own field, but to limit the field.

The dyarchy does not extend to the central government. The upper house of the legislature for all India, the Council of State, consists of sixty members, thirty-three elected and twenty-seven nominated. The franchise requirement in voting for the thirty-three elected members is exceedingly high. It is limited practically to men of considerable wealth, ex-office holders, or graduates of the universities. The membership is divided on a communal basis between Mohammedans, Hindus and Sikhs; but to European commercial interests three elected seats are assigned, thus assuring a tie vote should these European representatives and the nominated members vote together.

The lower house of the legislature, the Assembly, has a membership of one hundred and forty-four, a hundred and three of whom are elected, forty-one nominated. The franchise requirement here is lower, but still much higher than for the provincial legislatures. Nearly a million voters elect the hundred and three members of this assembly; and again its membership is on a communal basis, with some nine electoral seats reserved for European interests.¹

The powers of the Indian legislature are large, particularly on paper. In theory it passes all laws which have to do with British India as a whole, and approves the budget. In practice, however, a very important reservation almost

¹ Banerjee, D. N., *The Indian Constitution*, 18.

makes of the Viceroy a real dictator. "*Where the Governor-General in Council,*" we read, "*certifies that it is essential for the safety, tranquillity or interest of British India, or any part thereof . . . that any law shall be passed, the Council of State shall have the right to pass that law without the assent of the Legislative Assembly.*" An enormous grant of power, by this proviso, is placed in the hands of the Viceroy. He has to secure but four votes from the elected members of the Council of State to obtain a majority in that body; and this once secured he may place upon the statute book any law which seems to him necessary. Furthermore, "he may, in cases of emergency make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good government of British India . . . which will have the force of law for a period not exceeding six months."¹

The new constitution was immediately assailed from two sides. This "damning plunge" enfranchised too many voters. Had not a recent government report asserted that difficulty would be experienced in drawing up a list of 100,000 voters; and this measure admitted to the franchise, counting those who could vote for the provincial legislatures, upwards of 5,000,000. In addition, the Hindus were not to be trusted; had not their national congress just voted in favor of the repeal of all laws against sedition? Thus spoke the Anglo-Indians.

But the most vigorous opponents of the new law were those who asserted that it did not go far enough. They thought that India's record in the war entitled her to fairer treatment. In the last analysis, they said, the power of the purse is the test of government control, and this still remains with the Viceroy since he may certify his budget and legalize it without the assent of the lower house of the legislature. Also, since the reserved services in the provinces were protected against popular control, how futile it might become to seek new sources of revenue for the trans-

¹ *Ibid.*, 269.

ferred services. Such an increase might be immediately appropriated by the protected services. Why launch the ship of Indian self-government in the troubled seas of thirteenth century political strife when it was the twentieth century? Ten years were to pass by statute before the new laws were subject to revision. These years, it was affirmed, would be full of strife in which anti-British feeling would increase. Thus spoke the Indian Nationalists.

The partial surrender of British authority which the act predicated came at a time when public opinion in India had been maddened by the passage at Delhi of the Rowlatt Bills. During the war a special statute had safeguarded India against seditious disturbances; and since it expired with the coming of peace it was deemed desirable that renewed precautions be taken for the future. At the same time that Mr. Montagu planned to reward India for her loyalty during the war, other gentlemen, among them Mr. Justice Rowlatt, were planning to frustrate any outbreak of sedition at the end of it. The work of the latter tended to neutralize that of the former. Mr. Justice Rowlatt's report, and the bills passed in his name, apparently undid the good effect of Mr. Montagu's reforms.

The Rowlatt report makes interesting reading since it is the official narrative of sedition in Bengal and elsewhere from 1905 to 1918. It was compiled mainly of quotations culled from a large number of inflammatory bills, posters, private letters. There are records of many robberies and not a few murders; but the connection between the murders and the robberies on the one hand, and political unrest on the other is not always clear. The suspicion also will not down that patriotism was frequently the last refuge of a scoundrel in India as well as elsewhere, and that much of the literature headed *Bande Mataram* (Hail Motherland), was really used for personal blackmail. The Rowlatt report seems to have unearthed no general conspiracy against the British raj, nor does it show life in Bombay or

Calcutta to have been more hazardous than in New York or Dublin.

Yet the Rowlatt report advocated very strong measures which, embodied in the Rowlatt Bills, sorely infringed, in seditious cases, on legal rights hitherto guaranteed in India in times of peace. For instance, trial by jury in cases of sedition was abolished, as were preliminary legal proceedings, and also the right of appeal. Why promise reform and make magnificent gestures of friendliness, said the Nationalist press, and yet pass these bills?

The Government of India by so doing not only destroyed the good impression which it had made by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms; it also brought into the lists a new leader for the Indian extremists, a man hitherto well disposed toward the British raj. Mohandas Gandhi is not easily placed by either psychologist, historian or philosopher. The external landmarks of his career may be readily noted, his legal studies in England pursued under the three-fold vow of celibacy, vegetarianism and abstention from alcohol, his leadership of the depressed Hindus in South Africa, and his generous support of the Empire in the war. But the real Gandhi, the spirit behind this dreamy little man with the large ears; whence came it and how may it be weighed?

Of the Mahatma, the name by which he came to be known in India, it was written: "Persons in power should be very careful when they deal with a man who cares nothing for sensual pleasures, nothing for riches, nothing for comfort or praise or promise but simply determines to do what he believes to be right. He is a dangerous and uncomfortable enemy because his body, which you can always conquer, gives you so little purchase on his soul."¹ This tribute to Gandhi by an Englishman gives perhaps the true note to his character and explains how it came about that this

¹ Murray, Gilbert, *Gandhi's Speeches*, The Introduction, 64.

Hindu, prophet, madman or politician, was able so successfully to thwart and hinder the British program in her great dependency.

Gandhi had seen much of the workings of British justice, and for the Empire, he had at one time, high regard. If the greater part of his career had been spent in India it is possible that his enthusiasm for Great Britain would have been less marked. But Gandhi had lived for many years in South Africa; and the greater part of his time there had been given over to contending with the authorities in the Transvaal and Natal for the rights of Indians. In this protracted conflict, the British, raised as it were somewhat above the battle, and with one eye on Indian unrest, had given him generous support. And Gandhi was grateful, so much so that he took active part during the war in recruiting for service at the front.

The Mahatma believed in *swaraj*, Home Rule for India, long before the days of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. He also had advocated *swadeshi*, the patronizing of home industry and particularly the wearing of cloth made in India. But prior to the Rowlatt Bills he had taken his stand with those who thought Home Rule might be obtained merely by patient reasoning. The Rowlatt Bills turned Gandhi from a friend into an enemy. He believed them to be a needless insult to the Indian people. After reading through the report of the Rowlatt Committee he, like many others, could discover nothing tangible in the way of a plot, nor in the evidence given did there seem sufficient justification for such wholesale abrogation of ordinary civil liberty as the Rowlatt Bills proposed. India seemed powerless. One good weapon, however, was within her reach; she could refuse to coöperate in any way with her British masters and by sheer weight of negation render their rule impossible. This was the doctrine of *satyagraha*, or non-coöperation on a spiritual as well as on a material plane.

For Gandhi could not conceive of anything except through

a religious spectrum. His movement, he declared, "meant a change of heart. It is an attempt to introduce the religious spirit into politics. We may no longer believe in the doctrine of tit for tat: we may not meet hatred by hatred, violence by violence, evil by evil; but we have to make a continuous and persistent effort to return good for evil."¹ None the less the movement of resistance which he headed had a practical side, and those who participated in it took a pledge by which they agreed that until the Rowlatt Bills are withdrawn "we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a committee to hereafter be appointed may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle we shall faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property."

The Government of India promptly saw the danger of this crusade, for it knew Mr. Gandhi to be a person of both zeal and influence. In consequence, it sought to prevent his doctrines spreading by placing a ban on his presence at Delhi and in the Punjab. Mr. Gandhi disobeyed, and to his great joy was arrested. His imprisonment, he said, "made him free." Let his friends likewise submit to arrest, this was his advice. But his people had not altogether attained the same spiritual level as their leader. Some of them threw stones, created a riot in Bombay, and marched around trying to get their compatriots out of jails, instead of being eager in person to enter them. Gandhi reproached his disciples bitterly for so doing; they had brought disgrace upon him and the only answer he could make was to fast and pray.

And as he issued his edict to this effect there began the series of events in Amritsar which led to General Dyer's shooting down several hundred Indians—the so-called Amritsar massacre.

In the Punjab the appeal of Gandhi had been to Hindu and Moslem alike, and in Amritsar, a city of 150,000

¹ Gandhi, *Speeches*, 446.

inhabitants, two *hartals*, or days of abstinence from both food and business (moral strikes), had passed by without trouble. And now there was announced the meeting of an All-India Congress, Moslems and Hindus working together not only to oppose the Rowlatt Acts but also the partition of Turkey by the treaty of Sèvres.

Meanwhile, orders reached Amritsar from Delhi for the deportation of two agitators. That same day was a Hindu religious festival; but Moslems fraternized with their old enemy, drank from the same cup; and cries of *Hindu-Mussalman, ki jai*, resounded in the streets. The next day the deportations were made quietly: but when the news was bruited abroad bands of excited men tried to reach the deputy commissioner whom they considered responsible. The mob surged across a bridge and was stopped by a small picket of soldiers guarding one end of it. Stones were thrown, shots fired, a few Indians killed. And now, all over Amritsar violence broke out; the banks were gutted, the managers killed; the post office was wrecked; several Europeans were done to death in the street, among them a woman missionary.

Whereupon arrived Brigadier-General Dyer with reinforcements. Arrests were made, and a notice given that all meetings were prohibited. No one was to either leave or enter the city. And this was proclaimed by beat of drum in Amritsar.

For the next day a meeting had been summoned in the Jullianwalla Bagh, a rectangular piece of ground, partly covered by débris and building material, and so surrounded by walls that access or egress was difficult. To this place General Dyer went with fifty soldiers and a number of armored cars. He found a meeting in process. Stationing twenty-five soldiers on either side, suddenly and without warning, Dyer gave orders to fire. For ten minutes firing continued. As a result, despite the efforts of the crowd to get out, some 379 people were killed and many more

wounded. Of these many were villagers from without the city. To what address they were listening was unknown. They did not have arms, but many carried sticks.

Since the execution of the rebellious Sepoys after the Indian Mutiny there had been no such sensation as this. Fear and anger contended with one another for the uppermost place in the minds of the Anglo-Indians. The rage of the Indians against General Dyer knew no bounds. England was tremendously excited as well, and in that country opinion was sharply divided. From Britain came a strong commission of investigation. The majority report censured Dyer in two respects; for firing without notice and for continuing to fire after it was evident that he had the situation well in hand.¹ The general had stated that he continued firing in order that a lasting impression might be made. He had his wish.

The minority report was much more caustic in its criticism of General Dyer. It accused him of brutality in marching away from the scene of slaughter without taking any measures for the succor of the wounded. It condemned him also for his special ordinance whereby soldiers stationed at either end of the street where the missionary was killed were given orders that Indians passing down that street must go on all fours. He wanted to create a "great moral effect." But, the report continued, "we feel that General Dyer by adopting an inhuman and un-British method of dealing with the subjects of his Majesty, the King-Emperor, has done great disservice to the interests of British rule in India."

Unfortunately, this report was signed only by the three Indian members of the Hunter Commission. The majority report, signed by the five British members, did not go so far in censuring General Dyer. The British members disavowed Dyer's act; they acknowledged that it "is not proven that a conspiracy to overthrow British power had been

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1920, XIV (cmd. 681).

formed prior to the outbreak." They said of the general's order: "In our view this was unfortunately a mistaken conception of his duty." Their repudiation was clear; but in it there was neither warm indignation nor severe censure.

General Dyer was recalled from India. But Indian public opinion noted that he lost neither rank nor pension, and that the intransigent *Morning Post* raised a popular subscription of £26,000 for the general in appreciation of his work for the Empire; for the families of the several hundred Indians made fatherless by him it raised nothing. In the words of an English missionary-author, whose judgment of Indian affairs is without heat or passion, the following summary of Amritsar seems to the point: "Solitary English officials were handling excited mobs, clean out of hand, who in more than one place had tasted blood. Weakness would have been fatal. Stern repression seemed plain duty. But though force for the moment saves situations, it settles nothing. Most educated Indians one meets would say that if India be, indeed, a lost Dominion, it was lost at Amritsar."¹

The outbreaks at Delhi and Amritsar were duplicated elsewhere. Among them, those at Gujranwala and Ahmedabad were the more important. At the former place a British airman, flying low, dropped bombs in the midst of a mob. He also used his machine gun effectively. At Ahmedabad the rioting, although less militant than at Amritsar, was more prolonged. This city of 270,000 inhabitants contained the Satyagraha Ashram, a school which Gandhi had founded. The Mahatma was especially beloved in this city and the public was infuriated at the ordinance which prohibited his entering the Punjab. In the rioting which took place several Europeans lost their lives, and the danger of a great outbreak grew steadily worse until the arrival of the Mahatma. He calmed the people instantly, told them he was ashamed of their behavior, told

¹ Holland, W. E. S., *The Indian Outlook*, 54.

them that they misunderstood his message. He taught peace; they indulged in violence.

The non-coöperative movement now gathered headway fast and Gandhi, supported by the Indian Nationalist Congress, proceeded to define in just what it should consist. Seven specific acts were required of those who would live up to satyagraha. His followers were expected to surrender all titles given by the Government of India, to refuse to attend any reception or social function given by the Government, to withdraw their children from schools supported by the state, to boycott the courts of law, to discourage recruiting, to refuse to participate in elections for the reformed councils, and to boycott foreign-made goods—purchasing only those made in India (swadeshi).

If the intelligent people of India really believed in satyagraha, the Mahatma said, they would gladly teach their own children. School teachers should resign their posts; the community would look after them. Courts of law were unnecessary. Lawyers who believed in satyagraha could busy themselves by acting as mediators in all disputes. The reforms which the British offered were a mirage; their unsatisfactory character should be proclaimed by the refusal of the Indian people to take part in them. "The British cannot rule us by mere force," he said, "and so they resort to all means honorable and dishonorable to retain their hold on India. They want India's billions and they want India's man-power for their imperial greed."¹ If we prove their reforms a farce and injure their pocketbooks by refusing to buy foreign goods we shall have swaraj (Home Rule) within a year.

Of the seven best methods of obtaining it, Gandhi was particularly interested in swadeshi. And since the factories in India were by no means sufficient to supply the population with such meager clothing as it required, and since factories and power machinery were a product of the de-

¹ Gandhi, *Speeches and Writings*, 551.

spiritualized civilization of the west, the spinning wheel of their ancestors should once more be put into use. "If I had the power," he stated, "I would suspend every other action in the schools and colleges and everywhere else and popularize spinning; prepare out of these lads and lassies spinning teachers; inspire every carpenter to prepare spinning wheels, and ask the teachers to take these lifegiving machines to every home and teach them spinning." All exportation of cotton should be stopped and cotton depots should be established all over India for the poor. If this were done, "I would undertake," he said, "to drive pauperism out of India in a year."

Now while the people heard him gladly, they were more willing to burn British cloth than to learn spinning; and, to the Mahatma's distress, the cloth thus destroyed was not always paid for. Certain of the more level-headed Indians had but slight confidence in the liberating powers of the spinning wheel and were not interested in its adoption. But to Gandhi, the spinning wheel was a religious symbol. "The call of the spinning wheel," he declared, "is the call of love, and love is swaraj." And in reply to Tagore, who was not particularly impressed with this apotheosis of spinning, the Mahatma wrote: "I do, indeed, ask the poet and the sage to spin the wheel as a sacrament."¹

This conception, however, was somewhat above the average understanding of Gandhi's following; and as he witnessed the burning of foreign cloth in Bombay a riot was begun there by his disciples who were displeased by the non-interest of the Parsis in *swadeshi*. The latter, even, were willing to welcome the Prince of Wales to India; they should be taught a lesson. Two policemen were brutally set upon in this fracas. Gandhi rushed to the scene. "Mahatma Gandhi, ki jai," yelled the mob, "Victory to Gandhi." The poor prophet was distressed at this greeting. You are "unmindful of two sick brethren," he said. "Men

¹ *Ibid.*, 608.

and women of Bombay . . . the swaraj which I have witnessed during the last two days has stunk in my nostrils . . . the non-violence of the non-coöperator has been worse than the violence of the coöperator. . . . I invite every Hindu and Mussulman to return to his home and to ask God's forgiveness."

Over the Moslems Mr. Gandhi's influence was somewhat slow in spreading. With the two Ali brothers he indeed made an alliance, claiming as he did so that while they believed in violence for the time being they would submit to his leadership. Also no one was more indignant over the action of the "satanic" British government in regard to the Caliphate than Gandhi. Nevertheless, the Moslems understood even less than the Hindus the purport of his message, nor were they minded to accept him as a Mahatma, not, that is, without reservations.

The Caliphate situation came very opportunely to Gandhi's assistance. Until the destruction of Turkish power at the conclusion of the war there had been no real common ground between Moslem and Hindu. But Gandhi now made the cause of the Moslem his cause. Had not Lloyd George declared during the war that the Allies did not fight "to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race." This promise, said the Hindu leader, had not been kept, and yet because of it Indian Moslems had fought for Britain. The wrong done by the treaty of Sèvres must be righted, and Moslems shall have the aid of Hindus in righting it. Whereupon the Moslem League agreed to send delegates, together with the Hindus, to an All-India Congress, a better way to achieve their ends than that taken by 18,000 poor Moslem peasants who tried to emigrate to Afghanistan from India, only to be turned back by the hostile Afridis.

The cause of the Indian extremists was also aided by the troubles which now rose in East Africa and among the Sikhs

in the Punjab. On the dark continent, and especially in South Africa, discrimination against Indian immigrants had long been a source of anti-British feeling. The Government of India, however, had been able to allay it somewhat by vigorous protests to London, and by explaining to the Indians that even the King-Emperor had no right to interfere in the domestic legislation of the Union of South Africa. But after the war, in British East Africa, now christened Kenya Colony, this excuse could not stand. Kenya was not a Dominion and the writ of the British Parliament ran as clearly there as in London. If the Indian settlers were subjects of his Britannic Majesty, which none denied, they were entitled to the same rights and privileges as were accorded to Englishmen.

These they did not have. In Kenya there were approximately 2,500,000 negroes, 22,000 Indians, 8,000 Arabs and 10,000 Europeans. The latter, after the war, made a strong plea for responsible government with a franchise so restricted that the colony would be in their control. To this the Indians made violent objection. They already outnumbered the Europeans, two to one; they had been in Africa before the coming of the British; the railways had been built by their labor and a large part of the retail business of Kenya was in their hands. A high property qualification for voting they were willing to submit to, but not to a franchise based on color. And, as if to add further to their humiliation, the white planters had demanded that the uplands in East Africa, where nights were cool and life was healthy, should be forbidden ground to Indian residents.

The British government, under these circumstances, decided that it was best for all concerned that Kenya remain a Crown colony. But the Milner Commission, of 1920, by its recommendations for the government of the colony increased the bitterness of the Indians by recommending that only two Indians should serve on the advisory council of the governor; that the highlands should be reserved for

the Whites; and that elsewhere the principle of racial segregation should be adopted. The Indians, very largely engaged in trade, had not frequented to any extent the highland plateau; but to be legally debarred from it made them indignant. Into the sympathetic ear of Mr. Gandhi their grievances now were poured.

Strife among the Sikh warriors of the Punjab, old friends of the British raj, was now added to the tribulations of the Viceroy of India. The Sikhs were disturbed about their religion. It was semi-Hindu in character, puritanical in theory, and handed down to the Sikhs through a long line of ten gurus, or religious teachers. All the Sikhs, however, did not accept the authority of the last guru. Those who did so were especially austere in their way of living, submitting to the baptism of the dagger, wearing their uncut hair in a peculiar manner, and never shaving their beards. Those Sikhs who repudiated the tenth guru were more latitudinarian in their behavior, and were said to be in a majority.¹

This religious cleavage of the Sikhs led to bloodshed. Those who did not accept the tenth guru, wealthy and powerful, were in possession of the sacred shrines; and in them, it was said, permitted practices which were opposed to what even had been taught by the first nine gurus. In consequence, the more zealous Sikhs, the reform faction, proceeded to drive out of the temples the high priests (*mahants*) who were debasing pure Sikhism. The latter in deference to vested rights were reinstated by the Government. Whereupon the reforming Sikhs organized themselves into bands (*jathas*) for the purpose of recovering the sacred shrines. As followers of Gandhi they professed non-violence, and therefore they advanced on their most sacred shrine, the Golden Temple, unarmed. Linked arm in arm a company would march steadily forward. Met by the police they

¹ Maynard, Sir J., *The Sikh Problem in the Punjab, Contemporary Rev.*, 124:293-303 (Sept., 1923).

submitted to a beating but continued to progress until laid flat on the ground by the *lathis* of the policemen, bamboo rods shod in iron.

Day after day for more than six weeks this curious spectacle was repeated. Not a village among the Sikhs but contributed a member to some one of these jathas. One of them "consisted exclusively of soldiers with either leg or arm missing, veterans of the Great War, wearing British medals." This jatha was imprisoned and not subjected to violence. The purchase of the Golden Temple finally brought this affair to a conclusion. The purchaser, a banker, gave the control of the temple to those Sikhs who followed the tenth guru, and peace ensued. The British raj, technically, legally, perhaps philosophically, had behaved with even handed justice. But in so doing a severe and repeated beating had been administered in 1922 by the paid servants of the Government of India to thousands of loyal Sikhs.

Meanwhile, came the incarceration of Gandhi and the opening sessions of the Indian legislature. The Mahatma had been granted full executive authority by the Indian Congress at the end of 1920, provided that he made no treaty with the British which did not provide for full swaraj. The head of the Moslem League had tried to commit the congress to a declaration of Indian independence. *This, however, Gandhi successfully opposed. He still fondly hoped that the British Pharaoh would yield to persuasion. At his suggestion the congress voted in favor of "non-violent, non-coöperation with the British government." It enlarged somewhat the scope of nationalist activity to include resolutions in regard to alcohol, opium and the immediate removal of "untouchability," a defiance of the whole caste system of Hinduism and a reform dear to Gandhi's heart.

The Mahatma, during 1921, was at the height of his power: soon he was to fall from it. His people, seemingly, could not bring themselves to understand the inner purport

of his teachings. A mob of non-coöperators beat to death a number of policemen. The Mahatma, by virtue of the executive authority conferred on him by the congress, there-upon promptly suspended the entire campaign of civil disobedience throughout India and proclaimed for himself a five days' fast. The Government of India, in 1922, at its wits' end, arrested Gandhi. To the welcome surprise of the authorities he pleaded guilty, stating quietly that he could not disassociate himself from the violence which had occurred. The people sometimes went mad and he had not been skillful enough to restrain them. On that account he sought a heavy sentence. He got it, six years' imprisonment, the judge in passing it paying many deserved tributes to the character of the prisoner. India remained quiet, which was a greater tribute still to the ideals for which Gandhi stood. It might quite readily be argued that India would have seen far more bloodshed had he never lived. Possibly his career during the preceding three years had been the only bulwark of peace worth the mentioning. But whether this was so or otherwise his plea of guilt did credit, if not to the logic of his mind, at least to the virtue and simplicity of his heart.

A year had now passed since the formal inauguration of the new reforms, and the Parliament of India, if we may apply such a dignified title to this legislature of little power, had been opened with full pomp and ceremony. Since the followers of Gandhi had refused to go to the polls the membership of the first Assembly was moderate in its composition. It insisted, however, on the repeal of the Rowlatt Acts, and Lord Reading, as Viceroy, agreed to their repeal, at least in so far as their worst features were concerned. His lordship, however, refused to listen to any proposals for punishing the military officers who had suppressed the rebellion in the Punjab; and he patiently explained to the Assembly that their recall to England and separation from

the Indian army was already a disgrace in military eyes. Agitation then broke out over the Esher Report, which seemed to indicate that in the future the Indian Army might be controlled from England, rather than from Delhi. Lord Reading, however, quieted the fears of the Assembly in this particular, and with skill and tact managed, for the first year, to secure a popular majority for the Government's budget.

But the session for 1922 showed a more refractory spirit. The first evidence of this was a resolution which censured the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Lloyd George. The latter, while valiantly defending the Anglo-Indians in the House of Commons, had let fall the unguarded opinion that "he could see no period when India could dispense with the guidance and assistance of the British Civil Service." This, to Indian minds, did not suggest a transitional system which would ultimately lead to the responsible government they had been promised. The agitators, thereupon, made the most of their opportunity. Even in the Council of State the Prime Minister's words were spoken of as *ill-conceived*, *unfortunate*, *disappointing*, while in the Assembly the denunciations were more violent. This passage at arms, however, was as nothing compared with a real crisis which arose over a motion made by the Government to: •

"Introduce a bill to prevent the dissemination by means of books, newspapers and other documents of matter calculated to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against, Princes or Chiefs of State in India or the Government or Administrations established in such States."

The Assembly refused to admit the bill to its first reading, a courtesy always accorded Government measures in England. This act was particularly annoying to the British authorities at Delhi; and even from the Indian point of view it was foolish since the refusal to admit automatically inhibited debate. The iron hand of the Viceroy was now felt. Lord Reading, by virtue of his prerogative, informed

the legislature that the bill would be made law. The Council of Indian Princes had asked for this protection; it would be given them. In consequence, it was placed upon the statute books through the Viceroy's power of certification.

In 1923 the scene of interest shifted from the legislature to the elections. In these, certain of the followers of Mr. Gandhi now participated while others refrained, an evidence that the second Assembly would be more radical than the first. Gandhi's influence had begun to decline even before his incarceration. He had promised swaraj within a year, if obeyed, and swaraj there was none. His advocacy of the Moslem cause had centered largely on the sacredness of the Caliphate, and Turkey, now triumphant over the Greeks, could not so readily be envisaged as a martyred nation. Furthermore, many of his disciples saw an opportunity lost by foregoing administrative posts in the provincial governments. They wanted to "swamp the councils and to follow there the methods of obstruction." Here were new fields in which the Anglo-Indians might be made uncomfortable. Let us obtain such posts, they said, and it will be easier to persuade the people not to pay taxes. Gandhi, however, was not convinced. He advocated still, a boycott against all state schools, law courts and political life. Salvation for India he believed would come mainly through the spinning wheel and the removal of untouchability.¹ Let the Indians concentrate first on social and economic reforms.

But a majority of the Indian Nationalist Congress was determined to try its hand at the elections, and therefore it

¹As one of Gandhi's disciples put it to the Indian people: "To suit your kind you have hay, you have straw, you have fodder . . . you set apart at your meal time a portion for the crow and a portion for the dog, but you are so careful that you do not give to your own brother even the right that belongs to the crow and the dog to share with you . . . unless this problem of the untouchables is solved . . . there is no tomorrow for this doomed race." *Swarajya* (Daily newspaper of Madras) Sunday, October 22nd, 1922.

voted against continuing the boycotts except that on foreign cloth; and, more out of respect for their imprisoned leader than for any other reason, they placed the franchise for the Indian Congress at a number of hundred yards of cotton thread, home spun, per month. The thread was cheap and in the market. The resolution, therefore, was meaningless.

This could not be said, however, of the entrance of the Swarajists into the political field. They only carried the election in two of the eight provinces, namely Bengal and the United Provinces, and in the Indian Assembly they failed of a majority. None the less, during the next year, 1924, they were able to stir up much trouble along precedents established decades ago by Parnell at Westminster.

In the second Legislative Assembly, the strength of parties, still more or less embryonic, ran as follows:

Conservative or nominated members	46
Swarajists (non-coöperators who rejected Gandhi's advice) .	45
Liberals or independents	38
Special interests	15

The Conservative members who were not nominated, for the most part were large landowners who preferred the status quo. An alliance, however, was possible and one was concluded between the Swarajists and the Liberals, the former conceding as much to liberal idealism as was essential to gaining the majority. The Swarajists had stood for independence, and barring that, were willing to accept complete Dominion status for India. But for the time being they joined hands with the Liberals and demanded Dominion status except in so far as the army, navy and foreign affairs were concerned.

The details of this scheme were not insisted on by the insurrectionary forces; in fact they had not worked them out. They asked only for a round table conference to draft a scheme for full responsible government in India, "to be submitted to a newly elected assembly for its ap-

proval, thereafter to be submitted to the British Parliament for embodiment in statute."

This whole idea was anathema to the British, who five years before had introduced what seemed to them a generous measure of devolution. Also, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were only intended to last ten years. At the conclusion of this time they were to be reviewed in the hope that a more democratic constitution might be introduced. The Indians should be patient and prove first that they could successfully operate such constitutional powers as had been given them. Thus argued official India.

But the Swarajists having allied themselves with the Liberals, organized a National party, and since "no supplies without redress of grievances" was a good old English slogan, they threw out the Government's budget. Under these circumstances Lord Reading did the only thing possible; he certified the budget, thus making it legal without the sanction of the Assembly.

This exercise of the heavy hand was duplicated in the two provinces where the Swarajists had a majority. The latter, by refusing to coöperate in Bengal and the United Provinces had rendered the dyarchy inoperative. The governors of these provinces were compelled, in order that administration function at all, to take back the transferred services into their own keeping, and to place over them men nominated by themselves and not responsible to the Swarajist legislature.

So closed the year 1924; and there were at that time only two important difficulties which blocked the successful outcome of the non-coöperative movement. One of these was the tendency on the part of some Swarajists to yield to the enticements of actual power and to participate in the forbidden fruits of governmental authority; the other was a decided increase in Hindu-Moslem antagonism which undermined all unity of Indian action against the British raj.

The temptation to the Swarajists to have a hand in the

drawing up of laws which affected the railway and tariff policy of India was too strong to be resisted. In 1925, we even find them serving on official committees, and one of them acted as President of the Legislative Assembly. In the provincial legislatures the same phenomenon was noted. In theory their creed was summarized by "refusal of supplies; refusal of office; mass disobedience." In practice they changed their policy and accepted office under provincial governors. As ministers in their provincial cabinets they could shape policies and appoint subordinates. Would it not be foolish to reject such chances? In Bengal, even the legislature voted salaries to the ministers of the Crown, thus within one year reversing their constitutional position. The Swarajist party within twelve months was tending to become his Majesty's Opposition.

It would have been much more effective in this rôle had it done so as a unit. Gandhi, released from prison, protested eagerly against this coöperation, and the line of cleavage between the die-hard Swarajists and those who believed in "responsible coöperation" perceptibly widened. The Mahatma, disgusted with politics, retired at the end of 1925 for a year of meditation. His influence, however, did not die, and the Swarajist organization was torn asunder.

Its disintegration had already been hastened by the withdrawal of Moslem support. Good feeling between Moslem and Hindu had begun to evaporate several years before, as a result of certain occurrences on the Malabar coast where Moslems had made trouble for themselves by slaying Hindus. In the inaccessible lagoons and on the marshy uplands of that obscure corner of British India lived the Moplahs. These descendants of native women by Arab sailors were over a million in number, and were very warlike as well as very ignorant Moslems. Word, apparently, reached them that the Ali brothers, good Moslems both, had declared an Indian Republic. Promptly then the Moplahs, with knives and swords and spears, started on their own account to

secure a little swaraj. The principal victims of this uprising were peaceful Hindus in the vicinity. Government troops, however, lost their lives and the rebellion was subdued with difficulty, but not until many hundred Hindus had been done to death, as well as insurrectionary Moplahs.¹

Then came the new reforms and a renewed outbreak of ill feeling. It seemed impossible to hold elections without religious rivalry. The disasters which had overwhelmed Turkey no longer offered a common ground for protest. The Indian Moslems washed their hands of Turkey; had not the radical Kemal abolished the Caliphate of his own accord and so shown himself a religious renegade? The foremost concern of the Moslems was to secure minority representation in the various councils, and this the British seemed willing to grant. Only the Hindus, with their large numerical majority, demanded representation on the basis of population.

The Hindu reformers, on the other hand, in many instances showed more interest in religion than in politics. Lajpat Rai gave up political propaganda to organize a society for the reconversion to Hinduism of the descendants of those Hindus forcibly converted to Mohammedanism several hundred years before. And as he did so the Moslems replied in kind by campaigns among the "untouchables," the outcasts.

Throughout 1925 and 1926 the old story of Hindu-Moslem feud and riot was heard again. Once a year, on the anniversary of the sacrifice of Isaac offered by Abraham, the Moslems killed a cow. Even when this was done quietly it sent a shudder down the spines of all orthodox Hindus. The Moslems, when they paraded their creed and likewise the sacrificial animal, could be assured of a resulting riot. As for the Hindus, they were accustomed several times a

¹ A number of the latter taken prisoners, died of suffocation in a freight car on their way to prison. Indian opinion was quick to note the analogy between this event and the suffocation of Englishmen in the "black hole of Calcutta" in a bygone period.

year to conduct ceremonies in the public streets to the accompaniment of loud and weird music. The sound of this in front of mosques and at the hour of prayer was equally disturbing to Moslem sensibilities.

The Moslem-Hindu hatred has been so frequently advanced by British writers as an argument in favor of Britain's continued supremacy some might perhaps argue that the noise of contending Hindu-Moslem mobs is not altogether displeasing to the Government of India. But not yet has there appeared any evidence of a deliberate attempt to retain power by turning Moslem against Hindu, or vice versa. Nor is this explanation of their mutual dislike necessary. The Moslems, neither as wealthy, as educated or as numerous as the Hindus, distrust the latter; and no matter how far the fanaticism of their leaders might carry them it could not exceed that of Mr. Gandhi. To quote from the Mahatma: "The central fact of Hinduism, however, is cow protection . . . the cow is the poem of pity. . . . She is the Mother to millions of Indian mankind. Protection of the cow means protection of the whole dumb creation of God. . . . Cow protection is the gift of Hinduism to the world." As long as Mr. Gandhi and the Hindus feel this way an intimate rapprochement with the Moslems seems improbable.

And what of India's future? Let us take counsel with those who are conversant with India's problems and who have enjoyed first-hand experience in that country. They fall, generally speaking, into three groups; the first regards the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms as unfortunate and is prepared, if necessary, to strengthen or at least to retain unmodified the present British control; the second is optimistic, and believes that the gradual devolution of the Indian government will, in the course of time, bring east and west to a common understanding; and the third, the Indian nationalist, insists upon full Home Rule or independence

in the immediate future, and is eager not so much for a common understanding as for making yet more definite the points of difference between Occident and Orient.

In the first category belong a large number, perhaps a majority, of the Indian Civil Service, at least that section of it which is retired. One of the most vigorous exponents of their point of view is Sir Michael O'Dwyer, ex-governor of the Punjab. According to Sir Michael, the efficiency of the civil service has declined greatly since the giving of the reforms. It is increasingly difficult to recruit men in England for service in the sub-continent. There are but 1,200 British now left in the Indian Civil Service and the pension of £1,000 a year which is theirs after twenty-five years of hard work, and to which they must contribute from their salary, is not sufficiently conducive, under the present state of affairs, to bring forward the best men. In the old days, when the initiation of Indian policy was almost exclusively in their hands, it was different; but now, having in large measure to take orders from Indian superiors, they are restive and ill content. As for the Indian majorities in both the central and the provincial legislatures, and the resolutions which they propose, Sir Michael has this to say: "If even a fraction of these resolutions was given effect to, the administration, civil and military, today would be in a state of complete paralysis, and disorder and sedition would be rampant over all the land."¹ Even the British Viceroy now cater, in his opinion, to the Indian Nationalists and disregard the real interests of the Indian peoples. Particularly noticeable in this respect is their yielding to the clamor in India for a protective tariff. The duty on cloth has been raised thirty-three per cent, supposedly in the interest of home industries. The result has been, according to the ex-governor, that a few mill owners receive from thirty to one hundred per cent dividends, the price of cloth goes correspondingly higher, and the poor Indians suffer.

¹ *British Dominion Year Book for 1924*, 37.

To maintain their influence in India the British officials refuse to look facts in the face. They protest to England in regard to the status of Indians in Africa when as a matter of fact Indians receive much fairer treatment there than they do at the hand of their own Nationalists. The reforms are on the statute book and an effort must be made to live up to them. But, if Sir Michael's testimony is trustworthy, the future is far from glowing. The Indians have little to complain of. Tea, sugar and tobacco, heavily taxed in the old country, are free in India, the tax on salt is very slight, and the Indians are subject to a Government which is both just and benign.

To the second category belong many members of the Civil Service and also a majority of the missionaries. To their number may be added certain of the better known Indian leaders who have had experience in administrative work. These men regard the reforms with favor. They need modification, of course; there should be more decentralization throughout. The India Office at Whitehall should have less control over Delhi; the central government should leave more responsibility to the provinces; and a greater number of portfolios should be intrusted to Indians.¹ But these changes will come in time. Meanwhile, adjustments are taking place steadily and the number of Indians who are filling governmental posts in an efficient manner is steadily increasing.

This temperate, middle-of-the-road, British estimate of the reforms is supported by Indian opinion of the old moderate school. Representatives of it point out many ways in which India is progressing in self-government. Calcutta, for instance, the second largest city in the Empire, with one-fifth of the revenue of Bengal, is almost entirely self-governing, eighty per cent of the members of the city council being elected by the rate-payers. Likewise in provincial administration real power is exercised by Indian

¹ Lord Willingdon in *United Empire*, XVI, ii et seq.

members of the governor's council. In Bengal, Lord Ronaldshay appointed Indians to three out of four positions in his cabinet, there being one Englishman, one Moslem and two Hindus. Of these, the two Hindus were also elected members of the legislature and were responsible to it. One had charge of education, the other headed the department of local government which included sanitation. Concerning the work of the latter we may read a first-hand account. A number of British sub-officials were under his direction and he seems to have been on good terms with them.¹ In regard to the water supply of Bengalese towns, flood prevention, medical schools and precautions against various diseases the final word rested with the Indian official and he was not loath to say it. The only real opposition which confronted him was caused by his determination to Indianize as rapidly as possible the men employed in his department. Given a tactful governor, the functioning of the new reforms, from the point of view of those who are content to learn slowly, is progressing fairly well.

And this opinion of the moderates is supported wholeheartedly by a host of missionaries who, perhaps better than any other class, are seemingly able to see both sides of the complex problem. As a body they are impressed by the apparent approach to a Christian ethic on the part of Indian leaders like Tagore and Gandhi; they realize that in the last analysis the Christian church in India must be autonomous, self-supporting as well as self-governing; they look with approval on the efforts of the Swarajists to purify and moderate the caste system; and for the work of many extremists in regard to social reform, the drink and opium evils, they have high regard. At the same time their eyes are not shut to what they regard as the more seamy side of Hinduism, the prevalence of a debased idol worship among the outcasts, the existence here and there (rumored) of temple prostitution, and the tendency toward neurotic

¹ Banerjea, S., *A Nation in the Making*, 333 et seq.

violence on the part of certain of the more revolutionary idealists. To the missionary mind the reforms offer a fortunate breathing space during which there may be opportunity for the genuine spiritual values of eastern culture to blend with western energy and hopefulness of outlook.

To this praise of the missionary the Indian Nationalist would promptly enter a vigorous denial. To the Nationalist the fact that the missionaries come from the west, in itself, vitiates their judgment; and the added fact that they are *missionaries* distorts their point of view. The Government of India, it is claimed, only admits missionaries who are predisposed to support the authorities.¹ How then can the missionary be considered fair? To this assertion there is no complete rebuttal. No doubt the missionary point of view is distorted; no doubt a darker picture is given of social and religious conditions in the peninsula than the situation warrants. But none the less the missionary speaks and writes with greater calm and broader tolerance than either Anglo-Indian or Nationalist. He may not be fair; but relative to other classes he has less prejudice and displays less passion. He is from the west, it is true; but his religion had its origin in the east.

In the third category are to be found those Indians who are profoundly dissatisfied with the continuance of any British control. Their instant demand varies from a program of "fiscal autonomy, national militia, and equal treatment of Indians in British colonies," to complete independence. They note that the average cost of the British soldier to the Indian treasury is 1,900 rupees a year, but that the cost of a sepoy is but 400 rupees; why then should India pay for 60,000 British troops quartered within her borders? Also, they note that 1,200 British officials in the Civil Service receive salaries which to Indian eyes are exorbitant; why not supplant them by the native born? But far more

¹ Cornelius, J. J., *An Oriental Looks at Christian Missions*, *Harper's*, 154:598-606 (April, 1927).

disturbing is the sense of inferiority under which the Indians labor. There are but 100,000 British of all descriptions, soldiers, merchants, civil servants, in control of 300,000,000 people. There must be something lacking in the will, the energy, the courage and the character of the latter to endure this! The Indian discontent rising out of this phenomenon would seem but a part of the great wave of xenophobia following in the wake of the Great War. And the Indian extremists, thinking that for the time being they are helpless, turn back on their own past history; and like the Irish at the beginning of the century dream of a golden age in the bygone which the historian suspects is but a mirage.

Thus, writes Mr. Das, who succeeded Gandhi for some little time as the head of the Swarajists: "We had corn in our granaries; our tanks supplied us with fish; and the eye was soothed and refreshed with the limpid blue of the sky and green foliage of the trees. All day long the peasant toiled in the fields; and at eve, returning to his lamp lit home, he sang the song of his heart."¹ The pastoral loveliness of this scene, according to the writer, disappeared with the coming of the English. Yet, as another writer explains it, the intruder had nothing to boast of. The Hindus taught the Arabs algebra, and Pythagoras the scales of music; the Persians contributed paper and the Chinese printing and the compass. "Since the crusades and before the eighteenth century the western swashbucklers came to us for gold, silk, Damascene work and the real arts of civilization. They kept on coming as beggars to the gate of a royal palace. Till the eighteenth century they were our debtors, and they stole a march on us when they superseded man-and-animal power by steam and electricity. Their civilization began with the steam engine and will end with aerial navigation. In a hundred years more they are finished . . . and their souls dead."² And in this way a sense

¹ Ronaldshay, Lord, *The Heart of Aryavarta*, 93.

² Mukerji, D. G., *My Brother's Face*, 103.

of pride and superiority is implanted in the mind of the Hindus as strong and stubborn in quality as the ignorant glorification of western progress.

One would hesitate to apply this attitude of mind to the entire Swaraj party. That organization consists of many elements. Among them are the followers of Gandhi who appreciate the real potentialities of non-coöperation; those followers of the Mahatma who, having caught his idea but not his spirit, would destroy the machinery of government by participating in it; and also the wilder revolutionists who, drunk with the doctrine of violence strained from the Bhagavad Gita and Kali worship, explode bombs.

This summary of Indian opinion is incomplete. It omits, for instance, the work of Tagore and that of his school, the Vishva Bharati. But Tagore would seem so far above the battle, dwelling so serenely on philosophic heights, that an interpretation of his message to the world would take us far afield from the humdrum stage of Indian politics. As for the agricultural laborers, the main body of the Indian peoples, who can speak for them?

In 1929 the trial period of the new reforms will end. Moslem and Hindu, coöperator and non-coöperator, Swarajist and communist,¹ Anglo-Indian and Indian all look forward to that day, some with hope, others with foreboding. But to whom will go the victory? This, no man may prophesy intelligently.

The actors on the little Indian stage should not, however, draw attention from the Asian theater in which the coming drama is produced nor the Indian atmosphere in which it will be played. Asia lies in the grip of the Industrial Revolution. High prices, unemployment, a disturbed industrial life are to be met with everywhere in the Far East. To

¹ *The Vanguard*, advertised as "The Central Organ of the Communist Party of India" claims to be non-Bolshevik in tendency. (*The Vanguard*, Sept. 15th, 1923). At the same time it is affiliated with the Third International, a contradiction in terms. How large a clientele it represents it is impossible to determine.

blame Great Britain for this situation is unfair as well as futile. The steam engine knows no flag, the dynamo no nationalism. The temporary evils which they introduce would have arrived had Britain never trod on Indian soil. This, from the British point of view in all fairness should be stated.

But man does not live by bread alone, nor in the surge and counter-surge of economic forces is he a helpless child. Ideas still rule the world. India is the eastern cradle land of human thought. Perhaps from here shall come (who knows) a philosophic solvent for the woes which afflict western lands as well as eastern. Once weld the subjectivity of the east to western individualism and from that union there may spring a renaissance of thought and culture compared with which the machine age in which we live may seem both drab and pitiful.

Let India's poet-prophet, Tagore, conclude this chapter. "Your western mind," he tells us, "is too much obsessed with the idea of conquest. Your inveterate habit of proselytism is another form of it. Christ never preached himself or any dogma or doctrine. He preached the love of God. The object of a Christian should be to be like Christ—never to be like a coolie recruiter, trying to bring coolies to his master's tea garden. Preaching your doctrine is no sacrifice at all—it is indulging in a luxury far more dangerous than all the luxuries of material living. It breeds an illusion in your mind that you are doing your duty—that you are wiser and better than your fellow beings. But the real preaching is in being perfect which is through meekness and love and self-dedication." ¹

¹ *Swaraja*, April 31st, 1922.

CHAPTER XII

THE VALLEY OF THE NILE

In 1882 the British began the occupation of Egypt; in 1927 British troops were still encamped in the land of the Pharaohs. The necessity of their coming and the ethics of their remaining, present many a problem to both historian and philosopher. In their nicety, these may not be appreciated without a full understanding of the background, both British and Egyptian. To describe this in regard to 1882, alone, is a herculean task. It will not be attempted. One may not analyze in one paragraph Khedival extravagance, European greed, anti-foreign riots, Suez Canal phobias, Franco-British agreements and disagreements. One may, however, portray the general background of 1927, there perhaps to find revealed the reasons which explain why the Union Jack still flies in Egypt.

The map in the atlas is of more utility here than the printed page; geography takes precedence over politics; the Nile valley is the most important feature of the background. It seems curious that the ancients should have been so ignorant of the upper reaches of the Nile. Forth from the mythical mountains of the moon, with their snow covered peaks still unsubdued by tropical suns, for nearly three and a third thousand miles the Nile makes its way to lower Egypt, the sole source there of fertility and life. From the bracing highlands where Lakes Victoria and Albert Nyanza lie, it foams and surges through gorge and chasm to the Sudan plateau, there loses itself for hundreds of miles in floating swamps of papyrus and sudd, recovers once again its bearings near Fashoda, now Kodok, and for another five hundred miles flows peacefully until joined at

Khartoum by the shorter Blue Nile, descending westward from Abyssinian mountains. The White Nile and the Blue, once married, become full boisterous again, and curving magnificently in two wide-flung arcs plunge through six further rapids before the majority of the gentle fellaheen become acquainted with their waters.

Nature, roughly speaking, divided this valley into three parts, Egypt, the Sudan plateau, and the more mountainous terrain to the south; and this threefold division the historian would do well to keep in mind. The history of Egypt is distinct from that of the Sudan; yet it cannot be understood without reference to that spacious domain to the south, to which so recently the French have looked with longing eyes. Nor, on the other hand, should Sudanese history be studied without reference to Uganda and the headwaters of the Nile, where French missionaries and explorers vied in not altogether friendly fashion with their British brethren.

First in importance of the three comes Egypt. Here, by 1885, the British were firmly entrenched; and here, under the direction of Sir Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer, they were destined to accomplish much good. This renowned proconsul of Great Britain had been in Egypt since the early days of the occupation, and by the end of the century his influence had grown so steadily that it was well-nigh supreme. By him the impossible had been accomplished; the land of Egypt, if not a paradise, at least had been redeemed from chaos. To Cromer's suggestions the Government at London gave unqualified approval; and as for Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, he likewise, for other reasons, did not withhold assent.

The form of government in Egypt from the days of occupation to the end of the Cromer régime was peculiar. Hereditary overlord of the country was the Sultan, and to him yearly tribute was remitted. As Caliph of the western Moslem world his influence in Egyptian affairs ever was

an uncertain factor, and against intrigue and plot hatched on the shores of the Bosphorus it was necessary to be on guard. Secondly, the Khedive, as successor to the Ptolemies, appointed and dismissed all officers of state, supposedly formulated policies, signed decrees and enforced them. Through his agency alone was Cromer authorized to work his will in Egypt. Thirdly, the *caisse de la dette*, or international commission representing European bondholders, retained control of certain taxes and from the receipts subtracted interest charges. And in the fourth place, the capitulations, customary privileges granted foreigners, still further complicated Egyptian politics. Consular courts and mixed tribunals had jurisdiction over criminal cases in which Europeans or Americans were involved; and more serious yet, the capitulations forbade the levying of any direct tax in Egypt upon the foreign resident, a fact which automatically made impossible any income or inheritance tax in the country; for to exempt the foreigner was, in all simple justice, to exempt the Egyptian likewise.

And finally there was Cromer, Consul-General of her Majesty. The title of his post was not imposing, nor in juristic theory was his power different in kind from that of his American colleague. The British Consul-General only *advised* the Khedive, and anyone might do that. But British troops paced the streets of Cairo and Cromer's admonitions were treated with respect. Arabi Bey was an exile in Ceylon. Neither Tewfik nor his successor, Abbas Hilmi, cared to follow him. In consequence, they listened and approved. The choice of an Egyptian Prime Minister, the appointment of the Egyptian cabinet, the desirability of promulgating certain laws, the wisdom of selecting various Englishmen as advisers to the heads of the different departments of the Egyptian government, financial, juristic, educational, the nomination also of an Englishman as Sirdar of the Egyptian army: upon matters such as these the Khedive consulted with the Earl. For a resourceful

mind it gave an opportunity to embark upon an extensive program. And Cromer did so.

The military position of the British in Egypt was secure; but most certainly all Europe thought this Briton would end his career in financial disaster. To upwards of £100,000,000, the Egyptian national debt had crept; and now for several years had come increased indebtedness. The destruction of European property caused by Arabi's revolt had not been paid for, nor had the lamentable expedition of Hicks Pasha into the heart of the Sudan. With the economic recovery of the southern states in America after the civil war the price of cotton fell, and maladministration had wrecked the machinery of Egyptian economics. What could Cromer do?

There was but one chance for Egypt; to go further into debt in order that her more pressing obligations be met and that her house be set in order; and this once done, with every possible economy and with every possible utilization of her natural resources, begin a slow rehabilitation. Cromer took that chance. He borrowed some £8,000,000, spent £7,000,000 on immediate obligations, and with £1,000,000 attempted the reconstruction of Egypt's economic prestige. Aided by Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff and the Nile he accomplished this. Below Cairo, from the Rosetta to the Damietta branch of the river there stretched the half-completed and now half-wrecked barrage begun by able engineers from France. Scott-Moncrieff, hastening at the summons of Cromer from his irrigation work in India, repaired this barrage and finished its construction. By prodigious and scientific labor, he and his assistants brought to the delta of the Nile such fertility as it had never witnessed, and then, turning to fresh fields of conquest, attacked the irrigation problem of upper Egypt.

The race with bankruptcy was close and only by a narrow margin was Cromer able to meet Egypt's obligations. But the crisis once passed, a surplus, ever increasing year

by year, enabled him to push through reforms much needed. As the pressure of the debt grew gradually lighter, the British engineers planned the great barrage at the first cataract, the Assuan Dam. The immensity of that feat of engineering, the facts and figures of its cost and size, the amount of water impounded by it, the increased acreage due to its operation, and the substitution of two crops annually for one from Assuan to Cairo; this story is more germane to a history of modern Egypt than to a narrative of the Empire. But in its completion there was for all sufficient glory, and especially for Cromer, whose careful husbanding of Egyptian resources made this work possible.

Meanwhile, Cromer, at the earliest signs of financial convalescence, began the work of social reformation. The *courbash*, Egyptian whip of rhinoceros hide, had been for centuries plied upon the bare back of the recalcitrant fellaheen. Even before the coming of Cromer in 1882 it had been, at the suggestion of the newly arrived British, officially abolished by Khedival decree. But the enforcement of this edict against brutal punishment by local sheik or mudir was only made possible by Cromer's insistence. There followed then the ending of the *corvée*, compulsory labor on the canals for which many thousand fellaheen were annually drafted, and likewise the entire reorganization of the Department of Justice. Sanitation also engaged the attention of the British. The death rate in Egypt was high and plagues swept over the valley of the Nile in the days of Cromer as well as in the days of Moses. With six million people and their live stock obtaining drinking water from the same stream into which their drains emptied, and with medicine on a medieval basis of charms and incantations, it could not well be otherwise.

To rid political life of corruption, to establish audits and accounting in an Oriental country, to pay salaries to the inevitable governmental bureaucracy that there might be no excuse for bribery, to advertise for bids for public works



LORD CROMER

instead of utilizing ancient methods of favoritism, to start schools, to build bridges, jails, railways, post offices and to lower taxes; these are a few of the occupations which, within Egypt proper, engaged Cromer's attention.

South of Wadi Halfa and the second cataract of the Nile lay the Sudan. How far this land of misrule and disorder reached no man could say. Somewhere to the west was the Sahara; somewhere to the east one came on Abyssinia; to the south one found, if one knew how, the lakes of central Africa. Until the twentieth century it did not seem necessary to know how. Only to the north did the Sudan have a definite boundary. At Wadi Halfa the Nile ripped through a gorge which could be easily defended on either side. This was the neck of the Egyptian bottle, the passageway through which the nomadic tribesmen of the Sudan, on plunder bent, had penetrated in centuries long past.

The Dervishes of the Sudan, since time immemorial, had been slave-traders, raiding the less warlike negroes to the south and selling them in northern Africa and Arabia. To end this foul traffic Ismail Khedive had conquered them in the mid-nineteenth century. The financial troubles, however, which beset the poor Egyptians shortly afterwards, and which led to British intervention in their country, weakened Egypt's grip on her new conquest. General Gordon, sent by Gladstone to withdraw her scattered garrisons, was murdered at Khartoum and the Egyptians put to flight. Since his death in 1884 the Sudan had been left to its own bad devices. The British found sufficient outlet for their surplus energy in Ireland and Afghanistan. Egypt was poverty stricken, and the British officials there advised that the historic defenses of the second cataract at Wadi Halfa be considered the southern terminus of civilization.

The Mahdi, the crazed yet wily leader of the Dervishes, continued to wage intermittent warfare. The Dervishes made forays toward Suakim and the Red Sea; they also

rushed the defenses of Wadi Halfa, only to be badly routed. Meanwhile, the entire Sudan, from the Sahara to Abyssinia, from Victoria Nyanza to Wadi Halfa, was given over to bloodshed. The original Mahdi did not long survive his celebrated victim, Chinese Gordon; and Abdullah, the new Mahdi, failed to maintain his predecessor's glory. The King of Abyssinia fell in battle, it is true, and his skull was added to the famous and fast-growing pile at Omdurman. Also the mutinous Dervishes who lived near Dongola in the northern Sudan, and near Darfur in the west, were subdued. But trouble still continued. An anti-Mahdi claimed the sceptre in opposition to Abdullah. To the extreme south the Egyptian garrisons of the Equatorial Provinces waged semi-war until relieved by Stanley. Only by establishing a reign of terror at Omdurman, and by punitive expeditions constantly renewed against his own rebellious subjects, was Abdullah able to retain his power.

In the interim, Egypt, administered under the auspices of Lord Cromer, began slowly and painfully to reconstruct its army. The cowed and beaten forces which feebly had withstood the British occupation were in sorry plight. They were without pay, without officers, without discipline. These defects, however, British officers soon remedied, and first among them was Colonel Herbert Horatio Kitchener.

The latter had seen long years of service in the Near East, in Cyprus, Palestine and Egypt. He had been a staff officer under Wolseley in the latter's belated effort to rescue Gordon; he had distinguished himself later by fighting the Dervishes at Suakim; from 1889 to 1892 he had been Adjutant General of the army; and in the latter year he became Sirdar, or Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Egyptian command. As such his rule was absolute. And it continued to be so, as young Abbas Hilmi discovered on his return to his father's throne from his school in Vienna. The new Khedive criticized a review of his own troops. Kitchener instantly resigned; and from the Khedive an

apology was demanded and obtained before the Sirdar was placated and persuaded to resume command.

The army was only 18,000 strong, and of necessity raised by conscription. But it was well paid and officered; Kitchener saw to that. No married officer might hope to serve under him. One sick leave could be obtained from the Sirdar and only one. The army was Kitchener's life; it must also be that of his subordinates. To every native Egyptian battalion he assigned three British soldiers, two to serve as Bimbashis or Majors, one as a non-commissioned drill sergeant; for the black battalions, attached to Egypt's army, the number was increased to four. With these few Whites he was content. They were all young. The Sirdar in 1898 was only forty-eight years old, and but one English officer in the entire Egyptian army touched half a century.

In 1896 the army was conditioned and Egypt solvent; it was now possible to redeem the Sudan. Furthermore, disaster to Italian arms directly invited British intervention. By agreement with Italy, Kassala in the eastern Sudan had been recognized as a British sphere of influence, to be, however, garrisoned by Italian troops. These were now hard pressed by the Khalifa. To attack Abdullah on the Nile at Dongola would relieve pressure on the friendly Italians near the Abyssinian frontier. And if this was done future trouble with the French might also be averted. The latter, seemingly jealous of England's growing prestige in the lower Nile valley, had penetrated far inland from the French Congo toward the upper Nile. It was high time to act if that region was to be included, safely and permanently, within the spacious confines of the Empire. So thought the Tory government at London.

There was but one difficulty, that of finance. The Egyptian treasury at last boasted a surplus, but its control was vested by international agreement in the hands of a debt commission on which all the powers were represented. The

Government of Egypt, at the suggestion of Lord Cromer, requested one-fifth of the amount, a paltry £500,000. The International Debt Commission voted to grant it, the Italian and German representatives supporting the British against the French and Russian. But France now appealed this decision to the law courts, the mixed tribunals, and won. Egypt was thus inhibited from spending her own surplus. England, however, now countered by advancing the necessary funds from the British treasury. The first step had been taken toward the Sudan's recovery in Egypt's name.

So it came about that as Victoria held her Jubilee in pomp and splendor a few thousand of her loyal subjects toiled south from Wadi Halfa. Through dust and heat and sandstorm they pushed their way, accompanied by a brown army of Egyptian fellaheen and by a black Sudanese contingent in Egypt's pay, both officered by the British. The campaign on which they had embarked was to last three years. For the most part it was undramatic. Aided by railway and telegraph, by steamboat and camel corps, Kitchener made his slow advance. The locomotives were of uncertain age, some dating back to Ismail's time, in origin both American and English. Kitchener's mechanics were Italians, his laborers Egyptian, his supplies long distances away, his purse strictly limited. Such a situation the Sirdar enjoyed; it offered him free play for his marvelous administrative gifts. And now, in 1896, he concentrated his few Egyptian troops, withdrew his garrisons from the Red Sea, replaced them by detachments drawn from India, and attacked Dongola. That northern fortress of the Sudan having fallen, the Sirdar, in 1897, drove his railway some two hundred and thirty miles across the Nubian desert to Abu-Hamed on the Nile, thus shortening his distance by avoiding the six hundred miles of the curving arc of the great river, and facilitating his advance by the absence of rapids.

The camel corps, well in advance of the railway, was

now in touch with the Dervish outposts; and with the coming of the next year Kitchener prepared for the final advance to Abdullah's capital. It commenced with a sharp attack at Atbara on the eastern bank of the Nile, where a great host of Arabs were encamped. By long range artillery fire Kitchener destroyed their zareba; but he did not capture it without loss of many Egyptian lives. The Arabs fled across the river and joined the Mahdi at Omdurman. From that town Abdullah advanced north to meet his foes. Kitchener misled him into expecting a night attack. Since it did not materialize, Abdullah, with a supreme disregard of consequences, fell upon his enemy in broad daylight in one great massed onslaught.

The Egyptian fellaheen, the black Sudanese and the two brigades of British troops withstood it easily: for the Dervishes it was a holocaust. All morning long the Arabs charged furiously, some armed with rifles, some with muskets, some with spears. As one observer wrote: "They never got near and they refused to go back."¹ They preferred to die. The ground was covered with the white clothes of the Arabs like a snowstorm. The rifles of the Egyptians and of the British became so hot that they had constantly to be exchanged for new ones from the reserve supply.* It was more of a slaughter than a fight. Some 11,000 Dervishes were killed this day, some 16,000 wounded. Of those captured, unwounded, there were but 400. The total Anglo-Egyptian loss was inconsiderable, a hundred and thirty of the British were killed; of the Egyptians and their Sudanese allies, two hundred and fifty-six.

Omdurman lay not far away. To the advancing British the Dervish capital seemed deserted. Within its walls Kitchener found a few prisoners of the now fugitive Abdullah, some old men and women, much poverty, squalor and decay. He did not stay here long. The Mahdi's tomb was levelled to the dust, and the victorious Anglo-Egyptians

¹ Steevens, G. W., *With Kitchener to Khartoum*, 264.

crossing the river and going south entered Khartoum. There was no resistance. The Khalifa had already fled westward to the wilds of Kordofan with such few of his tribesmen as remained faithful and alive. The city where Gordon died was reoccupied, such portions of it as were standing. Over the ramparts, at the junction of the White and Blue Niles, flew side by side and at equal elevation the flags of Britain and of Egypt. The brunt of the campaign was over. An army of 23,000, for the greater part Sudanese and Egyptian, had made such poor amends as lay within its power for the abandonment of Chinese Gordon fourteen years before.

The significance of Khartoum's occupation by the Anglo-Egyptian troops does not lie, however, in any petty desire to avenge Gordon's death, nor should it be viewed mainly from any altruistic viewpoint. A resolute and determined people, such as the British, would scarcely have waited fourteen years had a longing for hot revenge characterized their action; nor, on the other hand, was their motive one of Bayard-like chivalry toward their Italian friends, or even the wish to regenerate and make clean the domains of the Mahdi. Old-fashioned imperialistic dreams, sharp jealousies, well-worn theories of the balance of power, fears fathered by diplomatic history of the old tradition; these were the major reasons which led to Kitchener's advance. In other words, the English did not want the French in the upper valley of the Nile.

To understand the seeming danger which confronted Britain and the background of the situation, it is necessary to turn in some detail to two regions intimately related to the Nile valley, Uganda and Abyssinia; for it must be remembered that the former country bordered on Lakes Victoria Nyanza and Albert Nyanza, and therefore controlled the headwaters of the White Nile; while the latter, flanking the great river to the east, contained within its

boundaries the sources of the Blue Nile as well as the larger part of that river's course.

Any comprehension, however, of the intricate situation in Uganda takes us back to 1887 and the Anglo-German agreement in regard to the territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar. His Majesty, the Sultan, signed in that year an agreement by which he consented to be shorn of much territory. The island of Zanzibar was to remain under his sovereignty and on the mainland a strip of territory, ten sea miles in depth. The hinterland was then divided between England and Germany, the latter country to the south, the former to the north. The Sultan, meanwhile, virtually partitioned such territory as remained in his possession on the mainland between the British East African Association and the German East African Company, granting for fifty years all rights of trading, fishing, railway construction; and to the Sultan was reserved a founder's share in both organizations. This consisted in ten per cent of the net profits remaining over and above the first eight per cent paid to the shareholders, a poor bargain since eight per cent profits were never realized. These concessions the Sultan was said to have made voluntarily; he liked the British, and the latter asserted on evidence not over-satisfactory that for many years he had desired that the Union Jack fly over a large portion of his domain.¹

The British East African Association now became the British East African Company, a joint stock business concern for the purpose of administering and exploiting Britain's share of this East African region. Financially, the company was unsuccessful; the capital was small, the acreage under its control enormous and difficult of access. Furthermore, time and treasure were freely wasted on incessant boundary quarrels with the Teutonic neighbor to the south. And even after the general Anglo-German agree-

¹ Woolf, L., *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, 250 et seq.

ment of 1890 ended that dispute, there still remained the problem of Uganda.

This kingdom, if a congeries of native states dominated by the King of Buganda could be called such, lay directly to the west of British East Africa. For its possession British, French and German agents had all actively worked. The Germans, however, officially recognized in 1890 that it lay within the sphere of British influence, and withdrew all claims thereto. The British East African Company then proceeded to occupy it,—and why?

In 1894 the bankrupt and discredited company pleaded strongly and effectively that it had done so in order to please public opinion in Britain and to comply with the suggestions of the British government. But Captain Lugard, in command of the company's troops, some fifty Sudanese accompanied by 250 negro porters, had reached Uganda long before public opinion in England was aroused in regard to that land, and the company had already embarked on a career of African conquest before requests to that effect had come from London. On their own responsibility, it would seem, the officials of this quasi-political corporation took action which in part accounted for the drive on the Mahdi's front at Omdurman.

The situation in Uganda was peculiar. A native King, reputed most immoral, was greatly hampered by religious feuds within his kingdom. Mohammedan missionaries vied vigorously with Christian in his territory; the Christian converts fought constantly within their own ranks. Some, converted by the French, were Catholic; others, inducted into their new faith by the Church Missionary Society, were good Anglicans. An English Bishop had been murdered; disorder long had been rampant; civil war existed.

The East African Company thereupon intervened. Captain Lugard, with instructions to be impartial in regard to religion, but intrusted with the consolidation of the Protestants, forced Mwanga, the King, to sign a treaty which

placed Uganda under the company's control. Lugard then disappeared into the central African bush on an exploring expedition which was to keep him occupied for a year.

The company now sought the financial aid of Lord Salisbury. The Premier was asked to guarantee the interest charges on money borrowed to construct a railroad from Uganda to the Indian Ocean. Salisbury at first agreed and then changed his mind. All that his Government would offer was an appropriation of £20,000, to survey the route. The company, therefore, ordered Lugard home and declared that it had no further interest in Uganda. Lugard refused to obey orders. Leaving his tiny command to watch Mwanga he determined to go to London to protest, or as he put it, "to make a buzz."

There was already a buzzing going on in missionary circles. They were loath to have the company abandon Uganda and they urged the directors to remain. The latter agreed to delay abandonment for one year if £40,000 could be found. The Church Missionary Society within one week raised £11,000 and Lugard was instructed to stay.

While doing so he drifted into hostilities with Mwanga, and the Government agreed to assist him until the company should withdraw. To abandon Uganda, however, seemed to the public an avoidance of responsibility. Downing Street, therefore, yielded to pressure and urged the company to continue its occupation, a request to which the company would gladly have acceded, if subsidized. The Liberals, now in office, refused to do this; they thought it preferable to take over Uganda as a protectorate. To reach it there must be a right of way from the Indian Ocean, and this would infringe upon the chartered rights of the company. Possibly the company would sell its charter? Yes indeed, for £300,000 came the reply. The Government bargained long, the company longer. Finally the price of £250,000 was agreed upon; the company faded into

oblivion, and British East Africa as well as Uganda came into the charmed circle of the British Empire.

But beyond Uganda lay what? Very clearly to the south was German East Africa, to the west the territory of the Congo Free State under Belgian control, to the north the undefined boundaries of the Sudan, to the northwest (somewhere) the ubiquitous French. Her Majesty's government preferred Belgian to French neighbors. With the Congo Free State, therefore, it negotiated a treaty by which the western watershed of the White Nile was recognized as being within the sphere of Belgian influence. The French, infuriated, insisted upon its repudiation. From their point of view the treaty was an unwarranted assumption of authority over no man's land. The British, therefore, withdrew this Anglo-Congolese agreement. The shore line of the great lakes already had been divided between the British, the Belgians and the Germans. One important question remained; to whom belonged the waters of the White Nile after they started on their way to the sea?

A vital matter was this to Egypt and to British dreams of Cape to Cairo railways through the valley of the Nile. Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff had already pointed out that he who owned Victoria Nyanza held at his mercy the fertility of lower Egypt; and England shared with Germany the ownership of that lake. But might not the river valley be tapped by alien interests further to the north, perhaps even before Khartoum was reached?

From the west the Bahr El Ghazel, almost equidistant between Uganda and Khartoum, flowed into the Nile. Might not the French advance this way from their Congo stations? The British were determined that they should not, and through the public warning of Sir Edward Grey they gave notice, as early as 1895, that the entire Nile valley was posted in the interests of the Empire and of Egypt, whether occupied or otherwise.

From the east danger also threatened. The Christian

kingdom of Abyssinia contained within its borders the headwaters of both the Blue Nile and the Atbara, the latter flowing into the Nile somewhat north of Khartoum. Furthermore, the borders of Abyssinia were not as yet delimited. Perhaps some interested and influential friends of Abyssinia might argue that they extended all the way to the White Nile itself! In addition, it was generally conceded that a railway stretching from Cape Town to Cairo would do well to cross a portion of Abyssinia, where the land was high, rather than to cut straight through the swampy lowlands near the White Nile. For several reasons, therefore, it was important to both Egypt and Britain that friendly hands guide the Government of this independent African state.

In the days of Theodore the Great, King of Kings, Abyssinia had cost Britain an expensive war. The memory of it was still fresh in British minds and now, some decades later in the nineteenth century, it seemed advisable to defend British interests in the court of the Lion of Judah in ways more diplomatic. Italy offered the opportunity. In the wave of imperialistic advance which characterized African history (1880-1881) Italy followed close at the heels of the French in asserting old claims to the eastern littoral of the Red Sea. The British were far from displeased at their advent. The adventurous French were now shut off to the north of Obok and Djibuti by their fellow Latins. That they might not spread south the reluctant Britons occupied the Somaliland coast adjacent.

In the hinterland was Abyssinia, a land which the ambitious Italians thought to absorb through a treaty with Menelik, the terms of which hinted at their control of Abyssinian foreign relations. Britain hastened to congratulate the newcomer, and between England and Italy a treaty was struck which provided, *inter alia*, for a mutual exchange of favors in Abyssinia. This Anglo-Italian rapprochement created ill feeling in France, and particularly when it was

known that to the published Anglo-Italian agreement was attached a secret clause. The French writers held vehemently that Britain simply gave Italy a free hand in Abyssinia in order that valuable concessions might come to her later from the enterprising Italians. The latter, however, had their high hopes crushed at Adowa, in 1894; the French rejoiced; the British took alarm, and with reason.

They feared the convergence of two French expeditions approaching the upper Nile from opposite directions. From both Abyssinia and the French Congo, from the northeast and the southwest the tricolor was advancing, supported in Europe by Russian diplomacy, in Africa by friendly aid from Abyssinia. The defeat of the Italians gave the French their opportunity. They had already given Menelik ammunition; in return they received a railway concession, a line to run from Djibuti to Addis Abbaba, the Abyssinian capital, and thence to the White Nile. The rest was clear sailing. As Lagarde, Governor of Djibuti, wrote to his subordinate: "It will be necessary to establish on the right bank of the Nile an Abyssinian fortress . . . while you will construct a French fortress on the left bank, insuring communication between the two by boats big and small, whichever you can obtain, and upon which you will fly our flag."¹ This was a simple plan and easy to operate. Let the Franco-Abyssinian expedition from the east once meet with Captain Marchand pushing north from the Ubangi to the Bahr El Ghazal, and thence to Fashoda on the Nile, and who would then dispute their occupation of the wilderness?

The British intended to. As Marchand portaged from the Ubangi to the Bahr El Ghazal, Kitchener closed in upon the Mahdi; as the French pitched their tents on the banks of the Nile at Fashoda, the Anglo-Egyptian forces drove before them in headlong flight the Dervish army. The French from the east with their Abyssinian allies had not

¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

yet arrived. Their plans had miscarried; camels and portable boats, both necessary for the undertaking, had not been supplied them.

Meanwhile, Kitchener, hearing that Marchand had planted the flag of France at Fashoda, five hundred miles away, hastened south. The Sirdar took with him a number of gunboats and several hundred men. At Fashoda he confronted Marchand. As at Quebec and Pondicherry, so now on the upper Nile the old rivals stood face to face. Like Montcalm and Dupleix the French captain found himself outnumbered by the Britons. Before the fall of Omdurman he had reached the Nile: on the day of the re-entry of the British into Khartoum he had struck a treaty with the native tribesmen placing them under the protection of the tricolor. And now Kitchener expected him to strike his flag and withdraw! It was hard that fortitude and dash and speed must yield to brute force. So also thought the French people. The British statesmen spoke frankly of the right of conquest; but had not the banner bearers of the Third Republic conquered first? If the upper Nile belonged to Egypt, by any nicety of law Egypt was a part of the Turkish Empire. Had the invading British any authority from the Sultan to act in his behalf? If they had not, the French were not inclined to withdraw.

Nor did they for several weeks. As Kitchener and Marchand watched one another on the banks of the remote river, the diplomats of the Quai d'Orsay sought vainly a compounding with those of Downing Street. British concessions in 1898 were few in number and slight in consequence; and in regard to the Nile watershed England did not yield an inch. War threatened and France gave way. Marchand was ordered home. The captain, refusing a British escort down the valley of the Nile, returned to his own country by way of Abyssinia under his own flag.

The capture of Khartoum, meanwhile, was not the conquest of the Sudan. The Khalifa was still to be run to

earth and a wild, depopulated country yet to be organized. The Sudan was not far from a million square miles in area, over twice that of Germany and France combined. But little land was cultivated and the population, decimated over and over again, had shrunk from over five to under two millions. How should these be governed and by whom? To put to rout Abdullah and his Baggara tribesmen was comparatively easy; to restore for the time being law and order not over difficult. But the permanent government of this quasi-nomadic people, half Arab, half negro, steeped in ignorance, superstition and poverty, was not so readily solved.

Upon Cromer's advice a form of government known as a *condominium* or joint rule was adopted. By its provisions the British and the Egyptian flags were to fly side by side and by the Khedive's council at Cairo all decrees of the Governor-General were to be approved before definitely becoming law. Extreme decentralization was to mark the new condominium. The governmental unit was to be the *mudir* or local governor of the various provinces into which the Sudan was divided. These men, all British, at first army officers and then members of the Sudan Civil Service, were for the most part stationed at some distance from Khartoum. With the capital, communication was most irregular, and since into their keeping was intrusted the maintenance of law, order, justice and economic welfare, they soon became the central key of Cromer's arch.

The Sudan was to have an army, a budget, a court system and in general all the paraphernalia of a modern state. The budget required the visé of Cairo. This once given, however, the Governor-General was at liberty to transfer any sum of money from one service to another, provided, of course, he did not exceed the total appropriation.¹

Now Cromer could not become Governor-General and remain at Cairo. Therefore, with the withdrawal of Kitch-

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1900, CV (cd. 95).

ener and the greater portion of the British forces, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was turned over to Sir Reginald Wingate as Governor-General. Nevertheless, in the background there still was in evidence the quiet judgment and cool brain of the Earl of Cromer, who continued to give authoritative advice of admirable quality at long distance.

This may best be seen in operation by studying the laws and regulations laid down for the conduct of missionaries in this region. In Egypt proper, said Cromer, since the population is settled and since it has been in part Christian since time immemorial, it is fitting and desirable that missionaries should have a free and open field. The same freedom may also be given in the southern Sudan where Mohammedanism has not as yet penetrated. But in the northern and central Sudan Christian missions must be prohibited. "The population of the Sudan generally is as yet far too ignorant and uncivilized to distinguish between the action of the British government in their corporate capacity and that of an individual European." The British officials, he considered, could not afford to run the risk of being considered religious proselytizers; much safer it would be to have no missionaries. In Khartoum this rule was relaxed. Cromer believed that here, under the eyes of the central administration, the danger could be reduced to a minimum. Even in Khartoum, however, missionary schools were to be open constantly to inspection by the political authorities, and the instruction of young Moslems was in all cases interdicted unless approved by their parents or guardians. Cromer was not opposed to missions, as his warm approval of one located on the banks of the Sobat River indicates. "It is," he wrote, "conducted on those sound practical common sense principles which are, indeed, thoroughly characteristic of American mission work in Egypt." But this enterprise was conducted among pagan Blacks and not among Moslem Arabs; furthermore, it

stressed civilization in general rather than evangelization in particular.

In two other respects the Government of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan exemplified governmental principles staunchly advocated by Cromer. One of these had to do with the administration of justice, the other with economic development.

Egypt having long endured a European legal code could not readily escape from it. But in the Sudan it was possible to start anew and to adopt Oriental principles, if not Oriental methods, for persons who thought and lived in Oriental terms. Justice must be flexible and not as rigid as in Europe. Natives, Cromer believed, who are willing to work should never have their land sold for non-payment of taxes. The individual mudir and the court at Khartoum as well were instructed to have ever in mind the customary law of the region. With witchcraft universally believed in, for instance, it would be the reverse of progressive to inaugurate immediately western ideas of jurisprudence on this alien soil. And Cromer gives as an illustration of this fact a story vouched for by the head of the Department of Justice at Khartoum. Part of it runs as follows: "The two men accordingly went to a fakir. He copied some passages from certain religious books upon a native writing board . . . washed it off, put the water in a bowl, dipped bread into the water and divided the bread and water between the two disputants, telling them that the one who was in the wrong would become very ill. . . . Tala Ali shortly afterwards was seized with violent pains and returning to the fakir confessed that he had stolen the money." ¹

Before any economic development of the Sudan should be attempted it was highly desirable that a careful survey be made of its possibilities. These depended, as was inevitable in that arid region, on irrigation, and Sir William

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1903, LXXXVII (cd. 1529).

Garstin was immediately set at work to report on the possibility of more water. His work covered both the White and the Blue Niles and was thoroughgoing. By damming up any one of three lakes, he maintained, the volume of water attainable for both Egypt and the Sudan could be tremendously increased. These lakes were: the Victoria Nyanza, the Albert Nyanza and Lake Tsana in Abyssinia. From the engineering point of view the last was the best. There were political objections since Tsana was in a foreign country; there were also scientific objections since being smaller than the other two lakes the dam would have to be higher, if a sufficient amount of water was to be impounded. On the other hand the distance by the Blue Nile from the proposed reservoir would be shorter, the slope more rapid, the country traversed much richer, the danger from earthquakes less. And most important of all, the swamps and sudd of the White Nile would not be encountered.

The "sudd" referred to was the floating vegetation which so frequently blocked the upper channel of this river. From Khartoum to below Kodok (Fashoda) the navigation of the stream presented no difficulty; but from Lake No, where the Bahr-El-Ghazel flowing from the west joins the White Nile proper, or, as it sometimes is called, the Bahr-El-Gebel (mountain stream), the reverse was the case. As Sir William states: "There are no banks at all and no semblance of any ridge on the water's edge. Reedy swamps stretch for many kilometers on either side. Their monotonous expanse is only broken at intervals by lagoons or *mayyehs* of open water. These marshes are covered by a dense growth of water weeds extending in every direction to the horizon." They comprise papyrus, tiger grass and the *um soof* of the Arabs; and frequently detached by the winds they form floating islands. The islands, caught in the current change their location constantly. Coming against an obstruction the water is forced under them, sucking in more vegetation, building the island up from

below and also densifying it. These islands, the sudd of the irrigation engineer, block the channel for hundreds of miles, cause the river to adopt a winding course, create additional swamps, waste valued water and prevent navigation. What could be done about it?

Sir William went up the Nile to see. The conclusion which he reached was that the sudd was best removed by first leveling the surface by fire, then digging trenches and dividing it off into sections which were towed off by river steamers through the medium of steel hawsers. Nitroglycerine although tried was found useless. The composition of the sudd was too elastic to be destroyed by dynamite; the slower method described was the only one effective. When one considers that this work was done in a dreary land, hundreds of miles from any base of supplies, where "an occasional mimosa bush is welcome as a landmark," and where "the air is hot and the whole region malarious to a degree,"¹ the preference shown for the Abyssinian highlands is not to be wondered at.

For the time being, however, neither Garstin nor Cromer thought to work miracles nor even to spend much money on irrigation. Other problems seemed more pressing. The mudirs were to be appointed, land titles investigated, order maintained, money conserved. Furthermore, it was Egypt's money, not England's, that covered the deficits in the Sudan.

Progress in the Sudan was slow. Evil climate, sparse population, poor communication, and want of water as well as want of money held it back. Civilization, however, did continue to advance. In an Oriental country the number of political petitions is held as one index of prosperity and these decreased in number from over four thousand in 1900 to approximately one thousand in 1905; and but few of these complained about the taxes. The Sudan had turned the corner. In the latter year Cromer estimated that the

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1901, XCI (cd. 441).

whole region cost Egypt but £27,000.¹ The population had increased and the *sakias* or water wheels, most certain proof of prosperity, had multiplied. The inhabitants might be suspicious of education and might fear the foreigner; they might still hire boys to sit in the hole of a boat rather than repair it; they might persist in medieval forms of private warfare and in barbaric relapses into personal vengeance: but none the less the Mahdi's despotism was no more. The Nile was open for transport; the railway supplemented the river; the youthful mudirs, wisely instructed by Kitchener, Wingate and Cromer, vied with one another in attempting to make clean and livable and orderly their respective bailiwicks. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was, if not regenerate, at least improved.

For eight years after Kitchener's victory at Omdurman Sir Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer, continued as his Majesty's Consul-General in Cairo, a period in which the prosperity of Egypt went hand in hand with that of the Sudan. The population of the former country grew rapidly, some fifty per cent in twenty-five years. Furthermore, Cromer could easily demonstrate that Egypt spent far less of her national income for military purposes than Great Britain. Moreover, although forty per cent of the Egyptian revenue was consumed in meeting debt charges, it must be held in mind that the average indebtedness per capita had fallen to sixteen shillings, a genuine relief. And this was done as Cromer abolished the salt monopoly, took off the tax on ferries and on fishing boats, and lowered import duties from eight to four per cent on many necessities of life.

The Earl of Cromer could well regard his labors as phenomenal; but on that account he did not lessen them. Over the Egyptian Civil Service he kept vigilant outlook, seeking intelligent natives for the lower ranks, and fewer and better men from the Mother country. So popular did the Egyptian

¹ *Ibid.*, 1905, CV (cd. 2409).

service become that in 1905 two hundred and twenty candidates, all graduates of Oxford, Cambridge or Dublin, presented themselves for fourteen vacancies. And none of these candidates were permitted to serve in Egypt until they had spent a further year in the study of Arabic.

Cromer tried next to amend and amplify the constitutional machinery of Egypt. The accord with France of 1904 made possible an informal ending of the obstructions of the *caisse*; the capitulations, however, remained. As a substitute Cromer proposed a council to be composed entirely of the protected subjects of the powers. Over a third of the foreign element was Greek and but a trifle over one per cent German. Yet in 1906 the German trade was tenfold that of the Greek. The basis of representation, therefore, should not be that of mere numbers. No matter how that might be determined, legislation by diplomacy (the consuls) he held was unintelligent. One clear illustration of this was the universal use of false weight and measures in Egypt, varying from three to twenty-five per cent. To meet this situation and to inflict penalties it "was necessary to consult fifteen different powers. Each of these powers," he wrote, "would probably have some observation to make on the subject, moreover many of them would be unable to give their consent without recourse to their respective legislatures."¹ Thus Cromer continued to press for reform, considering this one the more urgent and the most valuable.

In 1906 Mr. Balfour and the Conservative party were heavily defeated in the British elections; a year hence Lord Cromer sent in his last report to London. That these dates came so near to synchronizing is held by some significant. The new Liberal government stood for political democracy; it believed in the further extension of representative institutions both at home and abroad. Lord Cromer was not, in the political sense, a democrat. For efficiency in

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1906, CXXXVII (cd. 2817).

finance and justice in administration he had long contended; the training of young Egypt for self-government had not seemed to him of paramount importance. If such a program was desired by those in authority at home, perhaps a younger man had best attempt its launching. For over thirty years he had served his country well; his retirement now, so honorably earned, might be opportune. So much for rumor. But it must not be forgotten that Cromer went to Egypt under Liberal auspices. With Liberal statesmen such as Grey he had long been on friendly terms. The prestige of his position was enormous and London would scarcely have suggested his resignation. At the same time he was physically very tired, an ill man. One suspects that the ostensible reason for his withdrawal was also the real one, namely, ill health.

It is true that such adverse criticism as may be directed against Cromer's administration lay in his indifference to self-government. The substantiation of this charge may best be made from Cromer's own annual reports and from the fact that at the coming of his successor so little progress had been made in this direction, or even for that matter in education, so essentially a corollary of representative institutions.

The system of government of which he was the master was, in fact if not in name, one of benevolent despotism. To these precise terms Cromer himself took exception but in so doing seemed to substantiate rather than disprove their validity. "If that description," he wrote in his last report, "means that Egypt is not endowed with representative institutions based on the model of those which exist in some European countries, it is correct. But if the word despotism is intended to imply an absence of control over the alleged despot it is far from being accurate. Although the precise attributes of the representation of the British government are incapable of definition, and although I am very clearly of the opinion that nothing but harm can

result from any attempt to define them, I do not for a moment deny but that they are considerable. But it would be altogether erroneous to suppose that these powers are not subject to control. In the first place, the British Agent and Consul-General of Egypt is an executive officer of the British government, and as such under the control of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as any other member of the diplomatic service. In the second place, behind the Secretary of State lies the control, which at all times can be exercised, of the British Parliament and of British public opinion. In the third place the absolute freedom allowed to the local press in Egypt constitutes in itself a guarantee of no small value that no real abuse of power would be allowed to pass unnoticed."

That these were the only limitations set to his power would seem to be an acknowledgment by Lord Cromer of benevolent despotism, at least in practice; for Britain was far distant and the native press, although strident and impassioned, had no circulation at Charing Cross or Westminster.

There were, however, certain vestiges of representative institutions which Cromer has described as "proving useful adjuncts" of the Egyptian government. These dated from the Dufferin report of 1883 which had recommended the constitution of a legislative council, a general Assembly and provincial councils. In the Legislative Council there were to be fourteen appointed and sixteen elected members, chosen from the provincial councils. The latter were to be selected by universal indirect manhood suffrage.

These councils had amounted to little. The Legislative Council when enlarged by the inclusion of certain notables and governmental officials became the General Assembly and as such had the right to veto any direct, personal or land tax. But the capitulations tied the hand of Cromer's government in this respect. And although every law had to be submitted to this Assembly there was no corresponding liability on the part of the Government to accept its amend-

ments. It had, of course, some influence. In 1904, for instance, the Government had decided to insist on the examination of the *fikis* or village teachers before exempting them from military service. This the Assembly objected to, and successfully. So also, two years hence, the Assembly desired that the teaching of geography in the state supported schools be conducted in Arabic instead of in English and French; here likewise it won a victory.

But these were minor matters; that Lord Cromer should quote such instances as proof of an advancement made toward self-government by the Egyptians is evidence that the steps taken in that respect were really trifling. Cromer's work lay elsewhere. He was as cautious and skeptical in trusting the Egyptians with political power as he was bold and confident in regard to financial and social reform.

It is also held against Lord Cromer that he needlessly offended public opinion in Egypt. The Khedive, for instance, was never notified of the Anglo-Egyptian advance into the Sudan in 1896 until after his troops had left Cairo. When the Assuan Dam, the greatest public work in Egypt since the construction of the pyramids, was officially dedicated, not Abbas Hilmi, but the Duke of Connaught was invited to preside at the ceremony. His Grace, without question "was a most worthy representative of the British Royal Family, but at the same time one who had no especial connection with the Dam."¹

Furthermore, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, by Lord Cromer's express wish, was supposedly a *condominium*. Over that vast region the Khedive, technically at least, was joint sovereign with the King of England. Yet when the Port Sudan Railway was completed, connecting the Red Sea with the Nile, the Khedive did not attend its opening. England was represented by Cromer, the Sudan by Kitchener.

Abbas Hilmi doubtless was unfriendly. Perhaps from

¹ Dicey, E., *Nineteenth Century*, 64:85-100 (July, 1908).

policy as well as inclination he had withdrawn five miles from Cairo to escape contact with the hated British. But it was not impossible to be on friendly terms with him, as Cromer's successor was to demonstrate.

This unwillingness of England's Consul-General to placate Egyptian officialdom, if not public opinion, was the source of ever increasing trouble. The growth of a pan-Islamic sentiment in all Mohammedan countries characterized the first decade of the twentieth century and Egypt was far from immune. Anti-British disturbances broke out in many different places. In the Sinai peninsula, in Alexandria, in Cairo, incidents trifling in themselves but indicative of future storm harassed the last few years of Cromer's administration.

The Sinai peninsula, for instance, directly east of the Suez Canal, was thinly occupied by wild nomadic tribes and governed neither from Cairo nor Constantinople, although by agreement with Turkey it came under the Egyptian sphere of influence. Lord Cromer sent a British resident there with a handful of soldiers to preserve order. Great was the indignation in Constantinople, and great also that in Cairo at this further evidence of British imperialism. Yet it apparently was necessitated by complaints made in regard to the brand of justice administered by a local sheik who insisted that God always told him in a dream what decisions he should make. Certain local residents objected, murder was done, and the Egyptian camel corps arrived.

More serious were the riots in Alexandria in 1905. A number of Greeks, quarreling among themselves, killed a native. Owing to the capitulations the Government could not punish the Greeks. The result was an anti-foreign riot of some magnitude.

And far more disturbing was the Denshawi affair of the following year. Five British officers went pigeon shooting near a native village. They claimed to have had the permission of the local authorities. As they shot, a fire broke

out on a nearby threshing floor. The villagers, asserting that the fire had been caused by the officers' carelessness, surrounded them, demanding their guns. They were handed over and one, in the hands of an ignorant peasant, was discharged killing a near-by woman. The officers were attacked by clubs and bricks and driven some distance to the rear. Several were severely injured and one so seriously that he died. The result was the immediate arrest and trial of many natives, four of whom were sentenced to be hanged, two to penal servitude for life and others to lighter sentences. The punishment was held excessive by many in England, as well as in Egypt. Sir Edward Grey attempted to prevent a debate on this subject in the House of Commons. His efforts were futile. The Egyptian Nationalists were furious; only Cromer was calm. It was unfortunate, he remarked that this incident came so closely after trouble with Turkey in connection with the Egyptian boundary.¹

Shortly after came the resignation of Cromer. All-powerful to the end, he had no intention of yielding to any pressure which might be exerted by Egyptian nationalism. That phenomenon was new in Egypt. If any letting down of the barriers of autocracy was to be made a younger man might best attempt it. In fairness to Cromer, however, he should not be held obtuse and merely stubborn on this subject. The rising tide of the pan-Islamic movement caused him much concern. He was calm but not blind. Dispassionately he analyzed the spread of Egyptian nationalism, pointed out how unlike was the earlier nationalism of Arabi's time with its anti-Turkish bias, and showed the imminent danger to Britain of the Mohammedan revival throughout the Orient. In evidence of this Cromer quoted at length from a letter received by him. "He must be blind," it runs, "who sees not what the English have wrought in Egypt; the gates of justice stand open to the poor; the streams flow through the land and are not stopped by the

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1907, Vol. C (cd. 3394).

orders of the strong; the poor man is lifted up and the rich man is struck down . . . we are thankful . . . but thanks lie on the surface of the heart and beneath is a deep well. While peace is in the land the spirit of Islam sleeps." If it once is aroused all that the English have done will be forgotten. Cromer thought this quite probable. He knew that trouble lay ahead and did not believe that it could be offset by democratic devolution.

The Earl was also held by those who criticized him as one intent upon retaining in his own hands absolute control, and thus preferring young rather than experienced administrators, since from them greater obedience could be expected. There may be truth in this: but it should be noted that he regretted greatly that former intimate knowledge of the fellaheen which had characterized his early associates in Egypt, and he felt keenly that the newcomers were not in as close touch with Egyptian problems from the point of view of personal acquaintanceship as were the older men he was accused of putting to one side.

One further adverse criticism deserves mention, the fact that Cromer did not treat Egypt as a native Indian state and did not permit the Egyptians their own laws, customs, ways of life and separate officialdom.¹ But the proponents of this view seem to forget the proximity of Egypt to Europe, and the extensive foreign population in Cairo and Alexandria which makes any analogy between Egypt and Mysore seem farfetched. To have followed such counsel would have resulted not simply in the termination of Egyptian social reform; it would also have embroiled Greek, Armenian and European business interests in pandemonium. Cromer's work was over. If democracy was needed, he was not the man to inaugurate it. Narrow in some respects he may have been: but he was a high-minded gentleman concerning whom no tale of scandal, hint of speculation, act of

¹ Dicey, E., *Egypt of the Future*, *passim*.

vainglory may be noted. Among the heroes of the Empire he takes rank with the highest.

The problem of Egyptian nationalism was the most serious one which confronted his gentle successor, Sir Eldon Gorst. He differed from Cromer more in manner than in ideas. A friend of Abbas Hilmi, a man long versed in the intricacies of Egyptian finance, a democratic rider of the donkey in the streets of Cairo, Sir Eldon seemed to many peculiarly fitted to lead Egypt into new paths. After one year he was still optimistic. "During the last twelve months," he wrote, "changes have been introduced which are the outward and visible sign of the intention of the Government to associate the population, so far as is possible, with the conduct of public affairs." But the concessions which he made were not very substantial. More natives of Egypt received berths in the civil service; the ancient provincial councils were rehabilitated and given increased powers, particularly in education; and the property qualification for voting was cut in half for those Egyptians with a minimum of education. Even more, Sir Eldon presented the National Assembly with the right of interpellation, agreeing that ministers of state should appear at certain intervals and answer questions.

To these gestures of peace, however, the Nationalists remained cold. Their answer to these new-found privileges was to pass a resolution through the Assembly requesting the Government to prepare a law conferring on the nation the right of effective participation with the Government in the internal affairs of the country. Gorst was annoyed. "When it can be shown," he replied, "that existing institutions in which the people are already associated are not working in a satisfactory manner, it will be time enough to consider the question of further advance."

The new Consul-General had no intention of giving over this struggle. With the Khedive he was on good terms and

owing to his influence an interview was arranged between Abbas Hilmi and Edward VII. Meanwhile, he, Gorst, would trust the Egyptians, and as an earnest thereof he referred to the Assembly the new agreement made by the financial adviser of the Egyptian government, an Englishman, with the Suez Company. This provided for the immediate payment to Egypt of £4,000,000 provided that the lease of the Company, expiring in 1968, be renewed for forty years. The Assembly rejected the agreement. This was not only a blow to British prestige in Egypt; the British failed even to receive credit for asking the Egyptians' consent. Many of the latter, indeed, believed that the real purpose was a Machiavellian one, in some subtle fashion deftly concealed; for why should British vessels using the canal pay increased tolls to provide the necessary £4,000,000? Sir Eldon next appointed Egyptian inspectors to prevent the spread of the cotton worm: but the boll weevil proved worse than ever, the inspectors worthless and inefficient. Gorst was in despair.

Anti-British agitation grew rather than diminished and Gorst, disillusioned and with grave forebodings, analyzed it in the second year of his administration as due to three causes: the wave of enthusiasm of Egypt for a Parliament; the low class vernacular press; and finally, the disappearance of "the old Oriental desire on the part of the individual for self-effacement."¹ It seems strange that he should, apparently, have been less cognizant than Cromer of the religious character of the anti-British propaganda in Egypt. He had been in the country a long time. He must have known that the Egyptians made much of the petitions in the Book of Common Prayer for the conversion of the Turk and other infidels, repeated at official services before the Prime Minister and the King; he must have known how unfortunate was the impression made by Bishop Wilkinson's demand after the reconquest of the Sudan for the creation

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1909, CV (cd. 4580).

of an English bishopric, thus making imperialism and Christianity apparently coincide; he must have known how the English Mission Band in Alexandria had sent out circulars entitled "Jesus or Mohammed" in wrappers similar to those containing government notices; he must have heard that they gave testimony in Mohammedan mosques.¹ Yet the seriousness of the situation from the religious point of view does not seem to have impressed him.²

At any rate he was correct in believing that Oriental self-effacement had gone; the Egyptian Nationalists had no intention of effacing themselves. Their leader, Mustafa Kamel, had died in 1908, and with his going the militancy of the movement had somewhat abated. Mustafa Kamel had been under French influence and his extreme bitterness was believed largely instigated by French cabals. The Khedive, however, intriguing with the Nationalists had turned their energies to a new direction, demanding Home Rule for Egypt rather than independence. In consequence, their organ, the *Lewa* (flag), continued bitterly to criticize the foreigner, and when in 1908 the Turkish Parliament was created it vociferously demanded a similar institution in Egypt.

To obtain it the Nationalists sent a committee to London: but Sir Edward Grey ignored their request and from the British public, enthusiastic about Turkish democracy, came no warm response. The Nationalists thereupon became sharply divided among themselves, some urging violent measures, others coöperation with the British raj. And as they quarreled the rival factions held rival congresses of Young Egyptians in Geneva and other European cities.

¹ Ward, A., *Missionaries in Egypt, Nineteenth Century*, 48:207-18 (August, 1909).

² Sir A. Colvin did not fall into this error. "The direct and necessary consequences of the teachings of Mohammed and Mohammedan doctrines is that so long as the Muslim is subject to the Christian power, Islam suffers, and those who hold its tenets are kept in a position of subordination which is not in harmony with the promises of their prophet, or with the requirements of the faith as by him delivered." Quoted by Dicey, E., *Lord Cromer in Egypt, Nineteenth Century*, 62:156-166 (July, 1907).

Gorst thought that here was his opportunity. Zaghlul Pasha, a reformer of the mild type, had been trusted by Cromer. Why not, then, build up a pro-British party among the Nationalists and so perpetuate the differences between them? For this reason Gorst urged the appointment of Boutros Pasha as Prime Minister. This man was a Copt and therefore, although a Nationalist, not a Mohammedan. His term of office was short. In 1910 he was murdered by a man connected with *Lewa* and in extreme quarters his assassination was condoned.

Roosevelt, at this time emerging from the jungle and arriving at Cairo, denounced the assassins heartily; the British prepared to send troops from Malta; on the Egyptian press was clamped down a partial censorship; and the unabashed ex-President of the United States, speaking at the Guildhall in London, aroused the English electorate as no Englishman could have done, to an interest in Egyptian affairs. As Roosevelt there stated: "Great Britain had given Egypt the best government it had had for 2,000 years, but recent events had shown that error had been made, proceeding indeed, from the desire to do too much in the interests of the Egyptians. In such a situation, weakness, timidity and sentimentality might cause more harm than violence or injustice . . . if England did not wish to establish and keep order in Egypt, then let her by all means get out." ¹

The British were pleased with this frank statement, possibly because it echoed so clearly the well-known tradition of the British Foreign Office. And upon the death of Gorst, the following year, Lord Kitchener was appointed Consul-General in Cairo, a warning to all malefactors in Egypt more effective than any statute of the Imperial Parliament.

The interests of Herbert Kitchener were popularly believed, both in England and in Egypt, to lie more in bar-

¹ *Annual Register*, 1910, 130.

racks than in schools, in machine guns rather than in popular elections. In this, popular opinion judged wrongly. The soldier proved more lenient than the civilian. Lord Kitchener's term of office was brief; his career while thus engaged more occupied with remedying the causes of disaffection than in repressing its manifestations.

Two important reforms should be accredited to his initiative. The first of these was the Five Feddan Law of 1912 which made it impossible to seize for debt small agricultural holdings. This act, based on precedents found in the Homestead Laws of the United States, the *bien de famille insaisissable* in France and the Punjab Land Alienation Act in India, was defended by Kitchener on the same theory that made it illegal to take for debt the tools of a workingman. "The protection of the poor fellah," he wrote, "in this manner was rendered necessary by the action of the small foreign usurers who, scattered through the country in the villages and financed by various banks, were able, with the support of the capitulations, to lend money on mortgages to the fellaheen at exorbitant rates of interest, thirty to forty per cent and even higher being not unusual charges."¹ The peasantry in Egypt was proverbially extravagant. For weddings, fêtes, law suits, they encumbered themselves and their families with a terrific load of debt. The state already advanced their seed grain to them; they did not have to borrow for that purpose. He would protect them now from the money lenders and likewise from themselves.

Kitchener's second reform, the Organic Law of 1913, attempted something even more positive in the direction of self-government than the reforms of Sir Eldon Gorst. By it the old distinction between the Legislative Council and the Assembly was abolished. Kitchener merged their functions into one body called the Legislative Assembly. "This new body consisted of a much larger percentage of the

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1913, LXXXI (cd. 6682).

elected members (sixty) returned by indirect suffrage and of a much smaller one of members (seventeen) nominated by the Government, and nominated solely for the purpose of securing the representation of minorities and of interests which might otherwise have been unrepresented.”¹

It remained, it is true, still consultative in character and its name on that account is perhaps a misnomer. On the other hand, new powers were given to it. It might hold up for a long time the enactment of any law by a protracted discussion of its desirability; it could likewise debate on certain topics hitherto not within the province of the Assembly, such as the relations of Egypt to foreign countries; and its proceedings were to be made public.

Like Gorst, Kitchener met with a rebuff. His Five Feddan Law did not give him the hold on the Egyptian people that he hoped. The new Legislative Assembly was filled with enemies of the Occupation and from the beginning it proved factious. By 1914 it had done nothing except wrangle over rules of procedure, making it quite evident that “the outside influences and foolish counsels” which Kitchener feared were in operation.

In all probability this meant Abbas Hilmi. The Khedive and Kitchener were not fond of each other; and the latter, acting doubtless from a strong sense of public duty, had withdrawn from the hands of the Khedive the administration of certain Mohammedan trust funds, on the ground that there was evidence of dishonesty in their administration. In 1914, Abbas Hilmi went to Constantinople to seek aid from his ancient suzerain, the Turk. In the same summer Kitchener went to London. Before either could return to Cairo the war was under way.

¹ Chirol, V., *The Egyptian Problem*, III.

CHAPTER XIII

THE INDEPENDENCE OF EGYPT

At the outbreak of the Great War the position of Egypt was anomalous. The country was a part of the Turkish Empire, so recognized by the British government, and at Cairo were German and Austrian consuls whose appointment and tenure depended not on British but on Turkish confirmation; yet British troops patrolled the streets of Cairo and Alexandria, and a British general commanded Egypt's army. Was Egypt, then, a neutral country or an ally of Britain? And what if Turkey should yield to the tempting offers of the Central Powers and join them against the Entente; who could define the status of Egypt under such circumstances?

In his endeavors to keep Turkey out of the war the English ambassador at Constantinople was greatly harassed by the Egyptian question. The Turkish government asked for an explanation of the expulsion of German and Austrian consuls* from a part of the Turkish Empire; on what principle of international law had Britain made Egypt a base for operations against Germany and Austria, neutral countries both as far as Turkey was concerned?

To these queries there could be no logical reply, and Sir Edward Grey made none. The *tu quoque* argument was the best that England's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could advance. The Mosul and Damascus army corps had, he stated, been sending detachments toward the Suez Canal; Bedouin Arabs had been discovered crossing the Sinai frontier; the Moslems of Egypt, he suggested, were displeased with the way in which Germany was pushing Turkey toward hostilities with England, and should Turkey yield they

would feel obliged to disassociate themselves from her. These diplomatic jockeyings were, however, without much meaning. Four days after the delivery of this British note war was declared by Great Britain against Turkey. Egypt, officially proclaimed a British protectorate, was therefore at war with her former suzerain.

There converged now on Egypt from all directions British troops. How close that country came to mutiny and revolt it is difficult to determine. The non-Egyptian population, in Cairo and Alexandria at any rate, was fearful lest it happen, and displayed great contentment at the coming of the British Territorials who arrived even before the Anzacs. To what extent these troops were sent to Egypt because that country offered a good training ground for military action against Turkey, and to what extent because their presence on the banks of the Nile would have a sedative effect on the people living there, one may only guess. The proclamation of martial law and the constant threat of a large though transient British army made impossible a rebellion, no matter how zealous the advocates of it might have been.

Egypt took the war calmly. Toward her western boundary the Senussi went on the war-path and had to be repressed; toward the east the Turks made an abortive drive on the Suez Canal which was similarly repelled. But technically, Egypt should scarcely be considered as one of the active participants in the war. The announcement of the protectorate was accompanied by a statement that "Great Britain took upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling on the Egyptian people for aid therein." The Egyptians might tax themselves for the defense of Egypt, but Britain would neither conscript their men nor their wealth. On the other hand, a flood of British money soon came pouring in, part of it the squandered pay of care-free Anzacs marking time beneath the shadow of the Pyra-

mids, part of it the handsome prices paid for livestock, grain and cotton by the Allies.

The Egyptians, apparently, should have made money out of the war, and many of them did. But one class in Egypt, and that the most important, the fellaheen, was thoroughly antagonized. The agriculturalists had not concerned themselves about Egyptian nationalism prior to 1914; yet after the war was over, amid their ranks was to be found as staunch hatred of the British as anywhere. The proud boast of the English ruler, and under ordinary circumstances one warranted, that the poor laborer in the field was on his side, did not apply to post-war Egypt.

The complaints of the fellah were threefold; service in the Labor and Camel Corps; requisitions of grain and animals; and compulsory contributions to Red Cross funds.

The Egyptian Labor and Camel Corps was designed primarily for the purpose of providing transportation facilities for Allenby's army in Palestine and Syria. The men enlisting in this voluntary organization were decently paid and housed, sufficiently so in the earlier years of the war for many Egyptians to reënlist in its ranks. But as the war wore on and prices continued to rise in Egypt the pay of this body grew relatively less and less. Meanwhile, the pressure for more and more men grew rapidly. The local magistrates and the village headsmen (*omdehs*) were in charge of recruiting, and they did not fail. The methods which they used, however, were Oriental not to say tyrannical. Personal enemies were bullied into signing while those who remembered to give presents to the *omdehs* were overlooked. The local police sergeants (*mamurs*) likewise took a hand, it was said, in this enforced recruiting. The flow of men continued, uninterrupted until the end of the war; therefore, the Government did not investigate the means used to accelerate it.

Thus it was also in the matter of grain and livestock. The rate of pay was determined by the Government; but

price fixing in Egypt by political action was not thoroughly enforced and the wise could obtain double the official price. The rapacious omdehs would procure twice as many *ardebs* of *durra* (corn) from the peasants as the Government requisitioned. They would then deliver half to the authorities and sell the other half for their own profit. This method of extortion was duplicated in the purchase of livestock. The peasants received large sums for their cows and donkeys, but the omdehs and mamurs even more. Furthermore, at the conclusion of hostilities it was necessary to buy the beasts back at enhanced prices.

The fellaheen had no interest in the war. They never came in contact with either Turk or German; but they did experience considerable hardship in their laborious although not dangerous rôle of building roads, conveying supplies and munitions for Allenby's forces. The uplands of Syria were cold and dismal to these men from the Nile basin; and tales of sick sons and brothers in ill-kept hospitals circulated freely. It is a safe assumption that they lost none of their piquancy in the telling. "The days of Ismail have come again," the fellah wailed. The *Hakuma*, the Government, has taken our children, our donkey, our money (Red Cross subscription) and no longer protects us. The British said it was not their fault. If the fellaheen were so ignorant as to subscribe to the Red Cross simply because a native omdeh ordered it they must pay the penalty for their own stupidity. This argument, however, meant nothing to the average Nilot. The Government had formerly protected him from its own representative, and now it did not. And between Government and England they knew no difference.

This general background of discontent proved useful to the Egyptian Nationalists. They applauded heartily the speeches of President Wilson in regard to self-determination and national liberty. In Syria, Mesopotamia, the Hedjaz, in Palestine and other lands there was new talk of coming

freedom. Even in Egypt the declaration of a protectorate in 1914 had been accompanied by intimations that the constitutional limitations which it implied were transitory. An Anglo-French announcement of 1918 had made mention of a "complete and definitive enfranchisement of the peoples liberated from Turkish oppression."¹ Just what did this signify? As for the Nationalists, they stood for Egyptian independence; and they had no intention whatever of submitting to a reorganization of the Egyptian government on the model suggested to the Khedive by Sir William Brunyate, which would create an Egyptian Parliament with an upper house controlled by the foreign residents of Egypt, and with only a lower house directly responsible to the people. Such a solution they considered farcical.

Their leader, Saad Zaghlul, whose abilities had been recognized by Cromer two decades before, headed a delegation of Nationalists who intended going to London immediately after the armistice to present the case of Egyptian independence. Permission to do this, however, was refused. It was not granted even to the Prime Minister of Egypt, Rushdi Pasha, who represented moderate Egyptian opinion. Piqued at the refusal of the British to give an official hearing to even their own defenders in Egypt, the Prime Minister resigned. The Government for some time remained headless, and Egypt now entered into that long period of political confusion and occasional semi-anarchy which was to characterize her history during the next few years.

Just where the responsibility lay for this extraordinary lack of tact in refusing to meet representative Egyptians it is difficult to say. November and December, 1918, were hectic months at Downing Street, it is true; the peace conference lay in the offing and it is not to be assumed that the Cabinet had any common mind in regard to Egypt at this juncture. The Foreign Office claimed that it simply sug-

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1921, XLII (cmd. 1131).

gested that the Egyptian visit be postponed; but the Egyptians felt that they had been rebuffed.

Came then the gathering of the nations at Versailles, and among those with invitations were Hussein of the Hedjaz and his son, Feisal (ordinary Arabs from the Egyptian point of view); Indian Maharajahs also came, but the Egyptians were among the uninvited. Meanwhile, generous schemes of reform were freely talked of in Paris, proposals for imperial devolution in India, mandate guarantees for Palestine and Mesopotamia; but for Egypt, nothing. Zaghlul was greatly vexed. No opportunity was given him to speak for his country. Mesopotamia and Armenia were to be recognized as wards of Europe; even this poor consolation was refused Egypt. He returned to Egypt profoundly disillusioned and now thoroughly anti-British.

The Egyptians rallied to his support, somewhat obstreperously. Whereupon, the British, claiming that he threatened the Sultan with intimidation, exiled this troublesome patriot to Malta. As they did so disturbances broke out in Egypt that were more ominous in character than any since the days of Arabi in the eighties. Railway lines were wrecked and telegraph wires broken. Cairo, with its large foreign population, was cut off for a time from all communication with the outside world. At Dairut a number of British soldiers were murdered. Revolt everywhere seemed imminent.

It did not come. As Churchill assured an anxious public, there were 60,000 British troops in Egypt or in Palestine; and the railway now ran from Jerusalem to Cairo. The motor car and the aeroplane made revolutionary warfare impossible in the broad delta of the Nile. Censorship, "the most incompetent, the most inept, the most savagely ruthless since 1914," led to all kinds of unfounded rumors of disaster. But as a matter of fact the military had the situation well in hand. The soldiers, however, were restless and eager to return to England. Neither profit nor honor

could come from holding this country by the throat. Therefore, Allenby, dashing back to Cairo from Paris reversed the decision of the local British authorities, set Zaghlul free, promised increased autonomy and quieted the country.

There followed now the arrival of a royal commission to investigate Egyptian discontent. It was courteously although coldly greeted by official Egypt, and to all intent and purpose it was boycotted by the populace. Every kind of peaceful obstruction was placed in its path; citizens refused to testify before it; politicians who did so were spied upon; and wherever it traveled, constant and incessant demonstrations took place in favor of complete independence. And in this plea there joined in one accord the members of the Khedive's family, the *Literati*, the ruling spirits at the university, and the mob in general.

Despite these drawbacks, the commission continued at work; it listened to such witnesses as were willing to appear before it, conferred with all foreigners of note in Egypt, and frankly confessed that Egyptian public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of the Nationalists. This, however, did not mean that an agreement could not be reached. England asked nothing of Egypt: all that she wanted was the protection of the foreigner, already guaranteed under the capitulations, the safeguarding of imperial communications, and an understanding in regard to the Sudan. There was no question of Dominion status involved here, said the commission—Egypt had gone beyond that.

These conciliatory words had their effect. Zaghlul, sulking in Paris, consented to meet the commission in London, although he would not do so in Cairo. He and Milner got on famously together. They even drew up a memorandum to represent their informal agreement. This provided for a treaty between England and Egypt by which the latter country would become independent in all things except:

- "1. The stationing of British troops in Egypt to safeguard the line of Imperial communications.

- "2. The presence in the Egyptian government of a financial adviser appointed in concurrence with His Majesty's government.
- "3. An official in the Ministry of Justice, likewise appointed in concurrence with His Majesty's government.
- "4. The recognition of British rights of intervention in Egypt for the protection of foreigners."

These concessions on the part of the British were fundamental and extensive. The term, "independence," had slight significance; but the fact that education, public works, irrigation, agriculture, railways, the army, and practically the entire administration of government, passed from the guidance of British officials to Egyptians meant much. Of the higher posts in governmental service, those classified as paying salaries of £800 or more, a hundred and sixty-eight were held by British citizens, thirty-one by Egyptians, and thirty-one by the nationals of other countries. This situation would come to an end. Two British advisers now alone would be mandatory, all others could be retired at will if their pension rights were observed. Lord Milner's commission felt that it had gone a long way. It had conceded certain things it had no stomach for doing. It objected to separate diplomatic representation for the new Egypt; yet it gave in on this matter. If the Egyptians wanted to go to the expense of providing themselves with ambassadors who would not likely have anything to do except attend receptions, that was their affair. The important thing was to agree with the adversary quickly.

Zaghlul was not, however, the legal representative of Egypt, and the favorable completion of negotiations depended on the way in which Egyptian and British public opinion received this tentative settlement. To the surprise of the well-informed it gradually turned in Egypt to opposition, and Zaghlul was accused of secretly trying to defeat an agreement which he had been instrumental in forming.¹ The enemies of the treaty made much of such

¹ Symons, M. T., *Britain and Egypt*, 91.

general supervision of Egyptian finance as Great Britain insisted on retaining; and in regard to the administration of justice many Egyptians argued that the international limitation of Egypt's sovereignty by the capitulations was preferable to any purely British guarantee for the protection of foreigners. Furthermore, the fact that British troops would remain in Cairo, and the omission of any statement in regard to the Sudan, tended to increase Egyptian opposition.

The year 1921 saw it crystallize. Lord Curzon, now Foreign Secretary in the British cabinet, tried to put the Milner proposals into the form of a treaty with Egypt. In doing this, two or three changes in the Milner-Zaghlul program seemed to the cautious ex-Viceroy of India important; and by insisting on their inclusion he made the rejection of the treaty by Egypt inevitable. One of his addenda forbade "the employment of foreign officials in the Egyptian army and civil service without the consent of the British High Commissioner." If the British officials were to be dismissed, Curzon did not intend to have their places taken by the nationals of other countries. And a second new proviso stated that "all Egyptian forces in the Sudan should be under the orders of the Governor-General." There would be no possible loophole left for the assertion of Egyptian equality with Britain in that region if his lordship could prevent it.

These two clauses killed the treaty. Egypt's Prime Minister resigned rather than urge its ratification. Zaghlul resolutely opposed it; and anti-foreign riots, said to be the result of lurid language used by him, broke out in Alexandria. Allenby now forbade the Egyptian patriot the public platform. Zaghlul disobeyed and was sent to Suez to await deportation to some distant part of the Empire, a fact which did not detract from his popularity.

Anti-British demonstrations, more violent than ever, became the order of the day in Cairo; and again Lord Allenby

countered by bringing fresh pressure to bear on the Foreign Office. If the Egyptians refused to make a bilateral agreement, then let Britain, he suggested, make an announcement of her intentions which would be authoritative, if only unilateral. An interchange of guarantees with the Egyptians was desirable; but they could do without it. The British government, accepting his advice, thereupon abolished the protectorate, proclaimed the independence of Egypt; and reserved for future discussion four details only, the security of communications, the defense of Egypt, the protection of foreigners and minorities, and the Sudan.

In March, 1923, in accordance with this British proclamation, the history of modern Egypt as an independent nation began. The mere announcement of political independence, however, is no guarantee of the fact of it. As far as the form of the Egyptian government was concerned Britain cared nothing; what the British were interested in were the reservations, and the attitude of the Egyptians toward them.

The latter could not well be demonstrated until some kind of constitution was adopted and enforced, and in consequence 1923 and 1924 represent something of a lull in Anglo-Egyptian relations. During this time constitutional government on somewhat orthodox lines was inaugurated. The legislature was to consist of two houses; in the Senate, or Upper House, one-third of the membership was to be appointed by the King, two-thirds elected by universal suffrage; in the Chamber of Deputies the entire membership was thus elected. The tenure of office of a Senator was made ten years, that of a Deputy, five. All financial legislation had to originate in the lower chamber. None but Egyptians were permitted to act as ministers of state. And for the protection of all customary civil rights the usual guarantees were forthcoming.

Meanwhile, Zaghlul, that doughty defender of Egypt's prestige, had been spirited away to the distant Seychelles

Islands. On their dismal shores his health had suffered, and his captors had rushed him to Gibraltar where, they asserted, he could receive the best of medical care and at the same time be harmless. From Gibraltar he had been permitted to go to France and ultimately to his own country. Here he had been wildly acclaimed by his countrymen as Egypt's savior. Throwing himself into politics Zaghlul was victorious in the elections to Egypt's first Parliament, and in 1924 he became Prime Minister. In what light might he be expected to view the four reservations of Lord Curzon?

The British hoped for peace. They were prepared for further compromises; was not Ramsay Macdonald Prime Minister and the Labor party in power? But the Egyptian had no intentions of making any concessions. Zaghlul came to London for the purpose, apparently, of giving press interviews. Even the formulation of a vague kind of Monroe Doctrine in regard to Egypt was obnoxious to him. Complete independence, to which he had pledged himself, would not admit of any special British rights in Egypt. His demands seemed excessive, even to the British socialists, and negotiations were immediately deadlocked.

Of the four reservations, two, both from the Egyptian and the British point of view, seemed almost beyond compromise. The protection of foreigners and minorities, and the defense of Egypt, could, possibly, be arranged for. The security, however, of imperial communications, as the British saw it, necessitated British troops in Cairo; as for the Sudan, it was under British guidance, and Britain's duty toward that benighted region was both categorical and imperative. To the Egyptians, on the other hand, the mere presence of British battalions in Cairo was a denial of Egyptian independence. Furthermore, Egypt had conquered the Sudan long before the British ever came to Cairo, and Egyptian soldiers (under Kitchener) had reconquered that region. The Sudan belonged to Egypt, not to Britain.

Certain advocates of peace between England and Egypt suggested the withdrawal of the British Army of Defense (in deference to Egyptian susceptibilities it was no longer to be called the Army of Occupation) to the canal zone. If stationed there, it was argued, imperial communications could be maintained and at the same time no offense would be given the Egyptians. Or, if necessary, why should not the British troops be located in Palestine and from there be rushed to the canal zone if war threatened?

Many objections to this plan were promptly raised. The canal zone was internationalized, and to put British troops within it would infringe upon international law. As for Palestine, that country was only a mandate for Britain and the Empire had no right to use the Holy Land for such a purpose. The drinking water of the entire canal zone came from the sweet water canal direct from the Nile near Cairo. If that city was not occupied by British forces, water must needs be pumped a long distance from the Jordan or else costly condensers would have to be erected: thus spoke the military experts. Furthermore, the canal zone was unhealthy and undesirable as a military base. If Cairo were abandoned the business men of that city and Alexandria, many of them of foreign birth, would feel aggrieved, and in case of trouble could not be protected. Conversely, should the Egyptian army ever prove unfriendly the safety of the British troops in the canal zone would be menaced. Cairo meant Egypt, and Egypt meant the canal.

Despite this flood of protests against the removal of the troops the real crux of the Anglo-Egyptian problem lay in the question of the Sudan. A possible solution for the military problem might lie in a fortified camp part way between Cairo and the canal, with improved automobile roads in either direction: but as far as the Sudan was concerned Britain felt that there could be no yielding. Neither in topography nor in population, it was contended, could the Sudan be considered a part of Egypt. More than half of

the Sudanese came from the Southern Sudan. They were for the most part negroes in blood, pagan in religion, and without liking for either Egyptian or Moslem. The experience of these Sudanese in their fifty years subjection to Egypt had been bitter. Slavery had still survived. Egyptian officers, it was claimed, had married black girls in order to take them to Cairo that they might divorce them there and sell them into slavery. If the Egyptian once regained even nominal control, robbery, murder and the slave trade, it was prophesied, would reappear.

Britain and not Egypt, it was asserted, had redeemed this enormous empire. As Viscount Grey assured the House of Lords: "Egypt would never have had a finger in the Sudan again if it had not been for us. It was purely British strategy and British control, force and enterprise which recovered the Sudan."¹ Great Britain, it was urged, owed a duty to the wild tribesmen of this undeveloped country which could not be put aside. The recent progress of the Sudan had been astonishing. The Sudanese government had become self-supporting; the slave trade was disappearing; civil war grew less and less frequent; population increased; sanitation conquered, in Khartoum mosquito nettings were no longer necessary since the extirpation of the insects; habits of industry were taking the place of the old time shiftlessness; and educational advance was noteworthy.

We are just on the threshold of our work here, the British said. We are developing the cotton industry on a large scale through coöperation with the natives and a large expanse of the irrigated area. We are working out a new system of political control. Our policy is now "to leave administration as far as possible in the hands of native authorities wherever they exist, under the supervision of Government, starting from things as it finds them, putting its veto upon what is dangerous and unjust, and supporting

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 1924, V Series, LVII, 98.

what is fair and equitable in the usage of the natives."¹ This kind of work was too delicate to jeopardize.

The Egyptians, however, had a case. It was recognized by the British that Egyptian rights in the Sudan must be safeguarded, in so far as Egypt had vital interest in water drained from the Nile; and to protect Egypt in this particular they had suggested a joint irrigation commission. As Lord Curzon stated, however, it was unfair to limit Egyptian rights to a question of water. Egyptian troops and Egyptian money, with the exception of a trifling subvention from England in the early days, had reconquered the Sudan; Egypt for many years had made good the deficit there; and it was the Egyptian army, paid for by the Egyptian treasury, which defended the country in the joint name of England and Egypt.

Was there any way out of this difficulty? The British made one suggestion, the allocation of the waters of the Nile by arbitration and the continuance of the status quo in the Sudan. Now while the Egyptians were opposed to the latter on general grounds, they were particularly exercised over the question of water supply. Before the war the British Parliament had voted £3,000,000 to the Sudanese government for the irrigation of the Gezira district between the Blue and the White Niles. After the war this credit was increased to £13,000,000, in order that the cotton industry might develop in that flat triangular plain, the apex of which is the city of Khartoum. But this meant the building of a dam at Malkwar on the Blue Nile, and if this was done the Egyptians feared that further irrigation within the borders of Egypt would be limited since the Sudan would receive water which otherwise would come to them. The British, to offset these claims, pledged the Sudan government to only a limited use of the water of the Blue Nile, and at the same time promised that further irrigation pro-

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1923, XXV (cmd. 1950).

jects would be undertaken on the White Nile for the sole benefit of Egypt.

Thus stood the situation in 1924. Egypt, theoretically independent, was sufficiently autonomous to withdraw her annual payment for the British troops in Egypt; to refuse also any further payment of the Turkish tribute money (long since pledged by the Porte to European bondholders); and to dismiss from her employ the great majority of foreigners in the Civil Service. In the matter of the four reservations there was no yielding by either side.

Came the end of the year and Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, was murdered in broad daylight in Cairo. Whereupon Lord Allenby, as High Commissioner, presented the Egyptian government with an ultimatum in some respects more harsh than that delivered to Serbia by Austria in 1914. Not only was Egypt to apologize, punish, and prohibit political demonstrations; she was also to pay £500,000, to withdraw Egyptian troops from the Sudan and Egyptian officers from Sudanese battalions, and to agree to the indefinite extension of the area to be irrigated in the Gezira district.

To the first four of these demands Egypt promptly yielded; the last two she refused to accept. Then followed the landing of the British troops in Alexandria and the seizure of the customs house. This brought about the retirement of Zaghlul from the premiership and the formal submission of the Egyptians.

Concerning the ethics of this ultimatum there is much room for difference of opinion. From the British point of view only three regiments of cavalry and a few scattered battalions of infantry and field artillery intervened between the maddened mobs of Cairo and the European residents. Punishment, swift, condign, was the only way to deal with murder. They had no intention of depriving Egypt of her water supply; but the ultimatum would show what could be done if the occasion warranted it.

England, claimed the Egyptians, was using this opportunity to steal the Sudan under cloak of righteous anger. The Sudan cotton syndicate was represented in England by many investors prominent in the political life of the country. The death of Sir Lee Stack enabled them to steal the water supply of Egypt. Our population, the Egyptians argued, is growing rapidly. We need water to reclaim 1,800,000 acres at present without water at all, and we need water to provide perennial irrigation for 1,000,000 acres which are only partly irrigated. Assisted by the credit of the British government the damming up of the Blue Nile approaches completion; our own impecunious position makes it impossible for us to complete the irrigation works on the White Nile. England by this ultimatum smashes those very understandings which she had herself dictated in 1899 in regard to the Government of the Sudan; if we are forced to withdraw that region becomes a British colony.

The force of these arguments, on the economic side, was obvious, and the British now made an important concession. They agreed to use no more water in the Sudan than an impartial international commission would agree might be consumed without detriment to Egypt. Would the Egyptians in turn give over their pretensions to the Sudan?

Much now, of course, depended on the trend of domestic politics in Egypt. During 1925 Zaghlul's influence, apparently, was diminishing and an understanding with the British on that account seemed nearer. The political party which supported him, the *Wafd*, intent on the independence of Egypt, in fact as well as theory, hitherto had been opposed by the Liberal Constitutional Party, friendly toward British influence. This party, although supported by King Fuad, was weak in numbers and unpopular. "The House of the Nation" (Zaghlul's Palace) had been considered a more important place than the Abdine Palace (King's residence). The King did not like this, and since the Liberals could not serve his end he assisted in the formation of a

new party, the *Ittihad* (Union), an organization for the purpose of detaching from the Wafd as many of Zaghlul's adherents as possible. This new party gathered strength and shared Cabinet responsibility with the Liberals. Zaghlul's star was thought to be sinking.

And then there broke on Egypt a religious storm which aided Zaghlul in regaining the ascendancy. A public official published a book in which principles of higher criticism, long familiar to the west, were applied to the Koran. Egyptian fundamentalists resisted violently. The Cabinet was in hopeless disagreement. A wave of religious fanaticism rose which drove the unfortunate writer from his judicial post and the Liberals from office. Zaghlul capitalized it and swept all before him in the elections of 1926. But Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner, would not permit him to become Prime Minister without stringent guarantees in the British interest. These, Zaghlul refused to make, and once more he retired informally to the near background, accepting the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and permitting someone else to serve as Egypt's Premier.

In 1927 the Parliament of Egypt, guided by Zaghlul, thought to increase the Egyptian army and to dismiss the Sirdar from the command thereof. These proposals Great Britain vetoed. Neither the size of our army or the commander of it has anything to do with the four reservations, asserted the Egyptians. If you take the steps indicated the security of imperial communications might be threatened, replied the British. And to give further emphasis to their answer military preparations were begun to augment the British battalions already stationed in Egypt. In consequence, Great Britain had her own way.

Just what then is the present status of Egypt? A man well learned in international lore might have difficulty in defining it. In that country the anti-foreign party which Zaghlul headed, until his death in August, 1927, still is

powerful. Whether King Fuad and his henchmen relying on British support will make headway against it, remains to be seen. The Foreign Office, seemingly, is intent on strengthening the minority who follow the King. How else can one interpret the fuss made over the visit of that potentate in the early summer of 1927 to English shores? Possibly from it an Anglo-Egyptian alliance might emerge. In the valley of the Nile, one is inclined to think, almost anything may happen. Uncertainty and confusion now characterize the constitutional and political status of this independent country still occupied by British troops.

CHAPTER XIV

THE DEPENDENT EMPIRE

“George V, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India.”

Thus is written the title of the King of England, in accordance with the amendment suggested by the imperial conference of 1926. By it Ireland is no longer a part of the United Kingdom, nor, for some reason, is that island classified as a Dominion. Yet Ireland and the Dominions, together with the Mother country, comprise a Commonwealth of free nations; and in the course of time India may join them. The numerous Crown colonies, protectorates and mandates of the Empire find no mention in the King's title. The presumption is that they belong to Great Britain, and in an old imperial sense. It is difficult to conceive of Zanzibar and Nyasaland as being of the Commonwealth. The inhabitants thereof share doubtless in the commonweal; but they do not participate in any common effort to direct or determine it. They are a part of the dependent Empire.

The colonial dependencies of the British Crown defy scientific classification. That happy disregard of formal logic which has contributed so much to Britain's greatness may be seen in the organization of her Colonial Office as well as in her constitutional history. A few men at Whitehall, at a minimum of red tape and expense—they consider an appropriation of £177,000 “somewhat startling”¹—control through their agents the destinies of millions of people. And there is no general way, plan or method for so doing.

¹Fiddes, Sir G., *The Dominions and the Colonial Office*, 14.

The Empire has grown at odd and casual moments, and no one in authority has ever been sufficiently doctrinaire to apply standard measurements to this living and still growing organism.

None the less one may classify the units in the dependent Empire roughly by types, and by describing certain given examples in each type some light may, perhaps, be thrown on the evolution of the whole. Open as such a method is to the charge of incompleteness it seems preferable to cataloguing paragraph by paragraph, with a brief description given to each, the long list of Crown colonies, protectorates and mandates which are included in the British system.

I. THE CHARTERED COMPANY

The oldest form of colonial control in the Empire is the chartered company, and the history of the Empire in its earlier years must take note of many such. One by one, however, they have disappeared. Gone are the East Indian, Royal Niger and East African. In the twentieth century but two examples of this archaic structure, providing for the governance of alien peoples by a business organization, still survived—the British South African and the British North Borneo Companies.

The charter of the former, given by her Majesty's Government in 1889 for a period of twenty-five years, presented to the company extensive although not sovereign rights over an enormous stretch of territory in south central Africa. Rhodesia, as it was called, was larger in area than Germany and France combined. It offered good possibilities for European settlement, particularly that third of it which was located south of the Zambesi River. The South African Company had pleaded for extensive economic privileges in this region. It obtained more than it originally asked for; it was authorized to administer justice and preserve peace, as well as to build railways, open mines, attract immigrants. The British government, however, reserved the right to

abrogate its charter whenever such an act might be deemed desirable, and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies were granted large powers of intervention. At the expiration of the twenty-five years the charter was renewable in periods of ten years.

The British South African Company was to rule in Rhodesia until 1922. During that time, although highly abused as a wicked instrument of the ruthless imperialists, it never paid a penny in dividends. And by its balance sheet in 1922 it is evident that while the company raised and spent £13,000,000 it had as assured assets only £8,000,000.

None the less the venture was successful. It had accomplished what Rhodes hoped it would; the land was cleared, towns built, railways constructed, mines put in operation, settlers introduced—by 1920 some 33,000 in number. And all this was the work of private enterprise which cost the British government practically nothing. The latter assisted in quelling a native revolt; it also acted as intermediary between the company and the Portuguese, the Germans and the indigenous tribes. But it was the enthusiasm of the directors, long sustained, that made this seemingly unprofitable enterprise both popular and possible. Although there were no dividends the initial capital was doubled and shares still sold at a premium. Many persons bought them, it was said, simply for the purpose of attending the annual meeting and coöperating in the imperial labor of this unique corporation.

The more dramatic incidents in the company's history, the trek of Selous with the pioneers past the hostile tribesmen of Lobengula, the occupation of Mashonaland, the search for gold, the founding of Salisbury, the Matabele rebellion, took place in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Mr. Cecil Rhodes may have been a failure in South Africa, but in Rhodesia his presence was a godsend. With the cattle nearly gone, the mining machinery wrecked, and heavy casualties in the Matabele conflict, the plight of

both company and settlers was serious. By skillful palavers with the native warriors, by importing cattle and supplies, Rhodes saved the day. In feverish activity he sought, perhaps, to forget his evil connection with the Jameson Raid, so recently a failure. Whereupon Rhodesia began again to thrive and prosper.

The London directors, since they were business men as well as patriots, now thought the time had come for dividends. On the other hand the settlers, as they increased in numbers and learned to shift for themselves, became restless under the control of the company. By a partial reorganization of the administration they had been granted representation in the Legislative Council; but it was a minority representation, and at this they chafed. When the directors proposed a customs tariff to make good the annual deficit further trouble was created. The cost of living always had been high in Rhodesia, and now the directors would increase it. The elected members of the Council countered this unpleasant proposal by an offer to pay one-third of the administrative expenses of Southern Rhodesia, that part of Rhodesia south of the Zambesi and the only section into which the Whites had penetrated in numbers. But the company thought that the settlers should pay all the expenses of government. It proceeded, therefore, to exercise its legal authority and to establish a tariff.

Still the deficits grew, and among the company's stockholders there was agitation for a "get-a-way." But on what understanding would it be with the settlers? The company claimed that the latter owed it £7,500,000 for money spent. If they would assume the responsibility for two-thirds of this sum the company agreed to turn over to them all its land and mineral rights. But, said the settlers, what title have you to this land: there is nothing said in the charter about your ownership of the land?

Thus stood the situation in 1914 when, by efflux of time, the charter terminated. The elections held in Southern

Rhodesia resulted in its renewal. The alternative at this time seemed to be inclusion in the Union of South Africa; and this, to Rhodesia's British population, fearing submergence by the Dutch majority to the south, was distasteful. The company began, meanwhile, to develop the unused land and "announced that the £7,750,000 deficit need trouble the Rhodesians no more as this was money well spent in the acquisition of the land and minerals."¹

The settlers, however, disputed the land claims of the company, and the question of the ownership of the soil was now thoroughly thrashed out by the judicial committee of the Privy Council. The unalienated land comprised the greater part of the acreage, and though already occupied to a considerable degree by negroes, the company claimed title to all of it. The grounds on which it did so, however, were somewhat tenuous,² and the Privy Council decided against the company—unalienated land was held to be the property of the Crown. None the less, when this decision was handed down in 1918 the shares of the company rose, since it was given permission to reimburse itself for current expenses out of the sale of unoccupied land, as long as it remained legally responsible for the administration of Rhodesia.

When the charter was renewed, provision was made for the establishment of responsible government upon evidence of fitness and desire on the part of the inhabitants. Eleven out of twelve elected members of the Legislative Council petitioned in 1920 for this boon, and their request was overwhelmingly seconded at the polls. But there were only 33,000 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, and how could these establish responsible government in a country where there were over twenty negroes to one white man, and where financial disagreement was so acute?

For the first of these problems there was an easy although

¹ *Round Table*, XII, 197 (Dec., 1921).

² Harris, J. H., *The Chartered Millions*, 133 *et seq.*

temporary solution. The 770,000 Blacks in Southern Rhodesia were made wards of the Empire and placed under the control of an officer not responsible to the Rhodesian legislature. The financial problem, however, was more difficult to untangle, since the company was entitled to large sums if the charter was abrogated, and since these 33,000 settlers could not start housekeeping with a huge debt hanging over them.

In 1921 the Cave Committee on the finances of the South African Company made its report. It scaled down the claims of that organization against the British immigrants by entering counter-claims against the company for £2,000,000 expended in suppressing the Matabele revolt. Still, even so, the South African Company was due to receive from Rhodesia more than that embryonic Dominion was capable of paying. The Rhodesians now offered £2,000,000 to the company for compensation and the Imperial Government made a settlement on their behalf as follows: it paid the company £3,750,000 in cash, waived the British claims for £2,000,000 and took the promise of Rhodesia to pay £2,000,000, thus bringing a conclusion to the matter at a total expense to the British tax payer of £1,750,000. Rhodesia by this agreement obtained for her £2,000,000 not simply the gift of responsible government but that which went with it namely, title to the Crown lands.

In 1923 the company's flag was struck and Southern Rhodesia began its career, to all intent and purpose another Dominion except for the control of the native areas within its borders. The first Parliament promptly met in a dance hall over a country store, for Southern Rhodesia was poor. But the inhabitants, with the true spirit of the frontier, were ready to shift for themselves and welcomed the coming of responsible government.

The British South African Company now gave up its rôle as a political overlord. It withdrew, politically, both from Northern Rhodesia (left in the hands of a Commissioner)

and from Southern Rhodesia as well. It not only had never made any financial return to its stockholders but had spent £13,000,000. For this outlay it recovered £3,750,000 and retained mineral rights of value, as well as a goodly proportion of the shares in the privately owned railways of Southern Rhodesia. As a trading company it had expanded the Empire from the Transvaal to the Lakes. With its passing Southern Rhodesia ceased to belong to the dependent Empire and became self-governing.

The inauguration of responsible government in Southern Rhodesia left but one solitary example extant of the chartered companies of the old colonial days. The British North Borneo Company, with a charter dating from 1881, continued in control of the northern tip of Borneo, a district as large as Scotland. But the land is still largely forest and the population under 300,000, of whom not more than one in eight thousand is a European. The Governor and the officials are appointed by the directors in London subject to approval by the Colonial Office. The salary scale seems large; it must be to secure efficient service in this remote region. Nothing of a startling nature has ever happened in North Borneo; an occasional raid on the natives by an enterprising head hunter from the interior; an increase in the mileage of telegraph and bridle path; a short railway line appearing in recent years; and the history of British North Borneo is told.

II. THE CROWN COLONY


Dating back also to the early days of the Empire, is the Crown colony. To define the status of the latter is difficult. In the Colonial Office lists Crown colonies are now placed in the same category with protectorates as "colonies not possessing responsible government, in which the administration is carried on by public officers under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies." But when we come to analyze further the form of government found in these

two score and more British possessions we find it widely variant.

There are certain points of similarity which universally are met with. Among them are: a governor sent from England, and other officials, such as the commander of the troops, medical officer, judge or judges, bishop or clergymen; and in all the Crown colonies the more important of these gentlemen form the governor's council. But here the similarity ends. A number of colonies, such as St. Helena and Gibraltar, are without further governmental machinery. On the other hand a majority are equipped with a Legislative Council. In certain of these the members are exclusively nominated by the Crown; in others, as is the case in Fiji, Jamaica and Kenya, they are in part elected with a provision that a majority of the Council be nominated. In yet others this proviso does not exist and a majority of the Legislative Council may be elected. Of this number Cyprus and Ceylon are typical. Three Crown colonies out of the total number approach to modern democratic ideas and possess a legislature of two houses with the lower one comprised entirely of elected members. Barbados, the Bahamas and Bermuda comprise the three.

In general, Crown colony government may be said to be autocratic, tempered in a few instances by representative institutions. But it must always be remembered that they are rare. Let us take, for instance, the Government in Hong Kong. The chart here given (page 427) indicates the autocratic character of the colony's government. The sole trace of democratic influence, if we may call it such, in Hong Kong, is to be found in the provision for unofficial members of the councils. Yet these are always in a minority, and only one of them, the member representing the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, can be said in any way to represent popular opinion. Hong Kong, however, is more representative of the Crown colony group as a whole than Bermuda with its elected legislature.

Among the Crown colonies of Britain none exceed in historic interest the British West Indies. As to just what this phrase includes there is no definite answer. If, however, we define the British West Indies in the broadest



possible sense, going as far north as Bermuda, generally regarded as not being in the West Indies at all,¹ and as far south and west as the mainland, we may say that they comprise nine Crown colonies. These are: Bermuda; the

¹ According to Wrong, H., *Government of the West Indies*, 17. "Geography forbids that the Bermuda islands should be considered as West Indian." None the less Wrong describes the Government of Bermuda in this book, thereby implying, in a sense, that Bermuda may be included in the general West Indian system.

Bahamas, thirty in number; Jamaica, the largest; British Honduras, on the mainland and six hundred miles to the west of Kingston, capital of Jamaica; the Leeward Islands, a group of five islands six hundred miles to the east of Kingston and north of Martinique; the Windward Islands, south of Martinique, three of some size and a cluster of tiny islands known as the Grenadines; Barbados, thickly populated and British since 1625; Trinidad and its satellite, Tobago; and British Guiana on the coast of South America.

In the eighteenth century, in the heyday of their glory, the West Indies were as bright a jewel in the British Crown as India or the North American colonies. But since the middle of the last century their value and importance has steadily declined, not only relatively, but absolutely. And as their economic star has set, so has their constitutional development followed on parallel lines a reversion toward simpler and more autocratic forms. All of these colonies, with the exception of Trinidad and St. Lucia, possessed in the old days in some form or other representative institutions on the general model of those prevalent in the North American colonies before the Revolution. As a rule they took the form of an Assembly elected by the land owners or persons with property, and a council corresponding roughly to the House of Lords in England, with nominated membership, and a governor. Details varied, but always the old system was characterized by these two features: financial power lodged in the elective assembly, executive power in the hands of an irremovable governor, an illogical and unworkable system in case of serious and protracted friction between governors and governed.

During the nineteenth century, in a majority of the colonies, this system was abandoned. The Canadian constitutional precedent by which representative government gradually was transformed into responsible government was not followed. The constitutional process in the West Indies was reversed. With the exception of the Bahamas, Ber-

muda, Barbados, and to some extent British Guiana, even representative government was gradually abandoned for a more autocratic form, with a legislative council composed in part of office holders and in part of non-official members, the latter generally in a minority and generally appointed. Thus it came about that the government of these islands is today less democratic than it was a hundred years ago.

The principal reason for this seemingly retrograde course was the abolition of slavery. The Houses of Assembly in the West Indies, composed largely as they were of slave owners, were opposed to the emancipation of the Blacks, and to that end adopted obstructionist tactics which made them unpopular in Great Britain. Even after the imperial edict had gone forth that slavery should be no more they refused to pass laws facilitating emancipation, obstructed the colonial governors, and refused to vote salaries or necessary expenses. Hence the British Parliament was compelled to lay a heavy hand upon their chartered freedom. Furthermore, with slavery abolished it was immediately evident that a large number of negroes and colored men (British term generally in use to denote mixed breeding) would now become active British citizens. The free possession of the franchise by them might not prove innocuous.

Three colonies survived the storm. In Barbados the freeing of the slave had made a minimum of trouble for the Government. Since the island was very thickly populated, and since landownership was entirely in the hands of the planters, the ex-slaves were obliged to work on such terms as were dictated to them. In consequence, the planters bore no grudge against the British Parliament and therefore retained their charter. As for the Bahamas, the transition from slavery to freedom was made easy by the relatively large proportion of Whites to Blacks, and by the absence of the plantation system. In consequence, the constitutional privileges of these colonies remained unabridged, which was also true in the case of Bermuda. In the two former

colonies, however, the government could scarcely be called democratic, since a property qualification kept the vote from many, and since the governor retained the right of veto, and since also his post remained a gift of the Crown from which he might not be driven by an adverse vote of the Assembly.

But whether democratic or otherwise, there is no discontent within these three colonies that is articulate. Few voters even bother to participate in the elections. In the Bahamas, so widely scattered are the islands, the voters can only be brought together with the greatest difficulty. In Barbados few votes are recorded and political contests are regarded as somewhat undignified. In a recent one, which for Barbados was hotly contested, a total of 247 votes was cast. In Bermuda the pay of eight shillings a day to members of the Legislature, when that august body is in session, awakens more interest in politics. Debates in the Bermuda legislature are sometimes long in duration.

Nowhere in the British West Indies is there any active opposition to the governmental system now in vogue. Jamaica, where certain slight murmurs of democratic discontent may occasionally be noticed, contains more people than all the other colonies together, yet possesses much less political freedom than Bermuda. Semi-representative institutions are said to prevail in Jamaica because in the Legislative Assembly in that colony there are only fourteen official to fourteen unofficial (elected) members. "The initiation of all money bills," we are told, "is restricted to the governor or his deputy, but when a division is held the votes of the elected members are taken first, and if nine of them vote against the motion the governor does not call upon the nominated members to vote."¹ Despite this generous limitation of the governor's powers few exercise the franchise. Out of fourteen districts in 1920 nine returned their members unopposed, and in the five districts

¹ *Ibid.*, 129.

where there were contests only about twenty per cent of the electorate were sufficiently interested to go to the polls. When we remember that the population of Jamaica is 850,000 and that the property qualification is a low one, it is evident that the Government is either on the whole admirable or else the people are extraordinarily apathetic.

In Canada, Australia and South Africa, local and racial jealousies have not prevented federation; why should not a similar movement succeed in the West Indies? Here are British colonies among the oldest in the Empire and British patriotism at its keenest; here the racial question, except for the East Indians in Trinidad and British Guiana, is the same in every colony, and not intensified in any. Why not save the cost of sixteen governors with their sixteen staffs, have a federal capital, cut down expenses, conserve resources, unify tariffs and educational programs, create, perhaps, the Dominion of the British West Indies?

This mooted question has been frequently asked, and various schemes have been elaborated for a federal government for these colonies. And none have found favor. In fact, the physical difficulties in the way of federation seem almost insuperable. Where would the capital be? A yacht would seem to be the only answer to that question. The islands are small, but the distances between them great. From Jamaica to the nearest island in the Lesser Antilles it is almost 1,000 miles. The Bahama chain of islands alone stretches out 600 miles, and from Kingston to Trinidad it is 1,100 miles. Furthermore, these islands are not connected with one another by steamship lines. To send mail to the Barbados or British Guiana from certain of these colonies it is necessary that a letter travel first to New York or Halifax or even London. The British colonel in command of all the troops in the West Indies has frequently to wait several months to receive an answer to a letter mailed to a subordinate officer on an island but a few score miles away. To visit certain colonies from certain others

one frequently must go to New York and return, or else wait weary months until conveyed by sailing vessel or warship. In consequence, without new and expensive lines of communication an effective federal system is impossible. And an inter-colonial steamship line would require a heavy subsidy, since freight from colony to colony would be practically non-existent, all colonies being agricultural and exporting very largely the same commodities.

Furthermore, among certain of these islands rudimentary federal systems have already been established with great difficulty, and their record would seem to preclude any federation of all the British West Indies on a broader basis.

The islands north of Martinique, the Leeward group, were united in the latter nineteenth century not only by a common governor but by a common legislature, meeting at Antigua. Each separate island retained its own legislature, and no federal treasury was provided, contributions to the common cause being determined in proportion to the number of representatives returned by each colony to the general legislature. The latter has proved useful in reducing to one code various legal systems, antiquated and complex; but it has neither made itself popular nor has it lowered taxation.

The confederation of the Windward Islands, south of Martinique, is even less centralized. In this instance there was no general legislature, only a single governor and auditor for the various colonies. The governor is expected to visit each one every year. Since he lives in Grenada and not in St. Lucia or St. Vincent some jealousy has arisen in these latter colonies.

A British Dominion of the West Indies not being feasible, it has been frequently suggested that they join either Canada or the United States. Certain British imperialists have often dreamed of the former, certain American imperialists of the latter.

The Canadian idea is not as chimerical as it appears.

Halifax, extending far out to the east into the North Atlantic, is at no great distance from Bermuda; furthermore, between Canada and the West Indies there is a rapidly growing trade, the surplus products of the two regions being complementary. Just what, however, would be gained by either Canada or the West Indies by this joining of forces, except free trade, it is difficult to see. The latter is always possible without union, and the difficulties that have confronted Canada during the last twenty years in attempting to establish commercial treaties with one or two colonial legislatures in the West Indies would seem to indicate that any general federation under the auspices of Canada is unlikely.

The American solution is even less palatable to the British West Indies, primarily on account of the treatment of the negro in the United States. The West Indian men of color are very proud of their British citizenship, and the thought of the racial discriminations to which they would be subjected as American citizens is sufficient in itself to offset any advantage, economic or otherwise, which the islands might receive if the American flag flew over them.

None the less these various solutions have been common talk in the West Indies, owing to two reasons. In the first place the present system of government is wasteful and extravagant. Colonial governors with their staffs are an expensive luxury, and the payment of commensurate salaries to a host of officials, many of them without much to do or duplicating work done in a neighboring island, has proved a heavy burden. Secondly, the islands are desperately poor. Here lies the real crux of their problem—poverty, traced directly to one thing, the low price of sugar. In the report made in 1922 to Mr. Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, his special investigator wrote: "The West Indian Colonies have been and still are suffering from acute economic depression in this industry."¹ What the West Indies really seek is a preferential market for their sugar

¹ *Sessional Papers, 1922, XVI* (cmd. 1679).

in Great Britain. Since this can not be granted to any extent without a general inter-colonial tariff readjustment all around, and imperial preference to boot, the economic rehabilitation of the British West Indies is apt to be postponed for many years. Meanwhile, except for here and there an occasional misunderstanding with Governor or Colonial Office, their politics are as placid as the blue waters which encircle them.

III. CROWN COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES IN AFRICA AND ASIA

Between the government of a Crown colony and that of a protectorate the line of demarcation is today somewhat shadowy. In the nineteenth century a protectorate was represented primarily by a large block of land under the protection of the British government, on which a British resident, appointed by and responsible to the British Foreign Office, exercised a more or less general and indirect rule through advice given to the native ruler. The inhabitants of a protectorate were indeed protected—but largely against annexation by German, French or Portuguese. To some extent, in certain quarters, the British resident did protect them not only against the rapaciousness of their rulers but also against tribal customs, if sufficiently shocking and dehumanizing. But as a rule, aside from driving out slavery and the slave trade, it was not expected that he would interfere with the organization of native life, either political or social.

At the present this definition of a protectorate needs decided modification. The majority of the protectorates have been given up by the Foreign Office and have been taken over by the Colonial; the central African Crown colonies have extended their control inland and have assumed new responsibilities for the guidance of native races; and at the same time the administrative authorities in the protectorates have extended their control and have inter-

ferred more and more in the economic and social life of the people subject to them. Crown colony government, therefore, and protectorate government tend to blend, and it frequently is difficult to differentiate between them. For instance, there is the British Crown colony of Sierra Leone and the British protectorate of that name. There is now in theory but one Nigeria; yet to all practical purposes the protectorate of Northern Nigeria still remains, a confusion in terminology thereby resulting which to any except the British might seem undesirable. The Governor of Sierra Leone is, for instance, the British resident for Sierra Leone. For the seaport and the territory immediately adjacent to it, the old colony of Sierra Leone, there is a Legislative Council on the familiar West Indian model, with nominated majority. In the interior, in the protectorate, the decrees of this council are not binding; but the ordinances of the Governor, as British resident, are. In practice this frequently amounts to the same thing, since the friends of the Governor control the council. The protectorate, however, in both theory and practice, is less closely administered, more liberty being left to the local chieftains, sometimes the entire work of the administration being intrusted to their care.

This change has come about mainly as the result of the economic exploitation of the Dark Continent. The division of African territory among the European powers was largely completed by 1890; but the boundaries in the hinterland were as yet very shadowy. To secure them, expeditions were sent out by the various European governments. The first aim of their statesmen was, as in 1890, to stake down claims rather than to develop wealth. The line of the surveyor preceded the coming of the trader or planter; there was necessity for haste lest aliens preëempt savannahs, streams and forests that might prove useful in the future. And with the surveyors went the proclamation of the protectorate.

By 1904, however, with the Franco-British entente of that year, even the boundaries in the remote hinterland had, in most cases, been determined. And as this process drew to a conclusion a new one began, namely, the building of railways, the development of sugar, coffee and cacao plantations, the exploitation of palm oil and rubber resources, the pushing on into the interior of the white trader and all that it implied. From Sierra Leone in the west to Nairobi in the east, from Khartoum to the Zambesi; in Northern Nigeria, Nyassaland, Uganda and the Gold Coast one found the white man now appearing. And missionary, trader, native chief and government official were obliged to readjust their mutual relations. The British had really entered tropical Africa; had they come as associates, partners, neighbors or governors, and to what extent or degree?

This question was variously answered in different parts of the Dark Continent. Of course, in every section which they entered the British, like the other Europeans, came as overlord. Since they knew more than the negroes, an acknowledged fact, they assumed they knew best how the natives should be governed, an inference which was not inevitable. But in determining the form of this governance the new-comer was not altogether certain.

Roughly speaking, he followed either one of two methods, the west African or the east African. In the former, reliance was placed primarily on indirect rule. According to its principles the British resident endeavored to make himself as inconspicuous as possible while exalting the power and prestige of the native chief; in the latter or east African method the rule was direct. In accordance with the west African system private ownership of land on the part of the Whites was forbidden and tribal ownership on the part of the negroes encouraged. In the east African system the land policy was reversed. The natives were segregated on reserves set apart for them. White immigrants, on the

other hand, bought or leased land from the Crown and remained apart from the negro altogether.

Strange as it may appear, where the climate is the worst the conditions of life are best—for the negro. In other words the whites are less numerous in West Africa. No high plateau is found in the interior of Sierra Leone; the Fulas of Northern Nigeria and the inhabitants of Kumasai in the Gold Coast live in a region of slight elevation, less malarious than the sea coast, but still unhealthy for the white man. The Kikuyus and the Masai of East Africa, on the other hand, have for their home grassy uplands, sufficiently elevated to secure a temperate climate. In consequence, the Europeans have invaded their territory in large numbers whereas to the west their infiltration is gradual. Selfishness and greed in East Africa have worked havoc with the natives who are rapidly decreasing in numbers. In West Africa, where the economic stimulus has been less marked, justice and intelligence, for the time being, seem to prevail.

The west African system may best be studied in Nigeria. The history of that great protectorate, next to India the largest dependency under the British Crown, falls naturally in the twentieth century into two periods; the first dating from the wind-up of the affairs of the Royal Niger Company in 1900 to 1914; the second from the joining of Northern and Southern Nigeria, at that date, to the present.

In 1900 there was no Nigeria as we know it. The old colony of Lagos and the Government of Southern Nigeria divided between them the jurisdiction of all land between French Dahomey and German Kamerun, approximately south of seven degrees, ten minutes, north latitude; here were the coastal regions over which the British raj had gradually been extended. North of this line the Royal Niger Company exercised both political and commercial control, but with some difficulty. Local chieftains, it was said, had held up traffic and also had been guilty of atrocious

barbarisms, such as slaying slaves in queer religious rites. The company was ready to retire from the field, and with the opening of the twentieth century the imperial authorities took over its responsibilities, and penetrated inland with the double purpose of securing free trade with the interior and civilizing the natives.

As they did so they divided Nigeria, for administrative purposes, into two divisions. The first, Southern Nigeria, already pacified and somewhat civilized, contained within its borders a number of educated negroes. Its problems were economic rather than military. The mud had to be dredged from the rivers, railways constructed, roads built. But to accomplish these things there was no immediate pressure. The south could look after itself; it had done so for a long time and was amply financed by a slight tariff on imported gin.

The second division, Northern Nigeria, could not wait; and three quarters of Nigeria was north. Here were lands but recently acquired, in part by semi-conquest, in part by treaties loosely made, in part by negotiation and barter with the French. Discipline and control in this region were lacking. The old company had clung close to the rivers and had stood warily aloof from the fierce Moslem tribes of the interior, more Caucasian in blood than negro. The Hausas, a negro tribe, had been driven headlong before them and a reign of terror had ensued in the hinterland.

To end this, in the name of the Empire, and to establish order was the congenial task of that old war horse of tropical exploration and well known empire-tracker, Sir Frederic Lugard. He did it very rapidly, and with a small force comprised principally of the ex-constabulary of the Royal Niger Company. Nupe, Borm and Zaria speedily submitted to his rule. Kontagora, the old slaver who had boasted that he would die like a cat with a slave in his mouth, next yielded. In two years only the Fulani were left to conquer. The latter, entrenched in their walled town of Kano, re-

puted of enormous strength, had forced all Northern Nigeria to pay tribute to them for a hundred years. Toward Lugard they were contemptuously defiant. In 1903 he subdued them, Kano falling as did Sokoto, their other stronghold. New emirs were now installed over the Moslem tribes, fresh treaties were struck, wandering bands of robbers brought to heel. And all this was done by Lugard with a few hundred men.

The maintenance of the *Pax Britannica* was more difficult. This, Lugard thought to secure by gradual and indirect means. For the time being all non-official Europeans, such as missionaries and traders, were prohibited from entering Northern Nigeria; and over the various provinces into which the region was divided, some of them the size of England or of Scotland, British residents were placed, ordered to see to it that the local emirs or higher chiefs were supported by the paramount power. These Residents were not expected to guarantee western methods of criminal justice, or to interfere with the working of the local courts. Only such acts as throwing men to crocodiles, compelling suspected criminals to drink out of poisoned bowls, stuffing the bodies of twin babies into gourds (since the Devil must be the father of such) were placed beneath the ban.

Now it was evident that the Residents would interpret instructions such as these, each according to his own conscience or temperament. The more ambitious, making themselves unpopular with the emirs, would interfere too frequently; others, inclined toward laziness, would do as little as they could and retain their posts. Certain sections of Northern Nigeria might be well and tactfully administered; in others the Government might be both unintelligent and futile. This could not be altogether prevented; but the likelihood of evil could be minimized by laying down certain broad lines of policy in regard to land tenure, liquor and the administration of justice, leaving to individual adjustment all matters of detail.

The question of land tenure is of vital importance in tropical Africa where the Europeans, sometimes out of greedy malice, sometimes out of misdirected zeal, have insisted on the introduction of freehold, individual ownership of the land. This was contrary to general African practice. Natives in Africa were not accustomed to claim in person the land which they cultivated. If questioned as to the ownership of it the answer quite likely would be: "this is my farm, it is on land belonging to such and such a chief, or such and such a town."¹

Yet security of tenure, under the native régime, the occupant had. As long as he carried out certain duties laid upon him by custom, he and his family remained in possession. "In the case of pagan tribes the obligations imposed by the community were simple and not very onerous. To be ready to join in the fight when the tribe was at war, to raise sufficient grain to support a family and to contribute to the common stock for the purpose of brewing beer for the harvest festivals, and on occasions to bring a present to his chief or one of the elders, was generally all that a man was called upon to do."²

The coming of the British tended to break up this feudal system, particularly by the abolition of petty civil war, a sturdy prop of feudalism in Africa as in Europe. In the course of time freehold would inevitably have become general in British West Africa. It was prevented, however, in Northern Nigeria by the Land and Native Rights Proclamation of 1910. In accordance with its provisions all land belonged to the Crown and none of it could be alienated or sold. This stayed the development of individualism in West Africa, and buttressed up the communal and tribal spirit; it also protected the natives from the avaricious white man on the one hand, and from the crafty negro on the other. A danger, of course, lurked in the proclamation.

¹ Temple, C. L., *Native Races and Their Rulers*, 139.

² *Ibid.*, 141.

If the title was held by the Crown the latter might lease out mining property, for instance, at a very low figure and thus not act in accordance with the best interests of the people.

All leases, however, granted by the Government were issued for limited periods only, with the promise of renewal based on the rise in value of the lease. And in every instance it was distinctly provided that all increase in value brought about by improvements made by the leaseholder should be subtracted from the new assessment. By these means the individual was insured against losing the result of his labor while to the Crown was guaranteed the rise in value of the property or economic rent.

Meanwhile in 1914, Sir Frederic Lugard, recalled from the governorship of Hong Kong, was intrusted with the task of uniting Northern and Southern Nigeria. The latter, comparatively wealthy, might well afford to finance in part the administration of the former, particularly since import duties levied at the coast would affect the cost of goods consumed inland. Furthermore, railway construction in the two Nigerias had been carried on in a wasteful and competitive manner, and it was high time that a common understanding be had in regard to it. This might best be accomplished under a common government.

This was officially declared to be the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. It had a unified government to the extent that it was placed under the control of one governor and one executive council. Practically, however, there continued to be a Northern and Southern Nigeria, a distinction which found legal recognition in the division of all Nigeria into two lieutenant-governorships. The captious critic, indeed, might claim that there were three Nigerias, a northern and a southern protectorate and a Crown colony, since that portion of Nigeria which included the old colony of Lagos continued to boast of a Legislative Council, in part elective.

Several reasons account for this administrative division

of the now united Nigeria. The Crown colony had long been under European influence and also somewhat accustomed to Christianity. Life in it had some elements of stability; and business, relatively speaking, was prosperous and well developed. The central and northern parts of Nigeria, on the other hand, had only been slightly penetrated by the Whites. In the northern protectorate the warlike emirs, in control of the Moslem Arabs, and their co-religionists of negro blood, must needs be treated with circumspection. In the southern protectorate (central and southern Nigeria) special care was required lest a wild and semi-civilized pagan population break out of bounds.

In the north, the Christian missionary was forbidden. Influential as Christianity had been in making civilized the coastal regions, the introduction of it in the north seemed too dangerous. The Moslems must not be displeased; and Christianity, in addition, had a disastrous effect, it was believed, in breaking down the old tribal loyalties which made government through the emirs possible. The Christian negroes no longer abased themselves before the warrior chiefs by throwing dirt upon their heads. And upon the prestige of the chiefs the British depended. The pagan chieftains to the south, more purely negro in blood and less influential, were not thus protected against the inroads of Christianity among their subjects.

Also in the north, in accordance with Moslem susceptibility, the importation of alcohol was forbidden. In the south this was done in regard to distilled spirits only, beer and wine being permitted. These sumptuary ordinances, so contrary to British tradition, owe their origin in part to moral indignation in Britain at the debauching of the west coast of Africa by cheap gin, in part to a wholesome respect for the fighting qualities of the Fulani in the north.

Nigeria at the present represents the better side of British imperialism. Indirect or native rule has seemingly succeeded here, and there are but three exceptions that might

be taken to it. One of these is that a tyrannical yet crafty emir might, protected by the British raj, be far more oppressive to the people under him than in the old days. Then, at any rate, if he became too unbearable, the assassin's knife or poison might convey him from the scene. This Oriental safety valve has been almost closed. Complaints may, of course, be lodged with the Resident; but the arm of the emir, strengthened by the British, is a long one, and few there are to question it. A second criticism is that the indirect system is only of use when it is regarded as permanent. If the natives once suspect that the power of the emir is transitory they will plot and scheme behind his back and destroy his authority. But can such a system be permanent, if more and more white men enter the country? The coming of a railway means surveyors, engine drivers, agents, merchants, entrepreneurs and other Whites; will these submit to a government semi-negro in character?

Finally, in regard to the treatment of the missionary a caveat might be entered. Missionaries of the type of Mary Slessor,¹ have done quite as much for civilization in West Africa as have British political agents. In debarring them from Northern Nigeria the British government not only arbitrarily excludes the natives from the solace of the Gospels, but also from their stimulus. It also, by indirection, acts as a patron of Mohammedanism, a strange rôle for a country with a national Christian church.

While Nigeria represents British imperialism in West Africa at its best, Kenya Colony in the east represents it at its worst. The negro here has not only been deprived of his land; he also has been compelled to cultivate it for the British immigrant. Kenya as a colony dates from 1920. It comprises the better part of British East Africa, the swampy lowlands of the coast being now the Kenya Protectorate. The railway was the key to Kenya, since

¹ Livingstone, W. P., *Mary Slessor of Calabar, passim*.

communication through the upper Nile valley was impossible. Constructed in large part by Indian coolies, it rises rapidly from the malarial coast to a splendid plateau and prairie upland, directly under the equator but several thousand feet in height, and therefore is good land for the European.

This fertile island in a surrounding sea of impossible land averages from 1,000 to 5,000 feet in elevation. Mountains are found in it from 12,000 to 15,000 feet in height; a portion of the total area of 35,000 square miles possible to cultivate is too dry; another portion is too damp. But all things considered Kenya's climate is excellent, its soil superb. Life here for the European is not only possible but inviting.

Perhaps that is the reason why he has been so brutal to the negro. The sane and humane policy of the British in Northern Nigeria was reversed in Kenya. In the former protectorate the negro and the Arab retained their land; in Kenya, the land was alienated to the Whites, and the natives crowded on reservations. In 1921 it was estimated that 10,000 square miles of the choicest land was the private property of 10,000 Europeans whereas 2,000,000 natives were placed on reservations which totaled, it is true, 33,000 square miles. But of this only 5,000 square miles was classified as good.

Sir Charles Eliot, the first governor of Kenya, assumed that all land was at the disposal of the Government, and an invitation to occupy it on easy terms was given to the British settler, the Government in its haste granting large freeholds of many thousand acres to the incoming immigrants. And for ten years this process went on, marred by only one drawback—lack of labor.

The negroes did not care to work for the Whites. Certain of them, the Masai, quite warlike in the old days, had never cultivated the land, and had lived a pastoral life. They considered it beneath their dignity to till the soil. Even

the other tribesmen looked askance at the offers of the planters. The latter held them simply lazy; but as a matter of fact other reasons operated as well against this new type of employment. One of them was the dislike of leaving home and children; another was the tribal necessity of being present at various state occasions such as funerals where religious rites of purification must be performed. The wants of the negro were trifling, the incentives to work, slight.

Meanwhile, the British began to encroach on pastures where the negroes were accustomed to herd their flocks. The Masai, originally roaming through a wide stretch of territory, were now confined to two reserves, the Government assuring them that in perpetuity a corridor should exist between them. But the northern reserve was coveted by the Whites and the Masai were persuaded by sharp dealing, if not by trickery, to be content with a somewhat enlarged southern reserve, thus giving up much of their best land.¹ Not much could be done with the Masai; they refused to work for the stranger, even if a large part of their land was lost. The Kikuyu proved more amenable, and were persuaded to enlist in the ranks of labor; but even they showed a tendency to shirk, and there were not enough of them for the growing coffee plantations.

By 1912 forced labor was spoken of freely in Kenya. The testimony of a Native Land Commission held at this time in Nairobi, the capital, affords interesting reading. The system of work on the plantations varied, but in general a ranch owner would have several hundred negroes, *boys*, according to the vernacular, squatting on his estate. These would be given *shampas* (land for their own use) in return for which they would agree to work for wages a certain number of months in the year. Pressure should be brought to bear, almost all the planters agreed, to force the natives to work. One planter remarked that forced labor

¹ Leys, N., *Kenya*, 111.

was not to be thought of; but that if the Government would only demand a ground rent for the native land the negro would be compelled to leave his reserves and work, to the benefit of all concerned. Other planters said that it was indecent for the natives to go around half naked. If they could only be compelled to wear clothes they would have to make money to pay for them. Another planter, somewhat more frank than the others, spoke as follows: "My plan is simply this . . . a mild, benevolent despotism in the form of compulsory state education in the art of making an honest living by physical exertion is what the natives need." Lord Delamere, owner of 150,000 acres in Kenya, was convinced that the trouble lay in the fact that the natives could save too much. In England the workingman could only save, said his lordship, twenty-five per cent of his wages, but in Kenya the native could save seventy-five per cent. "The result was that after working a comparatively short time a man was able to get his first wife. He then settled on the land and produced enough to buy another, and as a result of a year's work he established himself on a farm for life without any necessity to work for anyone again, which was wrong and could be done nowhere else on earth."¹

How could the planters secure their labor? The area of the native reservations might be cut down; but this would be noticed in England. On the other hand taxation might be resorted to; also the Residents on the native reservations might bring pressure to bear on their tribesmen. The planters thought favorably of this.

The two latter plans were tried out in Kenya with disastrous results. The head tax was increased to sixteen shillings on every hut and levied on every adult male to prevent more than one family in a hut. A riot followed which was suppressed, and the head tax was lowered to twelve shillings, still a heavy tax inasmuch as the white

¹ *Native Lands Commission*, Nairobi, 1912-3, p. 209.

settlers paid no direct tax at all. They considered that in paying the customs duty they bore their full share of the financial burdens of the colony.

The pressure brought to bear by the Residents caused even more trouble. The latter were urged by a government circular to persuade the native chiefs that it was advisable for their young men to go out to work. Many of the more independent Residents resented being made the agents of the planters; and joining them in opposition were certain missionaries, long uneasy in conscience at the behavior of their fellow Whites, as well as hampered in their work by what seemed to be a clash between the theory and practice of Christian ethics.

Immediately after the war a number of wanton acts of cruelty brought home to the British public the condition of semi-slavery which existed in Kenya. Among them was the case of a negro flogged to death for riding a mare with foal; in another instance a negro trespassing on the ranch of a European was casually shot down and left to die by the callous owner. On neither occasion was any punishment worthy of the name inflicted on the planters. Desertion from employment, on the other hand, and the breaking of a contract were criminal offenses in Kenya as late as 1923, and throughout that colony at that date a disguised form of slavery was rampant.

Fortunately for the negroes as well as for the East Indian immigrants in Kenya the desires of the native Whites for responsible government were not seconded by the imperial authorities. Kenya continued as a Crown colony, and on that account an appeal to Cæsar still remained open to the negro. He has not as yet (1927) appealed effectively. High taxes compel him to work; but of the taxes raised but a small portion is ever returned to him. Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, admitted in 1925 that the educational expenditure on the European child in Kenya was at the rate of £41, 14s, 2d, while for the negro the Kenya

government appropriated £1, 11s, 2d per capita.¹ Nor, at this time, had compulsory labor gone out of vogue. The railways in Kenya needing extension, the colony gave permission to conscript labor for this work, and several thousand negroes were compelled to raise pick and shovel at the command of his Majesty's government (in Kenya).² Voluntary labor, it was stated, could not be obtained.

From the above it becomes evident that neither general indictment nor blanket approval of the British treatment of the negro is possible. If the British have made an end, on the one hand, to the more atrocious exhibits of pagan brutality, they have made life, on the other, a dreary drudgery to many thousands. How can the scales of justice, in such a question as this, be fairly balanced? Suppose we take the words of Lord Milner, shortly before his death, to the effect that he would pay off the American debt by "mobilizing the resources of the dependent Empire."³ This might or might not convey a sinister connotation. To the anti-imperialist it would mean the whip of the slave driver, disguised, let us say, in the kindlier form of a hut tax. Such a tax makes it impossible, of course, for a negro to marry and establish a home without first working at some employment which will pay this new impost. On the other hand, to Sir Harry Johnson or to Rudyard Kipling the statement of his lordship might simply awaken patriotic pride in the rich soil and fruitful possibilities of British Central Africa. Here, for instance, is the oil palm. From this marvelous tree come such diversified products as yeast, insecticide, roofing material, soap, baskets, food, wine and rust removers. The tree is a British tree, the profits derived from it belong to Whites and Blacks, alike protected by the majestic guarantee of the imperial laws.

Vexatious, indeed, are the problems which these con-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, V Series, 1924-5, CLXXXVIII, 893.

² *Ibid.*, 894.

³ Milner, Viscount, *Questions of the Hour*, 161.

siderations raise and to them there is no categorical answer. The anti-imperialist would do well, however, before excoriating economic imperialism to consider what the condition of the Black people would have been, if European governments had refrained from entering upon the rush for African possessions. Since it is impossible to conceive of any permanent barrier between Africa and Europe, we may assume that private traders would have indulged in every wicked device known to tyrannical governments, while at the same time ignoring such beneficial laws as have been enforced for the protection of the negro. No better friend of the latter ever lived than the late Mr. Morel. Yet he frankly stated that, "these races cannot escape being sucked into the vortex of white economic expansion."¹ In this quotation lies both a defense of imperialism and a challenge to it.

IV. THE MANDATE

Among the various compromises which characterized the peace treaty of 1919 was the idea of the mandate. Since the conscience of President Wilson could not, in view of the fourteen points, look with indifference on the annexation of the German colonies, and since the French and British would not, owing it was said to the treatment of the natives and for other reasons, return said colonies to the former owner, it became necessary to work out some new formula. Under it, as devised, the League of Nations would control the former German colonies through an agent, issuing a mandate to certain countries to act as such. The nation obtaining the mandate would, in the name of civilization and the League, administer it wisely, rendering yearly account to a chosen committee of the League selected from those nations which had no mandate. In this way, it was believed that a just accounting might be had.

This idea was a good one, and in accordance with it not

¹ Morel, E. D., *The Black Man's Burden*, 180.

only the German colonies but a large part of the Turkish Empire as well was apportioned to the Allied countries as mandates.

The latter were conceived of as being in three classes. Those in class *A* were considered as regions which would in time become independent, but which in the interim needed advice and assistance. Those in class *B* were held to be in greater need of "moral and material support," while class *C* mandates were those which were believed best ruled by the mandatory power as part of its own territory.

The British Empire after the war found itself the proud possessor of two class *A* mandates, Palestine and Iraq, the course of history in the former of which shall be briefly described.

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." Thus declared Mr. Balfour in November, 1917, and the note of the British government which made this announcement continued to state that they "will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this result, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which shall prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish community in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." With this announcement the history of Palestine under the mandate may be said to have begun.

Inasmuch as Palestine had already been unofficially pledged to the Arabs (so the latter thought) for their assistance in the campaign approaching a successful climax near Jerusalem, the generosity of the British government to the Jewish people is open to comment, particularly in view of the slight proportion that the Jewish population bears to other races in Palestine. Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner, and himself a Jew, estimated that at the time of the inauguration of the mandate there were "in the whole of Palestine hardly 700,000" people.

Of these the great majority were Arab in blood and in religion, Moslem. Some 77,000 Christians lived in Palestine, mainly of Arab stock. And there were also some 76,000 Jews.

The latter for the most part had drifted into Palestine during the two decades prior to the war. They had come there as religious zealots to die in the Holy Land; they had been sent there by other and more prosperous Jews who by proxy could thus keep warm their own religious enthusiasm. The success of these immigrants, however, was moderate since agriculture, which occupied the majority, was carried on in Palestine under adverse conditions. But the fact that they were there at all gave widespread impetus to the revival of Zionism, the idea of a Jewish nation equipped and furnished with the usual patriotic fittings, namely, a flag, language, racial and political aloofness within its own bailiwick.

From two major sources this Zionism received encouragement, from Russia and from Britain. From the former country came, during the early years of the nineteenth century, a great flock of exiles piteously beseeching charity from their brethren in the west. In the latter country were Jewish bankers of distinction, and to the latter country belonged much of the world's surface. Why should not Britain, out of the superfluity of her acreage, provide land for a new Zion? And this was not an unreasonable suggestion if many of the more ardent Zionists had not intimated that Palestine alone could fulfill their requirements. Meanwhile, however, many of the wealthier and more influential Jews in Britain and elsewhere subsidized this movement heavily, encouraged further immigration into Palestine, provided new teachers for the old Hebrew tongue, made possible continuous agitation for the physical revival of Israel. Who could tell but that this might mean a restoration of Solomon's Temple and the glories thereunto attached?

Thus stood the situation in 1914. History has not as

yet divulged just how it happened that Mr. Balfour made these astonishing promises three years later, possibly history never will. But a national home, at any rate, had been mentioned, with limitations. Just how the British would define *national home*, and just how they would reconcile this somewhat vague suggestion of Jewish nationality with equally vague stipulations as to the religious and civil rights of those in Palestine of non-Jewish blood, no one knew.

In 1920 Britain made public her plans for the Government of the new Palestine. A survey of them will indicate that the larger hopes of the confirmed nationalists were very unsubstantial. Altogether too uncertain stood Great Britain's prestige throughout the Moslem world to endanger it further through a too liberal support of Jewish aspirations in a Moslem country. As a matter of fact, until the League of Nations should act and a definite mandate for Palestine be given, Britain had no intention of setting up a form of government in the Holy Land which was either Jewish or Arab in character. Instead, the skeleton framework of the new administration bore a marked resemblance to that of a Crown colony. In place of a governor was a High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel. Under his control were a number of administrative heads, for the most part English. And aside from these officials an Advisory Council was organized of ten unofficial members, four being Moslems, three being Christian, three Jewish. The members of this board were nominated by the High Commissioner, who acknowledged that they had no real power. None the less in 1921 Sir Herbert was able to report that in every case his Government had agreed to enforce the recommendations of this body.

Sir Herbert now proceeded to put the country on a sound footing. The financially embarrassed British could afford no grant-in-aid: but they did agree to garrison the country with 5,000 troops at the expense of the imperial exchequer; the use of ex-Irish auxiliaries as a gendarmerie did not come

until later. Palestine soon began to show symptoms of recovery. The High Commissioner cut down the more excessive taxes and yet raised more money. The fish tax of twenty per cent ad valorem was abolished, import duties made low, railways taken in charge by the civilian authorities, public works started, credit restored.

Public health then received the Commissioner's attention. Old wells were closed, new ones dug, cisterns covered with oil, anti-malarial information spread broadcast, inspectors sent over the country, quinine distributed free.

Meanwhile, beyond the Jordan to the eastward the boundary of Palestine was not delimited. Before the impenetrable desert was met with, however, the land could support nomadic peoples, and on it there lived some 350,000 wandering Bedouins. How to extend British sway over them was a problem. Samuels solved it by enlisting on his side the second son of the King of the Hedjaz who agreed to act as emir over this region, ruling in the name of the Government of Palestine, and receiving a slight monetary reward and the service of a number of British officials.

Thus far successful in his task the High Commissioner was confronted with the more difficult phase of it: the reconciliation of Zionist aspirations with guarantees of civil and religious rights to the Arabian majority. In attempting this he fell between two fires; one, directed by the Zionists who were enraged at his immigration policy; the other, coming straight from the Arab camp and accusing him of pro-Jewish leanings.

The principal grievance which the Zionists had against their co-religionist, the High Commissioner, was that he limited immigration. The opening of the ports of Palestine after the war to the Jews had resulted in a rush thither. Many thousand Jews, without financial resources and utterly unfamiliar with agriculture (the one possible occupation in Palestine) had dashed Zionward. Their arrival had led to riots on the part of the Arabs which in turn brought about

the temporary banning of all immigration. Sir Herbert, after a closed season, removed this ban in part; visas for Palestine were only to be issued to the favored few who had money, or a guaranteed position, or who belonged to the professions.

While this curtailment of their hopes angered the Zionists, more serious yet was the rage of the Arabs. They did not want any Jews coming into the Holy Land. Was not the country theirs and by article twenty-two of the Covenant of the League of Nations were not communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire to be consulted about their own political future? And with the issuing of a formal mandate to Britain by the League their rage increased, since this gave international sanction to the Balfour declaration, and since also the form of government for Palestine now proposed made probable their political subordination.

A constitution for Palestine was next promulgated which looked generous. It called for universal suffrage and a Legislative Council. The members of this latter body, as in Jamaica, were in equal numbers elected and appointed, thus giving the final decision to the High Commissioner in case of a tie vote. It was not this situation which disturbed the Arabs so much as the fact that the elections were to be indirect, calling for the ultimate selection of representatives on a religious basis, thus securing for both Jew and Christian minority representation. The elected members of the Jewish and Christian faith, together with those appointed, would be in a majority.

The Arabs now refused to take part in the elections and the new constitutional machinery therefore was scrapped. They refused also to take part in an Arab Agency which, formed on the model of the Jewish Agency, was to be organized for their benefit. Instead they betook themselves to their tents.

But they did not keep quiet there; and in 1925 their

complaints against the British management of the mandate came to a head. In Jerusalem the irate Arab majority held a congress which drew up and presented to the new High Commissioner a dossier of grievances. Many of them were of absurd character, such as the accusation that the wealth of Palestine was being sapped by the increase of imports over exports. Many of them were of doubtful validity, such as claims made to the effect that the Arab agricultural population was taxed more heavily than the Jewish, and the objections raised to Jewish-owned concessions and franchises for lighting Haifa and Jerusalem and for establishing a power plant on the Jordan River. It may be assumed that the Arabs were financially quite unprepared to embark on economic enterprises of this description.

Other complaints, however, are more difficult to refute. "All building material, mostly imported by Jews, pays but four per cent duty."¹ But our tithes remain as high as they did during the Turkish régime. If the tariff is lowered, the land tax should be also; thus thought the Arabs. Furthermore, they claimed that the British authorities were enforcing for the first time an old Turkish law never before put into operation. This provided that the title to untilled and unused land should revert to the state. To prevent this catastrophe many Arabs sold their holdings at a great loss only to see them promptly bought up by the representatives of Jewish interests.

The British authorities in Palestine were and still are in a most unpleasant position. The original Zionist program: "to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English" has been dropped into the background. Such a consummation is inconsistent with the terms of both the Balfour declaration and those of the mandate which promise protection to the non-Jewish people in Palestine. But the hope of a Jewish homeland has not disappeared; why should it as long as a continuous stream of Jewish immigrants, financed

¹ *Report of the Executive Committee, Palestine Arab Congress, 15 et seq.*

by many wealthy Jews in Europe and America, pours into Palestine? Has not the Jewish population in the Holy Land been nearly doubled since the war; is there not now a Jewish university in session in Jerusalem, and have not proposals been made to rebuild in all its ancient splendor the Temple of Solomon? Can Palestine find room for the three million people the enthusiastic Zionists plan to plant there; and if this is done, what will be the status of the then Arab minority, both Moslem and Christian?

As for the Jewish immigrants, many seemed more inclined to give heed to Marx than to Isaiah. Between them and the older Jewish stock in Palestine which came to pray rather than to plow, there was no great affinity of interest. The language problem, also, caused trouble. The older Jewish immigrants, for the most part, spoke Arabic, as did the native Christians and the Moslems; of the new immigrants, the majority spoke Yiddish. And now by law Hebrew, Arabic and English were to be the three recognized official languages. A trilingual country of the size of Palestine might, of course, be no more absurd than a trilingual Switzerland. But to many it seemed a pity that the post-war language imbroglios should be still further increased by the addition of the spoken Hebrew.

By 1926, Palestine had become self-supporting, no longer costing Britain a penny, unless we include the maintenance of the imperial air service in the Holy Land. The last British soldiers had otherwise been withdrawn. The mandate was also seemingly at peace and prosperous. Money as well as immigrants had come to it, Jewish funds for purposes ranging from modern apartment houses in Jerusalem to free medical aid for children in Jericho.

Yet the Arabs are said to be without gratitude for the benefits which this development of Palestine has brought about. In 1923 the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem wrote freely of "the fixed and bitter opposition on the part of all natives of Palestine to Zionism." And to Britain now fell

the task of holding even the balance between Zionist and Arab claims; on the one hand a minority, weak in numbers but strong in enterprise, ambition and outside aid; on the other, a majority, overwhelmingly superior in numbers, but in economic development backward, powerless. Mr. Balfour in 1917 had promised a national home for Jews with safeguards for the indigenous peoples. Said Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1925: "the object of the British government is to make it certain that Palestine should be the national home for the Arabs in every sense and also to give an opportunity for the Jewish people to make a national home in it for themselves."¹

Whether this statement is a contradiction in terms may be left for the reader to decide. Palestine in area is but 10,000 square miles. The more enthusiastic Zionists plan to plant there 3,000,000 Jews. In doing this they have already made headway since the number of Jews in Palestine has increased some eighty per cent since 1914, reaching an estimated total in 1925 of 157,000 while the number of Arabs remains stationary. The latter, however, still outnumber the Jews four to one; their lead is a substantial one.

According to the Pritchett report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace the Zionist movement is "unfortunate and visionary," doomed to failure. "The inherent poverty of the country, its lack of resources, the absence of an industrial life, operate to make futile the economic success of such an effort. The enterprise is an artificial one, having its chief justification in the enthusiasm of well-meaning men who apparently do not appreciate the difficulties of their problem nor the interests of the existing native population." But the fairness of this statement the Zionists indignantly deny, as they continue to pour money into little Palestine. The outcome of the experiment will be awaited with interest.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

CHAPTER XV

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

The word *Empire* fell into disrepute as a result of the Great War. Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary had been Empires, and as such were humiliated and crushed. Even when prefixed by the adjective *British* this term had, to many, a suspicious connotation, hinting vaguely at imperialism, exploitation and the old order. Many post-war writers and prophets of the new day preferred the word *Commonwealth*. General Smuts proclaimed that the Empire was dead. Free coöperation had taken its place. Had not the League of Nations been born; were not the British Dominions among its numerous signatories; did they not form among themselves a veritable British League of Nations, participating in the new ordering of human affairs?

As to just what lands the Commonwealth embraced there was a difference of opinion. To some it meant the entire Empire, the Andaman Islands as well as the Province of Manitoba. Others, of a more legal turn of mind, included India, since that country held membership in the League of Nations, but excluded all other units of the Empire except Britain and the Dominions. The strict constructionists, indeed, debarred India, maintaining with some show of justice that the term Commonwealth had no juristic meaning, and that if it was to signify anything at all it ought to be that atmosphere of untrammelled freedom, democratic choice, which characterized the Mother country and the Dominions. Using the term, then, primarily in this latter sense, what progress may we ascribe to the post-war period; to what extent, if any, is there closer

articulation between Britain and the Dominions, either in legal st atus, common understanding, or fraternal spirit?

The war wrought great changes in the constitutional status of the Dominions. Not only had they raised armies and fought battles; they had been consulted openly, confidently, by Great Britain. Mr. Lloyd George's Imperial War Cabinet had been a true Commonwealth Cabinet, the premiers of the Dominions sharing in decisions of moment to the Empire, their influence and position well above that of many members of the ministry who debated on the floor of the House. The peace conference brought the premiers still greater prominence. The Dominions had separate representation there, five British premiers, representing five different electorates, participating in the settlement of the war. Even if the Dominion premiers were subordinate in fact as well as in theory to their colleague from England, their influence was felt in many ways. On the commission which dealt with Greece was Canada's representative; on that which decided Poland's boundary was Smuts of South Africa. Hughes, the Australian, was consulted about Czecho-Slovakia and reparations. Sir Robert Borden sponsored in the name of Canada the idea of a British panel from which representatives were drawn to speak for the Empire as a whole; and even after the Empire's quota at the inner conference had been reduced to two men, Sir Robert still, from time to time, was one of these. Furthermore, in the projected League of Nations seats were duly provided for each Dominion; and at the grand conclusion of the Congress of the Nations in the Hall of Mirrors, their premiers signed the peace treaty separately on behalf of their own nations.

This latter act attracted much attention; to some it seemed an approach to independence, to others a wily effort to draw the free Dominions into the troubled waters of European diplomacy. To Republican senators at Washington, eager to line up Irish Democrats against the League

of Nations, it was a godsend. Six British votes in the Assembly in addition to Britain's vote in the Council; here was proof that the League of Nations was a British firm.

It did seem somewhat illogical that the Dominions should continue to be an integral part of the Empire, yet at the same time take individual and separate responsibility for the execution of the treaties of peace. The signatures of the Dominions might be interpreted as merely the endorsement of the pledge given by the Mother country; but in this case why should they have separate representation in the League? On the other hand, since Great Britain had signed for the Empire and not simply for the United Kingdom, it could not well be argued that they were independent. Just what was their status? The war, for the time being, had certainly knit the Empire closer together, not simply emotionally but also constitutionally; an approach to imperial federation had been made, a council of Empire had been in operation. And now, with the peace, the League of Nations threatened not only to make moribund the still embryonic machinery of close imperial coördination, but also to emphasize the fragile character of the constitutional ties which bound Dominion to Mother country. The war had saved the Empire; the League of Nations might destroy it. The situation was anomalous, even to British statesmen, not customarily troubled by a want of logic in their constitutional practice. To find an answer to these troublesome questions they proposed to hold an imperial conference on constitutional relations.

Two years were to elapse before it was summoned, and meanwhile it was deemed desirable that the various Parliaments of the Empire ratify the treaties. This was done in all four Dominions with various degrees of alacrity.

In New Zealand few found fault with the Treaty of Versailles. The Labor Party, having but thirteen out of eighty seats in the legislature, made a slight commotion over Samoa. It feared the establishment of indentured labor

in that mandate. The Dominion had not coveted German Samoa; it would have preferred its annexation to the Empire at large as a Crown colony. With this slight exception it welcomed the peace treaty, and the League as an integral part of it, provided, of course, that it did not lull Britain into any false sense of security.

In Australia there was grumbling. Mr. Hughes announced in Parliament that his Government had not been sufficiently consulted in regard to peace terms. The Americans had interfered, and German New Guinea, which otherwise would have been completely dominated by Australia, was to be one of the new mandates. Furthermore, the Japanese, as a result of the peace, had extended their island sway several thousand miles nearer the Commonwealth. This was noted at Melbourne, and Premier Hughes insisted that a "white Australia policy" was no more subject to the League of Nations than the Monroe Doctrine. It was Australia's equivalent for that particular regional understanding. With this slight caveat Australia was warmly patriotic and promptly agreed to the peace terms.

In Canada, since it is the business of his Majesty's Opposition to oppose, speeches were made in criticism of the treaty. The rump of the old Liberal party, which had refused to coalesce with the Conservatives to form a war-time administration, gave some evidence of alarm lest Canada, by signing the pact of Versailles, drift into imperialistic ways. Besides, the oldest Dominion could not avoid being influenced by the example set by her southern neighbor, and when the United States showed alarm over article ten of the League of Nations, Canada evinced corresponding tremors. This article, the heart of the covenant according to President Wilson, provided that each signatory should "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League." What remained of Laurier's old Liberal host tried to amend the

treaty, by a reservation in regard to article ten. Their effort was fruitless, and with this slight objection the Canadian Parliament was unanimous in ratifying.

In South Africa there was real opposition. The Nationalists desired to repudiate the treaty since the authors of it had ignored their claims. At the conclusion of the war they had betaken themselves to Paris to urge before the peace conference the cause of the Boers. This they were not permitted to do, although an audience was granted them by Lloyd George. It was easy for him to argue that, since the Nationalists were in a minority in the Union, they could not well contend that they were deprived of self-determination. He had been their friend during the South African War; but to undo the work of 1902 was now impossible. The Union constitution of 1909 had met with their approval; they could not now reverse their position. The Nationalists returned home, angry at this rebuff. In consequence, they found nothing to praise in the work of the peace conference. "The League of Nations," said one of them in the Union legislature, "was built on a foundation of pillage and hypocrisy."¹ "The treaty," exclaimed another, "breathes the spirit of domination, jealousy and revenge." But even if General Hertzog and his adherents hated the treaty, for the time being they were helpless to prevent its ratification. The South African Party, well disposed toward the Commonwealth, had a plurality of votes in Parliament; when assisted by the Unionists, pro-British to a man, a safe majority could be assured. The S.A.P., as it was called, had been bereft of General Botha's genial guidance; but it had found a clever leader in General Smuts. The latter had no difficulty in maintaining his liaison with the Unionists, and the treaty therefore received the imprimatur of the Union government.

During these two years the drift of political thought and action tended toward a fuller recognition of Dominion

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, I, 196.

nationalism than the past had ever known. The cause was twofold: pride in the accomplishments of the Dominions in the war, and the general slump in idealism everywhere which followed in the wake of that conflict. It was not that the Dominions loved the Commonwealth less; they were simply not so sensitive to its existence. No immediate danger threatened; no clear summons to further sacrifice seemed imperative. Post-war problems of taxation and economic revival seemed more pressing than any theoretical necessity for knitting closer the unity of the larger British system.

As might be expected this drift toward Dominion nationalism was less noticeable in the Antipodes than elsewhere. The problem of a white Australia and a white New Zealand loomed even larger than in the past; and the more it did so, the more enhancing appeared imperial ties. Yet even here imperial federation was less strongly entrenched than at the beginning of the century. Lord Milner, after the war, had hinted at an imperial council with legislative power. This, Australia promptly rejected. "I think," said Mr. Hughes, "that the surest way of destroying this mighty Empire . . . is to tamper with its constitution. Complete autonomy of the parts is the foundation upon which its unity rests."¹ Meanwhile, the Australian Premier had not hesitated to lay down the law to both Mother country and to the League of Nations. "A white Australia is a vital part of our policy," he asserted. "On this principle there could be no compromise whatever." Australia must be prepared to uphold it by military strength. There must be no whittling away of her army. His Government was prepared to reduce the period of military service, but it must remain compulsory for all Australians.

Even in New Zealand, the staunch upholder of imperial federation in the old days, there was less zeal than formerly. The Premier, Mr. Massey, spoke in far less spe-

¹ *Ibid.*, II, 355.

cific terms in its favor in 1921 than Sir Joseph Ward had used in 1911. An imperial executive of some kind Mr. Massey was inclined to favor, but an imperial parliament, no! ¹

In Canada, centrifugal forces seemed also at work. As though it was the most casual thing in the world the Government at Ottawa announced that a Dominion embassy would be established at Washington. Three quarters of the business done by the British embassy there related to Canada. Why should the wishes of the Dominion be relayed any longer to Washington by way of the Colonial Office and Downing Street? This vigorous assertion of Canadian nationalism caused some surprise in England as well as in Canada. Possibly it was premature. No action was taken, and year followed year before the appointment was made. Had pressure from somewhere led to its postponement?

As for South Africa, General Smuts announced in Parliament that the peace conference had been a "formal recognition of the new position of the Dominions, and that in foreign relations they were to take part and speak for themselves, and that they no longer would be bound by the voice and signature of the British Parliament."² The forthcoming conference in London might, it was hoped, work out some new scheme of imperial coöperation; but the general promised that South Africa never would be bound by any mere majority vote. The voice of the Dominions must be unanimous, thus would Dominion nationalism be confirmed.

General Smuts' political position was delicate. The South African Party which he headed was composed principally of Boers, and of these a continuous flow of deserters constantly made its way toward Hertzog and the Nationalist tent. The very brilliance of Smuts' speeches

¹ *Ibid.*, II, 645.

² *Ibid.*, I, 545.

and his undisputed mental acumen brought him under suspicion. Botha of the slow speech, the Boers could understand; but this philosopher-statesman, so idealized in Britain, was he true to the Afrikaner? The Nationalists intimated that he was not, and as a result turned the election of 1920 against him.

The political divisions in the Assembly, after the election, show some striking changes:

	Number of seats in 1920	After 1920
South African Party (mainly Afrikaner, but friendly toward the Commonwealth)	53	41
Unionists (solidly British)	38	25
Nationalists (Boer irreconcilables)	27	44
Labor (Socialistic and, for the most part, in- different toward the Commonwealth)	6	21
Independents	6	3

For the first time in the history of the Union the extreme party of independence had a plurality of votes in the Assembly; and in order to carry on the King's government through the agency of the South African Party, Smuts had to form some kind of coalition. To do this he turned first to the Nationalists, attempting to bring the two Boer factions together. The Nationalists, however, insisted on a republic; the S.A.P. stood staunchly for Dominion nationality within the Empire. On this point there could be no compromise. The general turned now to the Unionists. The latter were willing to do anything to defeat Hertzog, even to the extent of committing political suicide. This, in effect, they did since they agreed to destroy their own political organization and to submerge themselves completely in the South African Party. The political atmosphere being thus cleared, Smuts struck home and appealed to the electorate, the second time within twelve months, on the issue of secession.

The results of the election of February, 1921, were everywhere hailed joyfully as a proof of empire-loyalty. An analysis of the voting, however, scarcely substantiates this claim. True, the S.A.P. obtained a majority over all of 22 votes in a house of 134. But this had come about not so much by the defeat of the Nationalists as by the sacrifice of the Unionists. The former actually increased their number to 45, and formed now the second largest party in the Union's Parliament, a compact and united minority, which might turn into a majority should General Smuts fail to maintain his perilous equilibrium between Briton and Boer. South Africa was evidently a house divided against itself.

The long awaited imperial conference convened in the summer of 1921. Despite high hopes it turned out to be a noncommittal affair, disappointing to all concerned. Mr. Churchill, the ubiquitous, happened at this time to be Colonial Secretary and the conference was ambitiously baptized by him, *Imperial Cabinet*. The delegates from overseas, however, did not take to this innovation. Cabinet was synonymous with authority, and they feared centralized authority in London. The word cabinet was therefore dropped and with it to the discard went the word imperial. The new meeting of British statesmen took to itself the simple title of Conference of the Prime Ministers of the Empire.

Originally, under the resolution of 1917, it had been intended that this conference should define new constitutional relationships. Now, for some reason never stated, this desirable action was indefinitely postponed. There remained then to discuss: defense, communications, foreign policy in general, and the Japanese treaty in particular; for the latter, about to expire, required immediate action.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the conference an exhaustive survey of the difficulties which beset him; and when he had finished the Colonial Secretary con-

tinued with the tale of the Empire's problems in the Middle East, Palestine and Iraq. The British government also took every pains to associate the Dominion premiers with the actual formulation of British foreign policy, and to that end invited the premiers to aid the British cabinet make certain decisions. We are told that the conference devoted much of its time to a discussion of the Pacific problem, or how to renew the Japanese treaty without offending America. It was also requested to give its opinion of the disarmament conference proposed by the American government; to determine upon some method of dividing the reparation receipts from Germany; to placate Indian opinion by alleviating the conditions under which Indians lived throughout the Commonwealth; and to see what could be done to encourage empire-settlement and emigration.

This program was extensive; but it was largely a paper program. As far as their published speeches were concerned, studied reserve characterized the premiers, with the exception of the representatives of New Zealand and India. Mr. Massey, returning to the historic lines of empire-idealism which had characterized New Zealand's policy in the past, urged a closer union. He disliked the word conference. "It means," he said, "consultation and consultation only. . . . We have gone back as compared with what was the case two years ago when the war cabinet was in existence."¹ As for the Honorable Srinavasa Sastri, the representative of the Government of India, he was concerned with but one thing, the status of Indians in the Dominions. India had agreed in 1918, he stated, "that each Dominion and self-governing part of the Empire should be free to regulate the composition of its population by suitable emigration laws." All that India requested was that those Indians already domiciled in the Empire should be "admitted into the general citizenship and that no deduc-

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1921, XIV (cmd. 1474).

tions be made from the rights that other British citizens enjoy.”¹

Cold comfort, however, was administered by the conference to both New Zealand and India. Nothing was done toward strengthening the constitutional bonds of the Empire, or even toward defining them. After long consultation the conference voted that continuous consultation of the premiers was impossible without a “substantial improvement in communication between the component parts of the Empire.” Until this was secured there was nothing to be gained by a constitutional conference. In regard to India it was recognized that there was “an incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British citizens lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire.” The conference voted in favor of remedying this situation. Since General Smuts, however, in the name of South Africa, refused to accede to this resolution, its passage without his signature was meaningless. South Africa, alone of the Dominions, had a large Indian population.

Just why, indeed, this conference of 1921 was held it seems rather difficult to fathom, unless its real purpose was to reach some agreement on the question of the Japanese treaty. Its discussion of this question, doubtless for reasons of state, was not made public. The conference did receive an official report on air communication; it likewise recommended the expenditure of various sums, apportioned between Britain and the Dominions, for empire-settlement, South Africa demurring. But the gravest question of all which confronted the British Commonwealth, that of Dominion partnership in British foreign policy, the conference left untouched.

Yet the problem of Dominion representation at the forthcoming disarmament conference at Washington showed the need for some common understanding in regard to this

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

partnership. The Dominions had received no individual invitation to attend this conference, since the American government believed that to issue one would be an act of discourtesy toward Great Britain. The official status of the Dominions not as yet having been determined, it was held beyond the competence of America to recognize them as independent units. Nevertheless, the fact that separate representation had not been accorded resulted in offense being taken. General Smuts intimated that if not invited in their own right it would be best for them to ignore the proceedings; Mr. Hughes spoke of the American invitation to Great Britain, alone, as a "slamming of the door"; and at Ottawa adverse criticism was not abandoned until Sir Robert Borden was appointed to represent Canada at Washington as one of the delegates of the British Empire.

Downing Street had proposed a preliminary meeting of the Washington Conference at London to coincide with the purely British one of the summer. When that plan was objected to by the Americans the British still urged a preliminary meeting in America before the formal opening on Armistice Day. This would afford the Dominion premiers a chance to attend before returning to their homes. Since this plan also proved unacceptable, Senator Pearce of Australia, Judge Salmond of New Zealand and Sir Robert Borden were drafted as members of the British Empire Delegation, and as such signed the various treaties which the conference drew up, not simply as representatives of their respective Dominions but as representatives of the Empire. Mr. Balfour was intrusted to look after the interests of South Africa, since from that Dominion there was no one present in Washington.

The ostensible object of the Washington Conference was the cutting down of naval expenditure: but this could only be obtained by abrogating or fundamentally altering the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The treaty which inaugurated this pact, as renewed in 1905, guaranteed military aid in

case "either contracting power should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or interests." This treaty threatened to involve Britain in war with America should the latter country come to blows with Japan. To make this impossible Britain and America had entered into special treaty obligations which provided for mutual arbitration of all difficulties. But the Senate of the United States amended this treaty in certain vital particulars and President Taft refused to accept the amendment. Whereupon the United States and Britain agreed, in 1914, to a treaty which provided for a peace commission to investigate all causes of difference between the two countries. This was not a treaty of arbitration, technically speaking; but Downing Street gave notice to Tokio, although not to Washington, that it should so consider it, and should thereby regard it as coming under the special clause in the second renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1911 which excluded from the pact any country with which either signatory had a treaty of arbitration.

The Americans did not hear of this qualification until 1921, and in the meantime the race for naval supremacy in Pacific waters continued apace. British statesmen saw nightmares; they did not want to break with Japan; they did not want to antagonize America; and they must not antagonize their own Dominions. The Japanese, on the other hand, disliked the qualification read into the treaty by the British in regard to America; the United States was ill disposed toward any Anglo-Japanese alliance; and the British Dominions, like the Mother country, desired to avoid friction with America. What would the solution be?

Since the proceedings of the Washington Conference are not germane to this book we need not concern ourselves with the way in which the Anglo-Japanese treaty was superseded by the more general four power pact signed by Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States. To the Anzac Dominions the new treaties resulting from the Wash-

ington Conference brought a welcome surcease from naval expenditure; they settled for the time being the Pacific problem, lessened perceptibly the danger of war between Japan and America; and above all else, they did not endanger the idea of a white Australia and New Zealand. The latter Dominion, indeed, not only ratified but expressed her pleasure that the treaties were signed at Washington by the representatives of the Dominions in the name of the Empire rather than in their own right, thereby reversing the precedent set at Versailles four years before.¹

Meanwhile at Cape Town General Smuts explained how South African protests at Washington had been heeded, and how "in connection with the international economic conference at Genoa the Union received its invitation direct from the Italian Government in Rome."² The international status of South Africa was now fully recognized, he said; and as a matter of fact it was true that Mr. Balfour signed the treaties at Washington twice, once for the British Empire, and once for the Union of South Africa. And this would not have been done had it not been for Smuts' protest. But it was also true, as the Premier of New Zealand contended, that the Dominions signed the treaties as part of the British Empire rather than as separate participants in the conference.

The year of the Washington Conference was also the year of the Chanak affair, which demonstrated very clearly the unsatisfactory state of affairs as far as the relations of the Dominions to British foreign policy went. Mustapha Kemal, at the head of the Turkish Nationalists, having driven the Greeks into the sea, turned his forces against Constantinople. The porcelain treaty of Sèvres was threatened with destruction; and of the European signatories Great Britain alone gave proof of a willingness to defend it. Under Lloyd George's direction a small British force was

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, III, 877.

² *Ibid.*, III, 908.

landed at Chanak, on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, and an ultimatum delivered to Mustapha Kemal. The British pickets again faced those of Turkey as in 1915; war seemed imminent and the Prime Minister of England appealed by cable to the Dominions for support.

Except for New Zealand they were not as ready to give it as in 1914. The Prime Minister of the smallest Dominion cabled instantly: "Government of New Zealand desires to associate themselves with action being taken and will send contingent." Mr. Massey thought that under the circumstances it was quite a proper and natural thing for Lloyd George and his Government to appeal to the Dominions for support and assistance. "We have to make our choice where our duty lies and it is our duty to stand by the British government and the British Empire." ¹ And in this point of view he was fully supported by the leader of the Opposition. Labor alone demurred, asserting that "wars for New Zealand should be made by the people of New Zealand." But Labor was defeated.

Australia was less eager to offer aid. Mr. Hughes' Cabinet was prepared "to associate itself with the British government" and was ready, "if circumstances required, to send an Australian contingent." And Parliamentary support for Mr. Hughes was forthcoming. But in this instance the leader of the Opposition condemned Hughes' action and demanded a referendum. And though the Labor Party was in opposition at this time, it is worth noting that at the elections in the autumn it was able to gain a plurality of seats in the House of Representatives.

Canada was decidedly more reluctant. The Parliamentary elections there had returned to office Mr. Mackenzie King at the head of a Liberal government supported by Progressives and decidedly anti-imperialistic. In addition to this fact a press dispatch had published Britain's appeal to Canada before any official word of it had even reached

¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 140.

the Premier. Nettled by what seemed to him the discourtesy of the British government he had replied asking for information, not simply in regard to the Near Eastern situation but also as to why prior public announcement should have been made of the Mother country's wishes. He had cabled London that he would call a special session of the Canadian Parliament, if the British cabinet so desired. The reply had been that it was not necessary. "It is for Parliament to decide," he said, "whether or not we should participate in wars in different parts of the world, and it is neither right nor proper for any individual or group of individuals to take any step which might limit the rights of Parliament in a matter of such great concern for all the people of our country." ¹

General Smuts took a similar line of action. "When the crisis in the Near East was raised," he told his Parliament, "and this Government was addressed by the British government on the question of sending some contingents to take part in the operations that might take place in the Near East the Government replied that in a matter . . . of such far reaching issues they would not commit themselves unless they consulted Parliament." ²

Nevertheless, despite this emphatic statement, General Hertzog and his Boer Nationalists made much to-do over the unconstitutional procedure of Britain, and attacked Downing Street for appealing to the people of South Africa over the heads of the Union authorities. This, of course, never occurred. Unfortunately in both the case of South Africa and Canada the public press had heard of the call to arms before it was officially received. What seems to have happened was this: Australia and New Zealand, having participated in the Gallipoli campaign, were considered especially interested in upholding British prestige in the Near East. Then someone in authority in London, fearing lest

¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 275.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 588.

it be untactful to call on them alone, suggested that the other Dominions be asked to join. The newspapers published prematurely what had happened, thus giving free rein to scandal mongers at Cape Town and Ottawa. The latter beat loudly on the drum of Dominion nationalism, perhaps the louder in so far as a new war to defend the partition of Turkey was as unpopular in the Dominions as in England.

The downfall of the Lloyd George government and the return to power of the Conservatives now mightily encouraged those statesmen who turned naturally to closer imperial ties as a way out of the chaotic vortex of European politics into which Britain found herself continuously drifting. In the Government of Bonar Law they were sufficiently powerful to demand a new imperial conference in 1923, a double one this time, on the one hand an official dress parade conference of premiers, on the other an economic conference, on paper subordinate to the first but probably the more important.

In the interval between the two conferences Mackenzie King's government had caused certain other flurries in imperial circles aside from the Chanak misunderstanding. Canada's representative in the League of Nations, for instance, had taken quite an independent stand in regard to article ten of the covenant, and acting on her own initiative had insisted on its modification. Persia alone, of the various countries represented in the League, refused consent to the Canadian resolution. The recalcitrance of the Shah diminished somewhat Canada's victory in this enterprise; none the less, among the smaller countries of the League Canada now took a prominent place. The latter country also signed a treaty with the United States in which Great Britain took no part. The Americans had submitted this treaty under the caption: "Convention between the United States of America and Great Britain concerning the halibut fishery." Mackenzie King and his wicked Liberal-Pro-

gressive partisans had stricken out Great Britain and had substituted Dominion of Canada. The British Ambassador at Washington had also received authority to sign the treaty together with the representative of Canada. But the latter would not agree to this, and insisted on signing the treaty alone. Here, indeed, was a new precedent which seemed to some ominous, to others satisfactory.

No grounds certainly for the summoning of a new conference can be found here, nor on the other hand could the projected improvements at Singapore be the real reason. The transformation of that entrepôt of commerce into a naval base of the first class was proposed by the new British government at an expenditure of no less than £10,000,000. All history, it was said, from the days of the Spanish Armada to the journeyings of the Russian fleet in Asiatic waters during the Russo-Japanese War, had proved the folly of a fleet in distant waters without a base. Hong Kong could not be further fortified by Britain; it came within the forbidden areas as defined by the Washington Conference. But Singapore beyond the limitation boundary would do as well. By the four-power agreement of 1921 Britain had sacrificed much of her naval superiority; she now must make amends for lessened striking power by improved mobility. Furthermore, the Motherland owed it to the Dominions.

In vain did discouraged peacemakers urge the absurdity and unwisdom of this expenditure. They denounced it as an extravagance which would be interpreted as an unfriendly act by the Japanese. Why had Britain placed confidence in the idea of a League of Nations; why had she signed a four-power pact at Washington if the spirit of both of these covenants was to be broken? Malta, Aden, Ceylon, Rangoon, all these ports were on the way to Singapore. Did the Government intend to build a string of dry docks on the eastern route of empire? And who was the enemy?

The First Lord of the Admiralty defended himself with vigor. We have been dependent on our late ally, he said: "but no self-respecting power can afford indefinitely to be dependent on another power for its security and even existence."¹ The defenses of Singapore had been the subject of imperial concern for many decades. In 1911 Singapore had been named as the rendezvous for the British navy in the Far East; and at the conclusion of the World War the Admiralty had returned to this earlier dream of a strongly fortified base with dry dock facilities for the largest ships. The defense of the Empire, he asserted, in Asiatic waters depended in the last analysis on ships, and these ships must have a safe harbor of refuge where supplies, fuel and repairs might be found.

The grandiose scheme of Singapore was not aimed at Japan. If directed at any one country, which it probably was not, one would be inclined to cite, perhaps, Australia or New Zealand. The support of the Anzac Dominions in a future conference might be the warmer if Great Britain on her own responsibility went ahead with the Singapore program; it was a popular one with the Anzacs and might, in future imperial undertakings, result in assistance, both political and financial.

The new Conservative government in London, however, did not summon a new conference of the Commonwealth in order to win support for Singapore; there was a large enough majority at Westminster to guarantee the Singapore expenditure without demanding aid from the Commonwealth at large. Nor, on the other hand, was Great Britain worried about the halibut treaty, or other evidence of Canadian self-sufficiency. What she did want to know was how far the Dominions might be relied on in matters of British foreign policy. Chanak, by mere luck, had caused no harm. But Great Britain had just signed a new treaty with Turkey, that of Lausanne. Were obligations under

¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 473.

this treaty shared by the Dominions or not; should they have been consulted in advance about this treaty or not? Also there were India and the Irish Free State; what could be done to articulate their external politics with those of the Dominions?

There was likewise the ever troublesome question of economic policy. The barometer of unemployment in Britain showed no signs of dropping; meanwhile the distribution of population throughout the Commonwealth was excessively unequal. Could anything be done to change this, and if so, what effect would it have on economic rehabilitation? Trade between Great Britain and the continent was sadly hampered, the Russian market gone, the German market mutilated. Could a revival of trade within the Empire make amends for this sorry situation; if so, how might it be brought about? The sons of Joseph Chamberlain stood high in the councils of the Tory Party and imperial preference had died hard. Here, possibly, there was a chance for its resurrection.

The conference of 1923, on its political side, was not constructive. Lord Curzon told the members about British foreign policy and Lord Robert Cecil about the League of Nations. Resolutions were passed affirming the need for consultation before treaties were signed and the desirability of an Empire delegation to represent the Commonwealth at international congresses. But no resolution took cognizance of the all important treaty of Lausanne. The Dominions and India had participated in the treaty of Sèvres, which broke up the old Turkey; that of Lausanne, which patched certain portions of it together again, had been negotiated and signed solely by Great Britain. Did or did not Lord Curzon's signature involve the Dominions, logically, legally, or morally, in the support of it?

The conference did nothing to answer this question, nor did it succeed in pacifying the delegates of India. The latter, ruffled by the treatment of Indians in various parts

of the Empire, asked whether the conference resolutions of 1921 in regard to equality of status meant anything or not? Of course South Africa could not be held to it since she had refused to sign the resolution. But of the other Dominions, New Zealand alone "put Indians on a footing of equality with all other inhabitants of the country." In Australia and Canada discrimination against Indians still continued as though the resolution of 1921 had been a dream. Only a handful of Indians were there; but in Kenya large numbers were found. Since Kenya was not a Dominion, Great Britain could not plead constitutional inability when it came to intervening on their behalf.

As for South Africa, the spokesman of India appealed to General Smuts on three grounds; "first, as a humanitarian; secondly as an Imperial statesman; thirdly as the Prime Minister of South Africa." That Dominion should not neglect the lowly Indian who had done so much to make it prosperous. Statesmanship should realize that peace, the pearl above price, could be had only by kindness. The Premier should take care lest "the Empire founder irretrievably." India, indeed, felt very bitter in regard to this situation. As one of her delegates said: "Inequality of Indian nationals enters like iron into our souls . . . it cuts to the quick our national pride and our new consciousness. It permeates and sours our whole outlook in regard to Imperial relationships."¹ Could not something be done?

Apparently not. The premiers of Canada and Australia expressed sorrow that inequalities still remained to trouble the few thousand Indians within their Dominions. General Smuts, in a speech which Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Indian's champion, termed "remarkably illusory and evasive," based his case against the Indians on economic competition rather than on color. And in regard to Kenya the Colonial Office made it plain that the constitution of that

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1923, XII (cmd. 1988).

colony which discriminated against the Indians would not be revoked. Courteous words and genial platitudes could not conceal the fact that this conference left the status of the Indian practically unaffected. Mr. Stanley Baldwin called the debate *helpful*, a useful word for a statesman.

The imperial economic conference of 1923, on the other hand, proved more worth while. To its sessions the Dominion premiers were constantly going, regarding it as more important than their own official meetings, and perhaps justly, since in this subsidiary conference was born again the dream of Chamberlain, imperial preference. Dispatches from the Dominions had for some time contained rumors of the expected birth. Prime Minister Bruce of Australia had insisted that "tariff preference be placed on the agenda." General Smuts grew eloquent in regard to the fertility of the soil in South Africa, provided that markets were obtained and also loans. Canada and New Zealand were also said to look forward to some economic return for the preferences long given by them to Britain. Mr. Baldwin was favorably disposed. To deal with unemployment at home some positive plan was imperative. Dominion trade, already large, could be increased, thus benefiting both British manufacturer and workingman. Bruce of Australia had complained that Empire settlement lagged over vast areas because of dearth of markets. Let these but once be created in the old country and the unemployed at home, if there still were any left, would be drawn like magic toward the Dominions. To Mr. Baldwin's mind nothing stood in the way except the free trade tradition of his country.

To grant preference to the Empire it was necessary to tax food, a dangerous thing for an English politician to propose. But why not make a distinction between essential foodstuffs like meat and corn and those more frequently classed as luxuries, such as fruit and canned goods? The British government and the Dominions drew up a list of

the latter produced overseas. Dried figs, plums and currants were on it, wine from South Africa and Australia, apples from Canada, canned salmon, lobster, crayfish, honey, and limes, lemons and fruit juice. On imports such as these the economic conference recommended a slight duty at British ports against all the non-British world. Surely the public could not object to such a mild form of preference as this!

Thus thought Mr. Baldwin, but not so the British electorate. The old cry of free food echoed once more in Britain. Mr. Lloyd George aroused the voters to a pitch of enthusiasm by making fun of an Empire tied together by crayfish and tin cans. The Labor Party, also, full fed with its panacea of a capital levy, looked askance at Baldwin's program. In consequence, at the parliamentary election the Baldwin cabinet fell and imperial preference suffered a new defeat.

The membership in the new House of Commons was divided thus:

Unionists	257
Labor	186
Liberals	157

This means an Opposition majority and the election of England's first Socialist Prime Minister, a fact so noteworthy that few thought of the effect on the Commonwealth. In one respect it seemed injurious. Mr. Macdonald's government promptly reversed the policy of his predecessor in regard to preference, a fact which made angry both Bruce and Smuts. It seemed to them that the whole work of the last conference had gone by the board. They thought of Macdonald's government as bound by the action of his predecessor. Continuity in foreign policy they believed no more important than continuity in Dominion policy. The Australian Premier painfully reiterated that for the year 1920-1921 the British preference in Australian markets amounted to £8,750,000 while the Australian pref-

erence in British markets equaled but £45,000. Surely this was a unilateral accommodation, and the Mother country should do something to return favors. General Smuts was equally displeased. Legally, he admitted, Britain was within her rights in rescinding the resolutions. None the less there were "highest reasons of policy and expediency for carrying them out." As for Mr. Massey of New Zealand, great was his wrath. While not personally taking part in the campaign for the election of any given individual in Britain he had not hesitated to state what his principles were. Like Smuts he believed that Mr. Macdonald was in honor bound to support the Dominion policy of his predecessor.

And this body blow delivered at imperial preference was not the only quarrel which some of the Dominions had with the new Labor ministry. It insisted on abandoning the Singapore base. No great naval center would be created there if they could help it. To construct it, according to the new Prime Minister, would be to throw doubt on Britain's pacific professions and would hamper her program of international coöperation. Although Australia and New Zealand were willing to contribute toward the cost, Mr. Macdonald felt compelled to go against their wishes.

Fortunately for the Commonwealth there was no unanimity among the Dominions in regard to Singapore. Canada, when consulted in advance of the decision, had no advice to offer. Smuts approved of the abandonment of Singapore. Only the Anzac Dominions were disturbed. They felt it entirely irrational that Britain should continue to protect herself by increasing her air service, and by the construction of five light cruisers, if at the same time Singapore was not to be fortified.

Canada and South Africa, moreover, although not interested in Singapore nourished little grievances of their own. The former, annoyed by certain British assumptions in regard to the treaty of Lausanne with Turkey, disputed

the British Premier's interpretation of Canada's obligations under that pact; the latter, displeased with what it chose to term imperialistic proclivities on the part of General Smuts, drove from office that distinguished friend of the Commonwealth.

When questioned in the House of Commons on the Turkish treaty Mr. Macdonald stated: "The Canadian Government have said, with full knowledge of the treaty, that they would be perfectly willing to accept the decisions of the Government and would take no exception to what his Majesty's Government did—something like that. I have not got the exact words."

To quote from the debate:

Sir E. Grigg: "Does Canada accept the obligation, herself?"

The Prime Minister: "I am perfectly certain she accepts the obligation having been represented by Lord Curzon at Lausanne, with her full knowledge and consent."

But, said Mackenzie King at Ottawa the very next day: "We take the position that not having been invited to the Lausanne Conference, not having been represented there, not having, for the reasons which I have mentioned, signed the treaty, the treaty does not impose obligations on Canada, and those parts of the Empire on which it does impose obligations are the only parts that should be expected to sign and ratify." ¹

Such a flat contradiction of the British Prime Minister by the Canadian Premier could not go unchallenged and in consequence, one month later, fortified by numerous documents and supported by his coalition majority of Liberals and Progressives Mackenzie King made a full explanation. Canada's advice, he said, had been asked after the event. His Government had simply been notified. To this he had no objection. It was no concern of Canada's. The Canadian Parliament was paramount in all matters of Ca-

¹ *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, V, 327.

nadian policy and so he had notified London. Canada assumed no responsibility for the carrying out of the treaty.

This speech caused a mild flurry in London. The Canadians had cabled that they "had no exception to take to Canada not being notified." Surely, argued British statesmen, this involved acceptance of the treaty. But in Ottawa, Mr. Mackenzie King's utterances were approved. Mr. Meighen, however, for the Canadian Opposition, sternly accused the Prime Minister of not having been bold enough. "The Prime Minister," he said, "should have been frank with the British government." He should have told them: "If you do not invite us to the Conference, we shall not sign and we shall not ratify."¹ In his opinion Canada was now bound by a treaty which she had no hand in formulating. We are not bound by the treaty, retorted the Prime Minister. Which of these gentlemen was right? At any rate Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had agreed to ratify. Canada alone stood aloof.

During this same year the days of General Smuts' power in South Africa were rapidly drawing to a close. Never popular on the back veldt like the good-natured and taciturn Botha, the South African Premier now found himself in quite general disfavor. Since the war the Union had passed through a severe economic crisis, and the more ignorant blamed Smuts. A great strike on the Rand, roughly handled by the general, increased his unpopularity, and his failure to obtain the necessary encouragement of South African trade by imperial preference added to it. The hour of his astute rival and uncompromising antagonist, General J. B. Hertzog, had arrived.

The latter's memory was vivid. It shot back straight to the days of 1902 when he, a Free Stater, had witnessed General Smuts' acceptance of the British peace terms; it visualized clearly Botha's pliant yielding to the Empire and his easy-going assumption that all was well with South

¹ *Ibid.*, V, 509.

Africa; it focused intently on the days of the World War when bitter things were said of his Boer followers: Here was Hertzog's opportunity. To maintain himself in power Smuts had brought into the fold of the South African Party the British voters. Hertzog now sought by the magic power of old association to draw out from it the Boers. "Come out of the House of the stranger," he said to them. The Boers are one in language, blood and religion. South Africa is their first concern. The Labor and Nationalist Parties should stand as one against Smuts and his adherents, imperialists and agents of foreign capitalism that they were.

Socialism, to the land-owning Boers, was anathema; and the Labor Party was socialistic. To the miners, on the other hand, largely of British origin, secession from the flag of their youth seemed hateful. Was it possible to make a coalition here?

Hertzog cleverly constructed it, and with Labor the South African Nationalists signed a formal pact. By it the Nationalists pledged themselves, if victorious, not to insist on secession from the Empire; by it, Labor pledged itself not to demand confiscatory legislation.

The alliance once struck moved forward to a victorious outcome. Again an election was held in South Africa and this time, to the dismay of the friends of the Commonwealth, Smuts went down to defeat. The seats held by the South African Party decreased from 72 to 53. Those in the possession of the Nationalists increased from 47 to 63. Labor enlarged its membership from 13 to 18. The alliance was victorious and the implacable Hertzog became Prime Minister.

By his agreement with the Laborites the general was prevented from all direct anti-British agitation. On the other hand he was a past master at the art of indirect and provocative innuendo. Reputed to hate the Empire, it was

thought that he would soon find means to further undermine it.

For some years the desirability of a national flag for South Africa had been the subject of sporadic debate. The other Dominions possessed national flags, but in each instance the Union Jack was retained as the focal point in their design. This would not do for Hertzog. "Since 1902," he said, "he had had no flag. The Union Jack was the flag under which he enjoyed his citizenship but it was not his flag."¹ The new emblem should not rake up the embers of past hatred. He agreed that it would be undesirable to revive the old vierkleur of the days of independence. Let the new flag be composed of four bars to represent the four provinces of the Union. The British flag and the vierkleur should both be excluded.

This idea the Government formulated in a bill which, during 1926, created wild excitement in South Africa. Fervent appeals were made to Westminster for imperial intervention; the Labor Party in South Africa threatened to split as a result of the contemplated action; and the South Africans of British blood were wounded and incensed.

Creswell, the Labor leader, essayed a compromise. Let there be two flags, he urged; one, the Union Jack, an imperial flag which should be displayed on the King's Birthday and Empire Day, when the unity of the entire Commonwealth was celebrated; the other might well be the new creation with its four bars, which was to represent South African particularism. Why should labor quarrel over a standard, anyway, pertinently said the head of the Labor Party?

But many of his followers did not feel inclined thus to minimize their allegiance to Britain. Capitalism, to their mind, might be the major dragon to be slain; but St. George remained their patron saint. Creswell's control over his own party was in danger, and without the Labor votes the

¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 644.

Nationalists could not retain their power. In consequence the South African flag issue was postponed.

Meanwhile, an event less dramatic in setting but more serious in implication was the signing of the Pact of Locarno by the British government, with the express provision included that this treaty did not apply to India or to the Dominions, unless they chose to sign. This celebrated document might or might not, with its series of mutual guarantees, preserve the peace of Europe. But that it brought to a head an acute problem within the British Commonwealth none could gainsay. From now on it was evident that a distinction must be made in the future between the foreign policy of Britain and that of the Dominions. To quote article nine of the pact: "the present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions or upon India, until the Government of such Dominion or of India signifies its acceptance thereof."

This was a distinct constitutional departure. At Paris and at Washington the Dominions and Great Britain had stood together. At Lausanne the Dominions were not represented and Canada had therefore insisted that she was under no obligation to enforce that treaty. At Locarno the objections of Canada were formally recognized 'as valid, and upon Great Britain and Northern Ireland alone fell the onus of supporting the treaty in the name of the Empire. The result was "a tremendous blow to that theory of diplomatic unity of the British Empire Commonwealth of Nations which had been the very basis of imperial policy since the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet."¹

In accordance with international law, when the Mother country was at war so also were the Dominions. But in accordance with this treaty it was evident that they might claim not to be. Suppose any Dominion should issue a declaration of neutrality in a war in which the Mother

¹ *Round Table*, XVI, 6 (December, 1905).

country was engaged in defense of this treaty of Locarno. What then would be the status of enemy aliens in Bombay, what that of a British warship at Wellington? On the other hand, why should India and the Dominions pledge themselves to Locarno and an agreement purely European in its guarantees? Were the men of West Australia concerned with the delimitation of the Rhine frontier; could one ask them to fight for it?

Immediately there was talk of yet another conference. But could it accomplish anything? Too often, it was felt, had the Dominion premiers been summoned from their own preserves for a friendly chat with the Prime Minister of Britain. Why bring men from half way round the earth for an exchange of social amenities? All vestiges of British control in foreign policy had now disappeared. Such traces of subordination to Great Britain which might still be discovered were purely incidental in character, the British flag, the traditional right of veto of the Crown (as dead in the Dominions as in Britain), and the appeal to the Privy Council. Was it worth while to hold parleys over matters such as these?

Many thought that it was. In Australia and in Canada there had been agitation in favor of the appointment of native-born Australians and Canadians as governors-general. In Queensland the appointment of British-born governors had been resented. In Ireland there had been violent criticism of the Privy Council for admitting an appeal on a minor issue arising from the Irish land law. The Irish Free State had appointed a minister to Washington; why should there not be a representative of South Africa at the Hague, an Australian emissary at Tokio? The Empire was confronted with a number of minor issues of this description which made for friction between the Dominions and the Motherland. Perhaps it would be just as well to have the Dominions understand, once and for all, that they were free in every respect to follow their own bent.

Baldwin's government wanted to make this quite clear

and to show its good faith it terminated all bonds which connected the Dominions with the Colonial Office. To the British cabinet a new member was to be admitted, the Secretary of State for the Dominions. Mr. Amery was appointed to the new office. He also continued to be Secretary of State for the Colonies. The same man played both rôles before the enlightened Commons of Great Britain, a somewhat curious procedure. It could, however, be no longer claimed that the Dominions were under the control of the Colonial Office. Were they in any respects tied still to British leading strings? To define formally their status, and to provide, if possible, some common method for procedure in foreign affairs, Mr. Baldwin summoned the last of a long series of imperial conferences in the year 1926.

It was due to meet in the summer but its sessions were postponed owing to the Canadian elections. At Ottawa, Lord Byng had inadvertently aroused a hornet's nest. He had refused to sanction a dissolution of Parliament requested by Mackenzie King, the Premier. The latter at once resigned. Meighen, the skilled leader of the Conservatives, at once was appointed to his place. For this action on the part of the Governor-General there was much to be said; Mackenzie King had been returned to office the preceding autumn by the slenderest of coalition majorities; this majority he was certainly about to lose, and now in the face of defeat he had demanded a second election within the brief period of six months. Meighen was willing to carry on the Government with the help of a few Progressives; why not let him? But even his position was too weak for him and his colleagues to accept the ministry with portfolios. Had they done so they must of necessity have stood for reëlection. Lord Byng supported Meighen, even so; but in so doing followed reason rather than precedent, and seemingly did not model his conduct in Ottawa on that kept by his sovereign in London. In this he was, perhaps, in error, and the imperial conference was delayed until

Canada, in a new election, called by the advice of Meighen, had an opportunity to rebuke the new Premier for what was alleged to be untactful and unparliamentary advice to that doughty soldier but unskilled parliamentarian, Byng of Vimy.

When the imperial conference at last met, in November 1926, it refused "to lay down a constitution for the British Empire." On the other hand, for the first time in the history of the Commonwealth, it defined the relations of the Dominions to the Mother country, with clear exactitude. The Dominions are, it asserted, together with Great Britain, "*autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.*"

There was nothing new in this pronunciamiento; everybody understood before this that the Dominions were free. None the less this formal acknowledgment of equality cleared the air of any possible suspicion of imperialistic taint, and also paved the way for the construction of a true system of coördination. The committee on inter-imperial relations which drew up the above statement indicated in outline how this might be done. Treaties in the future could be signed by all the Dominions, by a number of them or even by one. All treaties were to be in the name of the King, but none were to be negotiated except by the Governments concerned. In the Dominions the governors were no longer to be considered the representatives of the British government. Official communications in the future, therefore, would pass not through the governors, these representatives of the British Crown, but direct, Government to Government. Between the Dominions and Great Britain there was to be absolute equality.

The committee did not attempt to define how, in every instance, this would work in practice; nor did it propose a

final or even tentative settlement of a number of hypothetical disputes which might well arise as a result of this proclaimed equality. The Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, for instance, with its insistence that Dominion laws must not conflict with laws passed at Westminster, could not be repealed by any meeting of prime ministers—it was a statute of the British Parliament. Concerning this and a few other matters, future agreements must be made. The committee was too wise to indulge in minutiae; its chairman was Lord Balfour, sole survivor of the first colonial conference of 1887, too sagacious a statesman to fall into that error. Neither he nor the Dominion premiers had any intention of drawing up a constitution for the Commonwealth. To do so would be a very denial of the significance of that term—a *free association of nations* was the end sought.

The Conference of 1926 demonstrated that a part of the Empire had become a Commonwealth. What, however, of the larger fraction, that inhabited by Malays, Indians and negroes? Would the Federated Malay States seek in time Dominion status; what possibility did the future hold for the federation of the West African colonies; and the King-Emperor's Indian domain—would 1929 and the promised revision of the Indian constitution at that date transform the Indian Empire into a British Dominion?

Two decades before, and advanced Indian opinion would have been delighted with that solution; advanced British opinion would be delighted with it now. Such an outcome is yet within the scope of practical politics; more certain generalization than that cannot be made. There is no likelihood, however, that the Crown colonies, the African and the Asiatic protectorates and the mandates will enter the Commonwealth. The Empire will still remain an Empire. If India becomes a Dominion, then will the balance swing toward the Commonwealth idea; if India continues subordi-

nate to Great Britain, or becomes independent, then is the ideal of the Commonwealth but very partially attained.

Concerning the future of the Commonwealth, apart from India and as it now stands, many interesting conjectures arise. Does the League of Nations, for instance, detract from interest in it, or does it encourage and abet its growth? That Great Britain must choose between the League and the Commonwealth has become a common apothegm. In certain ways the League unquestionably threatens the Commonwealth's development. The Dominions as members of the League owe loyalty both to it and to the Commonwealth; to which will the ultimate appeal be the stronger?

The Irish Free State, by registering with the League, despite British opposition, what was known as the treaty between her and Great Britain, has already opposed British interests; for a treaty publicly registered may be publicly renounced. Australia, as the mandatory power for New Guinea, is responsible to the League and not to Britain, and the same is true of the Union of South Africa and German West. It may be, then, that the relations of the Dominions to the League will become more important than the relations of the Dominions to the Commonwealth; in that case what becomes of the latter except a sounding phrase?

On the other hand, of course, the League may be the means of drawing closer the bonds of union. Germany, as a member of it, will doubtless endeavor to gain back a part at least of her former Empire. Italy also will seek mandates. Colonial readjustments inevitably will occur. The Commonwealth, then, is apt to act as a unit in matters such as these. The British Prime Ministers will have something very real, and not over-theoretical, with which to deal. Furthermore, in economic relations Great Britain stands but partly in the orbit of European economic interests; she is an oceanic rather than a continental power. The League, primarily, is European, and therefore likely to adopt pol-

icies which in trade and commerce would more favorably affect the continent than the Commonwealth. Should ever this occur the component parts of the latter, in self-defense, would be driven closer together.

Meanwhile, it would be a mistake to assume that the deliberations of the conference of 1926 profoundly influenced the Commonwealth, one way or another. In the Anzac Dominions it had been so long understood that equality of status was a fact that the formal promulgation of it made little stir. Particularly was this true of Australia where the problem of increasing immigration (of good quality) from Great Britain, and the settlement of Northern Australia, was felt to transcend in importance any theoretical conception of legal status.

In Canada and South Africa this was not quite the case. In the former Dominion a number of French Canadians regretted the decision of 1926. Their special privileges in regard to religion and education were based on the British North America Act; and this sacred guarantee of their liberties was a statute of the British Parliament. With equality of status formally recognized they feared (somewhat) that the constitution of Canada might be amended in the future by the Canadian electorate in ways which might undermine and destroy their particularistic life.

More noteworthy yet was the repercussion of the conference in South Africa. General Hertzog was frankly pleased with the London meeting. "There is nothing," he said, "to prevent the most ardent protagonist of national liberty from being at the same time a supporter of the Empire."¹ And in these words men professed to see converted that life-long opponent of Great Britain. To what extent the steady and ever glowing dislike of thirty years may have been obliterated by a mere announcement of freedom, already actually tasted, remains to be seen. The conversion of the general has not as yet, by the spring of

¹ *Round Table*, XXIII, 394 (March, 1923).

1927, carried with it any acceptance of the Union Jack. The continuation of the flag controversy throughout the greater part of 1927 would seem to indicate that there remained of this ancient hatred something more than a trace. As this book goes to press a compromise has been effected, to the relief of all concerned. Whether the final settlement, however, is the result of harmonious agreement or of sheer exhaustion on the part of the combatant forces it is difficult to determine.¹

In Great Britain the results of the conference were cheerfully accepted. What the Motherland would doubtless have preferred would have been joint responsibility for Locarno. It was a trifle hard that she, together with Northern Ireland, should be the sole guarantor in the Commonwealth of that basic security for European peace. Since, however, the Dominions thought otherwise, Britain would bear the whole burden, but without grumbling. In the words of Burke:—"Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom, and a great Empire and little minds go ill together."

As for the historian, he is not a prophet; his work deals with the past. As he reviews, however, the empires which have come and gone within recorded time, none seem to him to surpass that of Britain's for tempered compromise, political sagacity. To him it would appear that whatever the coming days may hold, whether the Empire falls and the Commonwealth decays, or the reverse, the British people

¹ Early in 1927 Hertzog advocated a South African flag in the design of which the Union Jack did not appear. He thought that the Royal Standard, flown only when royalty was present, might supplement this flag on imperial occasions. Then followed the passage of a flag bill by the lower House of the Union Parliament and the rejection of it by the Senate. In this measure the Union Jack found some recognition, since it was to occupy one-sixty-eighth of the whole design. The compromise finally adopted calls for a tricolor flag of blue, white, and orange. One-third of the white stripe is given over to the Union Jack, the vierkleur, and the flag of the Free State. The Union Jack, therefore, will occupy one-twenty-seventh of the whole space. But over the four provincial capitals the Union Jack must fly, as well as the flag of the Union. From these concessions the British sympathizers in the Union extract considerable comfort. See, *Times*, October 26th, 1927.

have excelled in one great phase of life, namely, in those delicate and difficult adjustments which must be made among men in all that concerns government and politics. The standards which they set were not ideal; over certain great stretches of the earth's surface they did not guarantee absolute justice or even tolerant liberty; but by comparison, contemporary or historical, they are the best thus far achieved.

Possibly their comparative excellence is due to fortuitous circumstance, geographic situation, economic resource; possibly to the astonishing political sense of the British people, constantly creating fresh forms and new devices for their still sturdy imperial life. In one sense the Chamberlain proposals of 1897 came to complete wreck in 1926; in another sense the reverse may prove to be the truth. Chamberlain loved the Empire, and sought first its unity. Does it really matter how this is accomplished? He expected it from one direction; it may come from another. As a matter of mere law the conference of 1926 made the Empire less united; but what of that? "The inward vitality of a free organism is greater than the most imposing array of compulsory mechanisms."¹ How rich and strong that vitality flowed the war has proved. Where Britons live, the memory of that test is green.

¹ *Observer*, November 21st, 1926.

THE OFFICIAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMPIRE

(condensed)

- I. "The self-governing dominions which fall constitutionally into two groups:—
 - (1) Dominion of Canada; Dominion of New Zealand; Union of South Africa; Irish Free State; Newfoundland.
 - (2) The Australian Commonwealth and its six component states:—
New South Wales, Victoria . . . (etc.)
- II. Southern Rhodesia, which possesses responsible government subject to certain powers with regard to native administration which are reserved . . . (etc.)
- III. Malta, which possesses responsible government as regards its internal affairs . . . (etc.)
- IV. Colonies not possessing responsible government in which the administration is carried on by public officers under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Protectorates similarly controlled.
 - (1) Colonies possessing an elected House of Assembly and a nominated Legislative Council:—
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda,
 - (2) Colonies possessing a partly elected Legislative Council the constitution of which does not provide for a nominated majority:—
British Guiana, Ceylon, Cyprus,
 - (3) Colonies and Protectorates possessing a partly elected Legislative Council the constitution of which does provide for an official majority:—

Fiji,	Leeward Islands,	St. Vincent,
Grenada,	Mauritius,	Sierra Leone, (colony
Jamaica,	Nigeria, (Colony and	and Protectorate)
Kenya,	Protectorate)	Straits Settlements
	St. Lucia,	Trinidad,
 - (4) Colonies and Protectorates possessing a Legislative Council nominated by the Crown:

British Honduras,	Gold Coast,	Nyassaland Protectorate,
Falkland Islands,	Hong Kong,	Seychelles,
Gambia,	Northern Rhodesia,	Uganda Protectorate,
 - (5) Colonies and Protectorates without Legislative Council:—

Ashanti,	Northern Territory	Wei-hai-wei,
Basutoland	of Gold Coast,	Islands included under
Bechuanaland	St. Helena,	the Western Pacific
Protectorate,	Somaliland,	High Commission,"
Gibraltar,	Swaziland,	

Taken from the *Dominion Office and Colonial Office Year Book*, 1926, p. 800.

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The main reliance of the author in writing this book has been placed on the *Parliamentary Debates*, Dominion as well as British; and on the *Parliamentary Papers* or *Sessional Papers* (blue books) of the House of Commons. In addition use has been made of newspapers, colonial, Dominion and British, and of the periodic literature covering a span of thirty years. Among the more important periodicals consulted were: the *Round Table*, *A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Commonwealth*; the *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*; the *United Empire* (proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute); the *Journal of the African Society*; the *Hindu Review*; the *Asiatic Review*; the *Empire Review*; and the year books of the various Dominions. The bibliographies published by the Royal Colonial Institute have also been of great value. Nos. 2 and 3 are both of recent date (1926) and contain not only a list of publications "illustrating the constitutional relations between the various parts of the Empire" but likewise a list "illustrating the relations between European and colored races." Occasionally the author has not hesitated, here and there, to make free use of certain standard books on special phases of imperial history such as Cromer's *Modern Egypt*; Fraser's *India under Lord Curzon and after*; and Wrong's *Government of the West Indies*.

No effort will be made to publish a complete list of books on the recent history of the Empire. For the convenience of readers, however, a working bibliography is appended, for the most part devoted to the thirty years of imperial history covered in this book. A few titles, classic in the general history of the Empire in somewhat earlier days, are included, such as: Lord Durham's *Report*; Howe's *Speeches and Correspondence*; Seeley's *Expansion of England*; and Wakefield's *Art of Colonization*.

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